A Theodicy, or, Vindication of the Divine Glory Part 16

Section II.

The attempt of Howe to reconcile the eternal ruin of a portion of mankind with the sincerity of G.o.d in his endeavours to save them.

To ill.u.s.trate the justness of the remark just made, we shall select that solution of the difficulty in question which has been deemed the most profound and satisfactory. We mean the solution of "the wonderful Howe."(161) This celebrated divine clearly saw the impossibility of reconciling the sincerity of G.o.d with the offer of salvation to all, on the supposition that he does anything to prevent the salvation, or promote the ruin of those who are finally lost. He rejects the scheme of necessity, or a concurrence of the divine will, in relation to the sinful volitions of men, as aggravating the difficulty which he had undertaken to solve. This was one great step towards a solution. But it still remained to "reconcile G.o.d's prescience of the sins of men with the wisdom and sincerity of his counsels, exhortations, and whatsoever means he uses to prevent them." Let us see how he has succeeded in his attempt to accomplish this great object.

He admits in this very attempt, "that the universal, continued rect.i.tude of all intelligent creatures had, we may be sure, been willed with a peremptory, efficacious will, if it had been best." He expressly says, that G.o.d might have prevented sin from raising its head in his dominions, if he had chosen to do so. "Nor was it less easy," says he, "by a mighty, irresistible hand, universally to expel sin, than to prevent it." Now, having made this concession, was it possible for him to vindicate the sincerity and wisdom of G.o.d in the use of means to prevent sin, which he foresaw must fail to a very great extent?

After having made such an admission, or rather after having a.s.sumed such a position, we think it may be clearly shown that the author was doomed to fail; and that he has deceived himself by false a.n.a.logies in his gigantic efforts to vindicate the character of G.o.d. He says, for example: "We will, for discourse's sake, suppose a prince endowed with the gift or spirit of prophecy. This most will acknowledge a great perfection, added to whatsoever other of his accomplishments. And suppose this his prophetic ability to be so large as to extend to most events which fall out in his dominions. Is it hereby become unfit for him to govern his subjects by laws, or any way admonish them of their duty? Hath this perfection so much diminished him as to depose him from his government? It is not, indeed, to be dissembled, that it were a difficulty to determine, whether such foresight were, for himself, better or worse. Boundless knowledge seems only in a fit conjunction with an unbounded power. But it is altogether unimaginable that it should destroy his relation to his subjects; as what of it were left, if it should despoil him of his legislative power and capacity of governing according to laws made by it? And to bring back the matter to the Supreme Ruler: let it for the present be supposed only, that the blessed G.o.d hath, belonging to his nature, the universal prescience whereof we are discoursing; we will surely, upon that supposition, acknowledge it to belong to him as a perfection. And were it reasonable to affirm, that by a perfection he is disabled from government? or were it a good consequence, 'He foreknows all things-he is therefore unfit to govern the world?' "

This way of representing the matter, it must be confessed, is exceedingly plausible and taking at first view; but yet, if we examine it closely, we shall find that it does not touch the real knot of the difficulty. The cases are not parallel. The prince is endowed with a foreknowledge of offences, which it is not in his power wholly to prevent. Hence it may be perfectly consistent with his wisdom and sincerity, to use all the means in his power to prevent them, though he may see they will fail in some cases, while they will succeed in others. But G.o.d, according to the author, might prevent all sin, or exclude it all from his dominions by "his mighty, irresistible hand." Hence it may not be consistent with his wisdom and sincerity to use means which he foresees will have only partial success, when he might so easily obtain universal and perfect success. It seems evident, then, that this is a deceptive a.n.a.logy. It overlooks the root, and grapples with the branches of the difficulty. Let it be seen, that no power can cause the universal, continued moral rect.i.tude of intelligent creatures, and then the two cases will be parallel; and G.o.d may well use all possible means to prevent sin and cause holiness, though some of his subjects may resist and perish. Let this principle, which we have laboured to establish, be seen, and then may we entirely dispel the cloud which has so long seemed to hang over the wisdom and sincerity of the Supreme Ruler of the world. We might offer strictures upon other pa.s.sages of the solution under consideration; but as the same error runs through all of them, the reader may easily unravel its remaining obscurities and embarra.s.sments for himself.

