The Theological Tractates and The Consolation of Philosophy Part 7

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[65] possit _Vallinus_.

IV.

You must consider that all I have said so far has been for the purpose of marking the difference between Nature and Person, that is, [Greek: ousia] and [Greek: hupostasis]. The exact terms which should be applied in each case must be left to the decision of ecclesiastical usage. For the time being let that distinction between Nature and Person hold which I have affirmed, viz. that Nature is the specific property of any substance, and Person the individual substance of a rational nature.

Nestorius affirmed that in Christ Person was twofold, being led astray by the false notion that Person may be applied to every nature. For on this a.s.sumption, understanding that there were in Christ two natures, he declared that there were likewise two persons. And although the definition which we have already given is enough to prove Nestorius wrong, his error shall be further declared by the following argument. If the Person of Christ is not single, and if it is clear that there are in Him two natures, to wit, divine and human (and no one will be so foolish as to fail to include either in the definition), it follows that there must apparently be two persons; for Person, as has been said, is the individual substance of a rational nature.

What kind of union, then, between G.o.d and man has been effected? Is it as when two bodies are laid the one against the other, so that they are only joined locally, and no touch of the quality of the one reaches the other--the kind of union which the Greeks term [Greek: kata parathesin]

"by juxtaposition"? But if humanity has been united to divinity in this way no one thing has been formed out of the two, and hence Christ is nothing. The very name of Christ, indeed, denotes by its singular number a unity. But if the two persons continued and such a union of natures as we have above described took place, there could be no unity formed from two things, for nothing could ever possibly be formed out of two persons. Therefore Christ is, according to Nestorius, in no respect one, and therefore He is absolutely nothing. For what is not one cannot exist either; because Being and unity are convertible terms, and whatever is one is. Even things which are made up of many items, such as a heap or chorus, are nevertheless a unity. Now we openly and honestly confess that Christ is; therefore we say that Christ is a Unity. And if this is so, then without controversy the Person of Christ is one also. For if the Persons were two He could not be one; but to say that there are two Christs is nothing else than the madness of a distraught brain. Could Nestorius, I ask, dare to call the one man and the one G.o.d in Christ two Christs? Or why does he call Him Christ who is G.o.d, if he is also going to call Him Christ who is man, when his combination gives the two no common factor, no coherence? Why does he wrongly use the same name for two utterly different natures, when, if he is compelled to define Christ, he cannot, as he himself admits, apply the substance of one definition to both his Christs? For if the substance of G.o.d is different from that of man, and the one name of Christ applies to both, and the combination of different substances is not believed to have formed one Person, the name of Christ is equivocal[66] and cannot be comprised in one definition. But in what Scriptures is the name of Christ ever made double? Or what new thing has been wrought by the coming of the Saviour?

For the truth of the faith and the unwontedness of the miracle alike remain, for Catholics, unshaken. For how great and unprecedented a thing it is--unique and incapable of repet.i.tion in any other age--that the nature of Him who is G.o.d alone should come together with human nature which was entirely different from G.o.d to form from different natures by conjunction a single Person! But now, if we follow Nestorius, what happens that is new? "Humanity and divinity," quoth he, "keep their proper Persons." Well, when had not divinity and humanity each its proper Person? And when, we answer, will this not be so? Or wherein is the birth of Jesus more significant than that of any other child, if, the two Persons remaining distinct, the natures also were distinct? For while the Persons remained so there could no more be a union of natures in Christ than there could be in any other man with whose substance, be it never so perfect, no divinity was ever united because of the subsistence of his proper person. But for the sake of argument let him call Jesus, i.e. the human person, Christ, because through that person G.o.d wrought certain wonders. Agreed. But why should he call G.o.d Himself by the name of Christ? Why should he not go on to call the very elements by that name? For through them in their daily movements G.o.d works certain wonders. Is it because irrational substances cannot possess a Person enabling them to receive the name of Christ? Is not the operation of G.o.d seen plainly in men of holy life and notable piety? There will surely be no reason not to call the saints also by that name, if Christ taking humanity on Him is not one Person through conjunction. But perhaps he will say, "I allow that such men are called Christs, but it is because they are in the image of the true Christ." But if no one Person has been formed of the union of G.o.d and man, we shall consider all of them just as true Christs as Him who, we believe, was born of a Virgin. For no Person has been made one by the union of G.o.d and man either in Him or in them who by the Spirit of G.o.d foretold the coming Christ, for which cause they too were called Christs. So now it follows that so long as the Persons remain, we cannot in any wise believe that humanity has been a.s.sumed by divinity. For things which differ alike in persons and natures are certainly separate, nay absolutely separate; man and oxen are not further separate than are divinity and humanity in Christ, if the Persons have remained. Men indeed and oxen are united in one animal nature, for by genus they have a common substance and the same nature in the collection which forms the universal.[67] But G.o.d and man will be at all points fundamentally different if we are to believe that distinction of Persons continues under difference of nature. Then the human race has not been saved, the birth of Christ has brought us no salvation, the writings of all the prophets have but beguiled the people that believed in them, contempt is poured upon the authority of the whole Old Testament which promised to the world salvation by the birth of Christ. It is plain that salvation has not been brought us, if there is the same difference in Person that there is in Nature. No doubt He saved that humanity which we believe He a.s.sumed; but no a.s.sumption can be conceived, if the separation abides alike of Nature and of Person.

