Retribution_ The Battle For Japan, 1944-45 Part 15

THE CAMPAIGN was the first of the Pacific war to which the Royal Navy made a modest contribution. Hitherto, the British Eastern Fleet had merely conducted tip-and-run raids against j.a.panese installations in the Dutch East Indies and Malaya. Now four British carriers, along with two battles.h.i.+ps, five cruisers and escorts, began to operate against j.a.panese airfields on Formosa, and suffered their share of a.s.saults from kamikazes. "Task Force 57," as Vice-Admiral Bernard Rawlings's force was known, represented an attempt to satisfy Winston Churchill's pa.s.sionate desire for Britain to play a visible part in the defeat of j.a.pan. Its beginnings were inauspicious. Admiral King was bitterly hostile to any British presence in the Pacific, on both nationalistic and logistical grounds. It required the president's personal intervention to force the U.S. Navy to accede to the prime minister's wishes. was the first of the Pacific war to which the Royal Navy made a modest contribution. Hitherto, the British Eastern Fleet had merely conducted tip-and-run raids against j.a.panese installations in the Dutch East Indies and Malaya. Now four British carriers, along with two battles.h.i.+ps, five cruisers and escorts, began to operate against j.a.panese airfields on Formosa, and suffered their share of a.s.saults from kamikazes. "Task Force 57," as Vice-Admiral Bernard Rawlings's force was known, represented an attempt to satisfy Winston Churchill's pa.s.sionate desire for Britain to play a visible part in the defeat of j.a.pan. Its beginnings were inauspicious. Admiral King was bitterly hostile to any British presence in the Pacific, on both nationalistic and logistical grounds. It required the president's personal intervention to force the U.S. Navy to accede to the prime minister's wishes.

Thereafter, in the first months of 1945 it proved embarra.s.singly hard to muster a British fleet for Pacific service. The Royal Navy, like its parent nation, was overstretched and war-weary. Australia's shameless dock labour unions delayed the deployment of both wars.h.i.+ps and the fleet train of supply s.h.i.+ps. When Rawlings's s.h.i.+ps finally joined Spruance, they were hampered by design unfitness for tropical conditions, which inflicted chronic hards.h.i.+p on crews. British Seafire and Firefly aircraft were too delicate for heavy labour, and British carriers embarked far fewer planes than their American counterparts. s.h.i.+ps like Ill.u.s.trious Ill.u.s.trious had been fighting since 1939, and were troubled by old wounds-in mid-April, the carrier was obliged to sail home. Rawlings's fleet struggled to keep up with its vastly more powerful allies. In an early series of air strikes, the British lost forty-one aircraft in 378 sorties, a casualty rate which would have been deemed disastrous even by Bomber Command. Sir Bruce Fraser wrote later in his dispatch: "There can be little doubt had been fighting since 1939, and were troubled by old wounds-in mid-April, the carrier was obliged to sail home. Rawlings's fleet struggled to keep up with its vastly more powerful allies. In an early series of air strikes, the British lost forty-one aircraft in 378 sorties, a casualty rate which would have been deemed disastrous even by Bomber Command. Sir Bruce Fraser wrote later in his dispatch: "There can be little doubt772 that the Americans are much quicker than we are at learning the lessons of war and applying them to their s.h.i.+ps and their tactics...As a result the British fleet is seldom spectacular, never really modern..." that the Americans are much quicker than we are at learning the lessons of war and applying them to their s.h.i.+ps and their tactics...As a result the British fleet is seldom spectacular, never really modern..."

A British war correspondent, David Divine, joined the battles.h.i.+p King George V King George V after weeks aboard after weeks aboard Lexington Lexington, which refuelled and resupplied at sea in winds of up to Force 6, in a fas.h.i.+on reflecting the superb professionalism of the 1945 U.S. Navy. Now, Divine watched in dismay as "KGV went up astern went up astern of one rusty old tanker, which appeared to be manned by two Geordie mates and twenty consumptive Chinamen, and it took us, I think, an hour and a half to pick up a single buoyed pipe-line, fiddling around under our bows." Replenishment operations at sea remained an embarra.s.sment for the British. In a placid sea, an American carrier refuelled in two hours. A British one required all day. A proud service found itself struggling to play a bit part in a vast American drama. Vice-Admiral Rawlings wrote later of the "admiration and...it must be admitted...envy" with which he followed the sinking of of one rusty old tanker, which appeared to be manned by two Geordie mates and twenty consumptive Chinamen, and it took us, I think, an hour and a half to pick up a single buoyed pipe-line, fiddling around under our bows." Replenishment operations at sea remained an embarra.s.sment for the British. In a placid sea, an American carrier refuelled in two hours. A British one required all day. A proud service found itself struggling to play a bit part in a vast American drama. Vice-Admiral Rawlings wrote later of the "admiration and...it must be admitted...envy" with which he followed the sinking of Yamato Yamato. Flying mishaps inflicted an alarming rate of attrition-in their first twelve strike days, nineteen British planes were lost to flak, twenty-eight in accidents.

The Royal Navy discovered that its most significant a.s.sets in Pacific combat were its carriers' armoured flight decks. The extra weight reduced their complement of aircraft, but rendered them astonis.h.i.+ngly resistant to kamikazes, in contrast to their fir-decked American counterparts. When a Zero dived vertically onto the carrier Indefatigable Indefatigable on 1 April, its aircraft were able to resume landing within an hour. Though HMS on 1 April, its aircraft were able to resume landing within an hour. Though HMS Formidable Formidable suffered damage and fifty casualties when it was. .h.i.t on 4 May, the s.h.i.+p was soon operational again. On 9 May, suffered damage and fifty casualties when it was. .h.i.t on 4 May, the s.h.i.+p was soon operational again. On 9 May, Victorious Victorious was. .h.i.t twice and was. .h.i.t twice and Formidable Formidable a second time, by kamikazes which eluded patrolling British fighters. Here too, the Royal Navy found that inexperience cost dear. Fraser's Seafires and h.e.l.lcats shot down a steady stream of intruding j.a.panese, but lacked the ma.s.s which the Americans possessed, together with the refined fighter-direction skills. There was a further twist to British tribulations when the Canadian government announced that only those of its citizens who chose to do so need continue to serve against the j.a.panese once the war against Germany was over. Despite offers of increased pay, 605 ratings of Rawlings's Canadian-crewed cruiser a second time, by kamikazes which eluded patrolling British fighters. Here too, the Royal Navy found that inexperience cost dear. Fraser's Seafires and h.e.l.lcats shot down a steady stream of intruding j.a.panese, but lacked the ma.s.s which the Americans possessed, together with the refined fighter-direction skills. There was a further twist to British tribulations when the Canadian government announced that only those of its citizens who chose to do so need continue to serve against the j.a.panese once the war against Germany was over. Despite offers of increased pay, 605 ratings of Rawlings's Canadian-crewed cruiser Uganda Uganda insisted upon exercising their right to go home. Only with difficulty was the s.h.i.+p persuaded to stay on station until a relief arrived. insisted upon exercising their right to go home. Only with difficulty was the s.h.i.+p persuaded to stay on station until a relief arrived.

