The Evolution Of God Part 10

The first tribe, the Kaynuka, were craftsmen and traders, and so, as the scholar Fred Donner has argued, would have favored good relations with Mecca-a position at odds with Muhammad's growing belligerence toward Mecca. 36 36 The second tribe, the an-Nadir, seem to have challenged Muhammad's leaders.h.i.+p of Medina after he suffered a military defeat in his war against Mecca. The second tribe, the an-Nadir, seem to have challenged Muhammad's leaders.h.i.+p of Medina after he suffered a military defeat in his war against Mecca. 37 37 The third tribe, the Qurayzah, were suspected of secretly negotiating to help the Meccans during a battle that, alas for the Qurayzah, Muhammad finally won. In no case was religion per se the likely problem. The third tribe, the Qurayzah, were suspected of secretly negotiating to help the Meccans during a battle that, alas for the Qurayzah, Muhammad finally won. In no case was religion per se the likely problem.

The point here is just that incompatibility of Islam with Judaism and Christianity at the levels of theology and ritual may not have been an intellectual inevitability. Muhammad's ec.u.menical project might conceivably have succeeded had its political implications-especially including acceptance of Muhammad's leaders.h.i.+p-been to the liking of more Christians and Jews.

We'll probably never know for sure, and one reason is that we'll never know exactly what Muhammad's ec.u.menical project initially was. I've a.s.sembled the project's elements-the ritual and theology Muhammad embraced, his version of the story of Abraham -from the Medinan suras as a whole. But the Medinan suras acc.u.mulated over a decade, and we don't have a clear enough idea of their exact order to say which elements coalesced when. We don't really know, for example, whether his story of Abraham was one he tried to sell Christians and Jews, or whether it emerged only after he'd given up on converting them, and needed to rea.s.sure Muslims of their Abrahamic primacy.

For that matter, we don't even know that converting Christians and Jews was ever high on his list of priorities. If indeed, as the Const.i.tution of Medina suggests, Muhammad initially aimed to lead a diverse community and accept the religious autonomy of Jewish tribes, maybe failure in that endeavor kept him from seriously pursuing the more ambitious goal of intra-Abrahamic fusion.

Still, there is, in one Medinan sura, evidence of such a grand ambition thwarted. G.o.d seems to tell Muhammad to give up on unifying people at the level of ritual: "To every people have we appointed observances which they observe. Therefore, let them not dispute this matter with thee, but bid them to thy Lord, for thou art on the right way." 38 38 So long as Muhammad was directing people to the one true G.o.d, that was enough-or, at least, all he could reasonably hope for. So long as Muhammad was directing people to the one true G.o.d, that was enough-or, at least, all he could reasonably hope for.

Did the "Break with the Jews" Really Happen?

There is one more thing we don't know, and it is something that is virtually never called into question: whether Muhammad's "break with the Jews" really happened-or, if it happened, whether it was as dramatic as it is said to have been.

The standard story is that (a) the Jews resist Muhammad's theological message, noting contradictions between their Bible and his teachings; (b) Muhammad essentially gives up on Jewish conversion, and signals this turn in a stark change of ritual: Medina's Muslims had been praying toward Jerusalem, but henceforth they'll face Mecca; (c) one by one, he expels the Jewish tribes from Medina, with the final "expulsion" so b.l.o.o.d.y that it's closer to annihilation.

But much of this story rests on Islamic oral tradition that developed after Muhammad's death; the Koran's references to such events are much vaguer. The key Koranic verse-linked by oral tradition to the final, violent confrontation-refers to some "People of the Book" who aided the enemy; and, as a result "some you [Muhammad] slew, some you made captive. And He [G.o.d] bequeathed upon you their lands." 39 39 This pa.s.sage could indeed, as widely a.s.sumed, refer to a specific incident involving Jews, but it could also refer to Christians, since the term "People of the Book" encompa.s.sed both. In any event, Islamic tradition is famously creative in a.s.sociating cryptic Koranic verses with particular historical events. Sometimes a single Koranic verse is confidently ascribed by several different Muslim thinkers to several different sets of circ.u.mstances. 40 40 Is the standard interpretation of this pa.s.sage an example of such creativity? Is the standard interpretation of this pa.s.sage an example of such creativity?

A good reason to suspect so would be if there were influential Muslims in the decades after Muhammad died who would have benefited from the idea that the Prophet was at war with the Jews. There may be one such Muslim: Umar ibn al-Khattab, who became the leader of the Islamic state in 634, two years after the Prophet's death.

In 638, Umar conquered Jerusalem. In the history books this is depicted straightforwardly: the Muslims take Jerusalem from the Christian Byzantine Empire and claim it for their faith, and several decades later they build their mosque-the Dome of the Rock-atop the ruins of the Jewish temple that the Romans had destroyed half a millennium earlier. But that story, too, rests partly on the oral tradition, and so shouldn't be taken at face value. There are ancient doc.u.ments, written by people outside the Islamic tradition, that tell a different story.

The oldest doc.u.ment to give a coherent account of early Islam is an Armenian chronicle from the 660s attributed to the Bishop Sebeos. It calls Muhammad an "Ishmaelite" merchant and preacher who knew the story of Moses and presented himself to Jews "as though at G.o.d's command." And, in this account, the Jews were convinced. Jews and Arabs "all united under the authority of a single man." Muhammad then urged them to regain their common homeland, the promised land. "Go and take possession of your country which G.o.d gave to your father Abraham, and none will be able to resist you in the struggle, for G.o.d is with you."

This doc.u.ment has its flaws as a historical narrative. It takes biblical stories about Ishmaelite lineage and fuses them imaginatively into a streamlined account of early Islamic history. Still, the fact remains that it was written no more than three decades after Umar wrested Jerusalem from the Greek Christians of the Byzantine Empire, and it depicts Jews and Muslim Arabs as a united military front. "These are the tribes of Ishmael.... All that remained of the peoples of the children of Israel came to join them, and they const.i.tuted a mighty army. Then they sent an emba.s.sy to the emperor of the Greeks, saying: 'G.o.d has given this land as a heritage to our father Abraham and his posterity after him; we are the children of Abraham; you have held our country long enough; give it up peacefully, and we will not invade your territory; otherwise we will retake with interest what you have taken.'" 41 41 It's a disorienting prospect: contrary to Islamic tradition, and the western histories built on it, the conquest of Jerusalem was the work not of a Muslim army but of a Jewish-Muslim alliance. Strange as it sounds, though, there are other reasons to take this scenario seriously. In particular, it would help make sense of a puzzling feature of an earlier doc.u.ment, a Greek work from the 630s that refers to a "prophet who has appeared among the Saracens." ("Saracen" was a Greek word for Arabs and, later, Muslims.) The prophet claims that "he has the keys to paradise"-sounds like Muhammad so far-but also proclaims "the advent of the anointed one who is to come." Why would Muhammad, or any other Islamic leader, be buying into the Jewish idea that the Messiah was yet to come? Maybe because he was in fact closely allied with the Jews, long after his supposed "break with the Jews."

