The Evolution Of God Part 11

The same is true, in a sense, of Christianity. In the Roman Empire Christian salvation was conceived more narrowly than Islamic salvation was described in those several Koranic verses; it wasn't generally granted to those outside the faith. 12 12 Still, at its birth Christianity had been innovatively inclusive in carrying the Abrahamic scriptures beyond ethnic bounds. And the reason for this openness was that the founders of Christianity were operating within a multiethnic empire. Trying to build a big religious organization put them in a non-zero-sum relations.h.i.+p with potential recruits, and potential recruits were an ethnic smorgasbord. Still, at its birth Christianity had been innovatively inclusive in carrying the Abrahamic scriptures beyond ethnic bounds. And the reason for this openness was that the founders of Christianity were operating within a multiethnic empire. Trying to build a big religious organization put them in a non-zero-sum relations.h.i.+p with potential recruits, and potential recruits were an ethnic smorgasbord.

Time and again, empire has brought once antagonistic ethnicities into peaceful coexistence, and time and again religion has reached out to further that cause. This is cause for hope, since, as we've noted, the multinational milieu of a new empire is the closest ancient a.n.a.logue of globalization. To be sure, the inchoate global platform of today lacks something ancient empires had-unified leaders.h.i.+p. And to be sure, globalization so far has done as much to divide Abrahamic religions as to unite them. Still, the ancient imperial experience shows that if these religions never manage to see eye to eye, it won't be because they lack adaptive capacity.

The inclusive spirit of empire is captured in a sura typically dated to the late Medina period-and, for all we know, in fact dating from later-when G.o.d tells humankind that he has "made you into nations and tribes, so that you might come to know one another." 13 13 Compare this to the Bible's story of the Tower of Babel, written well before the exile. Here G.o.d's plan is for the world's nations to always have trouble getting to know one another. Compare this to the Bible's story of the Tower of Babel, written well before the exile. Here G.o.d's plan is for the world's nations to always have trouble getting to know one another.

Of course, if the existence existence of empire conduces to harmony, the of empire conduces to harmony, the expansion expansion of empire-the process of actually conquering new lands-heightens intolerance of nearby faiths and peoples. This, as we've seen, explains the pliability of the jihad doctrine: amid expansion its intolerant edge took the lead, but when the time came to govern conquered lands, its soft side surfaced. of empire-the process of actually conquering new lands-heightens intolerance of nearby faiths and peoples. This, as we've seen, explains the pliability of the jihad doctrine: amid expansion its intolerant edge took the lead, but when the time came to govern conquered lands, its soft side surfaced.

This also explains why the New Testament has fewer belligerent verses than either the Koran or the Hebrew Bible. During the formative years of Christian scripture, Christianity wasn't the official religion of an expanding power. Doctrines of holy war would surface when needed-as during the Crusades-but the gospels and epistles took shape too early to reflect them.

We could go on all day trying to decide which of the Abrahamic religions is "best" or "worst." But we'd find no uncontested winner. What we'd find is that all three fluctuate between best and worst according to the same dynamic: scripture ranges from tolerant to belligerent, and the reason lies in the facts on the ground, in the perceived non-zero-sumness, or lack thereof, among human beings.

And Muhammad, more than any other figure in the Abrahamic tradition, embodies this dynamic, ill.u.s.trates it across its entire range. At times he is the belligerent Josiah, at times the embittered Second Isaiah, at times the defensively inclusive Philo or Paul, at times the confidently inclusive Priestly source-or the confidently inclusive Jesus of the gospels (even if the historical Jesus was more like an earlier Muhammad, the inspired but ignored prophet of Mecca). This one man embodies the moral history of the Abrahamic faith, with all its twists and turns. This isn't always something to be proud of, but it's quite a feat. It's also ill.u.s.tration of what gives that history its structure: the exquisite responsiveness of human moral equipment to facts on the ground.

The Modernity of Muhammad.

Of course, the moral dimension isn't the only dimension along which religions are compared. A common complaint about the Koran is that it lacks the sweep and depth of the Holy Bible. There isn't, for example, the sometimes profound reflection on human existence found in Proverbs, Job, and other examples of the "wisdom literature." There aren't the arcane philosophical allusions -notably John's riffing on the Logos-found in the New Testament.

Then again, the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament are repositories of an intellectual heritage that went well beyond the Hebrew and Christian worlds. Composed by legions of urban elites, they captured ideas of great civilizations, from Mesopotamia to Egypt to Christianity's h.e.l.lenistic milieu. The Koran took shape in two desert towns on the margin of empires, uttered by a man who was more a doer than a thinker and was probably illiterate.

It's ironic, then, that in important senses the Koran was a more modern work than the Bible, and Muhammad a more modern figure than Moses or Jesus.

For one thing, Muhammad, in contrast to the key figures in the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament, has no special powers. He can't turn a rod into a snake or water into wine. Yes, later Muslims would depict him as a miracle worker, and they would claim that an opaque Koranic verse or two (most famously one about "splitting the moon") demonstrates such powers. But the Koranic Muhammad, unlike the biblical Jesus and Moses, doesn't depend on miracle-working for proof of proximity to G.o.d.

