International Law. A Treatise Volume I Part 22

543-557--Martens, I. -- 76--Bernard, "On the Principle of non-Intervention" (1860)--Hautefeuille, "Le principe de non-intervention" (1863)--Stapleton, "Intervention and Non-intervention, or the Foreign Policy of Great Britain from 1790 to 1865" (1866)--Geffcken, "Das Recht der Intervention"

(1887)--Kebedgy, "De l'intervention" (1890)--Floecker, "De l'intervention en droit international" (1896)--Drago, "Cobro coercitivo de deudas publicas" (1906)--Moulin, "La doctrine de Drago" (1908).

[Sidenote: Conception and character of Intervention.]

-- 134. Intervention is dictatorial interference by a State in the affairs of another State for the purpose of maintaining or altering the actual condition of things. Such intervention can take place by right or without a right, but it always concerns the external independence or the territorial or personal supremacy of the respective State, and the whole matter is therefore of great importance for the position of the States within the Family of Nations. That intervention is, as a rule, forbidden by the Law of Nations which protects the International Personality of the States, there is no doubt. On the other hand, there is just as little doubt[211] that this rule has exceptions, for there are interventions which take place by right, and there are others which, although they do not take place by right, are nevertheless admitted by the Law of Nations and are excused in spite of the violation of the Personality of the respective States they involve.

[Footnote 211: The so-called doctrine of non-intervention as defended by some Italian writers (see Fiore, I. No. 565), who deny that intervention is ever justifiable, is a political doctrine without any legal basis whatever.]

Intervention can take place in the external as well as in the internal affairs of a State. It concerns in the first case the external independence, and in the second either the territorial or the personal supremacy. But it must be emphasised that intervention proper is always _dictatorial_ interference, not interference pure and simple.[212]

Therefore intervention must neither be confounded with good offices, nor with mediation, nor with intercession, nor with co-operation, because none of these imply a _dictatorial_ interference. Good offices is the name for such acts of friendly Powers interfering in a conflict between two other States as tend to call negotiations into existence for the peaceable settlement of the conflict, and mediation is the name for the direct conduct on the part of a friendly Power of such negotiations.[213] Intercession is the name for the interference consisting in friendly advice given or friendly offers made with regard to the domestic affairs of another State. And, lastly, co-operation is the appellation of such interference as consists in help and a.s.sistance lent by one State to another at the latter's request for the purpose of suppressing an internal revolution. Thus, for example, Russia sent troops in 1849, at the request of Austria, into Hungary to a.s.sist Austria in suppressing the Hungarian revolt.

[Footnote 212: Many writers constantly commit this confusion.]

[Footnote 213: See below, vol. II. -- 9.]

[Sidenote: Intervention by Right.]

-- 135. It is apparent that such interventions as take place by right must be distinguished from others. Wherever there is no right of intervention, although it may be admissible and excused, an intervention violates either the external independence or the territorial or the personal supremacy. But if an intervention takes place by right, it never contains such a violation, because the right of intervention is always based on a legal restriction upon the independence or territorial or personal supremacy of the State concerned, and because the latter is in duty bound to submit to the intervention. Now a State may have a right of intervention against another State, mainly for six reasons:[214]

[Footnote 214: The enumeration is not intended to be exhaustive.]

(1) A Suzerain State has a right to intervene in many affairs of the Va.s.sal, and a State which holds a protectorate has a right to intervene in all the external affairs of the protected State.

(2) If an external affair of a State is at the same time by right an affair of another State, the latter has a right to intervene in case the former deals with that affair unilaterally. The events of 1878 provide an ill.u.s.trative example. Russia had concluded the preliminary Peace of San Stefano with defeated Turkey; Great Britain protested because the conditions of this peace were inconsistent with the Treaty of Paris of 1856 and the Convention of London of 1871, and Russia agreed to the meeting of the Congress of Berlin for the purpose of arranging matters.

Had Russia persisted in carrying out the preliminary peace, Great Britain as well as other signatory Powers of the Treaty of Paris and the Convention of London doubtless possessed a right of intervention.

(3) If a State which is restricted by an international treaty in its external independence or its territorial or personal supremacy does not comply with the restrictions concerned, the other party or parties have a right to intervene. Thus the United States of America, in 1906, exercised intervention in Cuba in conformity with article 3 of the Treaty of Havana[215] of 1903, which stipulates: "The Government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a Government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty...." And likewise the United States of America, in 1904, exercised intervention in Panama in conformity with article 7 of the Treaty of Was.h.i.+ngton[216] in 1903, which stipulates: "The same right and authority are granted to the United States for the maintenance of public order in the cities of Panama and Colon and the territories and harbours adjacent thereto in case the Republic of Panama should not be, in the judgment of the United States, able to maintain such order."

