The Essential Writings Of Machiavelli Part 6

ON HOW THE POWER OF THE DICTATORS DID NOT HARM THE R ROMAN R REPUBLIC BUT BENEFITED IT, AND ON HOW THE POWER A CITIZEN SEIZES FOR HIMSELF, UNLIKE THAT ACCORDED TO HIM BY FREE ELECTION, IS DESTRUCTIVE TO CIVIC LIFE.

Some historians condemn those Romans who created the inst.i.tution of dictator, maintaining that it was this that eventually brought about tyranny in Rome. They allege that the first tyrant ruled the city under the t.i.tle of dictator, and that had this t.i.tle not existed, Caesar would not have been able to disguise his tyranny beneath an official designation. Those holding this opinion, however, have not examined it carefully It has been believed without good reason, because it was not the t.i.tle or rank of dictator that enslaved Rome, but the power that the dictator seized from the citizens for the duration of his office. If the t.i.tle of dictator had not existed in Rome, another would have been chosen, because power easily acquires a t.i.tle, while t.i.tles do not easily acquire power. It is clear that the office of dictator, when it was bestowed in keeping with the public inst.i.tutions and not seized by one man's authority, always benefited the city. Republics are harmed when magistrates are created and granted power by exceptional and not ordinary means as was the case in Rome, when over such a long period of time no dictator did anything but good for the republic.

There are very clear reasons for this. First, for a citizen to do harm and seize illegal power for himself, he must have many faculties which he could not have developed in an uncorrupted state. He would have to be extremely rich and have many adherents and followers, which he could not have in a state where the laws are observed, and even if he did have followers and adherents, such a man would have been so dreaded that free votes would not have been given to him. Moreover, a dictator was elected for a brief period of time, not forever, and only to handle the emergency for which he was elected.109 He had the authority to decide on his own what measures needed to be taken to counter urgent danger, and he could do this without consultation, punis.h.i.+ng any individual without right of appeal. But the dictator could not take any action that would diminish the power of the state, such as removing authority from the Senate and the people, or eliminating old inst.i.tutions and establis.h.i.+ng new ones. Hence, if one takes into account a dictator's brief term of office and the limits on his power, and that the populace of Rome was not corrupted, it was impossible for the dictator to transcend the limits of his office and harm the city. And history has shown that the dictators.h.i.+p was always useful. He had the authority to decide on his own what measures needed to be taken to counter urgent danger, and he could do this without consultation, punis.h.i.+ng any individual without right of appeal. But the dictator could not take any action that would diminish the power of the state, such as removing authority from the Senate and the people, or eliminating old inst.i.tutions and establis.h.i.+ng new ones. Hence, if one takes into account a dictator's brief term of office and the limits on his power, and that the populace of Rome was not corrupted, it was impossible for the dictator to transcend the limits of his office and harm the city. And history has shown that the dictators.h.i.+p was always useful.

In fact, among all Roman inst.i.tutions, that of dictator deserves to be esteemed and numbered among those that led to the greatness and power of Rome. Without such an inst.i.tution, a state has difficulty emerging from extraordinary circ.u.mstances. The usual inst.i.tutions of a state move slowly, since no council or magistrate can run everything but will need to confer with others. This takes time, which makes this course of action perilous when it is a matter that cannot wait. Therefore states need to create an inst.i.tution similar to that of the Venetian Republic, which is an excellent republic of our times. It has given authority to a few chosen citizens to deliberate on urgent matters without the need to consult others if they are all in agreement.110 If such a system is lacking in a state, it will either come to ruin as it clings to its laws or, in order to escape ruin, breaks them. And in a state it is bad for anything to take place that forces it to be governed by exceptional means, because even if the exceptional means are beneficial for a time, the example nevertheless causes harm. It sets a precedent for contravening the state's laws for a good purpose, and later, under the same pretext, the laws might be contravened for bad. Thus there never was a perfect state that did not make provisions for everything in its laws, and set up remedies for every circ.u.mstance. In conclusion, I suggest that those states that have no recourse to a dictator or a similar authority when in urgent danger inevitably come to ruin. If such a system is lacking in a state, it will either come to ruin as it clings to its laws or, in order to escape ruin, breaks them. And in a state it is bad for anything to take place that forces it to be governed by exceptional means, because even if the exceptional means are beneficial for a time, the example nevertheless causes harm. It sets a precedent for contravening the state's laws for a good purpose, and later, under the same pretext, the laws might be contravened for bad. Thus there never was a perfect state that did not make provisions for everything in its laws, and set up remedies for every circ.u.mstance. In conclusion, I suggest that those states that have no recourse to a dictator or a similar authority when in urgent danger inevitably come to ruin.

It is to be noted with what foresight the Romans set up the method of electing a dictator. The creation of a dictator brought some shame on the consuls: They were the heads of state but, after the election of a dictator, would have to obey him like everyone else. The founders of the dictators.h.i.+p, foreseeing that this would cause the citizens to disdain the consuls, decided that the power to elect a dictator should remain with the consuls, the idea being that when a dire circ.u.mstance beset Rome and a monarchical authority was necessary, the consuls would willingly appoint a dictator. If they made the appointment, their own loss of authority would pain them less, because any harm that man does to himself voluntarily and by his own choice ultimately hurts less than harm done to him by others. In later years, however, the Romans gave dictatorial authority to the consul and not to a dictator with the words: "Let the consul see to it that no harm befalls the Republic."111 But to return to our subject, I conclude that Rome's neighbors, by trying to suppress Rome, forced the city to create inst.i.tutions that would not only be suited to its defense, but also give it the ability to counterattack with greater cohesion, force, and power.

109. Roman dictators were elected for a maximum period of six months. Roman dictators were elected for a maximum period of six months.110. The Council of Ten, established in 1310, watched over the security of the Venetian state. The Council of Ten, established in 1310, watched over the security of the Venetian state.111. Machiavelli quotes from Livy (Book III, chapter 4) in Latin: Machiavelli quotes from Livy (Book III, chapter 4) in Latin: Videat consul, ne respublica quid detrimenti capiat Videat consul, ne respublica quid detrimenti capiat.

CHAPTER THIRTY-EIGHT.

ON HOW WEAK STATES ARE INDECISIVE AND CANNOT REACH DECISIONS, AND HOW WHEN THEY DO IT IS USUALLY BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN FORCED TO, NOT BECAUSE THEY HAVE CHOSEN TO DO SO.