These discrepancies between the standard Islamic account and the earliest written non-Islamic sources were emphasized in the 1977 book Hagarism Hagarism, written by two young scholars of Islam, Patricia Crone and Michael Cook. Their thesis was radical: Islam had actually begun as a movement that included apocalyptic Jews, and only long after the conquest of Jerusalem did it carve out a religious ident.i.ty wholly distinct from Judaism. In this scenario, the Koran was in fact compiled in the eighth century, not the seventh-an attempt to claim deep roots for a new Abrahamic faith; an attempt, that is, to depict a new religion as old.

This thesis got a chilly reception from scholars and didn't catch on. But you don't have to buy the entire argument of Crone and Cook to see that the data they pointed to demand an explanation: Why does the earliest Byzantine doc.u.ment that clearly refers to Muhammad depict his people as allied with the Jews, united in their quest to retake Jerusalem? Maybe because that's the truth? And maybe after the conquest, when there finally was an actual "break with the Jews," Muhammad's successor Umar sought to justify it by ascribing to Muhammad a fiercer antagonism toward Jews than he actually held?

Certainly the conquest of Jerusalem by a combined force of Jews and Muslims would have provided a natural occasion for a falling-out. The Jews would have expected to resurrect the temple that was destroyed by the Romans half a millennium earlier. If the Muslims preferred to build a mosque on the temple's ruins, the dispute could have grown heated. And indeed, that Armenian doc.u.ment from the 660s depicts an argument between Jews and Arabs over the temple site, with the Jews rebuilding a temple but then being chased away by Arabs. 42 42 If the standard history were true-an army of Muslims, long divorced from the Jews, marching in and taking Jerusalem-it's hard to imagine any Jews in Jerusalem even bothering to start an argument they were so sure to lose. If the standard history were true-an army of Muslims, long divorced from the Jews, marching in and taking Jerusalem-it's hard to imagine any Jews in Jerusalem even bothering to start an argument they were so sure to lose.

Even if Islamic tradition, and standard western histories, have a.s.signed too early a date to a "break with the Jews" that in fact happened after Muhammad's death, it's unlikely that the whole idea of tension between Muhammad and the Medinan Jews is made up. There are too many Koranic verses reflecting such tension, and indeed tension with Christians, and they make too much sense. Given Muhammad's ambitions, his ten years in Medina would have featured, at a minimum, ups and downs with Christians and Jews.

Even so, it's worth remembering that the Koran hadn't congealed into a standard text when Umar took office. Indeed, well after his career-and half a century after Muhammad's death-Islamic coins were being produced with Koranic inscriptions that diverge at least slightly from what has become the canonical text. 43 43 So there would have been time for Umar and other influential Muslims to, at the very least, be selective about which of the divergent Koranic verses made the final cut. And presumably any attendant thematic reshaping of the Koran would have tended to meet the needs of the people who controlled the shaping. So there would have been time for Umar and other influential Muslims to, at the very least, be selective about which of the divergent Koranic verses made the final cut. And presumably any attendant thematic reshaping of the Koran would have tended to meet the needs of the people who controlled the shaping. 44 44 Distortion as the Norm.

Whatever the truth about the "break with the Jews," the source of our uncertainty about it is worth bearing in mind. Namely: Muhammad's immediate successors had an interest in distorting his message. This doesn't mean they fabricated parts of the Koran out of whole cloth (though they may have). But the manifestly divergent early traditions in the exact wording of Koranic verses would have offered chances to amend the book's meaning by choosing which traditions to draw on. And widening this lat.i.tude was the fact that the earliest written versions (like the earliest written Hebrew scriptures) lacked vowels; the words aided recitation but weren't definitive. No doubt later clerics, in choosing which vowel to put in the blank, occasionally found themselves with real semantic leeway. And, further, long after vowels were supplied, there remained obscurities and ambiguities to be worked out.

It's conceivable that no great distortion of the Koran set in after Muhammad's death. But if indeed the truth about his times evaded corruption, that would make Islam unique among the Abrahamic faiths. As we've seen, the official Jewish story reads back into history an earlier monotheism than is plausible. The ancient Israelites, notwithstanding the Bible's protestations, were finely intertwined with those polytheistic Canaanites-to the point of being, well, polytheistic Canaanites.

And, notwithstanding the claims of the Christian gospel, the "historical Jesus" was in all likelihood an apocalyptic Jew of the sort you'd expect to find wandering around the villages of Palestine in his time, waiting for the day when Israel would take its place of greatness among the nations. The cosmopolitan morals attributed to him-ethnic inclusion, interethnic love -were read back into his message by the cosmopolitans who later founded Christianity. And some post-Jesus Christians, perhaps like post-Muhammad Muslims, played up a kind of "break with the Jews"; they exaggerated Jewish responsibility for the Crucifixion.

In short, religions that reach great stature have a tendency to rewrite their history in the process. They cast themselves as distinctive from the get-go, rather than as growing organically out of their milieu. They find an epoch-marking figure -a Moses, a Jesus, a Muhammad-and turn him into an epoch-making figure. They depict his message as contrasting sharply with a backdrop that, in fact, his message was infused with.

To be sure, Muhammad, more clearly than Moses or Jesus, was a man who, in his own time, made a difference. He founded a government, and from this base he waged war and peace in a way that launched an empire. But here, too, in his p.r.o.nouncements about war and peace, his message would be shaped and reshaped by posterity. Even today, some Muslims like to emphasize his belligerence -they wage holy war and say they do so in the finest tradition of the Prophet-while other Muslims insist that Islam is a religion of peace, in the finest tradition of the Prophet.

This argument, the argument about the doctrine of jihad, may ultimately do more to shape relations between Muslims and other Abrahamic faiths than the many and diverse references to those faiths in the Koran. This argument is the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter Seventeen.

Jihad.

In the mid-twentieth century, many American and European parents worried about the younger generation-the loud music, the raucous parties, the disrespect for authority. Meanwhile, in Egypt, a middle-aged man named Sayyid Qutb was complaining not about the younger generation but about his own. And the problem wasn't rambunctiousness but reserve.

