God and my Neighbour Part 24

The doctrine of Free Will implies that G.o.d knowingly made the Serpent subtle, Eve seductive, and Adam weak, and then d.a.m.ned the whole human race because a bridge He had built to fall did not succeed in standing.

Such a theory is ridiculous; but upon it depends the entire fabric of Christian theology.

For if Man is not responsible for his acts, and therefore cannot sin against G.o.d, there is no foundation for the doctrines of the Fall, the Sin, the Curse, or the Atonement.

If Man cannot sin against G.o.d, and if G.o.d is responsible for all Man's acts, the Old Testament is not true, the New Testament is not true, the Christian religion is not true.

And if you consider the numerous crimes and blunders of the Christian Church, you will always find that they grew out of the theory of Free Will, and the doctrines of Man's sin against G.o.d, and Man's responsibility and "wickedness."

St. Paul said, "As in Adam all men fell, so in Christ are all made whole." If Adam did not fall St. Paul was mistaken.

Christ is reported to have prayed on the cross, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do."

That looks as if Jesus knew that the men were not responsible for their acts, and did not know any better. But if they knew not what they did, why should G.o.d be asked to _forgive_ them?

But let us go over the Determinist theory again, for it is most important.

_If G.o.d is responsible for Man's existence, G.o.d is responsible for Man's acts_.

The Christians say Man sinned, and they talk about his freedom of choice. But they say G.o.d made Man, as He made all things.

Now, if G.o.d is all-knowing, He knew before He made Man what Man would do. He knew that Man could do nothing but what G.o.d had enabled him to do. That he could do nothing but what he was foreordained by G.o.d to do.

If G.o.d is all-powerful, He need not have made Man at all. Or He could have made a man who would be strong enough to resist temptation. Or He could have made a man who was incapable of evil.

If the All-powerful G.o.d made a man, knowing that man would succ.u.mb to the test to which G.o.d meant to subject him, surely G.o.d could not justly blame the man for being no better than G.o.d had made him.

If G.o.d had never made Man, then Man never could have succ.u.mbed to temptation. G.o.d made Man of His own divine choice, and made him to His own divine desire.

How, then, could G.o.d blame Man for anything Man did?

G.o.d was responsible for Man's _existence_, for G.o.d made him. If G.o.d had not made him, Man could never have been, and could never have acted.

Therefore all that Man did was the result of G.o.d's creation of Man.

All man's acts were the effects of which his creation was the cause: and G.o.d was responsible for the cause, and therefore G.o.d was responsible for the effects.

Man did not make himself. Man could not, before he existed, have asked G.o.d to make him. Man could not advise nor control G.o.d so as to influence his own nature. Man could only be what G.o.d caused him to be, and do what G.o.d enabled or compelled him to do.

Man might justly say to G.o.d: "I did not ask to be created. I did not ask to be sent into this world. I had no power to select or mould my nature.

I am what You made me. I am where You put me. You knew when You made me how I should act. If You wished me to act otherwise, why did You not make me differently? If I have displeased You, I was fore-ordained to displease You. I was fore-ordained by You to be and to do what I am and have done. Is it my fault that You fore-ordained me to be and to do thus?"

Christians say a man has a will to choose. So he has. But that is only saying that one human thought will outweigh another. A man thinks with his brain: his brain was made by G.o.d.

A tall man can reach higher than a short man. It is not the fault of the short man that he is outreached: he did not fix his own height.

It is the same with the will. A man has a will to jump. He can jump over a five-barred gate; but he cannot jump over a cathedral.

So with his will in moral matters. He has a will to resist temptation, but though he may clear a small temptation, he may fall at a large one.

The actions of a man's will are as mathematically fixed at his birth as are the motions of a planet in its...o...b..t.

G.o.d, who made the man and the planet, is responsible for the actions of both.