The British Pacific Fleet's difficulties mounted with every week of operations. Crew morale suffered from the heat, discomfort and overcrowding: "Except for those engaged774 in flying operations, it was proving to be a dull war." At the end of April, Admiral King renewed his efforts to remove the Royal Navy from operations against j.a.pan by dispatching Fraser's s.h.i.+ps to support the Australian landings on Borneo. This proposal was defeated only by direct British appeals to MacArthur and Kinkaid. At the end of May, to the acute embarra.s.sment of Fraser and the British government, battle damage, crew exhaustion and mechanical failures obliged Rawlings's squadron to withdraw to Sydney for extended repairs. When TF57 departed, it had completed just eleven air-strike days, dropping 546 tons of bombs and firing 632 rockets. It claimed 57 enemy aircraft destroyed, for the loss of 203: 32 to suicide attacks; 30 in a hangar fire; 33 to enemy flak or fighters; 61 in deck landing accidents; and 47 to "other causes." It was a sorry story, indeed one of the most inglorious episodes of the Royal Navy's wartime history. The misfortunes of the fleet reflected the fact that Britain, after almost six years of war, was simply too poor and too exhausted to sustain such a force alongside the United States armada. A British squadron returned to Halsey's command only in the last days of July. in flying operations, it was proving to be a dull war." At the end of April, Admiral King renewed his efforts to remove the Royal Navy from operations against j.a.pan by dispatching Fraser's s.h.i.+ps to support the Australian landings on Borneo. This proposal was defeated only by direct British appeals to MacArthur and Kinkaid. At the end of May, to the acute embarra.s.sment of Fraser and the British government, battle damage, crew exhaustion and mechanical failures obliged Rawlings's squadron to withdraw to Sydney for extended repairs. When TF57 departed, it had completed just eleven air-strike days, dropping 546 tons of bombs and firing 632 rockets. It claimed 57 enemy aircraft destroyed, for the loss of 203: 32 to suicide attacks; 30 in a hangar fire; 33 to enemy flak or fighters; 61 in deck landing accidents; and 47 to "other causes." It was a sorry story, indeed one of the most inglorious episodes of the Royal Navy's wartime history. The misfortunes of the fleet reflected the fact that Britain, after almost six years of war, was simply too poor and too exhausted to sustain such a force alongside the United States armada. A British squadron returned to Halsey's command only in the last days of July.

OKINAWA was declared secure on 22 June, eighty-two days after the landings of Buckner's a.s.sault force. The U.S. Navy had lost 4,907 men killed, the army 4,675, the Marines 2,928. Another 36,613 men had been wounded ash.o.r.e, over 8,000 at sea. A further 36,000 soldiers and Marines became non-battle casualties, many of them combat-fatigue cases. Buckner was unable to celebrate the victory he had yearned for. A j.a.panese sh.e.l.l killed him, unmourned, in the last days. His j.a.panese counterpart, Gen. Misomu Us.h.i.+jima, also perished. He and his chief of staff committed ritual suicide in their headquarters cave on 22 June. Nine of his staff officers shot themselves. Dispute persists about how many Okinawan civilians died, because it is uncertain how many were evacuated before the battle began. Estimates range from 30,000 to 100,000, together with around 70,000 of the island's defenders. About 1,900 kamikazes died in their a.s.saults on the U.S. fleet off the island. A total of 7,401 j.a.panese surrendered, almost half of these local Okinawan conscripts. was declared secure on 22 June, eighty-two days after the landings of Buckner's a.s.sault force. The U.S. Navy had lost 4,907 men killed, the army 4,675, the Marines 2,928. Another 36,613 men had been wounded ash.o.r.e, over 8,000 at sea. A further 36,000 soldiers and Marines became non-battle casualties, many of them combat-fatigue cases. Buckner was unable to celebrate the victory he had yearned for. A j.a.panese sh.e.l.l killed him, unmourned, in the last days. His j.a.panese counterpart, Gen. Misomu Us.h.i.+jima, also perished. He and his chief of staff committed ritual suicide in their headquarters cave on 22 June. Nine of his staff officers shot themselves. Dispute persists about how many Okinawan civilians died, because it is uncertain how many were evacuated before the battle began. Estimates range from 30,000 to 100,000, together with around 70,000 of the island's defenders. About 1,900 kamikazes died in their a.s.saults on the U.S. fleet off the island. A total of 7,401 j.a.panese surrendered, almost half of these local Okinawan conscripts.

Some j.a.panese officers, including Kouichi Ito, retained a lifelong conviction that Us.h.i.+jima had been mistaken to allow the Americans an unopposed landing on Okinawa. Yet, given the overwhelming power of the amphibious force, it is hard to believe that any j.a.panese deployment could have prevented American a.s.sault units from getting ash.o.r.e, or indeed from conquering the island. The defenders could aspire only to what they accomplished-the extraction of a bitter price for American victory. The only tactical option which Buckner never explored, and which might have enabled his forces to prevail more quickly, was that of launching attacks in darkness. The difficulty, however, is that night operations demand exceptionally high motivation and tactical skills, to prevent those carrying them out from simply disappearing, "going to ground," rather than pressing home an a.s.sault. It is doubtful that Tenth Army possessed such qualities.

Photo Insert Two KAMIKAZE.

A j.a.panese pilot prepares for his final mission.

A suicide plane narrowly misses the U.S. carrier Sangamon Sangamon off Okinawa. off Okinawa.

The USS Franklin Franklin afire. afire.