In a book called Milestones, Milestones, written in the 1950s and early 1960s, he complained about "the sorry state of the present Muslim generation" and cited, as exhibit A, the prevailing interpretation of the doctrine of jihad. Most Muslim jurists insisted that holy war was justified only when a Muslim nation had been attacked. Such thinkers, said Qutb, misunderstood the Koran. They had "laid down their spiritual and rational arms in defeat. They say, 'Islam has prescribed only defensive war!' and think that they have done some good for their religion by depriving it of its method, which is to abolish all injustice from the earth, to bring people to the wors.h.i.+p of G.o.d alone, and to bring them out of servitude to others into the servants of the Lord." written in the 1950s and early 1960s, he complained about "the sorry state of the present Muslim generation" and cited, as exhibit A, the prevailing interpretation of the doctrine of jihad. Most Muslim jurists insisted that holy war was justified only when a Muslim nation had been attacked. Such thinkers, said Qutb, misunderstood the Koran. They had "laid down their spiritual and rational arms in defeat. They say, 'Islam has prescribed only defensive war!' and think that they have done some good for their religion by depriving it of its method, which is to abolish all injustice from the earth, to bring people to the wors.h.i.+p of G.o.d alone, and to bring them out of servitude to others into the servants of the Lord." 1 1 Among the unjust things that should be abolished, Qutb believed, were insufficiently fundamentalist regimes in Muslim countries. One example, the Egyptian government, had Qutb executed in 1966. But his ideas lived on and influenced, among others, Osama bin Laden.

After bin Laden's tactical triumph on September 11, 2001, an argument broke out in the West. Some, including President George Bush, said Islam is "a religion of peace" that had been "hijacked" by bin Laden and other radicals. In this view, modern-day jihadists don't understand the Koran and don't understand Islam; the prevailing Muslim interpretation that so perturbed Qutb is the true interpretation, faithful to the Prophet's words.

Other westerners-especially on the right-said Islam is a religion of violence, and in that regard reflects its scripture. There are lots of things they fault radical Muslims for, but misinterpreting the Koran isn't one of them.

Who is right? Is Islam a religion of peace? Of war? In one sense, the answer is the same as it would be for any other Abrahamic religion. That is: the answer is reminiscent of Certs commercials circa 1971, in which two people argued about whether Certs is a candy mint or a breath mint until they were interrupted by an authoritative voice that said, "Stop! You're both right!" Religions, as should be clear by now, have their good moments and their bad moments, their good scriptures and their bad scriptures. The ratio of good to bad scriptures varies among the Abrahamic faiths, but in all religions it's possible for benign interpretation of scripture to flourish. (Witness the "sorry state of the present Muslim generation"-the generation that as of the mid-twentieth century considered jihad a doctrine of defensive war.) In short: to ask "Is Religion X a religion of peace?" is to ask a silly question.

Still, there are less silly questions you can ask. Is Is the doctrine of jihad rooted firmly in the Koran? the doctrine of jihad rooted firmly in the Koran? Would Would Muhammad approve of what the jihadists are doing? Or, to put that last question in Muslim terms: Would G.o.d-who Muslims believe inspired Muhammad to say what he says in the Koran-approve of what the jihadists are doing? Granted that the answers Muslims give to these questions will vary over time, which answers are true? Muhammad approve of what the jihadists are doing? Or, to put that last question in Muslim terms: Would G.o.d-who Muslims believe inspired Muhammad to say what he says in the Koran-approve of what the jihadists are doing? Granted that the answers Muslims give to these questions will vary over time, which answers are true?

Muhammad on a Wartime Footing.

The word jihad jihad means "striving" or "struggle," and could apply to anything from violent struggles, like wars, to quiet struggles, like the struggle within your soul to do right. In the wake of 9/11, some people argued that this internal struggle was the true meaning of the term. Others insisted that jihad refers to violent struggle against infidels. means "striving" or "struggle," and could apply to anything from violent struggles, like wars, to quiet struggles, like the struggle within your soul to do right. In the wake of 9/11, some people argued that this internal struggle was the true meaning of the term. Others insisted that jihad refers to violent struggle against infidels.

Who is right? You won't find the answer in the Koran. Though the verb form of jihad jihad-jahada-appears often in the Koran, jihad jihad per se-the noun-appears only four times, typically in the phrase "striving in the way of G.o.d." per se-the noun-appears only four times, typically in the phrase "striving in the way of G.o.d." 2 2 And depending on which of those four verses you pick, you could make the case that jihad is either about an internal struggle toward spiritual discipline or about war; there is no "doctrine" of jihad in the Koran. And depending on which of those four verses you pick, you could make the case that jihad is either about an internal struggle toward spiritual discipline or about war; there is no "doctrine" of jihad in the Koran. 3 3 It was in the decades and centuries after Muhammad's death that Muslim thinkers turned jihad into a legal concept, and they've been arguing about its exact meaning ever since. It was in the decades and centuries after Muhammad's death that Muslim thinkers turned jihad into a legal concept, and they've been arguing about its exact meaning ever since.

To be sure, the Koran is relevant. It is one of the two main sources these arguments cite (the other being the hadith, sayings of the Prophet as recalled in the oral tradition). But Muslim thinkers searching the Koran for the meaning of jihad go well beyond those four inconclusive appearances of the noun jihad jihad. They look at the dozens of uses of the verb form of jihad, jihad, in particular those (maybe half) that occur in a military context. in particular those (maybe half) that occur in a military context. 4 4 And they look at the larger number of references to military fighting that use another verb. And they look at the larger number of references to military fighting that use another verb. 5 5 There are plenty of these martial verses in the Medinan suras, because during the Medinan years Muhammad did a lot of fighting. There are calls for Medinans to join G.o.d's battle, and guarantees that those who die in battle will find a place in paradise. There are exhortations to strike terror in the hearts of infidels, to slaughter them, to cut off their heads. These verses leave no doubt that at times Muhammad felt he had G.o.d's license to kill people who hadn't converted to Islam.

The question is how restricted the license was. When G.o.d tells Muhammad to go kill infidels is he saying that killing infidels is always good? Or is G.o.d more like an American officer before the Normandy invasion exhorting his troops to go kill Germans -not because killing Germans is always a good thing, and not because killing all Germans is a good thing even at the moment, but rather because, so long as a war is on, killing the enemy is the job at hand?

Right-wing Web sites devoted to showing the "truth about Islam" array searing verses that seem to show the Koran offering a nearly unlimited license to kill. (A few years after 9/11, a list of "the Koran's 111 Jihad verses" was posted on the conservative Web site freerepublic.com.) 6 6 But the closer you look at the context of these verses, the more limited the license seems. But the closer you look at the context of these verses, the more limited the license seems.

The pa.s.sage most often quoted is the fifth verse of the ninth sura, long known to Muslims as the "Sword verse." It was cited by Osama bin Laden in a famous manifesto issued in 1996, and on first reading it does seem to say that bin Laden would be justified in hunting down any non-Muslim on the planet. 7 7 The verse is often translated colloquially-particularly on these right-wing Web sites-as "kill the infidels wherever you find them." The verse is often translated colloquially-particularly on these right-wing Web sites-as "kill the infidels wherever you find them."

This common translation is wrong. The verse doesn't actually mention "infidels" but rather refers to "those who join other G.o.ds with G.o.d"-which is to say, polytheists. So, bin Laden notwithstanding, the "Sword verse" isn't the strongest imaginable basis for attacking Christians and Jews. 8 8 Still, even if the Sword verse wasn't aimed at Christians and Jews, it is undeniably b.l.o.o.d.y: "And when the sacred months are pa.s.sed, kill those who join other G.o.ds with G.o.d wherever ye shall find them; and seize them, besiege them, and lay wait for them with every kind of ambush." It seems that a polytheist's only escape from this fate is to convert to Islam, "observe prayer, and pay the obligatory alms."