The contrast is especially clear when both Muhammad and Jesus face skeptics who ask: if you really have a special link to G.o.d, prove it by producing wondrous "signs." Muhammad doesn't respond by trying to do anything supernatural. 14 14 He doesn't raise people from the dead or feed a big crowd on a tight budget. Of course, the historical Jesus-as opposed to the biblical Jesus-probably didn't do those things, either. But Jesus may well have engaged in faith healing and exorcism; certainly these would have been normal for a wandering Palestinian preacher circa 30 CE. In any event, the historical Jesus probably He doesn't raise people from the dead or feed a big crowd on a tight budget. Of course, the historical Jesus-as opposed to the biblical Jesus-probably didn't do those things, either. But Jesus may well have engaged in faith healing and exorcism; certainly these would have been normal for a wandering Palestinian preacher circa 30 CE. In any event, the historical Jesus probably was was asked to show signs. And even when, in the earliest gospel, we see him fail to deliver, his explanation rests on the premise that he asked to show signs. And even when, in the earliest gospel, we see him fail to deliver, his explanation rests on the premise that he could could produce signs if his audience deserved them. ("Truly I tell you, no sign will be given to this generation.") produce signs if his audience deserved them. ("Truly I tell you, no sign will be given to this generation.") 15 15 Here lies the second sense in which the Koran is paradoxically modern-in its style of theological argumentation. The style is set by the way Muhammad handles the challenge to show "signs." He defines the word "signs" in a way that gives him an empirical riposte, s.h.i.+fting attention from supernatural wonders to the wonders of nature. 16 16 If you want signs of G.o.d's greatness, he says, just examine the everyday evidence. Look at the world. Note how it seems to have been built for the benefit of humans. Doesn't a G.o.d who would create such a world deserve devotion? If you want signs of G.o.d's greatness, he says, just examine the everyday evidence. Look at the world. Note how it seems to have been built for the benefit of humans. Doesn't a G.o.d who would create such a world deserve devotion?

G.o.d "hath sent down rain from Heaven, and by it we bring forth the kinds of various herbs: 'Eat ye, and feed your cattle.' Of a truth in this are signs unto men endued with understanding." And: "Among fruits ye have the palm and the vine, from which ye get wine and healthful nutriment: in this, verily, are signs for those who reflect." And, of course, the ecosystem includes the human species itself: "And one of His signs it is, that He hath created wives for you of your own species, that ye may dwell with them, and hath put love and tenderness between you. Herein truly are signs for those who reflect." And consider the splendor of the whole human species: "Among His signs are... your variety of tongues and colour. Herein truly are signs for all men." 17 17 This ama.s.sing of evidence of G.o.d's goodness and grandeur makes the Koran come much closer than the Bible to fitting the description Darwin gave to his book The Origin of Species: The Origin of Species: "one long argument." That's not the only thing the two books have in common. Both arguments purport to explain the exquisitely fine fit between humans and their natural surroundings. Muhammad notes how conducive the ecosystem is to human flouris.h.i.+ng and explains it via G.o.d's design of the ecosystem. Darwin notes the same close match between humans and their ecosystem and posits a different explanation: humans were shaped to fit their ecosystem-not the other way around. "one long argument." That's not the only thing the two books have in common. Both arguments purport to explain the exquisitely fine fit between humans and their natural surroundings. Muhammad notes how conducive the ecosystem is to human flouris.h.i.+ng and explains it via G.o.d's design of the ecosystem. Darwin notes the same close match between humans and their ecosystem and posits a different explanation: humans were shaped to fit their ecosystem-not the other way around.

The "signs" Muhammad saw weren't confined to the organic. Note how nicely G.o.d had adapted the inanimate world to human needs: "He causeth the dawn to appear, and hath ordained the night for rest, and the sun and the moon for computing time! The ordinance of the Mighty, the Wise! And it is He who hath ordained the stars for you that ye may be guided thereby in the darknesses of the land and of the sea! Clear have we made our signs to men of knowledge." 18 18 Here again, a modern thinker would invoke evolution: both the biological evolution that adapted our sleep patterns to cycles of the sun, and the cultural evolution by which humans came to quantify time with sundials and calendars, turning the sun and moon into tools for "computing time." Muhammad, in contrast, sees G.o.d as the ultimate explanation of all such synchronous goodness, and the Koran dwells on this goodness at length. The Koran is in no small part a book about grat.i.tude: look around you; count your blessings. The pre-Islamic meaning of one of several Arabic words that the Koran uses to denote "unbelievers" seems to have been "those who are ungrateful." 19 19 In defining a blessing, Muhammad could be creative. Thunder and lightning are scary, and sometimes lightning is fatal. But are these really bad things? Thunder brings "awe of Him." Lightning brings "fear and hope," and has the added virtue of occasionally eliminating people who spend too much time arguing about theology and not enough time buying into it: "He sendeth His bolts and smiteth with them whom He will while they are wrangling about G.o.d!" 20 20 From a modern vantage point, it is natural to read Muhammad's litany of "signs" and think that the "argument" he's making is for the existence of G.o.d. It's not. The existence existence of G.o.d wasn't something he needed to argue for. His skeptics came in several varieties, but atheists weren't among them. Indeed, his skeptics accepted not just the existence of one or more G.o.ds, but the existence of Allah, who had earned his way into the pantheon of Meccan polytheists. Further, Meccans seem to have agreed that Allah was a creator G.o.d. The question was how much of a wors.h.i.+pper's devotion should go to that creator G.o.d. If Muhammad could argue that the creation-Allah's handiwork -showed Allah to be a G.o.d of tremendous power and goodness, then the answer would be: a whole lot of the devotion, like all of it. Allah was G.o.d. of G.o.d wasn't something he needed to argue for. His skeptics came in several varieties, but atheists weren't among them. Indeed, his skeptics accepted not just the existence of one or more G.o.ds, but the existence of Allah, who had earned his way into the pantheon of Meccan polytheists. Further, Meccans seem to have agreed that Allah was a creator G.o.d. The question was how much of a wors.h.i.+pper's devotion should go to that creator G.o.d. If Muhammad could argue that the creation-Allah's handiwork -showed Allah to be a G.o.d of tremendous power and goodness, then the answer would be: a whole lot of the devotion, like all of it. Allah was G.o.d.