There was a severe outbreak of pestilence in Rome, and the Volsci and the Aequi took the opportunity to mount an attack.112 They a.s.sembled a large army and a.s.sailed Rome's Latin and Hernici provinces, ravaging their lands and forcing them to call the Romans to their defense. Rome was afflicted by the plague, and so replied that it would allow these provinces to defend themselves with their own forces, as it was unable to defend them. They a.s.sembled a large army and a.s.sailed Rome's Latin and Hernici provinces, ravaging their lands and forcing them to call the Romans to their defense. Rome was afflicted by the plague, and so replied that it would allow these provinces to defend themselves with their own forces, as it was unable to defend them.

This is an example of the wisdom and generosity of the Roman Senate, how it always strove in good and bad times to be the arbiter of decisions concerning its subject provinces. Nor was it ashamed, when necessity demanded, of ruling in a way contrary to custom. I say this because on other occasions the same Senate had forbidden the Latins and the Hernici to arm and defend themselves.113 A less prudent senate might have considered that it was jeopardizing its standing by allowing its provinces to provide their own defense, but the Roman Senate always judged things as they ought to be judged, invariably choosing the least bad alternative as the best. For reasons I have already mentioned, and for many others that are obvious, the Senate was aware how bad it was for Rome not to be able to defend its subjects, and allowing them to arm themselves on their own. But the Senate was also aware that the provinces had no choice, since the enemy was at their gates. So the Senate took the honorable course in deciding that the provinces should do what they had to do with Rome's consent. If they now had to disobey out of necessity, they would not later disobey out of choice. Though this might appear to be a resolution any state would take, states that are weak and badly advised are not able to, nor do they know how to manage similar extraordinary circ.u.mstances. Cesare Borgia, for instance, had taken Faenza and forced Bologna to accept his terms. He then wanted to return to Rome by way of Tuscany, and sent word to Florence to request that he and his army be granted pa.s.sage. The Florentines consulted on how to handle the matter, but n.o.body proposed that his request be granted: The Florentines did not follow the Roman practice. As Cesare Borgia was heavily armed, and the Florentines were not well armed enough to forbid him pa.s.sage, it would have been a more honorable course of action for them to be perceived as allowing him pa.s.sage of their own free will rather than being forced to do so. What ensued was Florence's utter disgrace, though it would have been only a minor matter had they acted differently. The worst attribute of weak states is their irresolution, so that all the decisions they ultimately make are made by force. If they come to any good decisions it is because they are forced to, not because they do so out of their own wisdom. A less prudent senate might have considered that it was jeopardizing its standing by allowing its provinces to provide their own defense, but the Roman Senate always judged things as they ought to be judged, invariably choosing the least bad alternative as the best. For reasons I have already mentioned, and for many others that are obvious, the Senate was aware how bad it was for Rome not to be able to defend its subjects, and allowing them to arm themselves on their own. But the Senate was also aware that the provinces had no choice, since the enemy was at their gates. So the Senate took the honorable course in deciding that the provinces should do what they had to do with Rome's consent. If they now had to disobey out of necessity, they would not later disobey out of choice. Though this might appear to be a resolution any state would take, states that are weak and badly advised are not able to, nor do they know how to manage similar extraordinary circ.u.mstances. Cesare Borgia, for instance, had taken Faenza and forced Bologna to accept his terms. He then wanted to return to Rome by way of Tuscany, and sent word to Florence to request that he and his army be granted pa.s.sage. The Florentines consulted on how to handle the matter, but n.o.body proposed that his request be granted: The Florentines did not follow the Roman practice. As Cesare Borgia was heavily armed, and the Florentines were not well armed enough to forbid him pa.s.sage, it would have been a more honorable course of action for them to be perceived as allowing him pa.s.sage of their own free will rather than being forced to do so. What ensued was Florence's utter disgrace, though it would have been only a minor matter had they acted differently. The worst attribute of weak states is their irresolution, so that all the decisions they ultimately make are made by force. If they come to any good decisions it is because they are forced to, not because they do so out of their own wisdom.

I would like to give two more examples of this, concerning the government of our city of Florence, that have taken place in our times. In 1500, after King Louis XII of France had retaken Milan, he wanted to give Pisa back to Florence for the fifty thousand ducats that the Florentines had promised him for such a rest.i.tution. He sent his army to Pisa under the command of Monsignor de Beaumont, who, though a Frenchman, was a man the Florentines trusted. Commander and army marched to the area between Cascina and Pisa in order to attack the city walls, but during the few days in which they were preparing the siege, Pisan emissaries came to Beaumont and offered to hand Pisa over to the French army on condition that King Louis would pledge not to deliver the city to the Florentines before a period of four months had pa.s.sed. The Florentines spurned this proposal, with the result that they marched against Pisa only to march away again in disgrace. The proposal had been rejected for no other reason than the Florentines' distrust of the king's word, even though they had in the first place put themselves in his hands through bad counsel. They did not trust him, but they could not see how it made more sense for the king to restore Pisa to them once he had occupied it-and that if at that point he did not restore it, he would be revealing his true nature. But as Louis XII had not yet occupied Pisa, he could only promise it to them and force them to pay for that promise. Thus it would have been far more advantageous for the Florentines to have agreed to Beaumont's taking the city under any condition. There was a similar occurrence in 1502, when the city of Arezzo rebelled and the French king sent Monsignor Imbalt with French troops to aid the Florentines. As Monsignor Imbalt marched toward Arezzo he was approached by the Arezzans, who were prepared to give up their city for certain pledges, much as the Pisans had been. This proposal was rejected in Florence, and Monsignor Imbalt, convinced that the Florentines had little understanding of the matter, began to conduct negotiations on his own without involving the Florentine representatives. As a result, he drew up the agreement in his own manner, and under this agreement entered Arezzo with his men, giving the Florentines to understand that he considered them simpletons. If they really wanted Arezzo, they should address themselves to King Louis, who could hand them the city much more easily now that the French had occupied it than when they had been camped outside. There was much cursing and blaming of Imbalt in Florence until the Florentines finally realized that if Beaumont had acted the way Imbalt had, the Florentines would have had not only Arezzo, but Pisa too.

Hence, to return to our topic, irresolute states never make good choices except by force, because their weakness never lets them reach decisions where any doubt exists. And if this doubt is not eliminated by a violent act that presses them forward, they remain forever suspended in indecision.

112. Livy describes the plague and Rome's inability to help her allies in Book III, chapters 68. Livy describes the plague and Rome's inability to help her allies in Book III, chapters 68.113. Livy in Book II, chapter 30, mentions that when the Aequi attacked Latium, the Roman Senate felt it was "safer to have unarmed Latins defended by Romans than to allow them to rearm." Livy in Book II, chapter 30, mentions that when the Aequi attacked Latium, the Roman Senate felt it was "safer to have unarmed Latins defended by Romans than to allow them to rearm."