[Footnote 215: See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. x.x.xII. (1905), p. 79.--Even if no special right of intervention is stipulated, it nevertheless exists in such cases. Thus--see below, -- 574--those Powers which have guaranteed the integrity of Norway under the condition that she does not cede any part of her territory to any foreign Power would have a right to intervene in case such a cession were contemplated, although the treaty concerned does not stipulate this.]

[Footnote 216: See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. x.x.xI. (1905), p. 599.]

(4) If a State in time of peace or war violates such rules of the Law of Nations as are universally recognised by custom or are laid down in law-making treaties, other States have a right to intervene and to make the delinquent submit to the rules concerned. If, for instance, a State undertook to extend its jurisdiction over the merchantmen of another State on the high seas, not only would this be an affair between the two States concerned, but all other States would have a right to intervene because the freedom of the open sea is a universally recognised principle. Or if a State which is a party to the Hague Regulations concerning Land Warfare were to violate one of these Regulations, all the other signatory Powers would have a right to intervene.

(5) A State that has guaranteed by treaty the form of government of a State or the reign of a certain dynasty over the same has a right[217]

to intervene in case of change of form of government or of dynasty, provided the respective treaty of guaranty was concluded between the respective States and not between their monarchs personally.

[Footnote 217: But this is not generally recognised; see, for instance, Hall, -- 93, who denies the existence of such a right. I do not see the reason why a State should not be able to undertake the obligation to retain a certain form of government or dynasty. That historical events can justify such State in considering itself no longer bound by such treaty according to the principle _rebus sic stantibus_ (see below, -- 539) is another matter.]

(6) The right of protection[218] over citizens abroad, which a State holds, may cause an intervention by right to which the other party is legally bound to submit. And it matters not whether protection of the life, security, honour, or property of a citizen abroad is concerned.

[Footnote 218: See below, -- 319.]

The so-called _Drago[219] doctrine_, which a.s.serts the rule that intervention is not allowed for the purpose of making a State pay its public debts, is unfounded, and has not received general recognition, although Argentina and some other South American States tried to establish this rule at the second Hague Peace Conference of 1907. But this Conference adopted, on the initiative of the United States of America, a "Convention[220] respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts." According to article 1 of this Convention, the contracting Powers agree not to have recourse to armed force for the recovery of contract debts claimed from the Government of one country by the Government of another country as being due to its nationals. This undertaking is, however, not applicable when the debtor State refuses or neglects to reply to an offer of arbitration, or, after accepting the offer, renders the settlement of the _compromis_ impossible, or, after the arbitration, fails to submit to the award.--It must be emphasised that the stipulations of this Convention concern the recovery of all contract debts, whether or no they arise from public loans.

[Footnote 219: The Drago doctrine originates from Louis M. Drago, sometime Foreign Secretary of the Republic of Argentina. See Drago, "Cobro coercitivo de deudas publicas" (1906); Barclay, "Problems of International Practice, &c." (1907), pp. 115-122; Moulin, "La Doctrine de Drago" (1908); Higgins, "The Hague Peace Conferences, &c." (1909), pp. 184-197; Scott, "The Hague Peace Conferences" (1909), vol. I. pp.

415-422; Calvo in R.I. 2nd Ser. V. (1903), pp. 597-623; Drago in R.G.

XIV. (1907), pp. 251-287; Moulin in R.G. XIV. (1907), pp. 417-472; Hershey in A.J. I. (1907), pp. 26-45; Drago in A.J. I. (1907), pp.

692-726.]

[Footnote 220: See Scott in A.J. II. (1908), pp. 78-94.]

[Sidenote: Admissibility of Intervention in default of Right.]

-- 136. In contradistinction to intervention by right, there are other interventions which must be considered admissible, although they violate the independence or the territorial or personal supremacy of the State concerned, and although such State has by no means any legal duty to submit patiently and suffer the intervention. Of such interventions in default of right there are two kinds generally admitted and excused--namely, such as are necessary in self-preservation and such as are necessary in the interest of the balance of power.

(1) As regards interventions for the purpose of self-preservation, it is obvious that, if any necessary violation committed in self-preservation of the International Personality of other States is, as shown above (-- 130), excused, such violation must also be excused as is contained in an intervention. And it matters not whether such an intervention exercised in self-preservation is provoked by an actual or imminent intervention on the part of a third State, or by some other incident.

