A Character of King Charles the Second Part 3

Neither _King_ nor _People_ would now like just the _original Const.i.tution_, without any varyings.

If Kings are only answerable to G.o.d, that doth not secure them even in this World; since if G.o.d upon the Appeal thinketh fit not to stay, he maketh the People his Instruments.

I am persuaded that where ever any single Man had Power to do himself right upon a _deceitful Trustee_, he would do it. That Thought well digested would go a great way towards the discouraging Invasions upon Rights, _&c._

I lay down then as a Fundamental, 1st, that in every Const.i.tution there is _some Power_ which neither will nor ought to be bounded.

2. That the King's Prerogative should be as _plain_ a thing as the People's Obedience.

3. That a Power which may by parity of Reason destroy the whole Laws, can never be reserved by the Laws.

4. That in all limited Governments it must give the Governor Power to _hurt_, but it can never be so interpreted as to give him Power to _destroy_, for then in effect it would cease to be a limited Government.

5. That Severity be rare and great; for as _Tacitus_ sayeth of _Nero_, "Frequent Punishments made the People call even his Justice Cruelty."

6. That it is necessary to make the Instruments of Power easy; for Power is hard enough to be digested by those under it at the best.

7. That the People are never so perfectly backed, but that they will kick and sting if not stroked at seasonable times.

8. That a Prince must think if he loseth his People he can never regain them.

It is both wise and safe to think so.

9. That Kings a.s.suming Prerogative teach the People to do so too.

10. That Perogative is a Trust.

11. That they are not the _King_'s Laws, nor the _Parliament_'s Laws, but the _Laws of England_, in which after they have pa.s.sed by the Legislative Power, the People have the _Property_, and the King the _Executive_ part.

12. That no Abilities should qualify a noted Knave to be employed in Business. A Knave can by none of his Dexterities make amends for the Scandal he bringeth upon the Crown.

13. That those who will not be bound by the _Laws_, rely upon _Crimes_: a third way was never found in the World to secure any Government.

14. That a Seaman be a Seaman; a Cabinet-Counsellor a Man of Business; an Officer, an Officer.

15. In corrupted Governments the Place is given for the sake of the Man; in good ones the Man is chosen for the sake of the Place.

16. That Crowds at Court are made up of such as would deceive: The _real Wors.h.i.+ppers_ are few.

17. That _Salus Populi_ is the greatest of all Fundamentals, yet not altogether an immoveable one. It is a Fundamental for a s.h.i.+p to ride at Anchor when it is in Port, but if a Storm cometh the Cable must be cut.

18. _Property_ is not a fundamental Right in one Sense, because in the beginning of the World there was none, so that Property itself was an Innovation introduced by Laws.

Property is only secured by trusting it in the best Hands, and those are generally chosen who are least likely to deceive; but if they should, they have a legal Authority to abuse as well as use the Power with which they are trusted, and there is no Fundamental can stand in their way, or be allowed as an Exception to the Authority that was vested in them.

19. _Magna Charta_ would fain be made to pa.s.s for a Fundamental; and Sir _Edward c.o.ke_ would have it, that the Grand Charter was for the most part declaratory of the princ.i.p.al Grounds of the fundamental Laws of _England_.

If that referreth to the Common Law, it must be made out that every thing in _Magna Charta_ is always and at all times necessary in itself to be kept, or else the denying a subsequent Parliament the Right of repealing any Law doth by consequence deny the preceding Parliament the Right of making it. But they are fain to say it was only a declarative Law, which is very hard to be proved. Yet suppose it, you must either make the Common Law so stated a thing that all Men know it before-hand, or else universally acquiesce in it whenever it is alledged, from the Affinity it hath to the Law of Nature. Now I would fain know whether the Common Law is capable of being defined, and whether it doth not hover in the Clouds like the Prerogative, and bolteth out like Lightening to be made use of for some particular Occasion? If so, the Government of the World is left to a thing that cannot be defined; and if it cannot be defined, you know not what it is; so that the supream Appeal is, we know not what. We submit to G.o.d Almighty though he is incomprehensible, and yet He hath set down His Methods; but for this World, there can be no Government without a stated Rule, and a Supream Power not to be controled neither by the Dead nor the Living.

The Laws under the Protection of the King govern in the ordinary Administration; the extraordinary Power is in Acts of Parliament, from whence there can be no Appeal but to the same Power at another time.

To say a Power is Supream, and not Arbitrary, is not Sense. It is acknowledg'd Supream, and therefore, _&c._

If the Common Law is Supream, then those are so who judge what is the Common Law; and if none but the Parliament can judge so, there is an end of the Controversy; there is no _Fundamental_; for the Parliament may judge as they please, that is, they have the Authority, but they may judge against Right, their Power is good, though their Act is ill; no good Man will outwardly resist the one, or inwardly approve the other.

There is then no other Fundamental, but that _every Supream Power must be Arbitrary_.

Fundamental is a Word used by the Laity, as the Word Sacred is by the Clergy, to fix every thing to themselves they have a mind to keep; that n.o.body else may touch it.

_Of_ PRINCES.

A Prince who will not undergo the Difficulty of Understanding, must undergo the Danger of Trusting.

A wise Prince may gain such an Influence, that his Countenance would be the last Appeal. Where it is not so in some degree, his Authority is precarious.

A Prince must keep up the Power of his Countenance, which is not the least of his Prerogatives.

The Conscience, as well as the Prerogative of a King, must be restrained or loosened as is best for his People.

It may without Scandal be made of stretching Leather, but it must be drawn by a steady Hand.

A King that lets Intercession prevail, will not be long wors.h.i.+pped.

A Prince used to War getteth a military Logick that is not very well suited to the Civil Administration.

If he maketh War successfully, he groweth into a Demi-G.o.d; if without Success, the World throweth him as much below Humanity as they had before set him above it.

A Hero must be sometimes allowed to make bold Strokes, without being fettered by strict Reason.

He is to have some generous Irregularities in his Reasoning, or else he will not be a good Thing of his Kind.

PRINCES (_their Rewards of Servants_).

When a Prince giveth any Man a very extravagant Reward, it looketh as if it was rather for an ill thing than a good one.

Both the Giver and Receiver are out of countenance where they are ill suited, and ill applyed.

Serving Princes will make Men proud at first, and humble at last.

Resolving to serve well, and at the same time resolving to please, is generally resolving to do what is not to be done.

A Man that will serve well must often rule the Master so hard that it will hurt him.

It is thought an unsociable Quality in a Court to do ones Duty better than other Men.

Nothing is less forgiven than setting Patterns Men have no mind to follow.