CHAPTER FORTY-ONE.

ON THE IMPRUDENCE AND INEFFECTIVENESS OF SUDDEN CHANGE FROM HUMILITY TO HAUGHTINESS AND FROM MERCY TO CRUELTY WITHOUT APPROPRIATE MEASURES.

Changing too quickly from one quality to another was among Appius's princ.i.p.al injudicious measures for maintaining his tyranny114 His cunning on the other hand, in feigning to be a man of the people in order to deceive the plebeians, was effective. His cunning on the other hand, in feigning to be a man of the people in order to deceive the plebeians, was effective.115 Also effective were his methods for reappointing the Decemvirs, Also effective were his methods for reappointing the Decemvirs,116 as was the audacity of appointing himself against the wishes of the n.o.bility and then putting his entourage into power. But having done all this it was injudicious, as I said above, for Appius suddenly to change his nature, turning himself from a friend of the plebeians into their enemy, from benevolent to arrogant, from generous to difficult, and all this so suddenly and without excuse that anyone could see his falsity. If a man has been perceived as good at a certain time but wants to become evil for his advantage, he must do so on an appropriate occasion and in a way that gives the impression that his actions are being forced by circ.u.mstances, so that before his changed nature deprives him of old favors, it will have secured so many new ones that his power will not be diminished. Otherwise he will find himself exposed and without friends, and so will come to ruin. as was the audacity of appointing himself against the wishes of the n.o.bility and then putting his entourage into power. But having done all this it was injudicious, as I said above, for Appius suddenly to change his nature, turning himself from a friend of the plebeians into their enemy, from benevolent to arrogant, from generous to difficult, and all this so suddenly and without excuse that anyone could see his falsity. If a man has been perceived as good at a certain time but wants to become evil for his advantage, he must do so on an appropriate occasion and in a way that gives the impression that his actions are being forced by circ.u.mstances, so that before his changed nature deprives him of old favors, it will have secured so many new ones that his power will not be diminished. Otherwise he will find himself exposed and without friends, and so will come to ruin.

114. Appius Claudius was the most tyrannical of the Decemvirs, a legislative commission appointed in 451 and 450 Appius Claudius was the most tyrannical of the Decemvirs, a legislative commission appointed in 451 and 450 BCE BCE, given the task of resolving the power struggle between the patricians and the plebeians.115. Livy (Book III, chapter 33) writes: "By means of the plebeians' favor, the leaders.h.i.+p of the magistracy was granted to Appius. He feigned such a new personality that instead of being seen as a savage persecutor of the plebeians, he suddenly became their champion, ready to capture every breath of popularity." Livy (Book III, chapter 33) writes: "By means of the plebeians' favor, the leaders.h.i.+p of the magistracy was granted to Appius. He feigned such a new personality that instead of being seen as a savage persecutor of the plebeians, he suddenly became their champion, ready to capture every breath of popularity."116. Livy (Book III, chapter 33) writes: "The Decemvirs were elected without right of appeal." Livy (Book III, chapter 33) writes: "The Decemvirs were elected without right of appeal."

CHAPTER FORTY-TWO.

ON THE EASE WITH WHICH MEN CAN BE CORRUPTED.

It is also worth noting, concerning the Decemvirate, how easily men can be corrupted and made to a.s.sume an altogether different nature, no matter how good or educated they might be.117 Consider how the young men with whom Appius surrounded himself became supporters of his tyranny for the scant benefits it brought them, or how Quintus Fabius, one of the second group of Decemvirs and an excellent man, was blinded by ambition and persuaded by Appius's evil ways, turning from good to bad and becoming like him. Consider how the young men with whom Appius surrounded himself became supporters of his tyranny for the scant benefits it brought them, or how Quintus Fabius, one of the second group of Decemvirs and an excellent man, was blinded by ambition and persuaded by Appius's evil ways, turning from good to bad and becoming like him.118 Were lawgivers in republics or kingdoms to examine this matter carefully, they would be more ready to put a check on men's appet.i.tes and deprive them of the hope of transgressing without punishment. Were lawgivers in republics or kingdoms to examine this matter carefully, they would be more ready to put a check on men's appet.i.tes and deprive them of the hope of transgressing without punishment.

117. In 449 In 449 BCE BCE, the Decemvirs were forced to abdicate, as they had become tyrannical.118. Livy (Book III, chapter 41) writes: "The foremost among the Decemvirs were Quintus Fabius and Appius Claudius. [...] Fabius's character was deficient in soundness and integrity rather than actively evil. In fact this man, formerly distinguished at home and on the battlefield, was so changed by the Decemvirate and his colleagues that he chose to be like Appius rather than be himself." Livy (Book III, chapter 41) writes: "The foremost among the Decemvirs were Quintus Fabius and Appius Claudius. [...] Fabius's character was deficient in soundness and integrity rather than actively evil. In fact this man, formerly distinguished at home and on the battlefield, was so changed by the Decemvirate and his colleagues that he chose to be like Appius rather than be himself."

CHAPTER FORTY-THREE.

ON HOW MEN WHO FIGHT FOR THEIR OWN GLORY ARE GOOD AND FAITHFUL SOLDIERS.

Another issue to be considered concerning the matter discussed above is the difference between an army that is content and fights for its own glory and an army that is discontented and fights for the ambition of others. While the Roman armies tended to be victorious under the consuls, they were invariably defeated under the tyranny of the Decemvirs.119 This example also indicates to some extent why mercenary soldiers are of no use, since the meager salary they are paid is the only motive they have to keep fighting. This example also indicates to some extent why mercenary soldiers are of no use, since the meager salary they are paid is the only motive they have to keep fighting.120 This is not enough of a reason, nor can it be, to make them loyal to you, nor so much your friend that they will want to die for you. In an army whose soldiers do not have the kind of love for the man they are fighting for to make them his devoted supporters, there can never be enough skill and valor to resist an enemy who is even moderately skillful. And because such love and fervor cannot be inspired in anyone but one's subjects, it is necessary, in order to sustain a government or to maintain a republic or kingdom, to arm oneself with one's own subjects. All those who had their own armies had great success. The Roman armies under the Decemvir tyranny had the same skill as previous Roman armies, but because they did not have the same disposition, they did not achieve the same results. The moment the Decemvirs were abolished and the Roman soldiers once again fought as free men, their former valor returned. The result was that their campaigns became as successful as they had been before. This is not enough of a reason, nor can it be, to make them loyal to you, nor so much your friend that they will want to die for you. In an army whose soldiers do not have the kind of love for the man they are fighting for to make them his devoted supporters, there can never be enough skill and valor to resist an enemy who is even moderately skillful. And because such love and fervor cannot be inspired in anyone but one's subjects, it is necessary, in order to sustain a government or to maintain a republic or kingdom, to arm oneself with one's own subjects. All those who had their own armies had great success. The Roman armies under the Decemvir tyranny had the same skill as previous Roman armies, but because they did not have the same disposition, they did not achieve the same results. The moment the Decemvirs were abolished and the Roman soldiers once again fought as free men, their former valor returned. The result was that their campaigns became as successful as they had been before.