(2) As regards intervention in the interest of the balance of power, it is likewise obvious that it must be excused. An equilibrium between the members of the Family of Nations is an indispensable[221] condition of the very existence of International Law. If the States could not keep one another in check, all Law of Nations would soon disappear, as, naturally, an over-powerful State would tend to act according to discretion instead of according to law. Since the Westphalian Peace of 1648 the principle of balance of power has played a preponderant part in the history of Europe. It found express recognition in 1713 in the Treaty of Peace of Utrecht, it was the guiding star at the Vienna Congress in 1815 when the map of Europe was rearranged, at the Congress of Paris in 1856, the Conference of London in 1867, and the Congress of Berlin in 1878. The States themselves and the majority of writers agree upon the admissibility of intervention in the interest of balance of power. Most of the interventions exercised in the interest of the preservation of the Turkish Empire must, in so far as they are not based on treaty rights, be cla.s.sified as interventions in the interest of balance of power. Examples of this are supplied by collective interventions exercised by the Powers in 1886 for the purpose of preventing the outbreak of war between Greece and Turkey, and in 1897 during the war between Greece and Turkey with regard to the island of Crete.

[Footnote 221: A survey of the opinions concerning the value of the principle of balance of power is given by Bulmerincq, "Praxis, Theorie und Codification des Volkerrechts" (1874), pp. 40-50, but Bulmerincq himself rejects the principle. See also Donnadieu, "Essai sur la theorie de l'equilibre" (1900) where the matter is exhaustively treated, and Dupuis, "Le principe d'equilibre et le concert europeen" (1909), pp.

90-108, and 494-513. It is necessary to emphasise that the principle of the balance of power is not a legal principle and therefore not one of International Law, but one of International policy; it is a political principle indispensable to the existence of International Law in its present condition.]

[Sidenote: Intervention in the interest of Humanity.]

-- 137. Many jurists maintain that intervention is likewise admissible, or even has a basis of right, when exercised in the interest of humanity for the purpose of stopping religious persecution and endless cruelties in time of peace and war. That the Powers have in the past exercised intervention on these grounds, there is no doubt. Thus Great Britain, France, and Russia intervened in 1827 in the struggle between revolutionary Greece and Turkey, because public opinion was horrified at the cruelties committed during this struggle. And many a time interventions have taken place to stop the persecution of Christians in Turkey. But whether there is really a rule of the Law of Nations which admits such interventions may well be doubted. Yet, on the other hand, it cannot be denied that public opinion and the att.i.tude of the Powers are in favour of such interventions, and it may perhaps be said that in time the Law of Nations will recognise the rule that interventions in the interests of humanity are admissible provided they are exercised in the form of a collective intervention of the Powers.[222]

[Footnote 222: See Hall, ---- 91 and 95, where the merits of the problem are discussed from all sides. See also below, -- 292, and Rougier in R.G.

XVII. (1910), pp. 468-526.]

[Sidenote: Intervention _de facto_ a Matter of Policy.]

-- 138. Careful a.n.a.lysis of the rules of the Law of Nations regarding intervention and the hitherto exercised practice of intervention make it apparent that intervention is _de facto_ a matter of policy just like war. This is the result of the combination of several factors. Since, even in the cases in which it is based on a right, intervention is not compulsory, but is solely in the discretion of the State concerned, it is for that reason alone a matter of policy. Since, secondly, every State must decide for itself whether vital interests of its own are at stake and whether a case of necessity in the interest of self-preservation has arisen, intervention is for this part again a matter of policy. Since, thirdly, the question of balance of power is so complicated and the historical development of the States involves gradually an alteration of the division of power between the States, it must likewise be left to the appreciation of every State whether or not it considers the balance of power endangered and, therefore, an intervention necessary. And who can undertake to lay down a hard-and-fast rule with regard to the amount of inhumanity on the part of a Government that would justify intervention according to the Law of Nations?

No State will ever intervene in the affairs of another if it has not some important interest in doing so, and it has always been easy for such State to find or pretend some legal justification for an intervention, be it self-preservation, balance of power, or humanity.

There is no great danger to the welfare of the States in the fact that intervention is _de facto_ a matter of policy. Too many interests are common to all the members of the Family of Nations, and too great is the natural jealousy between the Great Powers, for an abuse of intervention on the part of one powerful State without calling other States into the field. Since unjustified intervention violates the very principles of the Law of Nations, and since, as I have stated above (-- 135), in case of a violation of these principles on the part of a State every other State has a right to intervene, any unjustifiable intervention by one State in the affairs of another gives a right of intervention to all other States. Thus it becomes apparent here, as elsewhere, that the Law of Nations is intimately connected with the interests of all the States, and that they must themselves secure the maintenance and realisation of this law. This condition of things tends naturally to hamper more the ambitions of weaker States than those of the several Great Powers, but it seems unalterable.