Hence that human nature which could not be a.s.sumed as long as the Person continued, will certainly and rightly appear incapable of salvation by the birth of Christ. Wherefore man's nature has not been saved by the birth of Christ--an impious conclusion.[68]

But although there are many weapons strong enough to wound and demolish the Nestorian view, let us for the moment be content with this small selection from the store of arguments available.

[66] Cf. the discussion of _aequiuoca_=[Greek: h.o.m.onumos] in _Isag.

Porph. Vide_ Brandt's Index.

[67] Vniuersalitas=[Greek: to katholou].

[68] For a similar _reductio ad absurdum_ ending in _quod nefas est_ see _Tr._ iii. (_supra_, p. 44) and _Cons._ v. 3 (_infra_, p. 374).

V.

Transeundum quippe est ad Eutychen qui c.u.m a ueterum orbitis esset euagatus, in contrarium cucurrit errorem a.s.serens tantum abesse, ut in Christo gemina persona credatur, ut ne naturam quidem in eo duplicem oporteat confiteri; ita quippe esse adsumptum hominem, ut ea sit adunatio facta c.u.m deo, ut natura humana non manserit. Huius error ex eodem quo Nestorii fonte prolabitur. Nam sicut Nestorius arbitratur non posse esse naturam duplicem quin persona fieret duplex, atque ideo, c.u.m in Christo naturam duplicem confiteretur, duplicem credidit esse personam, ita quoque Eutyches non putauit naturam duplicem esse sine duplicatione personae et c.u.m non confiteretur duplicem esse personam, arbitratus est consequens, ut una uideretur esse natura. Itaque Nestorius recte tenens duplicem in Christo esse naturam sacrilege confitetur duas esse personas; Eutyches uero recte credens unam esse personam impie credit unam quoque esse naturam. Qui conuictus euidentia rerum, quandoquidem manifestum est aliam naturam esse hominis aliam dei, ait duas se confiteri in Christo naturas ante adunationem, unam uero post adunationem. Quae sententia non aperte quod uult eloquitur. Vt tamen eius dementiam perscrutemur, adunatio haec aut tempore generationis facta est aut tempore resurrectionis. Sed si tempore generationis facta est, uidetur putare et ante generationem fuisse humanam carnem non a Maria sumptam sed aliquo modo alio praeparatam, Mariam uero uirginem appositam ex qua caro nasceretur quae ab ea sumpta non esset, illam uero carnem quae antea fuerit esse et diuisam atque a diuinitatis substantia separatam; c.u.m ex uirgine natus est, adunatum esse deo, ut una uideretur facta esse natura. Vel si haec eius sententia non est, illa esse poterit dicentis duas ante adunationem, unam post adunationem, si adunatio generatione perfecta est, ut corpus quidem a Maria sumpserit, sed, antequam sumeret, diuersam deitatis humanitatisque fuisse naturam; sumptam uero unam factam atque in diuinitatis cessisse substantiam. Quod si hanc adunationem non putat generatione sed resurrectione factam, rursus id duobus fieri arbitrabitur modis; aut enim genito Christo et non adsumente de Maria corpus aut adsumente ab eadem carnem, usque dum resurgeret quidem, duas fuisse naturas, post resurrectionem unam factam. De quibus illud disiunctum nascitur, quod interrogabimus hoc modo: natus ex Maria Christus aut ab ea carnem humanam traxit aut minime. Si non confitetur ex ea traxisse, dicat quo homine indutus aduenerit, utrumne eo qui deciderat praeuaricatione peccati an alio? Si eo de cuius semine ductus est h.o.m.o, quem uest.i.ta diuinitas est? Nam si ex semine Abrahae atque Dauid et postremo Mariae non fuit caro illa qua natus est, ostendat ex cuius hominis sit carne deriuatus, quoniam post primum hominem caro omnis humana ex humana carne deducitur. Sed