119. Livy (Book III, chapter 42) writes: "The soldiers, determined that nothing anywhere should prosper under the leaders.h.i.+p and auspices of the Decemvirs, allowed themselves to be defeated." Livy (Book III, chapter 42) writes: "The soldiers, determined that nothing anywhere should prosper under the leaders.h.i.+p and auspices of the Decemvirs, allowed themselves to be defeated."120. See See The Prince The Prince, chapter 12, t.i.tled "Of the Different Types of Armies, and of Mercenaries."

CHAPTER FORTY-SIX.

ON HOW MEN PROGRESS FROM ONE AMBITION TO ANOTHER, AND HOW THEY SEEK TO AVOID BEING HARMED BUT READILY HARM OTHERS.

Once the Roman populace had regained its liberty121 and become as it had been before-except that now the populace was in an even better position, as it had created many new laws guaranteeing its own power-it seemed reasonable to expect that within a short period calm would be restored. But quite the opposite happened, with new turmoil and discord breaking out every day. Livy cogently points out the reason for this, so it seems fitting to use his exact words when he says that either the populace or the n.o.bility always became insolent when the other was humiliated: When the plebeians were happy enough to remain quietly within their station, young n.o.blemen took to attacking them. Nor could the tribunes take any measures as they too were under attack. The n.o.bility, on the other hand, even though they thought their young men too violent, still felt that if the line was to be crossed it should be by their faction and not by the plebeians. and become as it had been before-except that now the populace was in an even better position, as it had created many new laws guaranteeing its own power-it seemed reasonable to expect that within a short period calm would be restored. But quite the opposite happened, with new turmoil and discord breaking out every day. Livy cogently points out the reason for this, so it seems fitting to use his exact words when he says that either the populace or the n.o.bility always became insolent when the other was humiliated: When the plebeians were happy enough to remain quietly within their station, young n.o.blemen took to attacking them. Nor could the tribunes take any measures as they too were under attack. The n.o.bility, on the other hand, even though they thought their young men too violent, still felt that if the line was to be crossed it should be by their faction and not by the plebeians.122 And so in its desire to defend its own liberty each faction strove to oppress the other, because men in their quest to live without fear will attempt to instill fear in others. The harm they dispel they impose on others, as if the only way to prevail is either to harm or be harmed. Here can be seen one of the ways in which republics disintegrate, and how men progress from one ambition to another. The words that Sall.u.s.t puts in Caesar's mouth are very true: "For all bad examples arise from good beginnings." And so in its desire to defend its own liberty each faction strove to oppress the other, because men in their quest to live without fear will attempt to instill fear in others. The harm they dispel they impose on others, as if the only way to prevail is either to harm or be harmed. Here can be seen one of the ways in which republics disintegrate, and how men progress from one ambition to another. The words that Sall.u.s.t puts in Caesar's mouth are very true: "For all bad examples arise from good beginnings."123 As I have already mentioned, the first thing a ruthlessly ambitious citizen of a republic will seek to do is guard himself from being harmed, not only by private citizens, but by magistrates as well. To do this he will seek allies, which he acquires by means that appear honest enough, either by offering money or by offering to defend the allies from those in power. This seems honest, so it easily fools everyone and is not remedied. Soon enough the ambitious citizen, continuing along his course without encountering any obstacles, reaches a position where private citizens are afraid of him and magistrates respect him. And once he has attained this position, he is at a point where it is extremely dangerous to counter him. I have already discussed the danger of trying to deal with a problem within a state when the problem has grown too great: As I have already mentioned, the first thing a ruthlessly ambitious citizen of a republic will seek to do is guard himself from being harmed, not only by private citizens, but by magistrates as well. To do this he will seek allies, which he acquires by means that appear honest enough, either by offering money or by offering to defend the allies from those in power. This seems honest, so it easily fools everyone and is not remedied. Soon enough the ambitious citizen, continuing along his course without encountering any obstacles, reaches a position where private citizens are afraid of him and magistrates respect him. And once he has attained this position, he is at a point where it is extremely dangerous to counter him. I have already discussed the danger of trying to deal with a problem within a state when the problem has grown too great:124 In a nutsh.e.l.l, one must seek either to eliminate it and run the danger of immediate ruin, or let it run its course and feign servitude until a death or some other incident frees you. Once citizens and magistrates are frightened of offending the powerful man and his allies, he does not have to do much more to have the magistrates pa.s.s rulings or attack others as he dictates. Consequently, a state must have inst.i.tutions and laws that will hinder a citizen from doing evil under the guise of doing good, thus ensuring that he can develop only the kind of standing that will benefit and not harm liberty, as will be discussed in its proper place. In a nutsh.e.l.l, one must seek either to eliminate it and run the danger of immediate ruin, or let it run its course and feign servitude until a death or some other incident frees you. Once citizens and magistrates are frightened of offending the powerful man and his allies, he does not have to do much more to have the magistrates pa.s.s rulings or attack others as he dictates. Consequently, a state must have inst.i.tutions and laws that will hinder a citizen from doing evil under the guise of doing good, thus ensuring that he can develop only the kind of standing that will benefit and not harm liberty, as will be discussed in its proper place.

121. In 449 In 449 BCE BCE, when the Decemvirs were forced to abdicate.122. Machiavelli is quoting Livy, Book III, chapter 65. Machiavelli is quoting Livy, Book III, chapter 65.123. Machiavelli quotes Machiavelli quotes Bellum Catilinae Bellum Catilinae, 51, 27, in Latin: in Latin: Quod omnia mala exempla bonis initiis orta sunt in Latin: Quod omnia mala exempla bonis initiis orta sunt. Regarding Bellum Catilinae Bellum Catilinae, see note 250 to Book III, chapter 6, below.124. In chapter 33 above, t.i.tled "When a Problem Within a State or Against a State Has Grown, It Is Better to Bide One's Time Than to Tackle It with Full Force." In chapter 33 above, t.i.tled "When a Problem Within a State or Against a State Has Grown, It Is Better to Bide One's Time Than to Tackle It with Full Force."

CHAPTER FIFTY.