The modern world is said to suffer from "disenchantment." As science explains more of the workings of nature, there seems less mystery, and so less room for a G.o.d that accounts for the otherwise mysterious. But in Muhammad's scheme nature's obedience to laws is tribute to the G.o.d who designed them so adeptly that he could then remove himself from the the day-to-day drudgery of running a universe: "It is G.o.d who hath reared the Heavens without pillars thou canst behold; then mounted His throne, and imposed laws on the sun and moon: each travelleth to its appointed goal. He ordereth all things. He maketh His signs clear." And: "He created the sun and the moon and the stars, subjected to laws by His behest: Is not all creation and its empire His?" And if nature exactingly complies with G.o.d's laws, what is the point of wors.h.i.+pping nature deities? "Bend not in adoration to the sun or the moon, but bend in adoration before G.o.d who created them both." 21 21 All told, it sounds like an effective rhetorical strategy: Take something Meccans already agree on-Allah is the creator G.o.d-and leverage this consensus logically, leading people to conclude that Muhammad's entire theology is on target.

That Was Then...

Today, of course, it doesn't work that easily. Today the argument isn't over which which G.o.ds exist but over whether any G.o.d exists; or even whether anything you could call a higher purpose exists. Still, if Muhammad's argument doesn't work today, the G.o.ds exist but over whether any G.o.d exists; or even whether anything you could call a higher purpose exists. Still, if Muhammad's argument doesn't work today, the kind kind of argument he made is, more than ever, the kind of argument that has to be made if people are to be persuaded: an argument that evidence of divine purpose-the signs-are embedded in the natural world; an empirical argument. of argument he made is, more than ever, the kind of argument that has to be made if people are to be persuaded: an argument that evidence of divine purpose-the signs-are embedded in the natural world; an empirical argument.

The conventional wisdom is that such arguments are either intrinsically illegitimate or unfailingly ineffectual. In fact, there's a standard historical anecdote that is trotted out to show how hopeless they are. The funny thing is that this anecdote, when closely examined, shows something quite different.

The anecdote is the story of the "blind watchmaker." It involves William Paley, a British theologian who wrote a book called Natural Theology Natural Theology in 1802, a few years before Darwin was born. In it he tried to use living creatures as evidence for the existence of a designer. If you're walking across a field and you find a pocket watch, Paley said, you know immediately that it's in a different category from the rocks lying around it. Unlike them, it is manifestly a product of design, featuring a complex functionality that doesn't just happen by accident. Well, he continued, organisms are like pocket watches: they're too complexly functional to just happen by accident. So organisms must have a designer-namely, G.o.d. in 1802, a few years before Darwin was born. In it he tried to use living creatures as evidence for the existence of a designer. If you're walking across a field and you find a pocket watch, Paley said, you know immediately that it's in a different category from the rocks lying around it. Unlike them, it is manifestly a product of design, featuring a complex functionality that doesn't just happen by accident. Well, he continued, organisms are like pocket watches: they're too complexly functional to just happen by accident. So organisms must have a designer-namely, G.o.d.

Thanks to Darwin, we now know that Paley was wrong. We can explain the complex functionality of organisms without positing a G.o.d. The explanation is natural selection.

Darwinians who are atheists have been known to celebrate the failure of Paley's explanation. They love to note how futile this attempt to empirically argue for the existence of G.o.d turned out to be. What they tend not to emphasize is that Paley was half right. The complex functionality of an organism does does demand a special kind of explanation. It seems pretty clear that hearts are in some sense here demand a special kind of explanation. It seems pretty clear that hearts are in some sense here in order to in order to pump blood, that digestive systems are here pump blood, that digestive systems are here in order to in order to digest food, that brains are here digest food, that brains are here in order to in order to (among other things) help organisms find food to digest. Rocks, in contrast, don't seem to be here in order to do anything. The kinds of forces that created a rock just don't seem likely to be the kinds of forces that would create an organism. It takes a special kind of force to do that-a force like natural selection. (among other things) help organisms find food to digest. Rocks, in contrast, don't seem to be here in order to do anything. The kinds of forces that created a rock just don't seem likely to be the kinds of forces that would create an organism. It takes a special kind of force to do that-a force like natural selection.

Indeed, so special is natural selection that lots of biologists are willing to talk about it designing designing organisms. (Or, actually, organisms. (Or, actually, "designing" "designing" organisms; they tend to put the word in quotes, lest you think they mean a conscious, foresightful designer.) Even the famously atheist Darwinian philosopher Daniel Dennett uses that kind of terminology; he says this process of "design" imbues organisms with "goals" and "purposes." For example: organisms are "designed" ultimately to maximize genetic proliferation, and are thus "designed" to pursue goals subordinate to that ultimate goal, such as finding mates, ingesting nutrients, and pumping blood. organisms; they tend to put the word in quotes, lest you think they mean a conscious, foresightful designer.) Even the famously atheist Darwinian philosopher Daniel Dennett uses that kind of terminology; he says this process of "design" imbues organisms with "goals" and "purposes." For example: organisms are "designed" ultimately to maximize genetic proliferation, and are thus "designed" to pursue goals subordinate to that ultimate goal, such as finding mates, ingesting nutrients, and pumping blood.

The take-home lesson is simple. It is indeed legitimate to do what Paley did: inspect a physical system for evidence that it was imbued with goals, with purpose, by some higher-order creative process. If the evidence strongly suggests such a thing, that doesn't mean the imbuer was a designer in the sense of a conscious being; in the case Paley focused on, it turned out not to be. Still, the point is that you can look at a system and argue empirically about whether it has, in some some sense, a "higher" purpose. There are hallmarks of purpose, and some physical systems have them. sense, a "higher" purpose. There are hallmarks of purpose, and some physical systems have them.