If holiness cannot be caused by a _direct_ application of power, it follows that there is no want of wisdom in the use of _indirect_ means, or of sincerity in the use of the most efficacious means the nature of the case will admit: but if universal holiness may be caused to exist by a mere word, then indeed it seems to be clearly inconsistent with wisdom to resort to means which must fail to secure it, and with sincerity to utter the most solemn and vehement a.s.severations that it is the will of G.o.d to secure it; for how obvious is the inquiry, If he so earnestly desire it, and can so easily secure it, why does he not do it?

In rejecting the principle for which we contend, Howe has paid the usual penalty of denying the truth; that is, he has contradicted himself. "It were very unreasonable to imagine," says he, "that G.o.d cannot, in any case, extraordinarily oversway the inclinations and determine the will of such a creature, in a way agreeable enough to its nature, (though we particularly know not, and we are not concerned to know, or curiously to inquire in what way,) and highly reasonable to suppose that in many cases he doth." Here he affirms, that our wills may be overruled and determined in perfect _conformity to our natures_, in some way or other, though we know not how. Why, then, does not G.o.d so overrule our wills in all cases, and secure the existence of universal holiness? Because, says he, "it is manifest to any sober reason, that it were very incongruous this should be the ordinary course of his conduct to mankind, or the same persons at all times; that is, that the whole order of intelligent creatures should be moved only by inward impulses; _that G.o.d's precepts, promises, and comminations, whereof their nature is capable, should be all made impertinences_, through his constant overpowering those that should neglect them; that the faculties, whereby men are capable of moral government, should be rendered to this purpose, _useless and vain_; and that they should be tempted to expect to be constantly managed _as mere machines that know not their own use_."

What strange confusion and self-contradiction! The wills of men may be, and often are, swayed by the mighty, irresistible hand of G.o.d, and in a way _agreeable to their nature_; and yet this is not done in all cases, lest men should be governed as _mere machines_! The laws, promises, and threatenings of G.o.d, are not to be rendered vain and useless in all cases, but only in some cases! Indeed, if we would escape such inconsistencies and self-contradictions, we must return to the position that a necessary holiness is a contradiction in terms,-that no power can cause it. From this position we may clearly see, that the laws, promises, and comminations; the counsels, exhortations, and influences of G.o.d, which are employed to prevent sin, are not a system of grand impertinences,-are not a vast and complicated machinery to accomplish what might be more perfectly, easily, and directly accomplished without them. We may see, that G.o.d really desires the holiness and happiness of all men, although some may be finally lost; that he is in earnest in the great work of salvation; and when he so solemnly declares that he has no pleasure in the death of the sinner, but would rather he should turn and live, he means precisely what he says, without the least equivocation or mental reservation. This position it is, then, which shows the goodness of G.o.d in unclouded glory, and reconciles his sincerity with the final result of his labours.

But we have not yet got rid of every shade of difficulty. For it may still be asked, why G.o.d uses means to save those who he foresees will be lost?

why he should labour when he foresees his labour will be in vain? To this we answer, that it does not follow his labour will be in vain, because some may be pleased to rebel and perish. This would be the case in regard to such persons, provided his only object in what he does be to save them; but although this is one great end and aim of his agency, it does not follow that it is his only object. For if any perish, it is certainly desirable that it be from their own fault, and not from the neglect of G.o.d to provide them with the means of salvation. It is his object, as he tells us, to vindicate his own character, and to stop every mouth in regard to the lost, as well as to save the greatest possible number. But this object could not be accomplished, if some should be permitted to perish without even a possibility of salvation. Hence he gives to all the means, power, and opportunity to turn and live; and this fact is nearly always alluded to in relation to the finally impenitent and lost. Thus says our Saviour, with tears of commiseration and pity: "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not! Behold, your house is left unto you desolate." Now the tears of the Redeemer thus wept over lost souls, and this eloquent vindication of his own and his Father's goodness and compa.s.sion, would be a perfect mockery, if salvation had never been placed within their reach, or if their obedience, their real spiritual obedience and submission, might have been secured. But as it is, there is not even the shadow of a ground for suspecting the sincerity of the Redeemer, or his being in earnest in the great work of saving souls.