ON HOW A SINGLE COUNCIL OR MAGISTRATE SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO BLOCK THE PROCEEDINGS OF A STATE.

When t.i.tus Quinctius Cincinnatus and Gnaeus Julius Mento were consuls in Rome they were always at odds, and this brought all the proceedings of the republic to a halt.125 As a result, the Senate decided to create a dictator to do what the consuls were unable to do because of their constant wrangling. The consuls, however, though they disagreed about everything else, did agree on one thing: They did not want a dictator. So the Senate had no other recourse than to turn to the tribunes for help. The tribunes, with the backing of the Senate, forced the consuls to obey. This demonstrates the usefulness of the office of tribune, which was valuable not only in keeping the ruthless ambition of the powerful against the plebeians in check, but also the conflict of the plebeians among themselves. It demonstrates too that one should never establish an inst.i.tution in a state that will enable the few to block a decision that might be vital in keeping the state from harm. For example, if you give a council power to distribute honors and rewards, or give a magistrate the power to direct an affair, it makes sense either to impose a stipulation that will compel these authorities to act in all circ.u.mstances, or to set things up in such a way that if they do not want to act, someone else can and will. Otherwise such an inst.i.tution is defective and dangerous, as it would have been in Rome had the power of the tribunes not been able to oppose the obstinacy of the consuls. In the Republic of Venice, it is the Greater Council that distributes the honors and rewards. There were times, however, when members of this council, out of contempt or false conviction, did not appoint successors to magistrates and those who administered Venice's empire. This led to great turmoil, because suddenly Venice and its foreign dominions lacked legitimate judges. Nor could anything be done unless all the members of the Greater Council were satisfied or dissuaded from their false conviction. This problem would have brought Venice to a bad end if prudent citizens had not made provision for it. When the opportunity presented itself, they pa.s.sed a law that no Venetian magistrate inside or outside Venice could vacate his post unless a successor had been appointed. This removed the possibility of the council impeding public actions and so endangering the republic. As a result, the Senate decided to create a dictator to do what the consuls were unable to do because of their constant wrangling. The consuls, however, though they disagreed about everything else, did agree on one thing: They did not want a dictator. So the Senate had no other recourse than to turn to the tribunes for help. The tribunes, with the backing of the Senate, forced the consuls to obey. This demonstrates the usefulness of the office of tribune, which was valuable not only in keeping the ruthless ambition of the powerful against the plebeians in check, but also the conflict of the plebeians among themselves. It demonstrates too that one should never establish an inst.i.tution in a state that will enable the few to block a decision that might be vital in keeping the state from harm. For example, if you give a council power to distribute honors and rewards, or give a magistrate the power to direct an affair, it makes sense either to impose a stipulation that will compel these authorities to act in all circ.u.mstances, or to set things up in such a way that if they do not want to act, someone else can and will. Otherwise such an inst.i.tution is defective and dangerous, as it would have been in Rome had the power of the tribunes not been able to oppose the obstinacy of the consuls. In the Republic of Venice, it is the Greater Council that distributes the honors and rewards. There were times, however, when members of this council, out of contempt or false conviction, did not appoint successors to magistrates and those who administered Venice's empire. This led to great turmoil, because suddenly Venice and its foreign dominions lacked legitimate judges. Nor could anything be done unless all the members of the Greater Council were satisfied or dissuaded from their false conviction. This problem would have brought Venice to a bad end if prudent citizens had not made provision for it. When the opportunity presented itself, they pa.s.sed a law that no Venetian magistrate inside or outside Venice could vacate his post unless a successor had been appointed. This removed the possibility of the council impeding public actions and so endangering the republic.

125. In 431, during the wars with the Volsci and Aequi, t.i.tus Quinctius Cincinnatus and Gnaeus Julius Mento were elected consuls. Livy (Book IV, chapter 26) writes: "The consuls' perverse discord and constant wrangling in the Senate greatly alarmed the Romans." In 431, during the wars with the Volsci and Aequi, t.i.tus Quinctius Cincinnatus and Gnaeus Julius Mento were elected consuls. Livy (Book IV, chapter 26) writes: "The consuls' perverse discord and constant wrangling in the Senate greatly alarmed the Romans."

CHAPTER FIFTY-ONE.

ON HOW A REPUBLIC OR PRINCE MUST MAKE A SHOW OF DOING OUT OF GENEROSITY WHAT HE MUST DO FROM NECESSITY.

Prudent men know how to make a merit of each of their actions even when necessity forces them to take these actions. The Roman Senate was prudent in this way when it chose to pay men in military service out of public funds even though the men had always been accustomed to supporting themselves. The Senate realized that otherwise it would be impossible to wage war over long periods and that the Roman armies would be unable to lay siege to cities or dispatch the soldiers far from Rome. The Senate saw that it was necessary to be able to do both, and so decided that salaries would be paid to the soldiers, but in such a way that made a merit of what in fact necessity was forcing it to do. The plebeians so welcomed this gift that all Rome went wild with happiness, and regarded the Senate's decision as a great benefit that they could never have hoped for or sought on their own.126 The tribunes did their best to abolish this resolution, arguing that as the plebeians would have to pay taxes in order to cover the military salaries, it would burden them, not provide relief, but the tribunes did not manage to convince the plebeians. The Senate even managed to increase the plebeians' enthusiasm in the way it distributed taxes, by imposing the heaviest and largest taxes on the n.o.bility, taxes which would have to be paid first. The tribunes did their best to abolish this resolution, arguing that as the plebeians would have to pay taxes in order to cover the military salaries, it would burden them, not provide relief, but the tribunes did not manage to convince the plebeians. The Senate even managed to increase the plebeians' enthusiasm in the way it distributed taxes, by imposing the heaviest and largest taxes on the n.o.bility, taxes which would have to be paid first.

126. Livy (Book IV, chapter 60) writes: "It is told that nothing was ever welcomed by the plebeians with such rejoicing They flocked to the Senate, grasped the senators' hands as they emerged, saying that they were rightly called 'Fathers,' and proclaiming that now no man, while he had any strength left, would spare his body or blood for such a generous state." Livy (Book IV, chapter 60) writes: "It is told that nothing was ever welcomed by the plebeians with such rejoicing They flocked to the Senate, grasped the senators' hands as they emerged, saying that they were rightly called 'Fathers,' and proclaiming that now no man, while he had any strength left, would spare his body or blood for such a generous state."

CHAPTER FIFTY-THREE.

ON HOW, DECEIVED BY A FALSE KIND OF GOOD, THE POPULACE OFTEN DESIRES ITS OWN RUIN, AND HOW EASILY IT IS MOVED BY GREAT HOPES AND BOLD PROMISES.

