Retribution_ The Battle For Japan, 1944-45 Part 18

Some historians have questioned whether Suzuki indeed used these words in this context. Yet if there is doubt about the exact language, it is undisputed that the j.a.panese government agreed to make no positive response to the Declaration. The U.S. a.s.sociated Press reported on 27 July: "The semi-official j.a.panese Domei news agency stated today that Allied ultimatum to surrender or meet destruction would be ignored." The emperor himself seems to have made no attempt to question Suzuki's posture. Hirohito has so often been credited with a role as j.a.pan's princ.i.p.al peacemaker that it is important to emphasise his rejection of the Potsdam terms. If the emperor had intervened decisively at this point, rather than a fortnight later, all that followed might have been averted. As it was, this hesitant, inadequate divinity continued to straddle the fence, wanting peace yet still recoiling from acknowledgement of his nation's defeat, and history took its course.

From Moscow, Amba.s.sador Sato continued to bombard Tokyo with imprecations to face reality. "There is no alternative but immediate unconditional surrender if we are to try to make America and England moderate and to prevent [Russia's] partic.i.p.ation in the war," he cabled on 30 July. Foreign Minister Togo replied on 2 August, urging patience: "It is difficult to decide on concrete peace terms all at one stroke." He reported, however, that the emperor was closely following developments in Moscow, while Suzuki and the army's leaders explored the question of whether the Potsdam Declaration offered scope for negotiation. American naval intelligence a.n.a.lysts of the Magic decrypts on the declaration reported: "There is a disposition (or determination) of finding in its terms a sufficiently effective emollient for tortured pride which still rebels at the words 'unconditional surrender'."

It is unknown whether Truman read these decrypts or this a.n.a.lysis on his way back from Potsdam. The final conference session took place on 1 August. Stalin left Berlin that day, and the U.S. president early the following morning. Truman had already approved the text of a public statement to be issued in his name when the bomb was dropped. In his eyes, all that now mattered was that the j.a.panese government refused to respond positively to the Potsdam Declaration. Indeed, the earlier Magic intercepts between Sato and Togo had made Tokyo's rejection certain, since the foreign minister explicitly ruled out unconditional surrender. For weeks past, use of the bomb had been almost inevitable. It now became absolutely so.

Many people of later generations and all nationalities have viewed the dropping of atomic weapons on j.a.pan as events which, in their unique horror, towered over the war as a dark mountain bestrides the plain. In one sense this perception is correct, because the initiation of the nuclear age provided mankind with unprecedented power to destroy itself. Until the bombs had exploded, however, full understanding of their significance was confined to a few score scientists. To grasp the context in which the commitment to bomb Hiros.h.i.+ma was made, it seems necessary to acknowledge the cacophony amidst which all those involved, the political and military leaders of the U.S., were obliged to do their business. These were men in their fifties and sixties, weary after years of perpetual crisis such as world war imposes, bombarded daily with huge dilemmas.

Europe was in ruins and chaos, the Western Allies striving to contend with Stalin's ruthlessness and greed, Britain's bankruptcy, the starvation of millions. Each day brought to the desks of Truman, Stimson, Marshall and their staffs projections relating to the invasion of the j.a.panese homeland. The U.S. found itself obliged to arbitrate upon the future of half the world, while being implored to save as much as possible of the other half from the Soviets, even as war with j.a.pan continued and mankind recoiled in horror from newsreel films of Hitler's death camps. What could be done about Poland, about millions of displaced persons? About escaping n.a.z.i war criminals and civil war in Greece? Could power in China be shared? Might the rise of the Communists in Italy and France be checked? j.a.pan's beleaguered Pacific garrisons continued to resist even though the Allies initiated no major operations against Hirohito's armies overseas after June 1945. The British were preparing to land in Malaya. Almost every day, LeMay's Superfortresses set forth from Guam and Saipan to incinerate more j.a.panese cities. Carrier aircraft strafed and bombed the home islands. Casualty lists broadcast grief to homes all over the U.S. and Britain. Apprehension overhung the fate of many thousands of Allied prisoners in j.a.panese hands.