But the next verse, rarely quoted by either jihadists or right-wing Web sites, suggests that conversion isn't actually necessary: "If any one of those who join G.o.ds with G.o.d ask an asylum of thee, grant him an asylum, that he may hear the Word of G.o.d, and then let him reach his place of safety." After all, polytheists are "people devoid of knowledge." 9 9 And the following verse suggests that whole tribes of polytheists can be spared if they're not a military threat. If those "who add G.o.ds to G.o.d" made "a league [with the Muslims] at the sacred temple," then "so long as they are true to you, be ye true to them; for G.o.d loveth those who fear Him." For that matter, the verse immediately before before the Sword verse also takes some of the edge off it, exempting from attack "those polytheists with whom ye are in league, and who shall have afterwards in no way failed you, nor aided anyone against you." the Sword verse also takes some of the edge off it, exempting from attack "those polytheists with whom ye are in league, and who shall have afterwards in no way failed you, nor aided anyone against you." 10 10 In short, "kill the polytheists wherever you find them" doesn't mean "kill the polytheists wherever you find them." It means "kill the polytheists who aren't on your side in this particular war." 11 11 Presumably, particular wars were the typical context for the Koran's martial verses-in which case Muhammad's exhortations to kill infidels en ma.s.se were short-term motivational devices. Indeed, sometimes the violence is explicitly confined to the war's duration: "When ye encounter the infidels, strike off their heads till ye have made a great slaughter among them, and of the rest make fast the fetters. And afterwards let there either be free dismissals or ransomings, till the war hath laid down its burdens." 12 12 Of course, if you quote the first half of that verse and not the second half-as both jihadists and some western commentators might be tempted to do-this sounds like a death sentence for unbelievers everywhere and forever. The Koran contains a number of such eminently misquotable lines. Repeatedly Muhammad makes a declaration that, in unalloyed form, sounds purely belligerent -and then proceeds to provide the alloy. Thus: "And think not that the infidels shall escape Us!... Make ready then against them what force ye can, and strong squadrons whereby ye may strike terror into the enemy of G.o.d and your enemy." Then, about thirty words later: "And if they lean to peace, lean thou also to it; and put thy trust in G.o.d." 13 13 If the Koran were a manual for all-out jihad, it would deem unbelief by itself sufficient cause for attack. It doesn't. Here is a verse thought to be from the late Medinan period: "G.o.d doth not forbid you to deal with kindness and fairness toward those who have not made war upon you on account of your religion, or driven you forth from your homes: for G.o.d loveth those who act with fairness. Only doth G.o.d forbid you to make friends of those who, on account of your religion, have warred against you, and have driven you forth from your homes, and have aided those who drove you forth." 14 14 Besides, even when enmity is in order, it needn't be forever: "G.o.d will, perhaps, establish good will between yourselves and those of them whom ye take to be your enemies: G.o.d is Powerful: and G.o.d is Gracious." 15 15 Realpolitik.

Modern-day critics of Muhammad who carefully skip parts of the Koran in ama.s.sing their lists of "jihad verses" are right about one thing: Muhammad pursued an expansionist foreign policy, and war was a key instrument. But to successfully pursue such a policy-and he was certainly successful-you have to take a nuanced approach to warfare. You can't use it gratuitously, when its costs exceed its benefits. And you can't reject potentially helpful allies just because they don't share your religion -especially when your turf is surrounded by people who don't share your religion. Muhammad may have been aggressive, and may even have been ruthlessly aggressive, but no one who accomplishes what he accomplished could be mindlessly aggressive. So he couldn't have enunciated a policy that literally meant you should fight everyone in your vicinity who doesn't share your religion. Indeed, if the standard versions of Muslim history are correct, he was forging alliances with non-Muslim Arabian tribes until the day he died. 16 16 Once you see Muhammad in this light-as a political leader who deftly launched an empire-the parts of the Koran that bear on war make perfect sense. They are just Imperialism 101. Like the Byzantine and Persian Empires that the Islamic Empire would largely displace, Muhammad used a combination of war and diplomacy to expand his turf. All-out jihad-attack the infidels wherever you find them-wouldn't have made sense for an incipient military power, and that is why you don't find it in the Koran.

You do find something like it in the decades after Muhammad's death. Now a true doctrine doctrine of jihad takes shape: Muslims, it is said, have a duty to engage in ongoing struggle-military when necessary-to expand Islam's bounds. In the strong version of the doctrine, which crystallized more than a century after Muhammad's death, the world is divided between the "House of Islam" and the "House of War." of jihad takes shape: Muslims, it is said, have a duty to engage in ongoing struggle-military when necessary-to expand Islam's bounds. In the strong version of the doctrine, which crystallized more than a century after Muhammad's death, the world is divided between the "House of Islam" and the "House of War." 17 17 The House of War is the part of the world still laboring under unbelief even though Islamic doctrine has reached it. It is called the House of War because the duty of Islam's leader is to fight there. The House of War is the part of the world still laboring under unbelief even though Islamic doctrine has reached it. It is called the House of War because the duty of Islam's leader is to fight there.

The extremity of this doctrine is in one sense puzzling. After all, Islam was still, in these post-Muhammad decades, an expansionist power. Why wouldn't it preserve the realpolitikal nuance we see in Muhammad's time, as reflected in the Koran itself? Maybe there were times during the rapid growth of the Islamic Empire when conquest of the world-at least, of the known world - seemed within reach. 18 18 In any event, why post-Muhammad thinkers opted for a full-throated version of jihad is only part of the puzzle. Another part is how they justified it. As we've just seen, even the more belligerent parts of the Koran, found among the Medinan suras, don't form a solid basis for such a doctrine. 19 19 And many verses seem to contradict a full-throated version of jihad-most of them Meccan ("To you be your religion; to me my religion") but some of them Medinan ("Let there be no compulsion in religion"). And many verses seem to contradict a full-throated version of jihad-most of them Meccan ("To you be your religion; to me my religion") but some of them Medinan ("Let there be no compulsion in religion"). 20 20 The Invention of Jihad.

So how did the creators of the doctrine of jihad do it? If the Koran is indeed G.o.d's word, and doesn't itself articulate any such doctrine, how did later Muslim thinkers manage to sell the idea that jihad had G.o.d's blessing? Largely through two intellectual maneuvers.

First was a crucial decision by Islamic jurists about how to resolve internal contradictions in the Koran. They decided that the more recently Muhammad had uttered a Koranic verse, the more likely it was to reflect the enduring will of G.o.d. 21 21 This skewed interpretation toward belligerence, since the earlier suras, revealed in Mecca, tended to be more tolerant. This skewed interpretation toward belligerence, since the earlier suras, revealed in Mecca, tended to be more tolerant.