ASh.o.r.e ON O OKINAWA.

Marines in one of the innumerable b.l.o.o.d.y a.s.saults.

Civilians await their fate.

A Marine helps a woman and her baby to safety-most often, such people died.

j.a.pANESE S SAMURAI, E EAGER AND O OTHERWISE.

Tos.h.i.+o Hijikata.

Yos.h.i.+hiro Minamoto.

Haruki Iki.

Renichi Sugano on a locomotive of the notorious Burma Railway.

Harunori Ohkos.h.i.+ as a teenage volunteer on his way to Iwo Jima, amid a grave but proud family group.

Kisao Ebisawa, the frustrated Okinawa suicidalist.

Tos.h.i.+haru Konada, who hoped to pilot a kaiten kaiten human torpedo against the allied invasion fleet. human torpedo against the allied invasion fleet.

Yos.h.i.+ko Has.h.i.+moto (second row, right) (second row, right) with her family, who paid a terrible price for the 9 March 1945 USAAF firebombing of Tokyo. With their parents are Chieko with her family, who paid a terrible price for the 9 March 1945 USAAF firebombing of Tokyo. With their parents are Chieko (second row, left), (second row, left), Hisae Hisae ( front row, centre) ( front row, centre) and Etsuko and Etsuko ( front row, right) ( front row, right).

Hachiro Miyas.h.i.+ta, who dispatched many suicide missions.

One of Miyas.h.i.+ta's own photographs of a sombre young pilot watching the fuelling for his plane's last flight.

USAAF B-29s release incendiaries over j.a.pan in May 1945.

USAAF B-29s formidable commander, Major-General Curtis LeMay.

CHINESE.

Bai Jingfan, her husband and other guerrillas.

Li Guilin.

Zhuan Fengxiang and her husband.

Liu Danhua.

Weng Shan, proud in his American uniform.

"Tieizi"-Li Dongguan.

Australians search enemy corpses for doc.u.ments in northern Borneo, June 1945.

Mountbatten, astride a captured j.a.panese gun, addresses British troops in Burma.

THREE OF S SLIM'S S SOLDIERS John Randle.

Brian Aldiss ( far right). ( far right).

Derek Horsford.

KEY F FIGURES IN THE F FINAL A ACT.

The Big Three at Potsdam.

Henry Stimson.

Leslie Groves and Robert Oppenheimer.

Hirohito.

Anami.

Marquis Kido.

For j.a.pan, the distinction between the carnage wrought by the Tokyo firebomb attacks.

The atomic bomb on Hiros.h.i.+ma was less decisive than it has seemed to posterity.

Distraught j.a.panese hear the emperor's broadcast on 15 August 1945.

The surrender ceremony in Tokyo Bay aboard the battles.h.i.+p Missouri Missouri.

American sailors celebrate victory on board the USS Bougainville Bougainville.

At every level, from high command to fighting soldiers, sailors and Marines, Americans emerged from the battle shocked by the ferocity of the resistance they had encountered, the determination of j.a.panese combatants to die rather than accept defeat. "People out here attach more importance to the Kamikaze method of attack as an ill.u.s.tration of the j.a.panese state of mind than as a weapon of destruction," New York Times New York Times correspondent William L. Laurence wrote from the Pacific. "Considered carefully, the fact that literally thousands of men, many young and in their prime, will go out alone on missions of certain death...is not one calculated to breed optimism." Some historians, armed with knowledge of subsequent events, argue that the capture of Okinawa was unnecessary. It did not bring j.a.pan's surrender a day closer. Yet to those directing the operation at the time, it was perceived as an indispensable preliminary to invasion of the j.a.panese home islands. Okinawa exercised an important influence on the development of events thereafter, through its impact upon the civilian, military and naval leaders.h.i.+p of the United States. To capture an outpost, American forces had been obliged to fight the most bitter campaign of the Pacific war. The prospect of invading Kyushu and Honshu in the face of j.a.panese forces many times greater than those on Okinawa, and presumably imbued with the same fighting spirit, filled those responsible with dismay. At the end of June 1945, staff planners a.s.sumed that Operation Olympic, the invasion of Kyushu, would take place four months thence. To the U.S. chiefs of staff, however, any alternative which averted such necessity would be deemed welcome. correspondent William L. Laurence wrote from the Pacific. "Considered carefully, the fact that literally thousands of men, many young and in their prime, will go out alone on missions of certain death...is not one calculated to breed optimism." Some historians, armed with knowledge of subsequent events, argue that the capture of Okinawa was unnecessary. It did not bring j.a.pan's surrender a day closer. Yet to those directing the operation at the time, it was perceived as an indispensable preliminary to invasion of the j.a.panese home islands. Okinawa exercised an important influence on the development of events thereafter, through its impact upon the civilian, military and naval leaders.h.i.+p of the United States. To capture an outpost, American forces had been obliged to fight the most bitter campaign of the Pacific war. The prospect of invading Kyushu and Honshu in the face of j.a.panese forces many times greater than those on Okinawa, and presumably imbued with the same fighting spirit, filled those responsible with dismay. At the end of June 1945, staff planners a.s.sumed that Operation Olympic, the invasion of Kyushu, would take place four months thence. To the U.S. chiefs of staff, however, any alternative which averted such necessity would be deemed welcome.

So dramatic was the succession of events which crowded into the last months of the war that it is hard to grasp the notion that, in June, the prospect of the atomic bombs did not loom foremost in the consciousness of the U.S. chiefs of staff. At that stage, their hopes of achieving victory without Olympic rested chiefly upon blockade, incendiary air bombardment and Russian entry into the j.a.panese war. All of these represented more immediate realities and more substantial prospects than the putative fulfilment of the Manhattan Project. The course of the Second World War had so often astonished its partic.i.p.ants that no prudent men, even those at the summits of Allied power, could feel a.s.sured of how its last acts would play out.

SEVENTEEN.