[Sidenote: The Monroe Doctrine.]

-- 139. The _de facto_ political character of the whole matter of intervention becomes clearly apparent through the so-called Monroe doctrine[223] of the United States of America. This doctrine, at its first appearance, was indirectly a product of the policy of intervention in the interest of legitimacy which the Holy Alliance pursued in the beginning of the nineteenth century after the downfall of Napoleon. The Powers of this alliance were inclined to extend their policy of intervention to America and to a.s.sist Spain in regaining her hold over the former Spanish colonies in South America which had declared and maintained their independence, and which were recognised as independent Sovereign States by the United States of America. To meet and to check the imminent danger, President James Monroe delivered his celebrated Message to Congress on December 2, 1823. This Message contains two quite different, but nevertheless equally important, declarations.

[Footnote 223: Wharton, -- 57; Dana's Note No. 36 to Wharton, p. 36; Tucker, "The Monroe Doctrine" (1885); Moore, "The Monroe Doctrine"

(1895), and Digest, VI. ---- 927-968; Cespedes, "La doctrine de Monroe"

(1893); Merignhac, "La doctrine de Monroe a la fin du XIXe siecle"

(1896); Beaumarchais, "La doctrine de Monroe" (1898); Redaway, "The Monroe Doctrine" (1898); Pekin, "Les etats-Unis et la doctrine de Monroe" (1900).]

(1) In connection with the unsettled boundary lines in the north-west of the American continent, the Message declared "that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have a.s.sumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonisation by any European Power." This declaration was never recognised by the European Powers, and Great Britain and Russia protested expressly against it. In fact, however, no occupation of American territory has since then taken place on the part of a European State.

(2) In regard to the contemplated intervention of the Holy Alliance between Spain and the South American States, the Message declared that the United States had not intervened, and never would intervene, in wars in Europe, but could not, on the other hand, in the interest of her own peace and happiness, allow the allied European Powers to extend their political system to any part of America and try to intervene in the independence of the South American republics.

(3) Since the time of President Monroe, the Monroe doctrine has been gradually somewhat extended in so far as the United States claims a kind of political hegemony over all the States of the American continent.

Whenever a conflict occurs between such an American State and a European Power, the United States is ready to exercise intervention. Through the civil war her hands were to a certain extent bound in the sixties of the last century, and she could not prevent the occupation of Mexico by the French army, but she intervened[224] in 1865. Again, she did not intervene in 1902 when Great Britain, Germany, and Italy took combined action against Venezuela, because she was cognisant of the fact that this action intended merely to make Venezuela comply with her international duties. But she intervened in 1896 in the boundary conflict between Great Britain and Venezuela when Lord Salisbury had sent an _ultimatum_ to Venezuela, and she retains the Monroe doctrine as a matter of principle.

[Footnote 224: See Moore, VI. -- 957.]

[Sidenote: Merits of the Monroe Doctrine.]

-- 140. The importance of the Monroe doctrine is of a political, not of a legal character. Since the Law of Nations is a law between all the civilised States as equal members of the Family of Nations, the States of the American continent are subjects of the same international rights and duties as the European States. The European States are, as far as the Law of Nations is concerned, absolutely free to acquire territory in America as elsewhere. And the same legal rules are valid concerning intervention on the part of European Powers both in American affairs and in affairs of other States. But it is evident that the Monroe doctrine, as the guiding star of the policy of the United States, is of the greatest _political_ importance. And it ought not to be maintained that this policy is in any way inconsistent with the Law of Nations. In the interest of balance of power in the world, the United States considers it a necessity that European Powers should not acquire more territory on the American continent than they actually possess. She considers, further, her own welfare so intimately connected with that of the other American States that she thinks it necessary, in the interest of self-preservation, to watch closely the relations of these States with Europe and also the relations between these very States, and eventually to intervene in conflicts. Since every State must decide for itself whether and where vital interests of its own are at stake and whether the balance of power is endangered to its disadvantage, and since, as explained above (-- 138), intervention is therefore _de facto_ a matter of policy, there is no legal impediment to the United States carrying out a policy in conformity with the Monroe doctrine. This policy hampers indeed the South American States, but with their growing strength it will gradually disappear. For, whenever some of these States become Great Powers themselves, they will no longer submit to the political hegemony of the United States, and the Monroe doctrine will have played its part.