Well, the entire process of life on Earth, the entire evolving ecosystem-from the birth of bacteria through the advent of human beings through the advent of cultural evolution, through the human history driven by that evolution-is a physical system. So in principle we could ask the same question about it that we asked about organisms; it could turn out that there is strong evidence of imbued purpose, as Paley and Dennett agree there is in organisms. In other words, maybe natural selection is an algorithm that is in some sense designed designed to get life to a point where it can to get life to a point where it can do something do something-fulfill its goal, its purpose.

And, actually, when you think about it, some of the evidence you might point to as the hallmark of purpose in organisms has a.n.a.logues in the evolving ecosystem.

Here is some of the evidence in the case of the organism. A single fertilized egg cell replicates itself, and the offspring cells in turn replicate themselves, and so on. Eventually the resulting lineages of cells start evincing distinctive specialties; there are muscle cells that beget muscle cells, brain cells that beget brain cells. If Paley were around today to watch videos of this process, he would say, Wow!-look at how exquisitely directional this process is; the system grows in size and in functional differentiation until it becomes this large, complex, functionally integrated system: muscles, brains, lungs, and so on; this directional movement toward complex functional integration is evidence of design! 22 22 And, in some sense of the word "design," he would be right. And, in some sense of the word "design," he would be right.

Now here is a somewhat parallel description of the history of the ecosystem on this planet. First, a few billion years ago, a single primitive cell divides. The resulting offspring cells in turn replicate themselves, and eventually different lineages of cells (that is, different species) emerge. Some of these lineages eventually become multicellular (jellyfish, birds) and evince distinctive specialties (floating, flying). One lineage-let's call it h.o.m.o sapiens h.o.m.o sapiens-is particularly good at thinking. It launches a whole new process of evolution, called cultural evolution, that sp.a.w.ns wheels and legal codes and microchips and so on. Humans use the fruits of cultural evolution to organize themselves on a larger and larger scale. As this social organization reaches the global level and features a richer and richer division of economic labor, the whole thing starts to resemble a giant organism. There's even a kind of planetary nervous system, made of fiber optics and other stuff, connecting the various human brains into big megabrains that try to solve problems. (And some of the problems are global-how to head off global warming and global epidemics, for example.) Meanwhile, as the human species is becoming a global brain, gradually a.s.suming conscious stewards.h.i.+p of the planet, other species-also descended from that single primitive cell that lived billions of years ago-perform other planetary functions. Trees are lungs, for example, generating oxygen.

In other words, if you watched evolution on this planet unfold from a distance (and on fast-forward), you would find it strikingly like watching the maturation of an organism: there would be directional movement toward functional integration. So why can't the part of Paley's argument that can be validly validly applied to an organism's maturation-the idea that it suggests a designer of applied to an organism's maturation-the idea that it suggests a designer of some some sort-be applied to the whole system of life on Earth? sort-be applied to the whole system of life on Earth?

This is just a question, not a rigorous argument. To argue seriously that the system of life on Earth, the evolving ecosystem, is a product of design, or at least "design," and thus in some sense imbued with higher purpose, or at least "higher" purpose, would take a whole book. This is not that book.

And even if you had successfully made that book-length argument, questions would remain. Was the purpose imbued by some conscious being or just by some unconscious process? And, in either event, is the purpose in some sense good? Good enough, at least, so that even if you couldn't specify the exact nature of the designer, you would be tempted to characterize the purpose itself as, perhaps, divine? divine?

This question, too, could encompa.s.s an entire book-and this book isn't that book, either. Still, this book has shed light on a question that would certainly arise in the course of that book: Does human history by its nature move toward something you could call morally good?

That's a question we'll treat more fully in the next chapter. But you can no doubt guess some of the territory we'll cross in treating it. It will have something to do with the forces conducive to amity and tolerance as opposed to the forces conducive to belligerence and intolerance. It will have to do with the effect of changing circ.u.mstance on human moral consciousness.

As we've seen, those forces are evident in all the Abrahamic scriptures if you look closely enough. But in no other Abrahamic scripture are they as evident as in the Koran. No other scripture so deeply cuts across the full spectrum of dynamics, from intensely zero-sum to intensely non-zero-sum, or so sharply expresses the attendant moral tenor. In no other scripture do you so quickly move from "To you be your religion; to me my religion" to "Kill the polytheists wherever you find them" to "There is no compulsion in religion," and back again. All of the Abrahamic scriptures attest to the correlation between circ.u.mstance and moral consciousness, but none so richly as the Koran. In that sense, at least, the Koran is unrivaled as a revelation.

V.

G.o.d GOES GLOBAL (OR DOESN'T) They have neither knowledge nor understanding, they walk around in darkness; all the foundations of the earth are shaken.- Psalms 82:5

Chapter Nineteen.

The Moral Imagination.

Things may look bad, but salvation is possible so long as you understand what it requires. This is the message of the Abrahamic prophets. Muhammad said it, Jesus said it, and both Isaiahs-among other Israelite prophets-said it.

They didn't all mean the same thing by "salvation." Muhammad was talking about the salvation of your soul in the hereafter. Both Isaiahs were talking about the salvation of the social system-Israel (or, in some pa.s.sages, the whole world). As for Jesus: the Jesus Christians remember was, like Muhammad, focused on personal salvation, though the real Jesus may have been, like the Isaiahs, more concerned with social salvation.

But even religions that emphasize personal salvation are ultimately concerned with social salvation. For Muslims and Christians the path to personal salvation involves adherence to a moral code that keeps their social systems robust. As we've seen, successful religions have always tended to salvation at the social level, encouraging behaviors that bring order.