Mao's War

1. Yan'an

U.S. SOLDIERS AND SOLDIERS AND M MARINES fighting for their lives in the Ryukyus and Philippines, Slim's men in Burma, Australians in the south-west Pacific, would have found it grotesque had they known how the leaders of their great Asian co-belligerent spent the spring of 1945. Both rival parties for dominance of China held national congresses. True, desultory skirmis.h.i.+ng with the j.a.panese persisted while the Nationalists were meeting in Chongqing, the Communists in Yan'an. The Americans wrung their hands in despair and disgust as the j.a.panese continued to expand their perimeter southwestwards across the Nationalists' Yunnan Province, resisted with conviction only by the Stilwell-trained Chinese divisions. Neither Chiang nor Mao was any longer interested in contributing to j.a.pan's defeat. That could be left to the Americans in the Pacific. What mattered to them now was to gird their loins, gather their political and military forces, for the civil war that must follow the expulsion of the j.a.panese from China. The Communist Congress lasted fifty days, from 23 April to 11 June, its ideological writhings coinciding with the agony of Okinawa. Its chief achievement was to confirm the absolute dominance of Mao Zedong. His "thoughts" were thenceforward paramount in every aspect of Chinese Communist creed and deed. fighting for their lives in the Ryukyus and Philippines, Slim's men in Burma, Australians in the south-west Pacific, would have found it grotesque had they known how the leaders of their great Asian co-belligerent spent the spring of 1945. Both rival parties for dominance of China held national congresses. True, desultory skirmis.h.i.+ng with the j.a.panese persisted while the Nationalists were meeting in Chongqing, the Communists in Yan'an. The Americans wrung their hands in despair and disgust as the j.a.panese continued to expand their perimeter southwestwards across the Nationalists' Yunnan Province, resisted with conviction only by the Stilwell-trained Chinese divisions. Neither Chiang nor Mao was any longer interested in contributing to j.a.pan's defeat. That could be left to the Americans in the Pacific. What mattered to them now was to gird their loins, gather their political and military forces, for the civil war that must follow the expulsion of the j.a.panese from China. The Communist Congress lasted fifty days, from 23 April to 11 June, its ideological writhings coinciding with the agony of Okinawa. Its chief achievement was to confirm the absolute dominance of Mao Zedong. His "thoughts" were thenceforward paramount in every aspect of Chinese Communist creed and deed.

Mao had almost a million men under arms, or what pa.s.sed for arms among the guerrillas-they lacked artillery, air support and heavy weapons. The question of what these forces did during the j.a.panese occupation baffled most Americans at the time, and has remained a focus of controversy since. For decades after their domestic victory in 1949, the Communist rulers of China a.s.serted that their followers, unsupported by the Americans, had alone waged effective war against the j.a.panese. Such Western propagandists as Edgar Snow made extravagant claims for the military successes of the Communists against the occupiers. They contrasted the energy and aggression of Mao's people with Nationalist pa.s.sivity and sloth. Here is a characteristic Snow flourish: "Though their enemies denounced775 the Communists' beliefs and attributed to them every shameful excess they could imagine, no one could deny they had wrought a miracle in arms...Rarely in the history of modern war or politics has there been any political adventure to match this in imagination or epic grandeur. The job was done by men who worked with history as if it were a tool, and with peasants as if they were raw material." the Communists' beliefs and attributed to them every shameful excess they could imagine, no one could deny they had wrought a miracle in arms...Rarely in the history of modern war or politics has there been any political adventure to match this in imagination or epic grandeur. The job was done by men who worked with history as if it were a tool, and with peasants as if they were raw material."

American officers of the 1944 "Dixie Mission" to Yan'an were taken to watch showpiece operations against the j.a.panese, about which they reported back to Chongqing as enthusiastically as they were intended to do. Most of Mao's forces, however, spent the war struggling to feed themselves and survive, skirmis.h.i.+ng only spasmodically with the j.a.panese. Today, the myth of Communist dominance of the struggle against the occupiers is discredited even in China. If Chiang Kai-shek's armies were less than effective on the battlefield, Mao Zedong's guerrillas lacked either the will or the combat power to do more than irritate the j.a.panese. By 1944, 70 percent of j.a.pan's forces in China were committed against the Nationalists. A staff officer at j.a.pan's army headquarters in Nanjing, Maj. s.h.i.+geru Funaki, said: "The Communists operated in regions776 that were strategically unimportant to us. Their troops were much more motivated than the Nationalists, but we sought only to contain them. Our attention was overwhelmingly concentrated on confronting Chiang's forces further south." that were strategically unimportant to us. Their troops were much more motivated than the Nationalists, but we sought only to contain them. Our attention was overwhelmingly concentrated on confronting Chiang's forces further south."

"The Communists were not strong enough to offer a major challenge to the j.a.panese occupation," says a modern Chinese historian, Yang Jinghua. "In the anti-j.a.panese war, the Kuomintang777 did most of the fighting, and killed far more of the enemy-I say this, as a Communist Party member for thirty years. Statistics tell the story. Some 1,200 KMT generals died fighting the j.a.panese, against just ten Communist ones." Zuo Yong, who later became a significant figure in Mao's China, served with the Communist New 4th Army from 1941 to 1945, latterly as a brigade chief of staff. Today, he says: "We had to adopt the strategy did most of the fighting, and killed far more of the enemy-I say this, as a Communist Party member for thirty years. Statistics tell the story. Some 1,200 KMT generals died fighting the j.a.panese, against just ten Communist ones." Zuo Yong, who later became a significant figure in Mao's China, served with the Communist New 4th Army from 1941 to 1945, latterly as a brigade chief of staff. Today, he says: "We had to adopt the strategy778 and tactics of the weak, as Mao urged in his books. We were staging raids, not serious offensives. We were guerrillas, sometimes living months at a time without fighting a battle. The enemy was too strong for us to do anything else." Zuo is generous in acknowledging U.S. aid to China, even though Was.h.i.+ngton denied arms to the Communists: "We felt really grateful to the Americans for all their help. One of their planes came down in our area, after being damaged bombing j.a.pan. The pilot was wounded. We helped him to get back to his own people." Another historian, w.a.n.g Hongbin, says: "Guerrillas could not realistically engage and tactics of the weak, as Mao urged in his books. We were staging raids, not serious offensives. We were guerrillas, sometimes living months at a time without fighting a battle. The enemy was too strong for us to do anything else." Zuo is generous in acknowledging U.S. aid to China, even though Was.h.i.+ngton denied arms to the Communists: "We felt really grateful to the Americans for all their help. One of their planes came down in our area, after being damaged bombing j.a.pan. The pilot was wounded. We helped him to get back to his own people." Another historian, w.a.n.g Hongbin, says: "Guerrillas could not realistically engage779 large bodies of j.a.panese regular troops. The main achievement of the Communist armies in the war was to win the support of peasants and the respect of the Chinese people." This seems just. large bodies of j.a.panese regular troops. The main achievement of the Communist armies in the war was to win the support of peasants and the respect of the Chinese people." This seems just.