Again the impenitent are addressed in the following awful language: "Turn ye at my reproof: behold, I will pour out my spirit upon you, I will make known my words unto you. Because I have called, and ye refused; I have stretched out my hand and no man regarded; but ye have set at naught all my counsel and would none of my reproof: I also will laugh at your calamity: I will mock when your fear cometh." Thus the proceeding of the Almighty, in the final rejection of the impenitent, is placed on the ground, that they had obstinately resisted the means employed for their salvation. This seems to remove every shade of difficulty. But how dark and enigmatical, nay, how self-contradictory, would all such language appear, if they might have been very easily rendered holy and happy! Thus, by bearing in mind that a necessary holiness is a contradiction, an absurd and impossible conceit, the goodness of G.o.d is vindicated in regard to the lost, and his sincerity is evinced in the offer of salvation to all.

Section III.

The views of Luther and Calvin respecting the sincerity of G.o.d in his endeavours to save those who will finally perish.

On any other principle, we must forever struggle in vain to accomplish so desirable and so glorious an object. If we proceed on the a.s.sumption that holiness may be very easily caused by an omnipotent, extraneous agency, we shall never be able to vindicate the sincerity of the Almighty, in the many solemn declarations put forth by him that he desires the salvation of all men. The only sound, logical inference for such premises, is that drawn by Luther, namely, that when G.o.d exhorts the sinner, who he foresees will remain impenitent, to turn from his wickedness and live, he does so merely in the way of mockery and derision; just "as if a father were to say to his child, 'Come,' while he knows that he cannot come."(162)

The representation which Calvin, starting from the same point of view, gives of the divine character, is not more amiable or attractive than that of Luther. He maintains that "the most perfect harmony" exists between these two things: "G.o.d's having appointed from eternity on whom he will bestow his favour and exercise his wrath, and his proclaiming salvation indiscriminately to all."(163) But how does he maintain this position? How does he show this agreement? "There is more apparent plausibility," says he, "to the objection [against predestination] from the declaration of Peter, that 'the Lord is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance.' But the second clause furnishes an immediate solution of the difficulty; for the willingness to come to repentance must be understood in consistence with the general tenor of Scripture."(164) Now what is the general tenor of Scripture, which is to overrule this explicit declaration that "G.o.d is not willing that any should perish?" The reader will be surprised, perhaps, that it is not Scripture at all, but the notion that G.o.d might easily convert the sinner if he would.

"Conversion is certainly in the power of G.o.d;" he adds, "let him be asked, whether he wills the conversion of all, when he promises a few individuals to give them 'a heart of flesh,' while he leaves them with 'a heart of stone.' " Thus the very clearest light of the divine word is extinguished by the application of a false metaphysics. G.o.d tells us that he "is not willing that any should perish:" Calvin tells us, that this declaration must, in conformity with the general tenor of Scripture, be so understood as to allow us to believe that he is not only willing that many should perish, but also that their destruction is preordained and forever fixed by an eternal and immutable decree of G.o.d. Nay, that they are, and were, created for the express purpose of being devoted to death, spiritual and eternal. Is this to interpret, or to refute the divine word?

The view which Calvin, from this position, finds himself bound to take of the divine character, is truly horrible, and makes one's blood run cold.

The call of the gospel, he admits, is universal-is directed to the reprobate as well as to the elect; but to what end, or with what design, is it directed to the former? "He directs his voice to them," if we may believe Calvin, "but it is that they may become more deaf; he kindles a light, but it is that they may be made more blind; he publishes his doctrine, but it is that they may be more besotted; he applies a remedy, but it is that they may not be healed. John, citing this prophecy, declares that the Jews could not believe, because the curse of G.o.d was upon them. Nor can it be disputed, that to such persons as G.o.d determines not to enlighten, he delivers his doctrine involved in enigmatical obscurity, that its only effect may be to increase their stupidity."(165)