After the city of Veii was defeated, the populace of Rome came upon the idea that it might be good if half the Romans went to live in Veii.127 They reasoned that as Veii was rich in territory and buildings and was also close to Rome, half the population of Rome could be made richer without great upheaval. The Senate and the wiser Romans, however, considered this so futile and dangerous that they openly declared they would rather face death than consent to such an idea. Consequently, when the matter came up for debate, the plebeians were so incensed against the Senate that arms and bloodshed would have ensued had not the Senate used some elderly and esteemed citizens as a s.h.i.+eld, the reverence the plebeians had for them putting a halt to the clamor. They reasoned that as Veii was rich in territory and buildings and was also close to Rome, half the population of Rome could be made richer without great upheaval. The Senate and the wiser Romans, however, considered this so futile and dangerous that they openly declared they would rather face death than consent to such an idea. Consequently, when the matter came up for debate, the plebeians were so incensed against the Senate that arms and bloodshed would have ensued had not the Senate used some elderly and esteemed citizens as a s.h.i.+eld, the reverence the plebeians had for them putting a halt to the clamor.128 Two things are of note here. First, the populace will often be misled by a deceptive appearance of good, and consequently end up desiring its own ruin; for if the populace is not made to understand what is good and what is bad by someone it trusts, endless danger and harm can come to a state. Two things are of note here. First, the populace will often be misled by a deceptive appearance of good, and consequently end up desiring its own ruin; for if the populace is not made to understand what is good and what is bad by someone it trusts, endless danger and harm can come to a state.129 And when fate has it that the populace does not have faith in anyone, as sometimes happens, having been duped in the past by men or events, this inevitably leads to ruin. In his discourse And when fate has it that the populace does not have faith in anyone, as sometimes happens, having been duped in the past by men or events, this inevitably leads to ruin. In his discourse De monarchic De monarchic, Dante says that the populace at times shouts: "Long live their death! Death to their life!"130 Because of this lack of faith, states sometimes do not reach good decisions, as I have said above about the Venetians: When all their enemies came together and a.s.saulted them, the Venetians did not manage to decide, before they were ruined, to give back territories they had occupied (which had given rise to the conspiracy of princes Because of this lack of faith, states sometimes do not reach good decisions, as I have said above about the Venetians: When all their enemies came together and a.s.saulted them, the Venetians did not manage to decide, before they were ruined, to give back territories they had occupied (which had given rise to the conspiracy of princes131 and the war that was waged against them), even though giving back these territories would have won over some of their enemies. and the war that was waged against them), even though giving back these territories would have won over some of their enemies.

Therefore, in considering what it is easy to persuade a populace of, or what is difficult, the following distinction can be made: What you must persuade it of appears at first glance a gain or a loss, or appears courageous or cowardly. And when the populace sees a gain in the matters placed before it, even if there is a loss hiding behind these matters, it will always be easy to persuade it to follow that path as long as it seems courageous, even if it leads to the ruin of the republic. Likewise, it will always be difficult to convince the populace about those decisions where there is seeming cowardice or loss, even if behind them there is hidden security and gain. My point is confirmed by countless examples, Roman and foreign, ancient and modern. From this arose the bad opinion in Rome concerning Fabius Maximus,132 who could not persuade the Roman populace that it would be good for the republic to proceed slowly in the Punic War, and to endure Hannibal's attacks without confronting them. The populace considered this option cowardly, and did not see the value hidden behind it, nor did Fabius Maximus present enough reasons to convince them. The Roman populace was so blinded by its opinion that even though it had committed the error of authorizing Fabius's Master of the Horse who could not persuade the Roman populace that it would be good for the republic to proceed slowly in the Punic War, and to endure Hannibal's attacks without confronting them. The populace considered this option cowardly, and did not see the value hidden behind it, nor did Fabius Maximus present enough reasons to convince them. The Roman populace was so blinded by its opinion that even though it had committed the error of authorizing Fabius's Master of the Horse133 to fight Hannibal, though Fabius was against it, the Roman army would have been destroyed if Fabius had not with his prudence saved the day. But the Roman populace did not learn from this, and went ahead and made Varro consul for no other merit than his promises in Rome's public places and squares to defeat Hannibal if he were given the authority to do so. to fight Hannibal, though Fabius was against it, the Roman army would have been destroyed if Fabius had not with his prudence saved the day. But the Roman populace did not learn from this, and went ahead and made Varro consul for no other merit than his promises in Rome's public places and squares to defeat Hannibal if he were given the authority to do so.134 The result was the utter disaster at Cannae and the near destruction of Rome. The result was the utter disaster at Cannae and the near destruction of Rome.

I would also like to put forward another Roman example: Hannibal had been in Italy for nine or ten years, killing Romans throughout the land, when Marcus Centennius Paenula, a man of very humble origins (though he did hold a position of rank in the army), came to the Senate and declared that if he were given the authority to gather an army of volunteers anywhere in Italy he pleased, he would in short order deliver Hannibal dead or alive.135 The Senate saw his demand as extremely rash, but felt that if it were to turn him down and the populace were to find out, much turmoil and resentment against senatorial order would have ensued. So Paenula's request was granted, as the Senate preferred to put all those who followed him in danger than to spark new anger in the people, knowing that such a decision would be popular and how difficult it would be to dissuade the people from it. So Paenula marched out with a disorderly and unruly rabble to find Hannibal, and at the very first encounter was routed and killed along with all the men who followed him. The Senate saw his demand as extremely rash, but felt that if it were to turn him down and the populace were to find out, much turmoil and resentment against senatorial order would have ensued. So Paenula's request was granted, as the Senate preferred to put all those who followed him in danger than to spark new anger in the people, knowing that such a decision would be popular and how difficult it would be to dissuade the people from it. So Paenula marched out with a disorderly and unruly rabble to find Hannibal, and at the very first encounter was routed and killed along with all the men who followed him.

In Greece, in the city of Athens, a most grave and prudent man by the name of Niceas could not persuade the populace that it was a bad idea to invade Sicily, so when this idea was adopted against the wishes of the wise, the result was the complete destruction of Athens. When Scipio was made consul and wanted to conquer Africa, promising the destruction of Carthage, the Senate was unresolved, as Fabius Maximus was against it. So Scipio threatened to put the matter before the people, knowing very well how they liked such enterprises.