Second, the architects of the jihad doctrine didn't confine themselves to the Koran. They drew on the hadith, the oral tradition of Muhammad's sayings. And here they had a smorgasbord to choose from, because there was no shortage of claims about things Muhammad had supposedly said.

For example, if you asked Muhammad to start listing Islam's basic values, what would he say? Option A, from a part of the hadith relayed by a man named Abdullah ibn 'Amr: "A person asked G.o.d's Apostle, 'What (sort of) deeds in or (what qualities of) Islam are good?' He replied, 'To feed (the poor) and greet those whom you know and those whom you don't know.'" Option B, from a part of the hadith that comes from a man named Abu Hurayra: "Allah's Apostle was asked, 'What is the best deed?' He replied, 'To believe in G.o.d and His Apostle (Muhammad).' The questioner then asked, 'What is the next (in goodness)?' He replied, 'To partic.i.p.ate in jihad in G.o.d's Cause.'" 22 22 For the aspiring jihadist, B is the preferred choice.

Of course, it's possible that Muhammad, in two different moods, said these two different things in response to essentially the same question. But there's no reason to think so. The hadith spent much more time in sheerly oral transmission before being written down than the Koran did. 23 23 This long phase of fluidity was open season for people who wanted to give their pet causes the Prophet's validation. This doesn't mean they were consciously dishonest. It just means that memory is a funny thing-as is the process by which people decide whose memories have the ring of truth. This long phase of fluidity was open season for people who wanted to give their pet causes the Prophet's validation. This doesn't mean they were consciously dishonest. It just means that memory is a funny thing-as is the process by which people decide whose memories have the ring of truth.

Here, for example, is a jihadist utterance attributed to Muhammad that may not have been written down until more than a century after he died: "I was ordered to fight all men until they say 'There is no G.o.d but Allah.'" 24 24 If G.o.d indeed gave this order to Muhammad, that would pretty much settle the question of whether jihad is a divine doctrine, because the injunction to fight "all men" is plainly universal. But it's curious that Muhammad would say G.o.d ordered him to do this when the Koran itself-the real-time record of things G.o.d ordered Muhammad to say and do-has no trace of any such order. It is, after all, a pretty important order. If G.o.d indeed gave this order to Muhammad, that would pretty much settle the question of whether jihad is a divine doctrine, because the injunction to fight "all men" is plainly universal. But it's curious that Muhammad would say G.o.d ordered him to do this when the Koran itself-the real-time record of things G.o.d ordered Muhammad to say and do-has no trace of any such order. It is, after all, a pretty important order.

The Koranless Jihad.

It's in one sense surprising that jihad, a doctrine taken seriously by Muslim thinkers over the years, has no solid grounding in what they consider the most reliable record of Muhammad's, and G.o.d's, utterances. In another sense, it's par for the course. The consistent moral of the story of the Abrahamic religions is that any given book of scripture can be put to a wide variety of uses.

But if the bad news is how malleable scripture is, that's also the good news. Yes, when you see your interests opposed to those of another group, you can find scriptural validation of animosity. But when your interests seem to lie in cooperation with another group, you may find your G.o.d counseling restraint.

This second edge of the sword was ill.u.s.trated by Muhammad's successors as the Islamic Empire grew and some of its borders stabilized. By the early 800s, only a few decades after Muslim thinkers had divided the world between a "House of Islam" and a "House of War," a seminal Islamic jurist had declared that there was actually a third house: the "House of Truce or Treaty." 25 25 And by the late 800s, another Islamic thinker had labeled war in the name of Islam the "lesser jihad" and said, "the greater jihad is the struggle against the self." And by the late 800s, another Islamic thinker had labeled war in the name of Islam the "lesser jihad" and said, "the greater jihad is the struggle against the self." 26 26 As we've seen, this idea of two kinds of jihad is consistent with the different uses of the term in the Koran. But on what basis would anyone say which was greater and which was lesser? The hadith to the rescue! By one account, Muhammad had himself told Muslims returning from war, "You have returned from the lesser jihad to the greater jihad." This account was late to surface, but better late than never. As we've seen, this idea of two kinds of jihad is consistent with the different uses of the term in the Koran. But on what basis would anyone say which was greater and which was lesser? The hadith to the rescue! By one account, Muhammad had himself told Muslims returning from war, "You have returned from the lesser jihad to the greater jihad." This account was late to surface, but better late than never.

An especially important doctrine was fard kifaya fard kifaya-the idea that jihad, though a duty, was a communal duty, not an individual duty. 27 27 So if war seemed inappropriate in your part of the empire, you could live a peaceful yet devout life, secure in the knowledge that somewhere, some Muslim was fighting on behalf of Islam. So if war seemed inappropriate in your part of the empire, you could live a peaceful yet devout life, secure in the knowledge that somewhere, some Muslim was fighting on behalf of Islam.

But all such moderating influences were hostages to fortune. They might dominate when cooperation with neighbors, or at least peaceful coexistence, seemed auspicious, but things could always change. When Muslims were being attacked, the definition of jihad changed from fard kifaya fard kifaya to to fard aynl fard aynl-a duty inc.u.mbent on each Muslim. When Christian crusaders reached Syria, for example, a treatise published in Damascus announced the s.h.i.+ft to fard aynl. fard aynl.28 As ever, swings between the non-zero-sum and the zero-sum could change the mood of a religion. As ever, swings between the non-zero-sum and the zero-sum could change the mood of a religion.

The Price of Tolerance.

The malleability of the doctrine of jihad was as evident within Islam's borders as along them. Though making all the world the "House of Islam" would seem to imply turning everyone you subjugate into a Muslim, that goal, if it was ever part of jihad, didn't stay that way for long. The more unbelievers you subjugate, the clearer it becomes that their ongoing antagonism won't be an a.s.set, and the less attractive is the prospect of incurring their wrath by coercing them into conversion. Once you've got an empire to run, the less friction within it, the better.

Here again, useful guidance could be found in scripture so long as you looked hard enough. The Koranic verse that comes closest to calling for jihad on a global scale also has a crucial loophole. It begins, "Make war upon such of those to whom the Scriptures have been given as believe not in G.o.d, or in the last day, and who forbid not that which G.o.d and His Apostle have forbidden," but then ends, "until they pay tribute out of hand, and they be humbled." 29 29 In the end, money would subst.i.tute for theological fidelity. In the end, money would subst.i.tute for theological fidelity.

There was nothing new about this. Ancient empires expanded as far as was feasible and demanded tribute of their va.s.sal states. That, after all, was half the point of being an empire. The Roman Empire had done it, and so had the two empires that Islam was now taking land from-the Persian Empire and the eastern heir of the Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire. So subjects of the emerging Islamic Empire shouldn't have found the taxes imposed on them disorienting.