As the natural forces created by G.o.d regulate the influences of Venus and Mars upon the Earth, so must the natural forces created by G.o.d have regulated the influences of Eve and the Serpent on Adam.

Adam was no more blameworthy for failing to resist the influence of Eve than the Earth is blameworthy for deviating in its course around the Sun, in obedience to the influences of Venus and Mars.

Without the act of G.o.d there could have been no Adam, and therefore no Fall. G.o.d, whose act is responsible for Adam's existence, is responsible for the Fall.

_If G.o.d is responsible for man's existence, G.o.d is responsible for all Man's acts._

If a boy brought a dog into the house and teased it until it bit him, would not his parents ask the boy, "Why did you bring the dog in at all?"

But if the boy had trained the dog to bite, and knew that it would bite if it were teased, and if the boy brought the dog in and teased it until it bit him, would the parents blame the dog?

And if a magician, like one of those at the court of Pharaoh, deliberately made an adder out of the dust, knowing the adder would bite, and then played with the adder until it bit some spectator, would the injured man blame the magician or the adder?

How, then, could G.o.d blame Man for the Fall?

But you may ask me, with surprise, as so many have asked me with surprise, "Do you really mean that no man is, under any circ.u.mstances, to be blamed for anything he may say or do?"

And I shall answer you that I do seriously mean that no man can, under any circ.u.mstances, be justly blamed for anything he may say or do. That is one of my deepest convictions, and I shall try very hard to prove that it is just.

But you may say, as many have said: "If no man can be justly blamed for anything he says or does, there is an end of all law and order, and society is impossible."

And I shall answer you: "No, on the contrary, there is a beginning of law and order, and a chance that society may become civilised."

For it does not follow that because we may not blame a man we may not condemn his acts. Nor that because we do not blame him we are bound to allow him to do all manner of mischief.

Several critics have indignantly exclaimed that I make no difference between good men and bad, that I lump Torquemada, Lucrezia Borgia, Fenelon, and Marcus Aurelius together, and condone the most awful crimes.

That is a mistake. I regard Lucrezia Borgia as a homicidal maniac, and Torquemada as a religious maniac. I do not _blame_ such men and women.

But I should not allow them to do harm.

I believe that nearly all crimes, vices, cruelties, and other evil acts are due to ignorance or to mental disease. I do not hate the man who calls me an infidel, a liar, a blasphemer, or a quack. I know that he is ignorant, or foolish, or ill-bred, or vicious, and I am sorry for him.

Socrates, as reported by Xenophon, put my case in a nutsh.e.l.l. When a friend complained to Socrates that a man whom he had saluted had not saluted him in return, the father of philosophy replied: "It is an odd thing that if you had met a man ill-conditioned in body you would not have been angry; but to have met a man rudely disposed in mind provokes you."

This is sound philosophy, I think. If we pity a man with a twist in his spine, why should we not pity the man with a twist in his brain? If we pity a man with a stiff wrist, why not the man with a stiff pride? If we pity a man with a weak heart, why not the man with the weak will? If we do not blame a man for one kind of defect, why blame him for another?

But it does not follow that because we neither hate nor blame a criminal we should allow him to commit crime.

We do not blame a rattlesnake, nor a shark. These creatures only fulfil their natures. The shark who devours a baby is no more sinful than the lady who eats a shrimp. We do not blame the maniac who burns a house down and brains a policeman, nor the mad dog who bites a minor poet.

But, none the less, we take steps to defend ourselves against snakes, sharks, lunatics, and mad dogs.

The _Clarion_ does not hate a cruel sweater, nor a tyrannous landlord, nor a shuffling Minister of State, nor a hypocritical politician: it pities such poor creatures. Yet the _Clarion_ opposes sweating and tyranny and hypocrisy, and does its best to defeat and to destroy them.

If a tiger be hungry he naturally seeks food. I do not blame the tiger; but if he endeavoured to make his dinner off our business manager, and if I had a gun, I should shoot the tiger.