As we've also seen, pre-Abrahamic religions of the Middle East were especially explicit about this goal. Civilization was constantly threatened by the forces of chaos, and obeying the G.o.ds, or at least the good G.o.ds, was the way to keep chaos at bay.

Today the social system, an incipiently global social system, is again threatened by chaos. But now religion seems to be the problem, not the solution. Tensions among Jews, Christians, and Muslims-or at least among some Jews, Christians, and Muslims -imperil the world's order. And the tensions are heightened by the scriptures of these religions-or at least by the scriptures as they're being interpreted by the people who are heightening the tensions. Three great religions of salvation have helped put the world in need of salvation.

Can we now say what the Abrahamic prophets said-that, though things look bad, salvation is possible so long as we understand what it requires? And if so, what does it require?

Conveniently, clues are provided by the three Abrahamic religions. (It's the least they can do, given their role in creating the question.) Their scriptures are, beneath the surface, maps of the landscape of religious tolerance and intolerance, maps that amount to a kind of code for the salvation of the world. The core of the code should by now be clear. When people see themselves in a zero-sum relations.h.i.+p with other people-see their fortunes as inversely correlated with the fortunes of other people, see the dynamic as win-lose-they tend to find a scriptural basis for intolerance or belligerence (though, as we've seen, if they feel hopelessly outgunned, sure to wind up on the losing side of any conflict, they may keep their hostility suppressed for the time being). When they see the relations.h.i.+p as non-zero-sum-see their fortunes as positively correlated, see the potential for a win-win outcome-they're more likely to find the tolerant and understanding side of their scriptures.

So the salvation of the world would seem straightforward: heed the lessons embedded in the Abrahamic scriptures; arrange things, wherever possible, so that people of different Abrahamic faiths find themselves in non-zero-sum relations.h.i.+ps.

The good news is that some of these arrangements have already been made. The world is full of non-zero-sum relations.h.i.+ps, many of which cross the chasms that supposedly separate humankind. The bad news is that the mere existence of non-zero-sumness isn't enough. After all, I've never said people summon tolerance in response to non-zero-sum dynamics. I've said people summon tolerance in response to seeing seeing the dynamics as non-zero-sum. And even this is putting it too simply. Depending on the exact circ.u.mstances, responding wisely to non-zero-sum opportunities can call for more than just seeing the non-zero-sumness. Sometimes it calls for a kind of "sight" that goes deeper. It can call for an apprehension not just of the pragmatic truth about human interaction, but of a kind of moral truth. And moral truth is sometimes elusive. the dynamics as non-zero-sum. And even this is putting it too simply. Depending on the exact circ.u.mstances, responding wisely to non-zero-sum opportunities can call for more than just seeing the non-zero-sumness. Sometimes it calls for a kind of "sight" that goes deeper. It can call for an apprehension not just of the pragmatic truth about human interaction, but of a kind of moral truth. And moral truth is sometimes elusive.

Non-Zero-Sumness Today.

But first, back to the good news. Globalization, for all its dislocations, entails lots of non-zero-sumness. You buy a new car, and you're playing one of the most complex non-zero-sum games in the history of humanity: you pay a tiny fraction of the wages of thousands of workers on various continents, and they, in turn, make you a car. A popular term for this is interdependence -they depend on you for money, you depend on them for a car-and interdependence is just another name for non-zero-sumness. Because the fortunes of two players in a non-zero-sum game are correlated, the welfare of each of them depends partly on the situation of the other.

You could look at other parts of the economy-consumer electronics, clothing, food-and find similarlyfar-flung chains of interdependence. And they all add up to a larger kind of interdependence. Economic downturn, or upturn, in one part of the world can be contagious. So nations broadly have a shared interest in keeping the global economy humming; they're playing a non-zero-sum game. This is just the natural culmination of the expansion of social organization. Villages merged to form chiefdoms, tribes merged to form states, states merged into empires. These mergers created vaster webs of non-zero-sumness, and often, as we've seen, religion reacted adaptively, helping to keep the webs intact.

Encouragingly, in the modern world this non-zero-sumness often does translate into an expansion of concord and tolerance, in keeping with the pattern seen in Abrahamic scripture. France and Germany, which spent much of the modern era in enmity, today have a high degree of economic entanglement, and the chances of their going to war are commensurately low.

American att.i.tudes toward the j.a.panese are an especially clear case of globalization expanding the circle of concord. In the 1940s, Americans saw j.a.pan as an enemy, and their regard for individual j.a.panese was accordingly low. One comic-book cover had Super-man encouraging readers to "slap a j.a.p" by buying war bonds. The accompanying caricature, with racial traits exaggerated, suggested that the j.a.panese were almost a separate species. And that was the att.i.tude implied by the final weeks of World War II, after atomic bombs fell on Hiros.h.i.+ma and Nagasaki. America evinced virtually no moral anguish over the tens of thousands of innocent children who had perished, to say nothing of some presumably innocent adults.

After the war, things moved toward the non-zero-sum. By the 1970s, Americans and j.a.panese were allies in the fight against communism, and, as a bonus, j.a.panese were building solid cars for American consumers. Now the average American didn't even call j.a.panese "j.a.ps," much less suggest slapping them.

Backtracking can always happen. In the late 1980s, the Cold War ended, so j.a.pan seemed a less crucial U.S. ally. Meanwhile, the j.a.panese economy started to seem like a peril to American jobs. In 1989, the same year the Berlin Wall fell-and the half-century policy of "containing" communism was vindicated-the Atlantic Monthly Atlantic Monthly ran a cover story t.i.tled "Containing j.a.pan." The World War II motif of the sly, insidious j.a.panese even started to make a comeback, notably in the best selling 1992 novel ran a cover story t.i.tled "Containing j.a.pan." The World War II motif of the sly, insidious j.a.panese even started to make a comeback, notably in the best selling 1992 novel Rising Sun Rising Sun by Michael Crichton. by Michael Crichton.