One could also give examples from our own city of Florence: Ercole Bentivoglio, along with Antonio Giacomini, commander of the Florentine troops, after having routed Bartolommeo d'Alviano at San Vincenti, besieged the city of Pisa. This campaign had been agreed to by the populace following the bold promises of Ercole Bentivoglio, even though many wise citizens condemned it. But the wise could do nothing, forced as they were by the will of the people, which was based on the rash promises of the commander. Hence I suggest that there is no easier way to ruin a republic where the populace has power than to engage it in bold campaigns, because where the populace carries weight in the deliberations, bold campaigns will be always accepted: Whoever might be of a different opinion will not be able to do anything about it. But if this causes the ruin of the state, it also causes-and this even more often-the ruin of the citizens in charge of such enterprises, because when the populace has taken victory for granted, when the defeat comes it does not accuse Fortune or the circ.u.mstances of war but the commander's wickedness and ignorance. In most cases he is then killed, imprisoned, or banished, as happened to countless Carthaginian generals and many Athenians. Previous victories are of no use to them because their present defeat cancels everything. This was the case with our Florentine general Antonio Giacomini, who, failing to conquer Pisa as he had promised and as the populace had been certain he would, fell into such disgrace with the people that, despite his countless successes in the past, he remained alive more because of the indulgence of those in power than that of the people.

127. Rome defeated Veii, a wealthy and important Etruscan city-state that lay ten miles northwest of Rome (modern Veio), after a decade-long siege in 395 Rome defeated Veii, a wealthy and important Etruscan city-state that lay ten miles northwest of Rome (modern Veio), after a decade-long siege in 395 BCE BCE. Machiavelli is closely following the text of Livy (Book V, chapter 24).128. Machiavelli closely follows Livy's text (Book V, chapter 25). Machiavelli closely follows Livy's text (Book V, chapter 25).129. The second thing of note is discussed at the beginning of the following chapter. The second thing of note is discussed at the beginning of the following chapter.130. In fact, Dante's In fact, Dante's Il Convivio (The Banquet) Il Convivio (The Banquet), I, 2.131. Machiavelli is referring to the League of Cambrai, formed in 1508 by Pope Julius II with the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I, Louis XII of France, and Ferdinand II of Aragon against Venice, with the aim of dividing its territorial possessions among them. Machiavelli is referring to the League of Cambrai, formed in 1508 by Pope Julius II with the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I, Louis XII of France, and Ferdinand II of Aragon against Venice, with the aim of dividing its territorial possessions among them.132. Fabius Maximus Quintus (d. 203 Fabius Maximus Quintus (d. 203 BCE BCE) was a Roman commander and statesman whose cautious delaying tactics during the war against Hannibal gave Rome time to recover its strength and take the offensive. Machiavelli is discussing the events described by Livy in Book XXII, chapters 2527.133. Fabius's effective delay tactics sparked controversy in Rome and a quarrel with Minucius Rufus, his Master of the Horse and second in command. In an unprecedented action, the people of Rome then divided the command between Minucius and Fabius. Fabius's effective delay tactics sparked controversy in Rome and a quarrel with Minucius Rufus, his Master of the Horse and second in command. In an unprecedented action, the people of Rome then divided the command between Minucius and Fabius.134. The Roman consuls of 216 The Roman consuls of 216 BCE BCE, Lucius Aemilius Paulus and Gaius Terentius Varro, set out to meet Hannibal in the disastrous Battle of Cannae with eighty thousand men, of whom only fourteen thousand escaped. (Livy, Book XXII, chapter 35.)135. Livy (Book XXV, chapter 19) comments: "The promise was foolish, but just as foolish was the credence it received. As though the skills of an ordinary soldier could be the same as those of a commander." Livy (Book XXV, chapter 19) comments: "The promise was foolish, but just as foolish was the credence it received. As though the skills of an ordinary soldier could be the same as those of a commander."

CHAPTER FIFTY-FOUR.

ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH A MAN OF GRAVITY AND RESPECT CAN HALT AN AROUSED MULt.i.tUDE.

The second thing of note concerning my discussion in the previous chapter is that nothing is as effective at halting an aroused mult.i.tude as its reverence for a man of gravity and authority who confronts them. Virgil does not say without reason: Yet if they see a man who is revered through goodness and merit, they will fall mute and crowd around him to listen to his words.136 Therefore a man who is given command of an army, or who finds himself in a city where there is turmoil, must step before the crowd with as much dignity as he can, surrounded by all the insignia of his rank, in order to make himself more revered. A few years ago Florence was divided into two factions, the Frateschi and the Arrabbiati, as they called themselves.137 These factions came to blows and the Frateschi were crushed. Among them was Pagolantonio Soderini, a citizen of repute in those days, and during the turmoil the armed mob headed to his house to sack it. His brother Francesco, then the Bishop of Volterra and today a cardinal, happened to be there, and the instant he heard the clamor and saw the crowd, put on his most venerable garment and over it the episcopal vestment. He confronted the armed crowd, and by his august presence and words managed to stop them. This incident was admired and celebrated throughout the city for many days. These factions came to blows and the Frateschi were crushed. Among them was Pagolantonio Soderini, a citizen of repute in those days, and during the turmoil the armed mob headed to his house to sack it. His brother Francesco, then the Bishop of Volterra and today a cardinal, happened to be there, and the instant he heard the clamor and saw the crowd, put on his most venerable garment and over it the episcopal vestment. He confronted the armed crowd, and by his august presence and words managed to stop them. This incident was admired and celebrated throughout the city for many days.

Hence I conclude that the best and most certain way of halting an aroused mult.i.tude is the presence of a man who appears venerable and is revered. Thus, to return to the incident discussed in the previous chapter, it can be seen with what obstinacy the Roman plebeians entertained the idea of moving to Veii because they judged it sensible and did not perceive the dangers it concealed, and how there would have been endless turmoil and upheaval had the Senate not used grave and revered men to halt the plebeians' frenzy.

136. Machiavelli quotes Virgil's Machiavelli quotes Virgil's Aeneid Aeneid, 1.151-52, in Latin: Tum pietate gravem ac meritis si forte virum quem/Conspexere, silent, arrectisque auribus adstant Tum pietate gravem ac meritis si forte virum quem/Conspexere, silent, arrectisque auribus adstant.137. The Frateschi were the followers of Savonarola, the Arrabbiati opposed him. The Frateschi were the followers of Savonarola, the Arrabbiati opposed him.

CHAPTER FIFTY-FIVE.

ON HOW EASILY THINGS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED IN A STATE WHERE THE POPULACE IS NOT CORRUPTED, AND ON HOW ONE CANNOT CREATE A PRINc.i.p.aLITY WHERE THERE IS EQUALITY, OR A REPUBLIC WHERE THERE IS NO EQUALITY.