In fact, some Christians preferred the new Muslim overlords to the old Christian ones. The Byzantine Empire had fought heretical Christian sects, whereas to the Muslims, a Christian was a Christian; so long as they paid their taxes, heretics could wors.h.i.+p as they wished. It was win-win: formerly suppressed Christians got their freedom for a price they considered a bargain, and Muslim rulers got peace within their empire and, to boot, a steady source of revenue. In fact, around 700, Muslim rulers banned banned conversion to Islam lest revenue fall. conversion to Islam lest revenue fall. 30 30 It was a deft maneuver that Muhammad's successors pulled off: declare war on a people because of their religion and then, shortly after the conquest, feel tolerance welling up. Fortunately, Islamic rulers had the ambiguity of the Koran to back them up. They cited the Koranic injunction against "compulsion in religion"-a pa.s.sage that, perhaps, had receded to the margins of their awareness during the conquest itself, back when more pungent verses sprang to mind. 31 31 And then there was the ever flexible hadith. When ruling over unbelievers, Muslims recalled that Muhammad had said, "If they convert to Islam it is well; if not, they remain (in their previous religion); indeed Islam is wide." 32 32 This from the same man who supposedly had said, "I was ordered to fight all men until they say 'There is no G.o.d but G.o.d.'" This from the same man who supposedly had said, "I was ordered to fight all men until they say 'There is no G.o.d but G.o.d.'"

Sometimes there was no contradiction between these statements. Subjects who were Jewish did, in fact, believe that there was no G.o.d but G.o.d even though they hadn't converted to Islam. So too with Christians (even if their monotheism was a bit suspect in light of Jesus's divinity). Conquest of the largely Christian lands of Syria and Egypt, then, entailed little doctrinal amendment. "People of the Book," it was said, were allowed to keep their religion.

But what about the conquest of Persian lands? Here tolerance of the native faith, Zoroastrianism, took creativity. After all, Zoroastrians didn't have scriptures devoted to the Abrahamic G.o.d-and so weren't in any clear sense "People of the Book." But, hey, the Zoroastrians did have a book of scripture-the Avesta-so they were in some some sense People of the Book, or at least, People of sense People of the Book, or at least, People of a a Book. Conclusion: they could be tolerated, too! Book. Conclusion: they could be tolerated, too! 33 33 And later, as Muslim conquests spread deep into Asia, it turned out that there was a way to extend this basic idea-taxes in exchange for toleration-to Buddhists and Hindus. And later, as Muslim conquests spread deep into Asia, it turned out that there was a way to extend this basic idea-taxes in exchange for toleration-to Buddhists and Hindus. 34 34 And Muslim rulers in Africa decided that there, too, polytheists could be tolerated. And Muslim rulers in Africa decided that there, too, polytheists could be tolerated.

In the end, the basic modus operandi of the Islamic Empire was the basic m.o. for ancient empires: conquer and then tax. And an easily collected tax requires empire-wide pax, whether it be Pax Romana or Pax Islamica.

Over the centuries, Islamic tolerance of Christians and Jews (like Christian tolerance of Muslims and Jews) would fluctuate. As voluntary conversion to Islam set in-sometimes with the goal of escaping the tax, sometimes with the goal of easing career advancement-the population of Christians dwindled to a point where Muslims found it less crucial to stay on good terms with them. This change in att.i.tude presumably heightened the incentive to convert to Islam. Jews, more averse to conversion, stayed intact and sometimes faced persecution. But on balance, as the scholar Claude Cahen has observed, Islam showed more tolerance toward Jews over the centuries than did Christian Europe. 35 35 Meanwhile, the reinterpretation of jihad went on and on, swinging between truculence and reserve as circ.u.mstances warranted. By the early twentieth century, many mainstream Muslim thinkers had stripped the doctrine of its offensive connotations: Islamic "holy war" was justified only in self-defense. 36 36 This convergence with western views on just war is, of course, what led Sayyid Qutb to complain in the mid-twentieth century about "the sorry state of the present Muslim generation." Qutb's complaint foreshadowed a resurgence of militant interpretations of jihad. And here we are. This convergence with western views on just war is, of course, what led Sayyid Qutb to complain in the mid-twentieth century about "the sorry state of the present Muslim generation." Qutb's complaint foreshadowed a resurgence of militant interpretations of jihad. And here we are.

Muhammad and bin Laden.

Now back to our earlier questions: Is the doctrine of jihad rooted firmly in the Koran? Would Muhammad approve of what the jihadists are doing? Would the G.o.d of the Koran approve?

The answer to the second question is "almost certainly not." There is no hint anywhere-not in the Koran, not in the hadith -that Muhammad would countenance the killing of women or children, a favorite practice of modern-day jihadists.

The answer to the first question-and to the third-is also negative. The doctrine doctrine of jihad, the doctrine that modern-day jihadists cite, came into being after Muhammad's death, and the Koran provides no firm foundation for it. Indeed, that the authors of the doctrine relied so heavily on sayings attributed to the Prophet - and that these attributions often showed up a suspiciously long time after he lived-is itself testament to how hard it would be to ground jihad in the Koran. of jihad, the doctrine that modern-day jihadists cite, came into being after Muhammad's death, and the Koran provides no firm foundation for it. Indeed, that the authors of the doctrine relied so heavily on sayings attributed to the Prophet - and that these attributions often showed up a suspiciously long time after he lived-is itself testament to how hard it would be to ground jihad in the Koran.

But there's a larger question: Does the doctrine of jihad really matter much anyway? Though Osama bin Laden was an indirect heir of Sayyid Qutb, and though bin Laden emphasizes the "Sword verse," which when read in isolation seems to justify offensive jihad, he doesn't, in the end, deploy that doctrine. Bin Laden's exhortations to fight America, as in his 1996 manifesto, involve a ritual recitation of America's crimes against Islam; there is always some provocation other than merely being unbelievers. 37 37 He always manages to cast the jihad in question as in some sense an act of defense. He always manages to cast the jihad in question as in some sense an act of defense.

And so it goes. When people feel like fighting, they are pretty good at coming up with reasons why the fighting is justified -reasons why G.o.d is on their side. A doctrine of offensive jihad might in theory save a person the time of formulating specific provocations, but in fact that time is going to be spent anyway. Human psychology is such that it's vanis.h.i.+ngly rare for attack to precede grievance, regardless of how much creativity the grievance's creation requires.

None of this is to say that scripture doesn't matter. If you are recruiting suicide bombers, it matters that the Koran says martyrs who die in holy war go to heaven, and that it paints heavenly delights with such brio. (And it mattered that Christian soldiers of the Crusades could imagine heavenly streets paved with gold as they marched to war.) Other parts of the Koran matter, too. Presumably if you spend much time reciting verses that embrace the torment of your enemies, you are more likely to embrace their torment, and perhaps even do the tormenting yourself. And certainly the Koran features many such verses.

To be sure, in the Koran as a whole, the "jihad verses" are a small fraction of the verses that embrace the torment of Islam's enemies. Most of those verses aren't about Muslims punis.h.i.+ng infidels in the here and now, but rather about G.o.d punis.h.i.+ng infidels in the afterlife.