But the j.a.panese economy proved not to be the juggernaut of paranoid fantasy, and besides, j.a.panese companies had the political wisdom to locate some of their auto manufacturing plants in the United States. That meant they were playing a non-zero-sum game not just with American consumers, but with American workers. Rising Sun Rising Sun turned out not to be a harbinger. On balance, between the end of World War II and the end of the twentieth century, relations between the United States and j.a.pan moved decisively toward the non-zero-sum, and on balance the international vibes got warmer: j.a.panese just seemed like better people to Americans than they had seemed decades earlier. Which is to say: they seemed like people. turned out not to be a harbinger. On balance, between the end of World War II and the end of the twentieth century, relations between the United States and j.a.pan moved decisively toward the non-zero-sum, and on balance the international vibes got warmer: j.a.panese just seemed like better people to Americans than they had seemed decades earlier. Which is to say: they seemed like people.

This is the way moral evolution happens-in ancient Israel, in the Rome of early Christianity, in Muhammad's Arabia, in the modern world: a people's culture adapts to salient s.h.i.+fts in game-theoretical dynamics by changing its evaluation of the moral status of the people it is playing the game with. If the culture is a religious one, this adaptation will involve changes in the way scriptures are interpreted and in the choice of which scriptures to highlight. It happened in ancient times, and it happens now.

In that sense it's good news that, on balance, the United States j.a.pan story reflects the way of the world in the age of globalization: more and more people getting intertwined in non-zero-sum relations. Even some of the bad-news stories may be good news. Trans-national environmental problems, ranging from overfis.h.i.+ng the seas to global warming, are in themselves unfortunate, but at least these negative-sum prospects give humanity an interest in cooperating to head them off.

So maybe the world's peoples will move into a proper frame of mind for doing that. Maybe they'll overcome prejudice that impedes communication, muster tolerance for diversity of culture and belief; maybe they'll warm up to each other. That, after all, is the pattern we've seen in scripture: the prospect of successfully playing a nonzero-sum game breeds decency. So in theory everything should work out fine!

Messy Reality.

In theory. But in fact various things can keep non-zero-sum potential from translating into the feelings that will realize that potential.

First is the problem of recognizing that you're in a non-zero-sum game. How many car buyers are aware of how many workers in how many countries helped build their car?

Second is the problem of trust. Palestinians and Israelis are playing a non-zero-sum game, because neither is going to expel the other from the area; given the inevitability of coexistence, lasting peace would be good for both sides and lasting war bad for both. And many people on both sides see this correlation of fortunes, at least in the abstract. But it's still hard to reach a deal because each side suspects that the other would violate it.

These two barriers to non-zero-sum solution-recognition, trust-may sound formidable, but in a sense neither is really the big problem. The big problem is something that compounds the problems of recognition and trust and also brings whole new problems to the table. The big problem is the human mind, as designed by natural selection.

Indeed, the human mind is such a big problem, and such a convoluted one, that it's hard to state the problem in the abstract. Better to ill.u.s.trate it by example. One example lies along the borderline that has gotten so much attention since September 11, 2001: relations between Muslims on the one hand and Christians and Jews on the other-or, as it is sometimes oversimplified, between the "Muslim world" and the "West." (For reasons we'll come to, I'll look at this example from the vantage point of the "West," asking what westerners could do to ameliorate the situation-although, of course, ameliorative efforts are welcome, and required, from the other side as well.) You might not guess it to read the headlines, but by and large this relations.h.i.+p is non-zero-sum. To be sure, the relations.h.i.+p between some some Muslims and the West is zero-sum. Terrorist leaders have aims that are at odds with the welfare of westerners. The West's goal is to hurt their cause, to deprive them of new recruits and of political support. But if we take a broader view-look not at terrorists and their supporters but at Muslims in general, look not at radical Islam but at Islam-the "Muslim world" and the "West" are playing a non-zero-sum game; their fortunes are positively correlated. And the reason is that what's good for Muslims broadly is bad for radical Muslims. If Muslims get less happy with their place in the world, more resentful of their treatment by the West, support for radical Islam will grow, so things will get worse for the West. If, on the other hand, more and more Muslims feel respected by the West and feel they benefit from involvement with it, that will cut support for radical Islam, and westerners will be more secure from terrorism. Muslims and the West is zero-sum. Terrorist leaders have aims that are at odds with the welfare of westerners. The West's goal is to hurt their cause, to deprive them of new recruits and of political support. But if we take a broader view-look not at terrorists and their supporters but at Muslims in general, look not at radical Islam but at Islam-the "Muslim world" and the "West" are playing a non-zero-sum game; their fortunes are positively correlated. And the reason is that what's good for Muslims broadly is bad for radical Muslims. If Muslims get less happy with their place in the world, more resentful of their treatment by the West, support for radical Islam will grow, so things will get worse for the West. If, on the other hand, more and more Muslims feel respected by the West and feel they benefit from involvement with it, that will cut support for radical Islam, and westerners will be more secure from terrorism.

This isn't an especially arcane piece of logic. The basic idea is that terrorist leaders are the enemy and they thrive on the discontent of Muslims-and if what makes your enemy happy is the discontent of Muslims broadly, then you should favor their contentment. Obviously. Indeed this view has become conventional wisdom: if the West can win the "hearts and minds" of Muslims, it will have "drained the swamp" in which terrorists thrive. In that sense, there is widespread recognition in the West of the non-zero-sumdynamic.