In conclusion, we would add that it is this idea of a necessitated holiness which gives apparent solidity to the arguments of the Calvinist, and which neutralizes the attacks of their opponents. To select only one instance out of a thousand: the Calvinist insists that if G.o.d had really intended the salvation of all men, then all would have been saved; since nothing lies beyond the reach of his omnipotence. To this the Arminian cries out with horror, that if G.o.d does not desire the salvation of all, but is willing that a portion should sin and be eternally lost, then his goodness is limited, and his glory obscured. In perfect conformity with these views, the one contends for a limited atonement, insisting that it is confined either in its original design, or in its application, to a certain, fixed, definite number of mankind; while the other maintains, with equal earnestness, that such is the goodness of G.o.d that he has sent forth his Son to make an atonement for the sins of the whole world. To design and prepare it for all, says the Calvinist, and then apply it only to a few, is not consistent with either the wisdom or goodness of G.o.d; and that he does savingly apply it only to a small number of the human race is evident from the fact that only a small number are actually saved. However the doctrine of a limited atonement, or, what is the same thing in effect, the limited application of the atonement, may be exclaimed against and denounced as dishonourable to G.o.d, all must and do admit the fact, that it is efficaciously applied to only a select portion of mankind; which is to deny and to admit one and the same thing in one and the same breath.

Now, in this contest of arms, it is our humble opinion that each party gets the better of the other. Each overthrows the other; but neither perceives that he is himself overthrown. Hence, though each demolishes the other, neither is convinced, and the controversy still rages. Nor can there ever be an end of this wrangling and jangling while the arguments of the opposite parties have their roots in a common error. Let the work of Mr. Symington, or any other which advocates a limited atonement, be taken up, its argument dissected, and let the false principle, that G.o.d could easily make all men holy if he would, be eliminated from them, and we venture to predict that they will lose all appearance of solidity, and resolve themselves into thin air.(166)

Chapter II.

Natural Evil, Or Suffering, And Especially The Suffering Of Infants Reconciled With The Goodness Of G.o.d.

Sweet Eden was the arbour of delight; Yet in his lovely flowers our poison blew: Sad Gethsemane, the bower of baleful night, Where Christ a health of poison for us drew; Yet all our honey in that poison grew: So we from sweetest flowers could suck our bane, And Christ, from bitter venom, could again Extract life out of death, and pleasure out of pain.-GILES FLETCHER.

If, as we have endeavoured to show, a necessary holiness is a contradiction in terms, then the existence of natural evil may be easily reconciled with the divine goodness, in so far as it may be necessary to punish and prevent moral evil. Indeed, the divine goodness itself demands the punishment of moral evil, in order to restrain its prevalence, and shut out the disorders it tends to introduce into the moral universe. Nor is it any impeachment of the infinite wisdom and goodness of G.o.d, if the evils inflicted upon the commission of sin be sufficiently great to answer the purpose for which they are intended-that is, to stay the frightful progress and ravages of moral evil. Hence it was that the sin of one man brought "death into the world, and all our woe." Thus the good providence of G.o.d, no less than his word, speaks this tremendous lesson to his intelligent creatures: "Behold the awful spectacle of a world lying in ruins, and tremble at the very thought of sin! A thousand deaths are not so terrible as one sin!"

Section I.

All suffering not a punishment for sin.

We should not conclude from this, however, that all suffering or natural evil bears the characteristic of a punishment for moral evil. This seems to be a great mistake of certain theologians, who pay more attention to the coherency of their system than to the light of nature or of revelation. Thus, says Dr. d.i.c.k: "If our antagonists will change the meaning of words, they cannot alter the nature of things. Pain and death are evils, and when inflicted by the hand of a just G.o.d, _must be punishments_: for although the innocent may be hara.s.sed and destroyed by the arbitrary exercise of human power, none but the guilty suffer under his administration. To pretend that, although death and other temporal evils have come upon us through the sin of Adam, yet these are not to be regarded as a punishment, is neither more nor less than to say,-they must not be called a punishment, because this would not agree with our system.

If we should concede that they are a punishment, we should be compelled to admit that the sin of the first man is imputed to his posterity, and that he was their federal head. We deny, therefore, that the labours and sorrows of the present life, the loss of such joys as are left to us at its close, and the dreadful agonies and terrors with which death is often attended, have the nature of a penalty. In like manner, a man may call black white, and bitter sweet, because it will serve his purpose; but he would be the veriest simpleton who should believe him."