By early 1945, the Communists claimed a combined strength of around 900,000 men for their 8th Route Army in the north and New 4th Army in central China, supported by another two million local militia members. As everywhere in the Second World War, guerrillas flourished chiefly in regions little valued by the occupiers. And like most irregular forces, those led by Mao were more concerned with proselytising for their cause and sustaining human existence in a starving countryside than with engaging the enemy. Li Fenggui, for instance, served eight months with his regiment of 8th Route Army in Shandong Province before acquiring a weapon of any kind. Most men went into action with perhaps ten rounds of ammunition apiece. Li's battalion possessed two light and two heavy machine guns; it acquired a single 60mm mortar only in 1944, artillery never. Most of its weapons were locally made single-shot rifles. Few Communist officers possessed watches, which made the synchronisation of operations difficult.

"For us," said Li, "1945 was not much different from 1940. Everyone was very hungry, everyone was very poor." They led nomadic lives, of stringent austerity. A battalion of seven hundred men billeted itself in a village for a few days, fed by local people. When supplies were exhausted, the column moved on, each man if he was fortunate carrying three days' bread and rice in a food bag. Their circ.u.mstances in 1945 had improved in only two respects: most j.a.panese troops had moved south from Shandong to confront the KMT; and far fewer Chinese were collaborating with the enemy. The ruthlessly pragmatic national ethic recognised that survival required bending with the wind. It had become plain even to peasants that the prevailing weather was no longer j.a.panese.

"Most nice people, clever people, chose to be Communists," claimed Xu Yongqiang, who in 194445 was an interpreter with the Nationalist army in Burma. "They were real Communists, not selfish politicians." He meant that many Chinese idealists and intellectuals gravitated naturally to the left in response to the Nationalists' moral bankruptcy and the hyperinflation which ruined so many people in those years. "The professional middle cla.s.ses found themselves bankrupted. The wife of the head of our university had to find work as a domestic servant. People were selling their clothes to buy food. It was the middle cla.s.s who paid for the war." Many Communists all over China languished in j.a.panese prisons, if they had been fortunate enough to escape execution.

Liu Danhua was a literature student in Harbin, Manchuria, when the j.a.panese took over. He was disgusted by everything about their behaviour, not least the fact that j.a.panese fellow students were so much better fed: "They had all the meat and fish. Everywhere we went, everything we did, was under j.a.panese control. The lives of ordinary people were wretched. I was young and angry. We tried to join the Communists, but for a long time we couldn't find them-they were underground." In 1940, Liu organised a student movement at Harbin University, which became known as the Left Reading Group. They made their pathetic protests by reading banned books, and urging peasants to defy j.a.panese orders about what crops to plant. They denounced collaborators. Liu taught his group revolutionary songs. He knew little Communist ideology, "but I could see the corruption and tyranny of the Kuomintang and the landlords. I was sure socialism must be the way forward for China."

It was too dangerous to a.s.semble in the university, so they met at the local tax office, where they incited tax collectors to defiance. In 1941, at last they made contact with the Communists, who began to use Liu as a courier. He was soon arrested, however, and interrogated by the usual j.a.panese methods-beatings, water torture, suspension by his ankles. When these refinements palled on their captors, prisoners were merely left to stand in the snow. After a trial, Liu was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment, and served the first of them manacled.

Thereafter, however, his circ.u.mstances improved. He shared a cell with seven others, guarded by Chinese who proved not unsympathetic to the prisoners. He was allowed to receive a monthly visit from his wife, Yuan, who brought food wrapped in newspapers. These provided fragments of information about the outside world. He exercised constantly and took cold baths, because he was determined to be fit if he regained freedom. Some of his cellmates were Nationalists, "but there was no tension with us Communists. We were all against the j.a.panese." He had no paper or pen, but composed poems in his head. Their only books were science texts and the Bible. "I read it, simply to keep my brain occupied. I can't say I enjoyed it-it has always been abused by national rulers to serve their own purposes-but there are good things there."

From 1944, Liu and his fellow prisoners knew that the j.a.panese were losing the war. Ironically, given Stalin's indifference to China's Communists, Liu felt pa.s.sionately committed to the Soviets: "At that time, I thought the Russians were wonderful. I was sure imperialism and capitalism were doomed to collapse." In his cell, he knew more about Stalin than about Mao. During the last months of the war, like every prisoner of the j.a.panese, he expected to be killed before liberation came. The tension between fear and hope became almost unbearable.

THE WAR POLICIES of Chiang and Mao had this much in common: each sought to strengthen his own power base, rather than to a.s.sist in the defeat of the j.a.panese. By a notable irony Mao, whose efforts to gain American support failed, profited vastly more from the conflict than Chiang, who received billions in aid, together with the wholehearted endors.e.m.e.nt of the greatest power on earth. Mao used the war years to build popular support among the peasantry of a kind which the Nationalists never achieved. Communist forces developed a motivation, comrades.h.i.+p and sense of shared purpose quite unknown in Chiang Kai-shek's army. of Chiang and Mao had this much in common: each sought to strengthen his own power base, rather than to a.s.sist in the defeat of the j.a.panese. By a notable irony Mao, whose efforts to gain American support failed, profited vastly more from the conflict than Chiang, who received billions in aid, together with the wholehearted endors.e.m.e.nt of the greatest power on earth. Mao used the war years to build popular support among the peasantry of a kind which the Nationalists never achieved. Communist forces developed a motivation, comrades.h.i.+p and sense of shared purpose quite unknown in Chiang Kai-shek's army.

Li Fenggui, in 1945 a twenty-four-year-old company commander, was typical. He grew up in a village of nine hundred people near Shanghai, dominated by three "rich" landlords and a few "rich" peasants. The natural condition of others, including his own family, was dest.i.tution. After a b.l.o.o.d.y j.a.panese visit in 1941, Li and a few other villagers formed a little resistance group. Their first act of defiance was both primitive and ruthless. They lay in wait in the fields for a well-known Chinese collaborator who rode past daily on a bicycle. They rushed out, pulled him off his machine, wielded their machetes, and dragged the half-dead figure into the paddy. There, they finished him off and hid the body. Next day, another Chinese agent of the j.a.panese arrived to question the village headman about the disappearance of his colleague. Such happenings were not uncommon, however. No more was heard about the killing from the authorities.