I have already discussed at length what is to be feared or hoped for from a corrupted state,138 but it nevertheless strikes me as fitting to consider a decision of the Roman Senate concerning Camillus's vow to give Apollo one-tenth of the spoils gathered from the people of Veii. but it nevertheless strikes me as fitting to consider a decision of the Roman Senate concerning Camillus's vow to give Apollo one-tenth of the spoils gathered from the people of Veii.139 These spoils had come into the hands of the Roman plebeians, and as the Senate was unable to check their value, it pa.s.sed an edict that everyone should deliver to the treasury a tenth of what they had plundered. To the plebeians' relief, however, the Senate ultimately decided on a different course of action, having settled on another way of pleasing Apollo, and this decision was not carried out. These spoils had come into the hands of the Roman plebeians, and as the Senate was unable to check their value, it pa.s.sed an edict that everyone should deliver to the treasury a tenth of what they had plundered. To the plebeians' relief, however, the Senate ultimately decided on a different course of action, having settled on another way of pleasing Apollo, and this decision was not carried out.140 Nevertheless, it is evident to what extent the Senate had confidence in the plebeians' honesty, and how it thought that no one would refrain from delivering exactly what the edict commanded. It is also evident that the plebeians did not think of cheating by giving less than they owed, since they strove instead to free themselves of the edict by voicing their outright indignation at it. This example, along with many others already cited, shows how much honesty and pious integrity this populace possessed, and how much good one could expect of it. In fact, nothing good is to be expected where such honesty is lacking, as we see from the states of our era which are so corrupted-Italy above all others. Even France and Spain have some of that corruption, though one does not see as much tumult in those countries as Italy faces every day. In those other countries this does not come so much from the populace's honesty, which is to a large extent absent, as it does from their having a king who keeps them united, not only through his expertise and skill, but with the help of inst.i.tutions that are not yet corrupted. This honesty and pious integrity are very apparent in Germany, with the result that many of its states are free, and observe their laws, so that no one dares occupy them, from within or without. Nevertheless, it is evident to what extent the Senate had confidence in the plebeians' honesty, and how it thought that no one would refrain from delivering exactly what the edict commanded. It is also evident that the plebeians did not think of cheating by giving less than they owed, since they strove instead to free themselves of the edict by voicing their outright indignation at it. This example, along with many others already cited, shows how much honesty and pious integrity this populace possessed, and how much good one could expect of it. In fact, nothing good is to be expected where such honesty is lacking, as we see from the states of our era which are so corrupted-Italy above all others. Even France and Spain have some of that corruption, though one does not see as much tumult in those countries as Italy faces every day. In those other countries this does not come so much from the populace's honesty, which is to a large extent absent, as it does from their having a king who keeps them united, not only through his expertise and skill, but with the help of inst.i.tutions that are not yet corrupted. This honesty and pious integrity are very apparent in Germany, with the result that many of its states are free, and observe their laws, so that no one dares occupy them, from within or without.141 In order to demonstrate how true it is that there is a good measure of this ancient honesty in the German states, I would like to give an example similar to the one cited above concerning the Roman Senate and plebeians. When the German states need to spend an amount of money for the benefit of the public, the empowered magistrates or councils solicit from all citizens one or two percent of what each has in revenue. When this decision has been made according to the inst.i.tutions of the state, each citizen presents himself before the tax collectors and, taking an oath to pay the proper sum, drops whatever his conscience compels him to donate into a box set up for that purpose. The man who pays is the sole witness of the amount he pays. From this we can conjecture how much honesty and pious integrity is still present in these men, and it must be a.s.sumed that everyone pays the correct sum, otherwise the tax revenue antic.i.p.ated based on previous collections would not have tallied with the amount received. Should the amounts not tally, the deception would be discovered and another method of collection would have been inst.i.tuted. Such honesty is all the more admirable in our times, when it has become rarer. In fact, it now seems to exist only in Germany. In order to demonstrate how true it is that there is a good measure of this ancient honesty in the German states, I would like to give an example similar to the one cited above concerning the Roman Senate and plebeians. When the German states need to spend an amount of money for the benefit of the public, the empowered magistrates or councils solicit from all citizens one or two percent of what each has in revenue. When this decision has been made according to the inst.i.tutions of the state, each citizen presents himself before the tax collectors and, taking an oath to pay the proper sum, drops whatever his conscience compels him to donate into a box set up for that purpose. The man who pays is the sole witness of the amount he pays. From this we can conjecture how much honesty and pious integrity is still present in these men, and it must be a.s.sumed that everyone pays the correct sum, otherwise the tax revenue antic.i.p.ated based on previous collections would not have tallied with the amount received. Should the amounts not tally, the deception would be discovered and another method of collection would have been inst.i.tuted. Such honesty is all the more admirable in our times, when it has become rarer. In fact, it now seems to exist only in Germany.

There are two reasons for this. The first is that the Germans have not had extensive contact with their neighbors, because neither they nor their neighbors travel to each other's lands; each is content with his goods and produce, and happy enough to clothe himself in the wool his land provides. This has removed the reason for any contact and the source of any corruption, because the Germans have not been able to pick up French, Spanish, or Italian customs, these nations taken together being the corruption of the world. The second reason is that the states that have an uncorrupted and vital civic order do not allow for any of their citizens to act or live in the manner of a "gentleman": In fact the citizens maintain equality among themselves and are great enemies of the gentlemen and men of substance of that land. If by chance they get their hands on any of these worthies, they are killed as the source of corruption and the reason for turmoil.

I shall clarify what the t.i.tle "gentleman" signifies. A gentleman lives in idleness and luxury off the profits of his possessions; he does not concern himself with the cultivation of the land, or submit himself to any of the toil necessary to live. In every state and land such men are pernicious, but even more pernicious are those men who have even greater fortunes, with castles and subjects who obey them. The Kingdom of Naples, the Papal States, the Romagna, and Lombardy are filled with both these kinds of gentleman. This is the reason that no republic or vital civic order has ever come about in those lands, because men of this kind are entirely hostile to any form of civil life. To introduce a republic into such states would be impossible, but if someone wanted to reorganize them entirely-that is, if someone were to serve as arbitrator-his only recourse would be to establish a kingdom. This is because where there is so much corruption that laws are not sufficient to halt it, one must combine laws with a larger force. This larger force must be a royal hand that with extreme and absolute authority restrains the excessive ambition and corruption of the powerful. This idea is supported by the example of Tuscany, where for a long time three republics-Florence, Siena, and Lucca-existed over a relatively small territory. Although the other states of Tuscany are in a sense subservient to them, it is evident from their spirit and their inst.i.tutions that they maintain, or at least would like to maintain, their liberty. This has come about because in Tuscany there is no lord of the castle and very few if any gentlemen, but rather the kind of equality that would enable a ruler w