si quem dixerit hominem a quo generatio sumpta sit saluatoris praeter Mariam uirginem, et ipse errore confundetur et adscribere mendacii notam summae diuinitati inlusus ipse uidebitur, quando quod Abrahae atque Dauid promitt.i.tur in sanctis diuinationibus, ut ex eorum semine toti mundo salus oriatur, aliis distribuit, c.u.m praesertim, si humana caro sumpta est, non ab alio sumi potuerit nisi unde etiam procreabatur. Si igitur a Maria non est sumptum corpus humanum sed a quolibet alio, per Mariam tamen est procreatum quod fuerat praeuaricatione corruptum, superius dicto repellitur argumento. Quod si non eo homine Christus indutus est qui pro peccati poena sustinuerat mortem, illud eueniet ex nullius hominis semine talem potuisse nasci qui fuerit sine originalis poena peccati. Ex nullo igitur talis sumpta est caro; unde fit ut nouiter uideatur esse formata. Sed haec aut ita hominum uisa est oculis, ut humanum putaretur corpus quod reuera non esset humanum, quippe quod nulli originali subiaceret poenae, aut noua quaedam uera nec poenae peccati subiacens originalis ad tempus hominis natura formata est? Si uerum hominis corpus non fuit, aperte arguitur ment.i.ta diuinitas, quae ostenderet hominibus corpus, quod c.u.m uerum non esset, tum fallerentur ii[69] qui uerum esse arbitrarentur. At si noua ueraque non ex homine sumpta caro formata est, quo tanta tragoedia generationis? Vbi ambitus pa.s.sionis? Ego quippe ne in homine quidem non stulte fieri puto quod inutiliter factum est. Ad quam uero utilitatem facta probabitur tanta humilitas diuinitatis, si h.o.m.o qui periit generatione ac pa.s.sione Christi saluatus non est, quoniam negatur adsumptus? Rursus igitur sicut ab eodem Nestorii fonte Eutychis error principium sumpsit, ita ad eundem finem relabitur, ut secundum Eutychen quoque non sit saluatum genus humanum, quoniam non is qui aeger esset et saluatione curaque egeret, adsumptus est. Traxisse autem hanc sententiam uidetur, si tamen huius erroris fuit ut crederet non fuisse corpus Christi uere ex homine sed extra atque adeo in caelo formatum, quoniam c.u.m eo in caelum creditur ascendisse. Quod exemplum continet tale: "non ascendit in caelum, nisi qui de caelo descendit."

[69] hii _uel_ hi _codd._

V.

I must now pa.s.s to Eutyches who, wandering from the path of primitive doctrine, has rushed into the opposite error[70] and a.s.serts that so far from our having to believe in a twofold Person in Christ, we must not even confess a double Nature; humanity, he maintains, was so a.s.sumed that the union with G.o.dhead involved the disappearance of the human nature. His error springs from the same source as that of Nestorius. For just as Nestorius deems there could not be a double Nature unless the Person were doubled, and therefore, confessing the double Nature in Christ, has perforce believed the Person to be double, so also Eutyches deemed that the Nature was not double unless the Person was double, and since he did not confess a double Person, he thought it a necessary consequence that the Nature should be regarded as single. Thus Nestorius, rightly holding Christ's Nature to be double, sacrilegiously professes the Persons to be two; whereas Eutyches, rightly believing the Person to be single, impiously believes that the Nature also is single.

And being confuted by the plain evidence of facts, since it is clear that the Nature of G.o.d is different from that of man, he declares his belief to be: two Natures in Christ before the union and only one after the union. Now this statement does not express clearly what he means.