But local Communists learned of it and approved. One day a stranger came to the village and told Li and his friends: "If you want to fight the j.a.panese properly, you must become a Communist." Li said: "But I don't know what a Communist is." The stranger said: "A Communist is a friend to poor people. When China is ruled by Communists there will be no more landlords, no more famines, everyone will have enough to eat, proper houses to live in and electricity." Li recalled later: "I had no idea what electricity was, because I had never seen it. But I accepted that it must be a good thing." The visitor helped Li and three others to write applications to join 8th Route Army, one of whose units was encamped a few miles away. Li's parents applauded. His mother made him a pair of cloth shoes. His father, poorest of the poor, nonetheless found money to buy cloth and st.i.tch him a blanket. Thus equipped, he and the others set off one morning, accompanied for the first mile or so of their adventurous journey by a throng of admiring villagers. They were local heroes.

The years that followed were unremittingly harsh, yet Li found them rewarding: "We had such good relations.h.i.+ps in the battalion, especially with our commanders. We were like family to each other." He enjoyed the communal concerts, led by the divisional entertainment troupe. Together they sang the famous "Guerrilla Song": "Marksmen all are we, when we shoot we kill!" In the summer of 1944, during the Ichigo offensive, Li's division found itself attacked by an overwhelming force of j.a.panese, obliged to disperse and flee: "We told the local peasants to hide everything, poison the wells, and come with us. About five hundred joined our retreat. There were just thirty-seven soldiers in our group, three of them wounded. At last we came to the Yellow River. We had to get across it to be safe. The women put small children on their heads. Some peasants helped carry our wounded. The river was deep. Some of those women were not very tall. The water closed over their heads. Children drowned. Hardly anyone could swim. When we finally reached the other side, maybe three hundred of the five hundred who had started the crossing were still with us. We all cried and embraced each other, guerrillas and villagers together. We were supposed to be soldiers, but we were always peasants as well-one family."

In a subsequent battle, Li was badly wounded-hit in the chest and leg. His unit had no medical supplies. They could only wash away the blood with salt water. When the rest of the battalion pulled out, he was left behind in the hut of a peasant named Li Qirong. For a week the wounded man lay undisturbed. Then one morning a j.a.panese collaborator appeared at the door of the house. "You seem to have visitors," said the man suspiciously. He looked in, saw Li on the bed, and said: "He looks as if he's from 8th Route Army." Li Qirong said angrily: "That's my own son, who was wounded last week when your j.a.panese friends shot up a lot of people." Not satisfied, the collaborator questioned the village headman. Somehow, Li Qirong persuaded him to support the story. After the collaborator had gone, the guerrilla burst into tears: "My mother first gave me life," he said, "but those people gave it to me a second time." He recovered, and eventually rejoined his unit.

By 1945, Li and his comrades knew little more about Communist ideology than they had done three years earlier. Survival remained their overwhelming preoccupation. Li had risen to become a captain, though he was denied the formal rank because he could not read. Orders were issued verbally, as so few men were literate, but Li's absence of education created problems in recording ammunition states, handling messages and taking roll calls. "Our general was the only really well-educated man in the division," he said.

The s.e.xual climate in the Communist ranks was puritanical. Zuo Yong, twenty-year-old son of a rich peasant, was a student in Shanghai in 1941 when the j.a.panese burnt down his school: "I decided I would rather fight than find another school." He joined the Communists not for ideological reasons, but simply because their forces chanced to be closer at hand than those of the KMT. After a spell at an "anti-j.a.panese military school" in Hainan he was posted to New 4th Army as a platoon commander. A year or so later he was billeted in the village house of a family whose father was away at the front, serving as an officer with the Kuomintang. The man's wife was a teacher, with two teenage sons and two daughters of eighteen and nineteen. Zuo persuaded the woman to let her daughters become nurses in a Communist clinic, because there was no longer a chance that they could study. Soon afterwards, the woman said she wanted to meet Zuo's mother, to discuss a serious issue. "I'm afraid that's difficult," said Zuo. "Our village is a long way off." The woman said: "Well, in that case, I'd better talk to you. I think you would make a good husband for one of my daughters." Zuo explained that he could fulfil none of the three alternative criteria for being allowed to marry in the Red Army: he was under twenty-eight, he had not completed ten years' service, and he was not a regimental commander.

Ordinary soldiers were officially denied physical contact with girls. Even the few married women in the ranks were forbidden to touch their husbands in public. Senior officers, however, were provided with arranged wives of eighteen or nineteen. Zuo said: "I remember one girl who was told she was to marry a regimental commander. She asked about him, and was told that he was brave, hard-working, kind. After their first meeting, a comrade demanded: 'Do you like him?' She said: 'How can I tell? I've only seen him once.'" The marriage went ahead anyway. After a while, the girl ran away. Her husband remained enthusiastic, however, and eventually persuaded her to return. "A lot of couples whose marriages780 were arranged made a go of it together," said Zuo, "but there were divorces. Some of our soldiers were pretty simple fellows from the countryside, not very nice. They took for granted the right to beat h.e.l.l out of their women." were arranged made a go of it together," said Zuo, "but there were divorces. Some of our soldiers were pretty simple fellows from the countryside, not very nice. They took for granted the right to beat h.e.l.l out of their women."