Now, we do not deny that the agonies and terrors of death are sometimes a punishment for sin: this is the case in regard to all those who actually commit sin, and sink into the grave amid the horrors of a guilty conscience. But the question is, Do suffering and death never fall upon the innocent under the administration of G.o.d? We affirm that they do; and also that they may fall upon the innocent, in perfect accordance with the infinite goodness of G.o.d. In the first place, we reply to the confident a.s.sertions of Dr. d.i.c.k, and of the whole school to which he belongs, as follows: To pretend that death and other temporal evils are _always punishments_, is neither more nor less than to say, "they _must_ be called punishments, because this would agree with our system. If we should concede that they are _not_ a punishment, we should be compelled to admit that the sin of the first man is not imputed to his posterity, and that he was _not_ their federal head. If our antagonists," &c. Surely it is not very wise to use language which may be so easily retorted.

Secondly, it is true, the change of a word cannot alter the nature of things; but it may alter, and very materially too, our view of the nature of things. Besides, if to refuse to call suffering in certain cases a _punishment_, be merely to change a word, why should so great an outcry be made about it? Why may we not use that word which sounds the most pleasantly to the ear, and sits the most easily upon the heart?

Thirdly, we do not arbitrarily and blindly reject the term _punishment_, "because it does not agree with our system." We not only reject the term, but also the very idea and the thing for which it stands. We mean to affirm, that the innocent do sometimes suffer under the administration of G.o.d; and that all suffering is not a punishment for sin. The very idea of punishment, according to Dr. d.i.c.k himself, is, that it is suffering inflicted on account of sin in the person upon whom it is inflicted; and hence, wherever pain or death falls under the administration of G.o.d, we must there find, says he, either actual or imputed sin. Now, in regard to certain cases, we deny both the name and the thing. And we make this denial, as it will be seen, not because it agrees with our system merely, but because it agrees with the universal voice and reason of mankind, except where that voice has been silenced, and that reason perverted, by dark and blindly-dogmatizing schemes of theology.

Fourthly, there is a vast difference, in reality, between regarding some sufferings as mere calamities, and all suffering as _punishment_. If we regard all suffering as punishment, then we need look no higher and no further in order to vindicate the character of G.o.d in the infliction of them. For, according to this view, they are the infliction of his retributive justice, merited by the person upon whom they fall, and adapted to prevent sin; and consequently here our inquiries may terminate; just as when we see the criminal receive the penalty due to his crimes. On the other hand, if we may not view all suffering as punishment, then must we seek for other grounds and principles on which to vindicate the goodness of G.o.d; then must we look for other ends, or final causes, of suffering under the wise economy of divine providence. And this search, as we shall see, will lead us to behold the moral government of the world, not as it is darkly distorted in certain systems of theology, but as it is in itself, replete with light and ineffable beauty.

But before we undertake to show this by direct arguments, let us pause and consider the predicament to which the greatest divines have reduced themselves, by their advocacy of such an imputation of the sin of one man.

Dr. d.i.c.k affirms, as we have seen, that every evil brought upon man under the good providence of G.o.d, must be a punishment for sin; and hence, as infants do not actually sin, they are exposed to divine wrath on account of the sin of Adam, which is imputed to them. But is not this imputation, which draws after itself pain and death, also an evil? How has it happened, then, that in the good providence of G.o.d, this tremendous evil, this frightful source of so many evils, has been permitted to fall on the infant world? Must there not be some other sin imputed to justify the infliction of such an evil, and so on _ad infinitum_? Will Dr. d.i.c.k carry out his principle to this consequence? Will he require, as in consistency he is bound to require, that the tremendous evil of the imputation of sin shall not fall upon any part of G.o.d's creation, except as a punishment for some antecedent guilt? No, indeed: at the very second step his great principle, so confidently and so dogmatically a.s.serted, completely breaks down under him. The imposition of this evil is justified, not by any antecedent guilt, but by the divine const.i.tution, according to which Adam is the federal head and representative of the human race. Thus, after all, Dr. d.i.c.k has found some principle or ground on which to justify the infliction of evil, beside the principle of guilt or ill-desert. Might there not possibly be, then, such a divine const.i.tution of things, as to bring suffering upon the offspring of Adam in consequence of his sin, without resorting to the dark and enigmatical fiction of the imputation of his transgression? If there be a divine const.i.tution, as Dr. d.i.c.k contends there is, which justifies the imputation of moral evil, with all its frightful consequences, both temporal and eternal death, may it not be possible, in the nature of things, to suppose a divine const.i.tution to justify suffering without the imputation of sin? How can the one of these things be so utterly repugnant to the divine character, and the other so perfectly agreeable to it? Until this question be answered, we may suspect the author himself of having a.s.sumed positions and made confident a.s.sertions, "because they agree with his system."