However, let us scrutinize his extravagance. It is plain that this union took place either at the moment of conception or at the moment of resurrection. But if it happened at the moment of conception, Eutyches seems to think that even before conception He had human flesh, not taken from Mary but prepared in some other way, while the Virgin Mary was brought in to give birth to flesh that was not taken from her; that this flesh, which already existed, was apart and separate from the substance of divinity, but that when He was born of the Virgin it was united to G.o.d, so that the Nature seemed to be made one. Or if this be not his opinion, since he says that there were two Natures before the union and one after, supposing the union to be established by conception, an alternative view may be that Christ indeed took a body from Mary but that before He took it the Natures of G.o.dhead and manhood were different: but the Nature a.s.sumed became one with that of G.o.dhead into which it pa.s.sed. But if he thinks that this union was effected not by conception but by resurrection, we shall have to a.s.sume that this too happened in one of two ways; either Christ was conceived and did _not_ a.s.sume a body from Mary or He _did_ a.s.sume flesh from her, and there were (until indeed He rose) two Natures which became one after the Resurrection. From these alternatives a dilemma arises which we will examine as follows: Christ who was born of Mary either did or did not take human flesh from her. If Eutyches does not admit that He took it from her, then let him say what manhood He put on to come among us--that which had fallen through sinful disobedience or another? If it was the manhood of that man from whom all men descend, what manhood did divinity invest? For if that flesh in which He was born came not of the seed of Abraham and of David and finally of Mary, let Eutyches show from what man's flesh he descended, since, after the first man, all human flesh is derived from human flesh. But if he shall name any child of man beside Mary the Virgin as the cause of the conception of the Saviour, he will both be confounded by his own error, and, himself a dupe, will stand accused of stamping with falsehood the very G.o.dhead for thus transferring to others the promise of the sacred oracles made to Abraham and David[71] that of their seed salvation should arise for all the world, especially since if human flesh was taken it could not be taken from any other but Him of whom it was begotten. If, therefore, His human body was not taken from Mary but from any other, yet that was engendered through Mary which had been corrupted by disobedience, Eutyches is confuted by the argument already stated. But if Christ did not put on that manhood which had endured death in punishment for sin, it will result that of no man's seed could ever one have been born who should be, like Him, without punishment for original sin. Therefore flesh like His was taken from no man, whence it would appear to have been new- formed for the purpose. But did this flesh then either so appear to human eyes that the body was deemed human which was not really human, because it was not subject to any primal penalty, or was some new true human flesh formed as a makes.h.i.+ft, not subject to the penalty for original sin? If it was not a truly human body, the G.o.dhead is plainly convicted of falsehood for displaying to men a body which was not real and thus deceived those who thought it real. But if flesh had been formed new and real and not taken from man, to what purpose was the tremendous tragedy of the conception? Where the value of His long Pa.s.sion? I cannot but consider foolish even a human action that is useless. And to what useful end shall we say this great humiliation of Divinity was wrought if ruined man has not been saved by the conception and the Pa.s.sion of Christ--for they denied that he was taken into G.o.dhead? Once more then, just as the error of Eutyches took its rise from the same source as that of Nestorius, so it hastens to the same goal inasmuch as according to Eutyches also the human race has not been saved,[72] since man who was sick and needed health and salvation was not taken into G.o.dhead. Yet this is the conclusion he seems to have drawn, if he erred so deeply as to believe that Christ's body was not taken really from man but from a source outside him and prepared for the purpose in heaven, for He is believed to have ascended with it up into heaven. Which is the meaning of the text: none hath ascended into heaven save Him who came down from heaven.

[70] The ecclesiastical _uia media_, with the relegation of opposing theories to the extremes, which meet in a common fount of falsity, owes something to Aristotle and to our author. _Vide infra_, p. 118.

[71] The use of this kind of argument by Boethius allays any suspicion as to the genuineness of _Tr_. iv. which might be caused by the use of allegorical interpretation therein. Note also that in the _Consolatio_ the framework is allegory, which is also freely applied in the details.

[72] Another _reductio ad absurdum_ or _ad impietatem_, cf. _supra_, p.

98, note b.

VI.