FOR MOST of the war, Allied intelligence in China was shockingly poor. Stilwell and his successor Wedemeyer knew little about what the Nationalist armies were, or were not, achieving on the ground against the j.a.panese, and even less about the Communists. Until late 1944, the Communists' base in Yan'an remained a distant lunar world, shrouded in mist. It was known that Mao Zedong and his followers controlled an area the size of France, inhabited by some ninety million Chinese people, in which they had established a radical social and economic regime. Westerners who visited Yan'an a.s.serted that living conditions were better than those prevailing in Nationalist areas. Such reports were compromised, however, by the fact that most of their authors were ideological fellow travellers. Were Mao's people serious Communists, or was he merely a rival warlord to Chiang? This issue mystified American and British officials in Chongqing. John Keswick, a scion of Hong Kong's Jardine Matheson trading house, was a British political adviser. He described the Yan'an regime contemptuously as "nothing more than a provincial government of the war, Allied intelligence in China was shockingly poor. Stilwell and his successor Wedemeyer knew little about what the Nationalist armies were, or were not, achieving on the ground against the j.a.panese, and even less about the Communists. Until late 1944, the Communists' base in Yan'an remained a distant lunar world, shrouded in mist. It was known that Mao Zedong and his followers controlled an area the size of France, inhabited by some ninety million Chinese people, in which they had established a radical social and economic regime. Westerners who visited Yan'an a.s.serted that living conditions were better than those prevailing in Nationalist areas. Such reports were compromised, however, by the fact that most of their authors were ideological fellow travellers. Were Mao's people serious Communists, or was he merely a rival warlord to Chiang? This issue mystified American and British officials in Chongqing. John Keswick, a scion of Hong Kong's Jardine Matheson trading house, was a British political adviser. He described the Yan'an regime contemptuously as "nothing more than a provincial government781 by a group whose policy sprang from agrarian revolt...It is unlikely that they would interfere with private property." by a group whose policy sprang from agrarian revolt...It is unlikely that they would interfere with private property."

Lt.-Gen. Adrian Carton de Wiart was Churchill's personal emissary to Chiang, an appointment which reflected the prime minister's weakness for battlefield heroes, heedless of their other limitations. De Wiart was absurdly brave, veteran of campaigns innumerable, wounded eight times. He neglected to mention his Victoria Cross in his autobiography, presumably on the grounds that a self-respecting soldier should scorn such trifles. He lacked an eye, a hand (after being hit in France in 1915, he bit off his own mangled fingers when a doctor declined to remove them) and any hint of intellect. De Wiart despised all Communists on principle, denounced Mao as "a fanatic," and added: "I cannot believe he means business782." He told the British cabinet that there was no conceivable alternative to Chiang as ruler of China.

A British diplomat delivered a shrewder and more nuanced verdict: "The Communists do not, any more783 than the Kuomintang, think of 'democracy' as a system which gives a chance to opposition parties. What is really meant by the 'democracy' of the Communists is that they are strongly supported by the poorer peasantry." British agents proved wiser than some Americans, dismissing any possibility of a deal between Chiang and Mao. By contrast Patrick Hurley, who became U.S. amba.s.sador in October 1944, for months pursued the chimera of reconciliation. His first actions on arrival were to have a Cadillac appropriate to his status flown to Chongqing, and the amba.s.sadorial residence redecorated. Then he set out to broker a deal between the Kuomintang and the Communists. In Hurley's first weeks, this foolish man confided to his own staff that he could perceive little to choose between Mao and Chiang. than the Kuomintang, think of 'democracy' as a system which gives a chance to opposition parties. What is really meant by the 'democracy' of the Communists is that they are strongly supported by the poorer peasantry." British agents proved wiser than some Americans, dismissing any possibility of a deal between Chiang and Mao. By contrast Patrick Hurley, who became U.S. amba.s.sador in October 1944, for months pursued the chimera of reconciliation. His first actions on arrival were to have a Cadillac appropriate to his status flown to Chongqing, and the amba.s.sadorial residence redecorated. Then he set out to broker a deal between the Kuomintang and the Communists. In Hurley's first weeks, this foolish man confided to his own staff that he could perceive little to choose between Mao and Chiang.

The Nationalists, unsurprisingly, were implacably hostile to any Anglo-American dealings with Mao, and for most of the war the Americans indulged them. But late in 1944, as Was.h.i.+ngton's disillusionment with Chiang hardened, some contacts developed. John Service, a U.S. diplomat who shared with John Paton Davies a growing respect for the Yan'an regime, met the Communist leaders in August. After years of contending with Chiang's self-importance, pomposity and duplicity, Service was captivated by the charm, humour and apparent frankness of the Communists in general, and Mao Zedong in particular. Mao told him that he had thought of abandoning the name "Communist" for his party, to a.s.suage capitalist fears about its nature: "If people knew us they would not be frightened." He said that China would need American investment after the war: "We must cooperate and we must have American help. This is why it is so important to us Communists to know what you Americans are thinking and planning. We cannot risk crossing you-cannot risk any conflict with you." Mao pleaded for American amphibious landings on the coast of northern China, to open a direct supply route to Yan'an. So eager were the Communists for aid that Zhou Enlai, while acting as Mao's emissary in Chongqing, told Service they were willing to place their troops under American command if the U.S. would arm them. Service, impressed and even entranced, formally recommended to Stilwell that weapons should be sent to the Communists. The general was not unsympathetic.

The idea got nowhere. More than sixty years later it is easy to convict of naivete those Americans-some in Chongqing, some in Was.h.i.+ngton-who frustrated Chinese Communist advances. They persisted in backing Chiang Kai-shek when it was plain that his regime was incorrigibly corrupt. Yet the advocates of Mao also showed themselves imperceptive. American visitors, arriving from Chongqing with the rotten taste of Nationalism still fresh in their mouths, were absurdly easily seduced by the Communist leaders. Davies, who flew to Yan'an in October 1944, was enchanted by the "direct, friendly manner" in which Mao strode up to each visitor in turn and shook hands. His physical presence impressed them: the strong chin and prominent mole; long, thick black hair; wide lips. Davies noted Mao's slow gestures, big, soft, heavy frame, mastery of dialectic argument, "the incandescence of personality784 which develops not in the twinkling of an eye but of easy perception. There is an immense, smooth calm and sureness to him." which develops not in the twinkling of an eye but of easy perception. There is an immense, smooth calm and sureness to him."

