The Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis Part 3

The practical necessity of strict co-operation between the Foreign Service and the Consular Service had previously been acknowledged in Norway on certain sides. It may thus be of interest to recall the strong efforts that were made by the Norwegian majority in the latest Union Committee, to emphasize the importance of having the consuls under the direct control of the Minister for Foreign affairs and Envoys in all matters which are likely to a.s.sume a diplomatic character. The same conclusions may also be drawn from the plan of some Norwegians to solve the Consular question, by arranging for the separation of the mercantile part of the joint Consular service, while the diplomatic part remained intact[30:1].

But the problem now presented a somewhat different aspect from the one it had for the Norwegian Majority of the last Union Committee, for it had postulated a Union Minister of Foreign affairs. And, undoubtedly, a deeper penetration into questions it included, had made clearly manifest the impossibility of drawing a distinct line between the diplomatic and mercantile functions of the Consuls. The question, for instance, now arose, as to whether a Norwegian civil official, in certain cases, would be subordinate to a Swedish Minister. In the face of this problem, the Norwegians on their part lost sight of the real points at issue in a most remarkable way. In the Consular Committee's deliberations, Norwegian opinion on the question of subordination, that it would be an anomaly, in conflict with the spirit of the Norwegian Const.i.tution etc. etc. made it evident that the Swedish claim would come into collision, on the part of Norway, with the formal respect to which the abstract demand of State Sovereignty, viewed logically, is ent.i.tled.

From this conflict, the Swedish government had no duty, nor even the right to withdraw without protest. Facts are of more importance than mere forms. The evasive talk of the spirit of const.i.tutional law, and the administrative anomalies could not be decisive. Many events both in public annals and administrative legislature are very illogical, and very great anomalies. The main fact which the Swedish government had to hold in view, was this, _that the responsibility of the Swedish Minister of Foreign affairs, for the joint Foreign policy of the two Kingdoms, must presuppose a fully effective administration of the same in all its branches_.

[Sidenote: _The Norwegian proposal. May 1904._]

The Norwegian proposal of the 28th May 1904 showed that the views of the Swedish governement could not entirely be ignored. According to this proposal[31:1] the Consular administration in Christiania should regularly inform the Minister of Foreign affairs of nominations, orders issued etc., etc. which it would be of importance for him to know.

Furthermore, when an affair seemed likely to a.s.sume a Diplomatic character and required immediate treatment, the Consul should send the report directly to the Minister for Foreign affairs, and the latter, under similar conditions, would give direct instructions to the Consul.

Amba.s.sadors were also empowered to give orders to the Consuls, but on no account to exceed the instructions given by the Norwegian Authorities.

This was undoubtedly something, but manifestly not much. The connection between the Diplomatic Service and the Norwegian Consular administration was very unsatisfactorily provided for. There was no guarantee whatever that the orders of the Norwegian Consular administration would not come into conflict with those of the Minister for Foreign affairs, a deficiency so much the more serious as the Act -- 1--c allowed the Norwegian Consular administration rather extensive powers of more or less diplomatic significance, for instance, that of giving instructions to Consuls respecting the regulations of International Law.

Furthermore it was deficient of any provisions that would ent.i.tle the Minister of Foreign affairs and the Amba.s.sadors to the authority to secure a guarantee, by strict control, that the Consuls would not compromise the Foreign administration, and, in fact, there was good cause for declaring from the Swedish side, that the proposition includes scarcely any rules calculated to secure the guarantee referred to in the Communique, that the Consuls would not exceed the proper limits of their office, and _was therefore in that respect not in accordance with the acknowledged principles of the Communique_.

[Sidenote: _Mr Bostrom's Conditions._]

From what has been already stated, it seems that in the Swedish Cabinet there were divided opinions. But the Government was unanimous in not accepting the Norwegian proposal, and even in the summer of 1904 it must have been evident to the Norwegian Council, that the Swedish Cabinet cil would not in any essentials comply with the Norwegian proposal. But the question was not thoroughly discussed by the Swedish Cabinet in pleno, till the autumn.

During the autumn Mr LAGERHEIM resigned on the grounds of difference of opinion with the Prime Minister, though the real cause of his resignation was said to have no direct connection with the Union negotiations. In November His Excellency Mr BOSTRoM went to Christiania and presented his conditions, as to which the Swedish Cabinet had declared its approval if the Norwegian government would approve of them[33:1]. These conditions stipulated among other matters, that no orders should be issued from the Consular Office that would come into conflict with the commands of the Minister of Foreign affairs; that, if a Consul acted in any way likely to disturb the relations between the United Kingdoms and the Foreign Powers, the Minister of Foreign affairs could send in an appeal to the King, recommending his dismissal; that the Amba.s.sadors, in certain cases, should also be empowered to suspend the Consul from his Office[33:2].