Sed satis de ea parte dictum uidetur, si corpus quod Christus excepit ex Maria non credatur adsumptum. Si uero adsumptum est ex Maria neque permansit perfecta humana diuinaque natura, id tribus effici potuit modis: aut enim diuinitas in humanitatem translata est aut humanitas in diuinitatem aut utraeque in se ita temperatae sunt atque commixtae, ut neutra substantia propriam formam teneret. Sed si diuinitas in humanitatem translata est, factum est, quod credi nefas est, ut humanitate inmutabili substantia permanente diuinitas uerteretur et quod pa.s.sibile atque mutabile naturaliter exsisteret, id inmutabile permaneret, quod uero inmutabile atque inpa.s.sibile naturaliter creditur, id in rem mutabilem uerteretur. Hoc igitur fieri nulla ratione contingit. Sed humana forsitan natura in deitatem uideatur esse conuersa. Hoc uero qui fieri potest, si diuinitas in generatione Christi et humanam animam suscepit et corpus? Non enim omnis res in rem omnem uerti ac trans.m.u.tari potest. Nam c.u.m substantiarum aliae sint corporeae, aliae incorporeae, neque corporea in incorpoream neque incorporea in eam quae corpus est mutari potest, nec uero incorporea in se inuicem formas proprias mutant; sola enim mutari transformarique in se possunt quae habent unius materiae commune subiectum, nec haec omnia, sed ea quae in se et facere et pati possunt. Id uero probatur hoc modo: neque enim potest aes in lapidem permutari nec uero idem aes in herbam nec quodlibet aliud corpus in quodlibet aliud transfigurari potest, nisi et eadem sit materia rerum in se transeuntium et a se et facere et pati possint, ut, c.u.m uinum atque aqua miscentur, utraque sunt talia quae actum sibi pa.s.sionemque communicent. Potest enim aquae qualitas a uini qualitate aliquid pati; potest item uini ab aquae qualitate aliquid pati. Atque idcirco si multum quidem fuerit aquae, uini uero paululum, non dic.u.n.tur inmixta, sed alterum alterius qualitate corrumpitur. Si quis enim uinum fundat in mare, non mixtum est mari uinum sed in mare corruptum, idcirco quoniam qualitas aquae mult.i.tudine sui corporis nihil pa.s.sa est a qualitate uini, sed potius in se ipsam uini qualitatem propria mult.i.tudine commutauit. Si uero sint mediocres sibique aequales uel paulo inaequales naturae quae a se facere et pati possunt, illae miscentur et mediocribus inter se qualitatibus temperantur. Atque haec quidem in corporibus neque his omnibus, sed tantum quae a se, ut dictum est, et facere et pati possunt communi atque eadem materia subiecta. Omne enim corpus quod in generatione et corruptione subsist.i.t communem uidetur habere materiam, sed non omne ab omni uel in omni uel facere aliquid uel pati potest. Corpora uero in incorporea nulla ratione poterunt permutari, quoniam nulla communi materia subiecta partic.i.p.ant quae susceptis qualitatibus in alterutram permutetur.

Omnis enim natura incorporeae substantiae nullo materiae nit.i.tur fundamento; nullum uero corpus est cui non sit materia subiecta. Quod c.u.m ita sit c.u.mque ne ea quidem quae communem materiam naturaliter habent in se transeant, nisi illis adsit potestas in se et a se faciendi ac patiendi, multo magis in se non permutabuntur quibus non modo communis materia non est, sed c.u.m alia res materiae fundamento nit.i.tur ut corpus, alia omnino materiae subiecto non egeat ut incorporeum.

Non igitur fieri potest, ut corpus in incorporalem speciem permutetur, nec uero fieri potest, ut incorporalia in sese commixtione aliqua permutentur.

Quorum enim communis nulla materia est, nec in se uerti ac permutari queunt. Nulla autem est incorporalibus materia rebus; non poterunt igitur in se inuicem permutari. Sed anima et deus incorporeae substantiae recte creduntur; non est igitur humana anima in diuinitatem a qua adsumpta est permutata. Quod si neque corpus neque anima in diuinitatem potuit uerti, nullo modo fieri potuit, ut humanitas conuerteretur in deum. Multo minus uero credi potest, ut utraque in sese confunderentur, quoniam neque incorporalitas transire ad corpus potest neque rursus e conuerso corpus ad incorporalitatem, quando quidem nulla his materia subiecta communis est quae alterutris substantiarum qualitatibus permutetur.