"We say, then," says Dr. d.i.c.k, "that by his sin his posterity became liable to the punishment denounced against himself. They became guilty through his guilt, which is imputed to them, or placed to their account; so that they are treated as if they had personally broken the covenant."

Thus all the posterity of Adam, not excepting infants, became justly obnoxious to the "penalty of the covenant of works,-death, temporal, spiritual, and eternal." Now, we would suppose that this scheme of imputation is attended with at least as great a difficulty as the doctrine that the innocent do sometimes suffer under the good providence of G.o.d.

Indeed, the author does not deny that it is attended with difficulties, which have never been answered. In regard to the imputation of sin, he says: "Candour requires me to add, that we are not competent fully to a.s.sign the reasons of this dispensation. After the most mature consideration of the subject, it appears _mysterious_ that G.o.d should have placed our first parent in such circ.u.mstances, that while he might insure, he might forfeit, his own happiness and that of millions of beings who were to spring from his loins. We cannot tell why he adopted this plan with us and not with angels, each of whom was left to stand or fall for himself."(167) Now, when it is affirmed that the innocent may suffer for wise and good purposes, why is all this candour and modesty forgotten? Why is it not admitted, "It may be so;" "We cannot tell?" Why is the fact, of which these writers so often and so eloquently remind us, that the human intellect is a poor, blind, weak thing, quite unfit to pry into mysteries, then sunk in utter oblivion, and a tone of confident dogmatism a.s.sumed?

Why not act consistently with the character of the sceptic or the dogmatist, and not put on the one or the other by turns, according to the exigencies of a system?

If we ask, why infants are exposed to death, we are told, that it is a punishment for Adam's sin imputed to them. We are told that this _must_ be so; since "none but the guilty ever suffer under the administration of G.o.d," who is not an arbitrary and cruel tyrant to cause the innocent to suffer. Why then, we ask, does he impute sin to them? To this it is replied, "We cannot tell." No wonder; for if there must always be antecedent guilt to justify G.o.d in imposing evil upon his subjects, then there can be no reason for such a dispensation for imposing the tremendous evil of the imputation of sin. The advocates of it themselves have laid down a principle, which shows it to be without a reason. Hence they may well say, "We cannot tell." Thus suffering is justified by the imputation of guilt; the imputation of guilt by the divine const.i.tution; and the divine const.i.tution, by nothing! If this is all that can be done, would it not have been just as well to have begun, as well as ended, in the divine const.i.tution of things? But, no! even the most humble of men must have some explanation, some little mitigation of their difficulties, if it be only to place the world upon the back of an elephant, the elephant upon the back of a tortoise, and the tortoise upon nothing.

It seems to be inconceivably horrible to Dr. d.i.c.k, and others of his school, that the innocent should ever be made to suffer under the providence of G.o.d; but yet they earnestly insist that the same good providence plunges the whole human race-infants and all-into unavoidable guilt, and then punishes them for it! To say that the innocent may be made to suffer is monstrous injustice-is horrible; but to say that they are made sinners, and then punished, is all right and proper! To say that the innocent can suffer under the administration of G.o.d, is to shock our sense of justice, and put out the light of the divine goodness; but it is all well if we only say that the punishment due to Adam's sin is made, by the same good administration, to fall upon all his posterity _in the form of moral evil, and that then they are justly punished for this punishment_!

Alas, that the minds of the great and the good, born to reflect the light of the glorious gospel of G.o.d upon a darkened world, should be so sadly warped, so awfully distorted, by the inexorable necessities of a despotic system!

Section II.

The imputation of sin not consistent with the goodness of G.o.d.