After personal consultations in Christiania His Excellency Mr HAGERUP made a written statement of his objections.

[Sidenote: _Mr Hagerups Reply._]

In this, and the ensuing interpolations on the Norwegian side, the Norwegian system of conducting negotiations appears in its typical manner. Of real facts and reasons there is not a trace. For instance, though the Norwegian majority itself, in the last Union Committee, emphasized the danger of separating the Consular Service from the Diplomatic administration, Mr HAGERUP does not make the slightest acknowledgement that interminable practical difficulties would be the results of acceding to the Norwegian proposition. Neither is there a single proposal, which, from a Norwegian point of view, would be acceptable, to make decisions that might in any possible degree remedy the deficiences. On the contrary, Mr HAGERUP mentions that such decisions would be calculated to stamp Norway as a dependency, according to international and common law principles, and declared that from a national point of view, it indicates a very great retrogression on the present arrangement of the Consular Service[34:1]. In this, he forgets that Mr BOSTRoM'S conditions refer to exceptional decisions and do not touch the Norwegian Consul's normal position as being a Norwegian civil Official, and he omits to observe that the interference of the Diplomatic Officials with Consular affairs, as proposed by Mr BOSTRoM, would very seldom occur.

[Sidenote: _The Swedish Government's proposal._]

It is, meanwhile, easy to understand that Mr BOSTRoM'S demand, that the King, on the Swedish Minister's representations, should be empowered to dismiss a Norwegian civil official, would deeply injure the Norwegian susceptibilities, and that it was therefore quite possible to be blind to the fact that the Swedish Minister was also responsible for Norway's Foreign politics. When therefore His Excellency Mr HAGERUP went to Stockholm for further discussions, all the rest of the Swedish Ministers, as will be seen, were ready to present a Swedish proposal[34:2] for identical laws modified especially to meet the sensitive point.

The demand that the Consular Office should not issue orders in conflict with those given by the Minister of Foreign affairs, remained, but it naturally did not necessarily imply a formal subordination, as the Minister could not give orders directly to the Consular Office. Further, the decision remained, that the Amba.s.sadors could, on especial occasions, suspend the Consuls from their office, but this decision need not necessarily offend the Norwegian susceptibility, as the Amba.s.sadors, though more directly under the influence of the Minister for Foreign affairs, are nevertheless, according to the Norwegian legal point of view, not only Swedish Officials, but Officials of the Union[35:1]. On the other hand, the form for the interference of the Minister for Foreign affairs with the Consuls was modified in a way which showed great consideration for Norway; thus when a Consul had compromised the United Kingdoms, the Minister of Foreign affairs was to bring the matter before the joint or the Ministerial Council, after which it was laid before the King for decision at a State Council especially dealing with the affairs of that State.

[Sidenote: _The Norwegian government's Ultimatum._]

What reply now does the Norwegian government give to these apparently perfectly fair and moderate demands?[35:2]

It declares that it stands to reason that the Norwegian Consular Office would not issue orders in conflict with those of the Minister for Foreign affairs, and remarks that it is not very appropriate in a form of law, to presuppose want of loyalty in a Public Office[35:3]. If the Swedish proposals had been accepted, the Norwegian Consular service would have been very largely placed under the control of the Foreign Minister, who is const.i.tutionally a Swedish Minister. It claims for other more important points the unsuitability of a hierarchal relation between Swedish and Norwegian officials, and several times cites the decisions of the Consular Committee, the one-sided formal views of which the Norwegian government itself had abandoned. But when the Norwegian government intends offering other guarantees of cooperation between the Minister for Foreign affairs and the Norwegian Consular Office, and that the Consuls shall not exceed the limits of their duties, it has only to refer to the loyalty of the Norwegian Consular Office, and its interest in keeping Norway from being compromised abroad, guarantees, which, of course, have their significance, when reliable, but manifestly are not of the legislative binding nature intended by the Communique. Finally the Norwegian government declares these and sundry other Swedish conditions unacceptable, and adds, that if they should be adhered to further discussion the Swedish draft about would be useless[36:1]. Really a formal ultimatum!

