Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism Part 6

Diogenes gives in part the same ill.u.s.trations of this Trope, but in a much more condensed form. The marked characteristic of this train of reasoning is the attempt to prove that abnormal conditions are also natural. In referring at first to the opposing states of body and mind, which so change the character of sense-perception, s.e.xtus cla.s.sifies them according to the popular usage as [Greek: kata physin] and [Greek: para physin].

This distinction was an important one, even with Aristotle, and was especially developed by the Stoics[1] in a broader sense than referring merely to health and sickness. The Stoics, however, considered only normal conditions as being according to nature. s.e.xtus, on the contrary, declares that abnormal states are also conditions according to nature,[2] and just as those who are in health are in a state that is natural to those who are in health, so also those not in health are in a state that is natural to those not in health, and in some respects according to nature. Existence, then, and non-existence are not absolute, but relative, and the world of sleep as really exists for those who are asleep as the things that exist in waking exist, although they do not exist in sleep.[3] One mental representation, therefore, cannot be judged by another, which is also in a state of relation to existing physical and mental conditions. Diogenes states this principle even more decidedly in his exposition of this Trope. "The insane are not in a condition opposed to nature; why they more than we? For we also see the sun as if it were stationary."[4] Furthermore, in different periods of life ideas differ. Children are fond of b.a.l.l.s and hoops, while those in their prime prefer other things, and the aged still others.[5] The wisdom contained in this Trope in reference to the relative value of the things most sought after is not original with s.e.xtus, but is found in the more earnest ethical teachings of older writers. s.e.xtus does not, however, draw any moral conclusions from this reasoning, but only uses it as an argument for [Greek: epoche].

[1] Diog. VII. 1, 86.

[2] _Hyp._ I. 103.

[3] _Hyp._ I. 104.

[4] Diog. IX. 11, 82.

[5] _Hyp._ I. 106.

_The Fifth Trope_. This Trope leaves the discussion of the dependence of the ideas upon the physical nature, and takes up the influence of the environment upon them. It makes the difference in ideas depend upon the position, distance, and place of objects, thus taking apparently their real existence for granted. Things change their form and shape according to the distance from which they are observed, and the position in which they stand.[1]

The same light or tone alters decidedly in different surroundings. Perspective in paintings depends on the angle at which the picture is suspended.[2] With Diogenes this Trope is the seventh,[3] and his exposition of it is similar, but as usual, shorter. Both s.e.xtus and Diogenes give the ill.u.s.tration[4] of the neck of the dove differing in color in different degrees of inclination, an ill.u.s.tration used by Protagoras also to prove the relativity of perception by the senses. "The black neck of the dove in the shade appears black, but in the light sunny and purple."[5] Since, then, all phenomena are regarded in a certain place, and from a certain distance, and according to a certain position, each of which relations makes a great difference with the mental images, we shall be obliged also by this Trope to come to the reserving of the opinion.[6]

[1] _Hyp._ I. 118.

[2] _Hyp._ I. 120.

[3] Diog. IX. 11, 85.

[4] _Hyp._ I. 120; Diog. IX. 11, 86.

[5] _Schol. zu Arist._ 60, 18, ed. Brandis; Pappen. _Er.

Pyrr. Grundzuge_, p. 54.

[6] _Hyp._ I. 121.

_The Sixth Trope_. This Trope leads to [Greek: epoche] regarding the nature of objects, because no object can ever be presented to the organs of sense directly, but must always be perceived through some medium, or in some mixture.[1] This mixture may be an outward one, connected with the temperature, or the rarity of the air, or the water[2] surrounding an object, or it may be a mixture resulting from the different humors of the sense-organs.[3] A man with the jaundice, for example, sees colors differently from one who is in health. The ill.u.s.tration of the jaundice is a favorite one with the Sceptics. Diogenes uses it several times in his presentation of Scepticism, and it occurs in s.e.xtus' writings in all, as an ill.u.s.tration, in eight different places.[4] The condition of the organ of the [Greek: hegemonikon], or the ruling faculty, may also cause mixtures.

Pappenheim thinks that we have here Kant's idea of _a priori_, only on a materialistic foundation.[5] A careful consideration of the pa.s.sage, however, shows us that s.e.xtus' thought is more in harmony with the discoveries of modern psychiatry than with the philosophy of Kant. If the sentence, [Greek: isos de kai aute (he dianoia) epimixian tina idian poieitai pros ta hypo ton aistheseon anangellomena],[6] stood alone, without further explanation, it might well refer to _a priori_ laws of thought, but the explanation which follows beginning with "because" makes that impossible.[7] "Because in each of the places where the Dogmatics think that the ruling faculty is, we see present certain humors, which are the cause of mixtures." s.e.xtus does not advance any opinion as to the place of the ruling faculty in the body, which is, according to the Stoics, the princ.i.p.al part of the soul, where ideas, desires, and reasoning originate,[8]

but simply refers to the two theories of the Dogmatics, which claim on the one hand that it is in the brain, and on the other that it is in the heart.[9] This subject he deals with more fully in his work against logic.[10] As, however, he bases his argument, in discussing possible intellectual mixtures in ill.u.s.tration of the sixth Trope, entirely on the condition of the organ of the intellect, it is evident that his theory of the soul was a materialistic one.

[1] _Hyp._ I. 124.

[2] _Hyp._ I. 125.

[3] _Hyp._ I. 126.