But this recognition hasn't always led to sympathetic overtures from westerners toward Muslims. The influential evangelist Franklin Graham declared that Muslims don't wors.h.i.+p the same G.o.d as Christians and Jews and that Islam is a "very evil and wicked religion." That's no way to treat people you're in a non-zero-sum relations.h.i.+p with! And Graham is not alone. Lots of evangelical Christians and other westerners view Muslims with suspicion, and view relations between the West and the Muslim world as a "clash of civilizations." And many Muslims view the West in similarly win-lose terms.

So what's going on here? Where's the part of human nature that was on display in ancient times-the part that senses whether you're in the same boat as another group of people and, if you are, fosters sympathy for or at least tolerance of them?

It's in there somewhere, but it's misfiring. And one big reason is that our mental equipment for dealing with game-theoretical dynamics was designed for a hunter-gatherer environment, not for the modern world. That's why dealing with current events wisely requires strenuous mental effort-effort that ultimately, as it happens, could bring moral progress.

Processing the Clash of Civilizations.

If you are a Christian or Jew in, say, the United States, and you're trying to come to terms with the "Muslim world," much if not most of your input is electronic. You may not encounter many Muslims in real life, but you see them on TV. So your feelings toward Muslims in general depend largely on which Muslims wind up on TV.

For starters, there's Osama bin Laden. His interests are sharply opposed to America's interests, so if American minds are working as designed, they should sense this zero-sumness and react with antipathy and moral revulsion. And that is indeed the standard reaction.

And what about bin Laden's foot soldiers-the people who actually commit the acts of terrorism? If anything, the western relations.h.i.+p with them is even more unalterably zero-sum than with bin Laden. Bin Laden, after all, is at some level a rational actor. He seems to want to stay alive and hold on to prominence, and sometimes goals like that lead people toward compromise. Some terrorist foot soldiers don't even seem to want to stay alive. So certainly when westerners look at terrorists and view them with antipathy and intolerance, the mental equipment is working as designed: westerners are sensing a stubborn zero-sum dynamic and reacting aptly.

Of course, terrorists and their leaders are a pretty small subset of Muslims. If you're going to develop an att.i.tude toward the "Muslim world," it would be nice to have more data points. What other Muslims show up on TV? Well, there were the thousands of Muslims protesting in sometimes violent fas.h.i.+on the publication of cartoons of Muhammad. And every once in a while you see a clip of Iranian Muslims burning the American flag.

Here, too, the images evoke reactions of antipathy, and here, too, this reaction would seem to make sense. Surely burning a country's flag suggests that you see your relations.h.i.+p to it as antagonistic, as zero-sum-and that you're unlikely to warm up to it anytime soon. And people so fervent as to get riled up over a cartoon don't look like plausible negotiating partners, either. In mustering antipathy toward these seemingly confirmed foes, the mind is working as designed.

But is it working well? Is antipathy toward Muslims who seem opposed to western values, if not the West itself, really in the interest of westerners? Maybe not, for two reasons.

The first is fairly obvious. You could call it the Franklin Graham reason. Antipathy toward radical Muslims you see on TV could lead you to retaliate rhetorically in a broad-brush way and say things offensive to all Muslims. You might, for example, call Islam a "very evil and wicked religion." This may alienate Muslims who aren't yet cartoon protesters or flag burners but would be more likely to burn a flag post-alienation.

There's a second reason why antipathy toward flag burners and cartoon protesters may make for bad strategy, and it's less obvious.

If one of this book's main premises is correct-if scriptural interpretation is obedient to facts on the ground-then flag burners and cartoon protesters who are acting under the influence of radical religious ideas came under that influence for a reason. Somewhere in the past are facts that account for their interpretation of their faith. And even if that interpretation has become basically unshakable-even if every flag burner and cartoon protester is beyond changing-there would still be virtue in finding out what those facts are. After all, keeping more moderate Muslims from joining the ranks of the exercised would be nice, and knowing what circ.u.mstances made the exercised Muslims exercised might aid that task. By the same token, it would be nice to understand why suicide bombers become suicide bombers-not so we could help them become moderates (good luck!), but so we could keep moderates from becoming them.

And here is the problem with feeling antipathy toward those cartoon protesters, flag burners, and even suicide bombers. It isn't that pouring lots of sympathy on them would help things. (In some ways it could hurt.) It's that, because of the way the human mind is built, antipathy can impede comprehension. Hating protesters, flag burners, and even terrorists makes it harder to understand them well enough to keep others from joining their ranks.

Moral Imagination.

The way hatred blocks comprehension is by cramping our "moral imagination," our capacity to put ourselves in the shoes of another person. This cramping isn't unnatural. Indeed, the tendency of the moral imagination to shrink in the presence of enemies is built into our brains by natural selection. It's part of the machinery that leads us to grant tolerance and understanding to people we see in non-zero-sum terms and deny it to those we consign to the zero-sum category. We're naturally pretty good at putting ourselves in the shoes of close relatives and good friends (people who tend to have nonzero-sum links with us), and naturally bad at putting ourselves in the shoes of rivals and enemies (where zero-sumness is more common). We can't understand these people from the inside.

So what do things look like from the inside? Consider a case where an interior view is available-the case of a good friend. Your friend tells you about an arrogant prima donna at work who drives her nuts, and you are reminded of an arrogant prima donna in high school-the football star, the valedictorian-who drove you nuts. With a friend this process can be automatic: you scour your memory for shared points of reference and so vicariously feel her grievance. It's part of the deal that sustains your symbiotic relations.h.i.+p: you validate her gripes, she validates yours. You work toward a common perspective.

This is the work you aren't inclined to do with rivals and enemies. They complain about some arrogant prima donna, and you just can't relate. (Why are they such whiners?) And that's of course especially true when they say-as a rival or enemy might -that you are an arrogant prima donna. Then you certainly certainly aren't struck by the parallels with that prima donna in your high school. aren't struck by the parallels with that prima donna in your high school.