The American reported to Was.h.i.+ngton: "I got the impression that here785 we were dealing with pragmatists-men who knew their limitations as well as their strengths. And they were confident-confident and patient. They have waited a long time to get where they are now. They are willing to wait much longer." Likewise Raymond Ludden and the five military members of the U.S. Yan'an Observers' Group-the "Dixie Mission"-who travelled on foot and by mule to visit guerrillas. "8th Route Army has a legendary fame in North China as friend and champion of the people," Ludden enthused in February 1945. After years of cynicism and frustration in the Nationalist camp, such men as Service and Davies found the Communists intensely romantic. They swallowed claims for the decency and moderation of Mao's leaders.h.i.+p, when shrewder observers recognised that the Communist leader, like Chiang, was engaged in the ruthless pursuit of power. Soft words offered to American emissaries were meaningless. we were dealing with pragmatists-men who knew their limitations as well as their strengths. And they were confident-confident and patient. They have waited a long time to get where they are now. They are willing to wait much longer." Likewise Raymond Ludden and the five military members of the U.S. Yan'an Observers' Group-the "Dixie Mission"-who travelled on foot and by mule to visit guerrillas. "8th Route Army has a legendary fame in North China as friend and champion of the people," Ludden enthused in February 1945. After years of cynicism and frustration in the Nationalist camp, such men as Service and Davies found the Communists intensely romantic. They swallowed claims for the decency and moderation of Mao's leaders.h.i.+p, when shrewder observers recognised that the Communist leader, like Chiang, was engaged in the ruthless pursuit of power. Soft words offered to American emissaries were meaningless.

Mao's personal vices are starkly depicted by modern writers. Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, in an unremittingly dark portrait, highlight his maltreatment of his first two wives, and of a host of unfortunate young women whom he exploited. Many Western as well as Chinese scholars argue contrarily, however, that whatever Mao became after he achieved power, in the wartime years his excesses had not yet manifested themselves. What seems indisputable is that Mao had no interest in liberal socialism. American visitors to Yan'an were foolish to be deluded by the warmth of Communist greetings. They saw, or thought they saw, a group of austere, dedicated patriots committed to fighting the j.a.panese and creating a better life for China's starving millions. This was fanciful. It is no longer denied in China that Mao's regime in Yan'an engaged in large-scale opium trafficking, and almost certainly also made tactical truces with the j.a.panese. "Mao and the Communists786 engaged in the opium trade," says Yang Jinghua, a historian of Manchuria. "How else could they pay their troops? Nothing else that would grow in Yan'an was marketable. In such a situation, you do what you must." engaged in the opium trade," says Yang Jinghua, a historian of Manchuria. "How else could they pay their troops? Nothing else that would grow in Yan'an was marketable. In such a situation, you do what you must."

Evidence about Communist parleys with the j.a.panese is circ.u.mstantial, but persuasive. It suited both parties to trade opium, a major industry for the occupying regime. j.a.pan's China Affairs Board, established by Prince Konoe, controlled a $300-million annual traffic, deliberately revived by the j.a.panese army to weaken the Chinese and raise cash. This was the body whose agents negotiated with Mao's people for supplies. Several of the largest j.a.panese corporations administered distribution-Mitsubis.h.i.+ in Manchuria, Mitsui in the south. There was intense rivalry over markets, though all the interested parties sought to conceal their roles. By 194445 it also suited Communists and j.a.panese alike to avoid headlong military confrontation. "China was so fragmented at that time, that it remains hard to say with certainty what did or did not happen," shrugs Yang.

Mao's suppression of dissent, however, is undisputed. A young intellectual named w.a.n.g s.h.i.+wei had languished under house arrest since 1942 for denouncing in an essay the "dark side of Yan'an," the "three cla.s.ses of clothing and five grades of food," of which the best went to senior cadres while "the sick can't get a bowl of noodles and the young have only two bowls of congee a day." While the rest of the politburo walked everywhere, Mao rode in a Chevrolet van, prominently labelled "Ambulance: Gift of the New York Chinese Laundrymen's National Salvation a.s.sociation." Young girls are alleged by Chang and Halliday to have suffered chronic s.e.xual predation from party bosses. Dissidents were ruthlessly purged. w.a.n.g s.h.i.+wei was eventually beheaded. Spies and counter-revolutionaries were identified by torture and confessions. Among denounced intellectuals, suicides were not unknown.

Western visitors were charmed787 by the apparent casualness of Yan'an, the charm and fluency of Zhou Enlai, the manner in which Mao dropped by people's quarters for cards or gossip, danced energetically though with absolute absence of rhythm at Sat.u.r.day-night hops. Foreigners joined the cadres to drink by the apparent casualness of Yan'an, the charm and fluency of Zhou Enlai, the manner in which Mao dropped by people's quarters for cards or gossip, danced energetically though with absolute absence of rhythm at Sat.u.r.day-night hops. Foreigners joined the cadres to drink baicha baicha, "white tea"-hot water. They witnessed a brilliantly staged pantomime. The choice for China was not between a corrupt, brutal, incompetent dictators.h.i.+p and libertarian socialism. It lay between two absolutist systems, of which that of the Communists was incomparably more subtle and effective, possessed of wide appeal for peasants and intellectuals.

Those Americans in Chongqing and Was.h.i.+ngton who opposed an alliance with Yan'an made the right call for the wrong reasons. They disdained Mao because they were fearful of undermining Chiang Kai-shek. The proper grounds for refusing aid to the Communists were that war materiel would not have been employed to a.s.sist the defeat of j.a.pan. The Soviets took the same view. Moscow's emissaries in Yan'an reported most unfavourably to Stalin on the discipline, battlefield performance and alleged successes of Mao's troops. The Communists had indeed created a remarkable political edifice. The problem from an Allied viewpoint was that their achievement had everything to do with the future of post-war China, almost nothing to do with defeating j.a.pan.

Yet in the wartime years, millions of Chinese peasants pa.s.sionately believed that Mao held out the promise of a better life. To this day, many of those who served with the Communist guerrilla forces in World War II remember the experience with romantic enthusiasm. For all his shortcomings, Mao was a profoundly inspirational leader. Those modern biographers who claim that his achievement and long maintenance of power in China were founded exclusively upon terror seem drastically to understate the popular support which he mobilised. "The Communists were so much better organised than the KMT," said Wei Daoran, son of a famous Nationalist general, Wei Lihuang, who as a teenager accompanied his father on wartime campaigns. "They had an infrastructure788 that stretched right through the countryside. When Communist troops pa.s.sed through a region, they left behind much better memories than the KMT. They offered the peasants some education. If you were talented, the party offered opportunities for advancement. They treated women as equals." that stretched right through the countryside. When Communist troops pa.s.sed through a region, they left behind much better memories than the KMT. They offered the peasants some education. If you were talented, the party offered opportunities for advancement. They treated women as equals."