Still, is it possible that these visions of divine retribution in the afterlife wind up encouraging human retribution in the real world? Are madra.s.sahs in which young men chant the Koran, and indeed memorize the whole book, inciting violence out of proportion to the belligerence encouraged in the book itself? Yes, that's possible. (So we can be thankful that many of these young men in places like Pakistan and Afghanistan don't speak Arabic and so don't understand verses they're memorizing phonetically.) Scripture matters enough that, if we could magically replace the Koran with a book of our choosing, or could magically replace the Bible with a book of our choosing, we could probably make Muslims, Jews, and Christians better people. But we don't have that option. So we're lucky that scripture isn't as important in shaping behavior as the circ.u.mstances on the ground, circ.u.mstances that shape the interpretation of scripture. Circ.u.mstances can be stubborn, but at least they're not fixed in print.

Chapter Eighteen.

Muhammad.

Who was Muhammad? It depends on when you look at him. We've already seen his resemblance, at various times in his career, to earlier figures in the Abrahamic tradition, notably Moses and Jesus. There are other biblical characters we could add to the list. Indeed, it's possible to depict Muhammad's whole career as a kind of rotation among Abrahamic predecessors.

It was in Mecca that Muhammad had much in common with Jesus. He led a small band of devotees, warning that Judgment Day was coming. The message fell on deaf ears, after which he started to sound a bit like Second Isaiah. Second Isaiah, while enduring the humiliation of exile, had dreamed of a day when the nations that had oppressed his people would bow to a restored Israel and to its G.o.d. Now Muhammad envisioned his present persecutors getting their comeuppance as his faith in the one true G.o.d was grandly vindicated. In glorious detail, he imagined Judgment Day, again and again.

Next he spent some time as a kind of Moses, leading his hara.s.sed followers toward the promised land, the town of Medina. In Medina he came to resemble the apostle Paul. Paul had tried to convince extant Abrahamics-the Jews-that his brand of the Abrahamic faith was essentially the same as theirs, even if it had a few new twists. Muhammad made much the same case to the Abrahamics of his day, a group that, thanks to Paul's only mixed success, now included both Jews and Christians. Muhammad had little if any more success than Paul; most of his followers, it would seem, came from the ranks of pagans.

But there is a big difference between Muhammad and Paul. Paul was working wholly outside formal political power, and had no real choice about that. His fledgling church had to settle for being a nongovernmental organization. Muhammad, in contrast, could aspire to run a munic.i.p.al government, and he succeeded, securing control of Medina.

Now the Pauline side of Muhammad fell away, and he started to resemble King Josiah, the man who put the ancient Israelites on the path toward monotheism in the course of gathering power. For Muhammad, as for Josiah, the exclusive devotion to G.o.d that he demanded was intertwined with-was almost identical with-the political obedience he sought. And, like Josiah, Muhammad wanted to expand the scope of obedience, via conquest if necessary.

So that's Muhammad: a one-man recapitulation of some great moments in Abrahamic history, not exactly in chronological order. If a primary thesis of this book is correct-if the tone of scripture is set by the circ.u.mstance of its creation-then you would expect Muhammad's checkered past to leave a scriptural legacy that defies easy generalization. If the last several chapters show nothing else, they show that.

But generalize we must. The parallels between Muhammad's circ.u.mstances and circ.u.mstances of biblical authors.h.i.+p raise a question that people tend to raise anyway: How does the tenor of Islamic scripture compare with the tenor of Jewish and Christian scripture? Actually, that's the polite way of putting it. What many of these people want to know is: Which scripture is, you know, best? Which is on the highest moral plane? That this is a question we can't easily answer doesn't mean it's a question we shouldn't tackle. Religions aren't reducible to a checklist of moral qualities, but comparing them across such a checklist has its illuminating aspects.

Brotherly Love, and Hate.

The Koran lauds those who "master their anger, and forgive others! G.o.d loveth the doers of good." Such values had been in the Abrahamic tradition since the Hebrew Bible was written. In fact, such values are a feature of pretty much all traditions. Tensions between people must be subdued for any society, or any religion, to cohere, and the punishment for lack of coherence is often extinction. (If the people themselves don't perish, the culture may.) After all, there is often a competing group poised to profit from disarray. The Koran is fairly explicit about the logic: "The infidels lend one another mutual help. Unless ye do the same, there will be discord in the land and great corruption." 1 1 This ultimately pragmatic nature of intrasocial bonding can drain seemingly high-minded scriptures of their idealism. As we've seen, scholars doubt that the Hebrew Bible's "Love thy neighbor as thyself" was meant to extend beyond the borders of ancient Israel. Some of the Koran's odes to brotherly love are sufficiently candid to need no such scholarly deflating. "Only the faithful are brethren," says one sura attributed to the late Medinan period. Another from the same period says that Muhammad's comrades are "vehement against the infidels but full of tenderness among themselves." 2 2 This is a long way from the "Love your enemies" pa.s.sage attributed to Jesus. Then again, as we've seen, Jesus probably never said this anyway. And the person who probably did inject the idea into the Christian scripture-Paul-was a mere proselytizer who couldn't afford to antagonize his movement's powerful enemies. He was, in short, like the Muhammad of the early Medinan years, or the Muhammad of Mecca, the Muhammad who said to "turn away evil by what is better" and to greet antagonists by saying, "Peace." 3 3 A Jewish a.n.a.logue of Paul, and of the Meccan Muhammad, was Philo of Alexandria. Seeing that an interfaith war would doom Jews in the Roman Empire, Philo found messages of tolerance in his scripture and creatively downplayed parts of Deuteronomy in which G.o.d tells the Israelites to slaughter infidels.

Those verses are a.s.sociated with King Josiah. Not coincidentally, Josiah's circ.u.mstances match the circ.u.mstances of Muhammad when Muhammad was producing his most belligerent sayings. Both men were political rulers who wanted to expand their turf. Their moral compa.s.ses made the necessary adjustments.

To be sure, Josiah's moral compa.s.s seems to have been more thoroughly skewed by his ambitions than Muhammad's. The prescription in Deuteronomy for neighboring infidel cities is all-out genocide-kill all men, women, and children, not to mention livestock. There is nothing in the Koran that compares with this, arguably the moral low point of the entire body of Abrahamic scripture.

Still, if Muhammad never countenanced the killing of women or children, he did countenance a lot of killing. At least, he expressed approval of it quite a few times. In sheer numbers, such expressions in the Koran may not exceed those in the Bible. (Deuteronomy alone celebrates the utter "destruction" and "dispossession" of infidel cities again and again, and the book of Joshua also takes a festive att.i.tude toward urban mayhem.) But the Koran is a shorter book than the Bible; pound for pound, it no doubt features more exhortations to violence.