At hi ita aiunt ex duabus quidem naturis Christum consistere, in duabus uero minime, hoc scilicet intendentes, quoniam quod ex duabus consist.i.t ita unum fieri potest, ut illa ex quibus dicitur constare non maneant; ueluti c.u.m mel aquae confunditur neutrum manet, sed alterum alterius copulatione corruptum quiddam tertium fecit, ita illud quidem quod ex melle atque aqua tertium fit constare ex utrisque dicitur, in utrisque uero negatur. Non enim poterit in utrisque constare, quando utrorumque natura non permanet.

Ex utrisque enim constare potest, licet ea ex quibus coniungitur alterutra qualitate corrupta sint; in utrisque uero huiusmodi constare non poterit, quoniam ea quae in se transfusa sunt non manent ac non sunt utraque in quibus constare uideatur, c.u.m ex utrisque constet in se inuicem qualitatum mutatione transfusis.

Catholici uero utrumque rationabiliter confitentur, nam et ex utrisque naturis Christum et in utrisque consistere. Sed id qua ratione dicatur, paulo posterius explicabo. Nunc illud est manifestum conuictam esse Eutychis sententiam eo nomine, quod c.u.m tribus modis fieri possit, ut ex duabus naturis una subsistat, ut aut diuinitas in humanitatem translata sit aut humanitas in diuinitatem aut utraque permixta sint, nullum horum modum fieri potuisse superius dicta argumentatione declaratur.

VI.

I think enough has been said on the supposition that we should believe that the body which Christ received was not taken from Mary. But if it was taken from Mary and the human and divine natures did not continue, each in its perfection, this may have happened in one of three ways.

Either G.o.dhead was translated into manhood, or manhood into G.o.dhead, or both were so modified and mingled that neither substance kept its proper form. But if G.o.dhead was translated into manhood, that has happened which piety forbids us to believe, viz. while the manhood continued in unchangeable substance G.o.dhead was changed, and that which was by nature pa.s.sible and mutable remained immutable, while that which we believe to be by nature immutable and impa.s.sible was changed into a mutable thing.

This cannot happen on any show of reasoning. But perchance the human nature may seem to be changed into G.o.dhead. Yet how can this be if G.o.dhead in the conception of Christ received both human soul and body?

Things cannot be promiscuously changed and interchanged. For since some substances are corporeal and others incorporeal, neither can a corporeal substance be changed into an incorporeal, nor can an incorporeal be changed into that which is body, nor yet incorporeals interchange their proper forms; for only those things can be interchanged and transformed which possess the common substrate of the same matter, nor can all of these so behave, but only those which can act upon and be acted on by each other. Now this is proved as follows: bronze can no more be converted into stone than it can be into gra.s.s, and generally no body can be transformed into any other body unless the things which pa.s.s into each other have a common matter and can act upon and be acted on by each other, as when wine and water are mingled both are of such a nature as to allow reciprocal action and influence. For the quality of water can be influenced in some degree by that of wine, similarly the quality of wine can be influenced by that of water. And therefore if there be a great deal of water but very little wine, they are not said to be mingled, but the one is ruined by the quality of the other. For if you pour wine into the sea the wine is not mingled with the sea but is lost in the sea, simply because the quality of the water owing to its bulk has been in no way affected by the quality of the wine, but rather by its own bulk has changed the quality of the wine into water. But if the natures which are capable of reciprocal action and influence are in moderate proportion and equal or only slightly unequal, they are really mingled and tempered by the qualities which are in moderate relation to each other. This indeed takes place in bodies but not in all bodies, but only in those, as has been said, which are capable of reciprocal action and influence and have the same matter subject to their qualities. For all bodies which subsist in conditions of birth and decay seem to possess a common matter, but all bodies are not capable of reciprocal action and influence. But corporeals cannot in any way be changed into incorporeals because they do not share in any common underlying matter which can be changed into this or that thing by taking on its qualities.

For the nature of no incorporeal substance rests upon a material basis; but there is no body that has not matter as a substrate. Since this is so, and since not even those things which naturally have a common matter can pa.s.s over into each other unless they have the power of acting on each other and being acted upon by each other, far more will those things not suffer interchange which not only have no common matter but are different in substance, since one of them, being body, rests on a basis of matter, while the other, being incorporeal, cannot possibly stand in need of a material substrate.