[4] See Index to Bekker's edition of s.e.xtus.

[5] Papp. _Er. Pyr. Gr._ p. 55.

[6] _Hyp._ I. 128.

[7] _Hyp._ I. 128.

[8] Diog. VII. 1, 159.

[9] _Hyp._ I. 128.

[10] _Adv. Math._ VII. 313.

_The Seventh Trope_. This Trope, based upon the quant.i.ties and compositions of objects, is ill.u.s.trated by examples of different kinds of food, drink, and medicine, showing the different effects according to the quant.i.ty taken, as the harmfulness and the usefulness of most things depend on their quant.i.ty. Things act differently upon the senses if applied in small or large quant.i.ties, as filings of metal or horn, and separate grains of sand have a different color and touch from the same taken in the form of a solid.[1] The result is that ideas vary according to the composition of the object, and this Trope also brings to confusion the existence of outward objects, and leads us to reserve our opinion in regard to them.[2] This Trope is ill.u.s.trated by Diogenes with exceeding brevity.[3]

[1] _Hyp._ I. 129-131.

[2] _Hyp._ I. 134.

[3] Diog. IX. 11, 86.

_The Eighth Trope_. The Trope based upon relation contains, as s.e.xtus rightly remarks, the substance of the other nine,[1] for the general statement of the relativity of knowledge includes the other statements made. The prominence which s.e.xtus gave this Trope in his introduction to the ten Tropes leads one to expect here new ill.u.s.trations and added[2] arguments for [Greek: epoche]. We find, however, neither of these, but simply a statement that all things are in relation in one of two ways, either directly, or as being a part of a difference. These two kinds of relation are given by Protagoras, and might have been used to good purpose in the introduction to the Tropes, or at the end, to prove that all the others were really subordinate to the eighth. The reasoning is, however simply applied to the relation of objects to each other, and nothing is added that is not found elsewhere where as an argument for [Greek: epoche].[3]

This Trope is the tenth by Diogenes, and he strengthens his reasoning in regard to it, by a statement that s.e.xtus does not directly make, _i.e._, that everything is in relation to the understanding.[4]

[1] _Hyp._ I. 39.

[2] _Hyp._ I. 135-140.

[3] _Hyp._ I. 135-140.

[4] Diog. IX. 11, 88.

_The Ninth Trope_. This is based upon the frequency and rarity of events, and refers to some of the phenomena of nature, such as the rising of the sun, and the sea, as no longer a source of astonishment, while a comet or an earthquake are wonders to those not accustomed to them.[1] The value of objects also depends on their rarity, as for example the value of gold.[2]

Furthermore, things may be valuable at one time, and at another not so, according to the frequency and rarity of the occurrence.[3] Therefore this Trope also leads to [Greek: epoche]. Diogenes gives only two ill.u.s.trations to this Trope, that of the sun and the earthquake.[4]

[1] _Hyp._ I. 141-142.

[2] _Hyp._ I. 143.

[3] _Hyp._ I. 144.

[4] Diog. IX. 11, 87.

_The Tenth Trope_. We have already remarked on the difference in the character of the tenth Trope, dealing as it does, not with the ideas of objects, like the other nine Tropes, but with philosophical and religious opinions, and questions of right and wrong. It was the well-known aim of the Sceptics to submit to the laws and customs of the land where they were found, and to conform to certain moral teachings and religious ceremonies; this they did without either affirming or denying the truth of the principles upon which these teachings were based,[1] and also without any pa.s.sion or strong feeling in regard to them,[2]

as nothing in itself can be proved to be good or evil. The tenth Trope accordingly, brings forward contradictions in customs, laws, and the beliefs of different lands, to show that they are also changeable and relative, and not of absolute worth. The foundation-thought of this Trope is given twice by Diogenes, once as we have before stated in his introduction[3] to the life of Pyrrho, and also as one of the Tropes.[4] As it is apparently one of the oldest of the Tropes, it would naturally be much used in discussing with the Stoics, whose philosophy had such a wide ethical significance, and must also have held an important place in the Sceptical School in all metaphysical and philosophical discussions. The definition[5] in the beginning of s.e.xtus'

exposition of this Trope Fabricius thinks was taken from Aristotle, of schools, laws, customs, mythical beliefs and dogmatic opinions,[6] and the definition which Diogenes gives of law in his life of Plato[7] is similar. Pappenheim, however, thinks they were taken from the Stoics, perhaps from Chrysippus.[8] The argument is based upon the differences in development of thought, as affecting the standpoint of judgment in philosophy, in morals, and religion, the results of which we find in the widely opposing schools of philosophy, in the variety in religious belief, and in the laws and customs of different countries. Therefore the decisions reached in the world of thought leave us equally in doubt regarding the absolute value of any standards, with those obtained through sense-perception, and the universal conflict of opinion regarding all questions of philosophy and ethics leads us also according to this Trope to the reserving of the opinion.[9] This Trope is the fifth as given by Diogenes, who placed it directly after the first four which relate more especially to human development,[10] while s.e.xtus uses it as the final one, perhaps thinking that an argument based upon the higher powers of man deserves the last place, or is the summation of the other arguments.

[1] _Hyp._ I. 24.

[2] _Hyp._ III. 235.

[3] Diog. IX. 11, 61.

[4] Diog. IX. 11, 83.

[5] _Hyp._ I. 145-147.

[6] Fabricius, Cap. IV. H.