So too on the geopolitical stage: if you are a patriotic American, and people who are burning an American flag say America is arrogant, that prima donna probably won't spring to mind.

This doesn't mean you're at a loss to explain their behavior, or totally blind to their interior lives. When you see people burning flags and they look enraged, you can, even while hating them, correctly surmise that somewhere within them lies rage. You may also grant that flag burners perceive America as arrogant. But you don't relate relate to this perception, so you can still characterize them in unflattering terms. You say they are driven by "resentment" of American power and "envy" of American success. And, since envy and resentment aren't n.o.ble motivations, the moral coloration of the situation suggests it's the flag burners who are to blame. And because America isn't to blame, you resist the idea that it should change its behavior. to this perception, so you can still characterize them in unflattering terms. You say they are driven by "resentment" of American power and "envy" of American success. And, since envy and resentment aren't n.o.ble motivations, the moral coloration of the situation suggests it's the flag burners who are to blame. And because America isn't to blame, you resist the idea that it should change its behavior.

At this point in the discussion, if not sooner, an ominous question is often asked: Wait a minute-are you saying America is an arrogant prima donna? Are you saying that America, not the flag burner, is to blame for the burning of the flags? The question has even more bite if you're talking about terrorists: Are you saying America was to blame for 9/11? After all, that's what it would seem like if you really got inside the mind of a terrorist.

The short answer is no. But it's a "no" with an asterisk, a "no" in need of elaboration-and, since the elaboration is a bit arcane, I've relegated it to an online appendix. 1 1 It's recommended reading, because if you buy the argument it may radically alter your view of the world. But for now the point is just that the ability to It's recommended reading, because if you buy the argument it may radically alter your view of the world. But for now the point is just that the ability to intimately intimately comprehend someone's motivation-to share their experience virtually, and know it from the inside-depends on a moral imagination that naturally contracts in the case of people we consider rivals or enemies. comprehend someone's motivation-to share their experience virtually, and know it from the inside-depends on a moral imagination that naturally contracts in the case of people we consider rivals or enemies.

In other words, we have trouble achieving comprehension without achieving sympathy. And this puts us in a fix because, as we've seen, some people it is in our profound interest to comprehend-terrorists, for example-are people we're understandably reluctant to sympathize with. Enmity's natural impediment to understanding is, in a way, public enemy number one.

It's easy to explain the origins of this impediment in a conjectural way. Our brains evolved in a world of hunter-gatherer societies. In that world, morally charged disputes had Darwinian consequence. If you were in a bitter and public argument with a rival over who had wronged whom, the audience's verdict could affect your social status and your access to resources, both of which could affect your chances of getting genes into the next generation. So the ability to argue persuasively that your rival had no valid grounds for grievance would have been favored by natural selection, as would tendencies abetting this ability-such as a tendency to believe believe that your rival had no valid grounds for grievance, a belief that could infuse your argument with conviction. And nothing would so threaten this belief as the ability to look at things from a rival's point of view. that your rival had no valid grounds for grievance, a belief that could infuse your argument with conviction. And nothing would so threaten this belief as the ability to look at things from a rival's point of view.

In dealing with allies, on the other hand, a more expansive moral imagination makes sense. Since their fortunes are tied to yours-since you're in a non-zero-sum relations.h.i.+p-lending your support to their cause can be self-serving (and besides, it's part of the implicit deal through which they support your cause). So on some occasions, at least, we're pretty good at seeing the perspective of friends or relatives. It helps us argue for their interests-which, after all, overlap with our interests-and helps us bond with them by voicing sympathy for their plight.

In short, the moral imagination, like other parts of the human mind, is designed to steer us through the successful playing of games-to realize the gains of non-zero-sum games when those gains are to be had, and to get the better of the other party in zero-sum games. Indeed, the moral imagination is one of the main drivers of the pattern we've seen throughout the book: the tendency to find tolerance in one's religion when the people in question are people you can do business with and to find intolerance or even belligerence when you perceive the relations.h.i.+p to be instead zero-sum.

And now we see one curious residue of this machinery: our "understanding" of the motivations of others tends to come with a prepackaged moral judgment. our "understanding" of the motivations of others tends to come with a prepackaged moral judgment. Either we understand their motivation internally, even intimately-relate to them, extend moral imagination to them, and judge their grievances leniently-or we understand their motivation externally and in terms that imply the illegitimacy of their grievances. Pure understanding, uncolored by judgment, is hard to come by. Either we understand their motivation internally, even intimately-relate to them, extend moral imagination to them, and judge their grievances leniently-or we understand their motivation externally and in terms that imply the illegitimacy of their grievances. Pure understanding, uncolored by judgment, is hard to come by.

It might be nice if we could sever this link between comprehension and judgment, if we could understand people's behavior in more clinical terms-just see things from their point of view without attaching a verdict to their grievances. That might more closely approach the perspective of G.o.d and might also, to boot, allow us to better pursue our interests. We could coolly see when we're in a non-zero-sum relations.h.i.+p with someone, coolly appraise their perspective, and coolly decide to make those changes in our own behavior that could realize non-zero-sumness. But those of us who fail to attain Buddhahood will spend much of our lives locked into a more human perspective: we extend moral imagination to people to the extent that we see win-win possibilities with them.

Given this fact, the least we can do is ask that the machinery work as designed: that when we are in a non-zero-sum relations.h.i.+p with someone we do do extend moral imagination to them. That would better serve the interests of both parties and would steer us toward a truer understanding of the other-toward an understanding of what their world looks like from the inside. extend moral imagination to them. That would better serve the interests of both parties and would steer us toward a truer understanding of the other-toward an understanding of what their world looks like from the inside.