It is therefore impossible for a body to be changed into an incorporeal species, nor will it ever be possible for incorporeals to be changed into each other by any process of mingling. For things which have no common matter cannot be changed and converted one into another. But incorporeal things have no matter; they can never, therefore, be changed about among themselves. But the soul and G.o.d are rightly believed to be incorporeal substances; therefore the human soul has not been converted into the G.o.dhead by which it was a.s.sumed. But if neither body nor soul can be turned into G.o.dhead, it could not possibly happen that manhood should be transformed into G.o.d. But it is much less credible that the two should be confounded together since neither can incorporality pa.s.s over to body, nor again, contrariwise, can body pa.s.s over into incorporality when these have no common matter underlying them which can be converted by the qualities of one of two substances.

But the Eutychians say that Christ consists indeed of two natures, but not in two natures, meaning, no doubt, thereby, that a thing which consists of two elements can so far become one, that the elements of which it is said to be made up disappear; just as, for example, when honey is mixed with water neither remains, but the one thing being spoilt by conjunction with the other produces a certain third thing, so that third thing which is produced by the combination of honey and water is said to consist of both, but not in both. For it can never consist in both so long as the nature of both does not continue. For it can consist of both even though each element of which it is compounded has been spoiled by the quality of the other; but it can never consist in both natures of this kind since the elements which have been trans.m.u.ted into each other do not continue, and both the elements in which it seems to consist cease to be, since it consists of two things translated into each other by change of qualities.

But Catholics in accordance with reason confess both, for they say that Christ consists both of and in two natures. How this can be affirmed I will explain a little later. One thing is now clear; the opinion of Eutyches has been confuted on the ground that, although there are three ways by which the one nature can subsist of the two, viz. either the translation of divinity into humanity or of humanity into divinity or the compounding of both together, the foregoing train of reasoning proves that no one of the three ways is a possibility.

VII.

Restat ut, quemadmodum catholica fides dicat, et in utrisque naturis Christum et ex utrisque consistere doceamus.

Ex utrisque naturis aliquid consistere duo significat: unum quidem, c.u.m ita dicimus aliquid ex duabus naturis iungi sicut ex melle atque aqua, id autem est ut ex quolibet modo confusis, uel si una uertatur in alteram uel si utraeque in se inuicem misceantur, nullo modo tamen utraeque permaneant; secundum hunc modum Eutyches ait ex utrisque naturis Christum consistere.

Alter uero modus est ex utrisque consistendi quod ita ex duabus iunctum est, ut illa tamen ex quibus iunctum esse dicitur maneant nec in alterutra uertantur, ut c.u.m dicimus coronam ex auro gemmisque compositam. Hic neque aurum in gemmas translatum est neque in aurum gemma conuersa, sed utraque permanent nec formam propriam derelinquunt. Talia ergo ex aliquibus constantia et in his constare dicimus ex quibus consistere praedicantur.

Tunc enim possumus dicere coronam gemmis auroque consistere; sunt enim gemmae atque aurum in quibus corona consistat. Nam in priore modo non est mel atque aqua in quibus illud quod ex utrisque iungitur constet. c.u.m igitur utrasque manere naturas in Christo fides catholica confiteatur perfectasque easdem persistere nec alteram in alteram trans.m.u.tari, iure dicit et in utrisque naturis Christum et ex utrisque consistere: in utrisque quidem, quia manent utraeque, ex utrisque uero, quia utrarumque adunatione manentium una persona fit Christi. Non autem secundum eam significationem ex utrisque naturis Christum iunctum esse fides catholica tenet, secundum quam Eutyches p.r.o.nuntiat. Nam ille talem significationem coniunctionis ex utraque natura sumit, ut non confiteatur in utrisque consistere, neque enim utrasque manere; catholicus uero eam significationem ex utrisque consistendi sumit quae illi sit proxima eamque conseruet quae in utrisque consistere confitetur.

Aequiuoc.u.m igitur est "ex utrisque consistere" ac potius amphibolum et gemina significatione diuersa designans: una quidem significatione non manere substantias ex quibus illud quod copulatum est dicatur esse coniunctum, alio modo significans ita ex utrisque coniunctum, ut utraque permaneant.

The Theological Tractates and The Consolation of Philosophy Part 7

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