[Sidenote: _The Swedish government's reply._]

Before the Swedish government replied to the Norwegian government's Ultimatum, the critical att.i.tude of the Consular negotiations became the subject of debate in the Lower Chamber of the Swedish Diet, and from the liberal party's side, a strong appeal was made to the government to try, if possible, to avoid any interruption of the negotiations. The reply of the Swedish Cabinet is dated Jan. 30th 1905[36:2]. Its tone is one af decision tempered with undoubted moderation and good-will. The Cabinet firmly maintains the real grounds of the disputed claims. It especially emphasizes the importance of the Minister for Foreign affairs having the power in exceptional cases to interfere in Consular matters, as the limits between the Diplomatic and Consular operations are exceedingly indistinct and, on both sides, there is a natural tendency to extend operations into departments that had previously been considered as belonging to the other party. The reference, made by the Norwegian Cabinet, to the Consular Committee's resolution that the Norwegian Consuls should be entirely under the control of Norwegian authority, was met by the Norwegian Cabinet's own admissions, that the Minister for Foreign affairs should be authorised to give the separate Consuls instructions, and, herewith the claim that, in the Diplomatic branch of affairs, the Norwegian Consuls should be solely under the control of Norwegian authority may be considered void. Furthermore it points out the unsatisfactory att.i.tude of the Norwegian proposal with reference to the guarantees presupposed by the Communique that the Consuls shall not exceed the proper limits of their duty, and the objection made only on Norway's side, that the best guarantee would be the control exercised by the Norwegian Consular Office, is met on the grounds that a guarantee of that kind was not intended in the Communique, as it had nothing to do with the internal relations between Norwegian Consuls and the Norwegian Consular Office.

On the whole the Swedish Cabinet maintains its claims, but it offers to modify them, if they can be proved to be in conflict with the provisions of the Communique. Furthermore the possibility is not excluded, of making on other accounts changes and modifications in the proposed resolutions, but their essential items must be adhered to. The Cabinet does not consider itself ent.i.tled, in the interests of the Union, unconditionally to refuse the points designated by the Norwegian Cabinet.

[Sidenote: _The Norwegian government breaks off negotiations._]

To this doc.u.ment from the Swedish Cabinet, is immediately despatched the reply, that the Norwegian Cabinet finds no grounds for further communication on the matter.

FOOTNOTES:

[30:1] Thus, their claim for a separate Consular service was worded in the Norwegian Moderate party's programme as follows: Our own Norwegian Consular Service with the exception of all matters connected with the relations between the Consular Service and Diplomatic administration is hereby declared established.

[31:1] N:o 4.

[33:1] N:o 5.

[33:2] Some other points in Mr BOSTRoM'S Memorandum were rejected by the Norwegian side. They ran as follows:

1:o Before a Consul was nominated, opportunity should be given to the Minister for Foreign affairs to make such observations as he might think necessary.

2:o In the Consular Diploma, the King shall be styled King of Sweden and Norway--not King of Norway and Sweden, as was the case in Norway--as these Diplomas are intended for presentation to Foreign powers, and the King always makes use of this t.i.tle abroad Foreign powers.

3:o As long as the appointment of separate consuls was not approved of by Foreign powers and so long as amba.s.sadors in a Foreign conntry had not been stationed, the joint Consular Service should continue its functions.

--Mr HAGERUP did not refer to these points in his reply partly because the difficulties of his agreeing on them with Mr BOSTRoM were not, according to his own account, so very insurmountable.

[34:1] N:o 6.

[34:2] N:o 7.

[35:1] They are mentioned, for instance, in the Act of Union.

[35:2] It is characteristic that NANSEN in his review of the negotiations (page 76 and following) does not mention one of the Swedish demands. It can, however, be safely referred to all, who are impartial on the subject, as to whether its decisions, as NANSEN (page 77) insists, imply the subordination of the Norwegian Consular Service to the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs on a very extensive scale.

[35:3] In that case, what numbers of legislative rules and regulations would have remained unwritten!

[36:1] N:o 8.

[36:2] N:o 9

V.

[Sidenote: _Norwegian accusations aganist the Swedish government._]

The breaking off of the negotiations caused great depression in Norway, and even in wide circles in Sweden the issue was deeply deplored.

Norwegian policy had always been a policy of strong feelings, and now it made it an object systematically to work up illwill against Sweden.

Strong expressions were not wanting, and soon the whole of Europe-- thanks to the indefatigable manner in which the Norwegians cultivated the European Press--resounded with accusations against the Swedish government, and the entire Swedish nation of unreasonableness, fickleness etc. etc.; it was important now to make good cause for the plans then already existing in Norway, plans which had probably been laid years ago.

Now in what does the truth of their accusations lie?

[Sidenote: _The responsibility of breaking off the negotiations._]