So if you ask which book is "worse" in terms of belligerence, you might say that qualitatively qualitatively the Hebrew Bible (and hence the Christian Bible) takes the trophy-thanks to that unrivaled embrace of genocide in Deuteronomy -but that the Hebrew Bible (and hence the Christian Bible) takes the trophy-thanks to that unrivaled embrace of genocide in Deuteronomy -but that quant.i.tatively quant.i.tatively the winner is the Koran, at least in terms of the frequency of belligerent pa.s.sages, if not in absolute numbers. And if, on top of the verses espousing violence in the terrestrial world, you add verses gleefully envisioning the suffering of infidels in the afterlife, the Koran wins the quant.i.tative compet.i.tion more decisively. (As we've seen, the Christian notion of h.e.l.l, a notion Muhammad inherited, hadn't fully crystallized by the time the gospels were written.) the winner is the Koran, at least in terms of the frequency of belligerent pa.s.sages, if not in absolute numbers. And if, on top of the verses espousing violence in the terrestrial world, you add verses gleefully envisioning the suffering of infidels in the afterlife, the Koran wins the quant.i.tative compet.i.tion more decisively. (As we've seen, the Christian notion of h.e.l.l, a notion Muhammad inherited, hadn't fully crystallized by the time the gospels were written.) Salvation.

Both the Koran and the Bible have their saving graces. In their warmer moments, they envision the salvation of neighboring peoples-indeed, the salvation of the whole world.

To be sure, salvation is sometimes a polite term for what they have in mind. As we've seen, Second Isaiah imagined salvation coming to the nations in the form of abject submission to Yahweh and Israel, a submission prefaced by violent retribution for past offenses. Similarly, when Muhammad is in Second Isaiah mode-a powerless, humiliated prophet in Mecca-the global salvation he imagines carries a punitive edge. Someday, G.o.d will "raise up a witness out of every nation: then shall the infidels have no permission to make excuses, and they shall find no favor." 4 4 A sense of persecution can take some of the charity out of Christian salvation, too. We're seen that the book of Revelation, written amid Roman oppression, envisions an apocalypse in which the savior carries "a sharp sword with which to strike down the nations, and he will rule them with a rod of iron." A sense of persecution can take some of the charity out of Christian salvation, too. We're seen that the book of Revelation, written amid Roman oppression, envisions an apocalypse in which the savior carries "a sharp sword with which to strike down the nations, and he will rule them with a rod of iron." 5 5 There are sunnier versions of salvation. According to Second Isaiah, Israel will be a "light unto the nations." Jesus's disciples will go teach the "good news" to all peoples. And Muhammad's conception of paradise is definitely good news.

If, that is, you qualify for admission. But more people qualify than you might imagine. The Koran says more than once that not just Muslims but Jews and Christians are eligible for salvation so long as they believe in G.o.d and in Judgment Day and live a life worthy of favorable judgment. 6 6 This inclusiveness may reflect Muhammad's frustration at the Jewish and Christian claims to exclusive possession of salvific truth. He marveled: "The Jews a.s.sert, 'The Christians have no valid ground for their beliefs,' while the Christians a.s.sert, 'The Jews have no valid ground for their beliefs'-and both quote the divine writ!" He reminded them that they "are but a part of the men whom He hath created! He will pardon whom He pleaseth, and chastise whom He pleaseth." 7 7 Muhammad doesn't go so far as to embrace universal universal salvation. To be saved you do have to accept that the Abrahamic G.o.d is the one and only G.o.d. Still, in deeming all Abrahamics eligible for salvation he is opening the gates to salvation wider than Christians were opening them. And at one point he seems to open them wider still; he lists Zoroastrians along with Christians, Jews, and Muslims, and says that G.o.d-who "guideth whom He pleaseth"-will be their judge on the day of resurrection. salvation. To be saved you do have to accept that the Abrahamic G.o.d is the one and only G.o.d. Still, in deeming all Abrahamics eligible for salvation he is opening the gates to salvation wider than Christians were opening them. And at one point he seems to open them wider still; he lists Zoroastrians along with Christians, Jews, and Muslims, and says that G.o.d-who "guideth whom He pleaseth"-will be their judge on the day of resurrection. 8 8 There is a funny thing about this Koranic mention of the Zoroastrians: it's the only one. By and large the Koran offers no evidence that Muhammad had contact with Zoroastrians-except for this one verse in which they appear out of nowhere and are suddenly deemed eligible for paradise. It's enough to make you wonder whether this verse wasn't added, or at least amended, after Muhammad's death, when the conquest of Persian lands brought many Zoroastrians under Islamic governance. 9 9 As we've seen, this conquest inspired a doctrinal amendment under which Zoroastrians were lumped in with "People of the Book" -a designation that made it easier for them to be amiable imperial subjects and ample sources of tax revenue. As we've seen, this conquest inspired a doctrinal amendment under which Zoroastrians were lumped in with "People of the Book" -a designation that made it easier for them to be amiable imperial subjects and ample sources of tax revenue.

There's another reason to suspect that this verse is a product of the post-Muhammad era. It grants salvation not only to Zoroastrians, but to "Sabeans." To judge by the beliefs of their modern-day heirs (sometimes called Mandeans), the Sabeans, like the Zoroastrians, would have been hard to fit into the Abrahamic fold; they revered John the Baptist but considered Jesus, Abraham, and Moses false prophets. And (again, to judge by their modern heirs), they would have had another thing in common with Zoroastrians: their residential epicenter was to the east of Muhammad's turf, in modern-day Iraq and Iran, lands conquered not by Muhammad but by his successors. 10 10 Whether the verse is from Muhammad's time or after it, it seems to represent the peak of a growing salvific inclusiveness. There are many verses in the Koran suggesting that Jews and Christians are eligible for salvation. Three of those verses add Sabeans to the list, and, of the three, this one verse adds Zoroastrians as well. (And actually, this verse can be read - fairly straightforwardly, even-as including polytheists in the pool of eligibility, but some scholars dispute this interpretation.) 11 11 It's possible that all three verses carrying salvation beyond the Abrahamic compa.s.s were indeed uttered by Muhammad. Maybe near the end of his career he found small pockets of Sabeans and Zoroastrians within the ambit of his conquest, or maybe he found himself in alliance with towns populated by these non-Abrahamics. But, regardless of whether these verses come from Muhammad's time or later, the best explanation for them is an expanded scope of non-zero-sumness. Whether by allying with non-Abrahamics or governing them, Islamic leaders.h.i.+p seems to have acquired an incentive to stay on cooperative terms with them.

This is reminiscent of the growing inclusiveness we saw in the Hebrew Bible. Before the exile, Israel had frequently been on antagonistic terms with neighbors, as reflected in both exilic and pre-exilic scriptures. Around the end of exile, with Israel now part of the Persian Empire, the "Priestly source," apparently speaking in harmony with Persian leaders.h.i.+p, struck a more accommodating tone. In Hebrew scripture as in Islamic scripture, imperial conquest had eventually translated into tolerance -at least within the empire.