In judging the behaviour of those responsible for ordering the atomic attacks, it seems necessary to acknowledge all this. The bomb was only the foremost of many huge issues with which these mortal men, movingly conscious of their own limitations, strove to grapple. In the course of directing a struggle for national survival, all had been obliged to make decisions which had cost lives, millions of lives, of both Allied servicemen and enemy soldiers and civilians. Most would have said wryly that this was what they were paid for. The direction of war is never a task for the squeamish. The U.S. had already partic.i.p.ated in bombing campaigns which killed around three-quarters of a million German and j.a.panese civilians, and to which public opinion had raised little objection. It is much easier to justify the decision to drop the atomic bombs than the continued fire-raising offensive of the Twentieth Air Force. "The preoccupation845 of the historians' debate with the necessity of using the bomb," Lawrence Freedman and Saki Dockrill have written wisely, "has meant that it has been judged strategically against the prospective invasion [of j.a.pan], rather than the actual air bombardment under way at the time and with which it was unavoidably linked in the minds of policy-makers." of the historians' debate with the necessity of using the bomb," Lawrence Freedman and Saki Dockrill have written wisely, "has meant that it has been judged strategically against the prospective invasion [of j.a.pan], rather than the actual air bombardment under way at the time and with which it was unavoidably linked in the minds of policy-makers."

Poison gas was the only significant weapon available to the wartime Allies which was not employed against the Axis. Roosevelt opposed this for moral, or rather propagandistic, reasons; the British chiefly on the pragmatic grounds that the Germans might retaliate against their homeland. As discussed above, the Americans began the war with moral scruples about bombing civilians, but by 1945 had abandoned them. It is a delusion of those who know nothing of battle, to suppose that death inflicted by atomic weapons is uniquely terrible. In truth, conventional sh.e.l.ls and bombs dismember human bodies in the most repulsive fas.h.i.+on. The absolutism of atomic destruction merits humanity's horror, and indeed terror, more than the nature of the end which it inflicts upon individuals.

Most of those involved in the atomic decision recognised war, the homicidal clash of belligerents, as the root evil from which mankind should spare itself. After living for years with the b.l.o.o.d.y consequences of global conflict, they were less sensitive than modern civilians to specific refinements of killing. Many people whose deaths are described in this book would have found nothing uniquely pitiable about the manner in which Hiros.h.i.+ma's and Nagasaki's inhabitants perished, even if they might have been appalled by the scale.

From the inception of the Manhattan Project, it was a.s.sumed by all but a few scientists that if the device was successful, it would be used. Some people today, especially Asians, believe that the Allies found it acceptable to kill 100,000 j.a.panese in this way, as it would not have been acceptable to do the same to Germans, white people. Such speculation is not susceptible to proof. But given Allied perceptions that if Hitler and his immediate following could be removed, Germany would quickly surrender, it is overwhelmingly likely that if an atomic bomb had been available a year earlier, it would have been dropped on Berlin. It would have seemed ridiculous to draw a moral distinction between ma.s.sed attacks on German centres of population by the RAF and USAAF with conventional weapons, and the use of a single more ambitious device to terminate Europe's agony.

Curtis LeMay regarded the Hiros.h.i.+ma and Nagasaki raids merely as an addition-a redundant and unwelcome addition-to a campaign which his B-29s had already won. LeMay had not the slightest moral qualms about the atomic attacks, but was chagrined that they diminished the credit given to his conventional bomber force for destroying j.a.pan. In late June, he predicted that the Twentieth Air Force would render the enemy incapable of continuing the war after 1 October 1945. "In order to do this," said Arnold, "he had to take care of some 30 to 60 large and small cities." LeMay had accounted for fifty-eight when events rendered it unnecessary to test his prophecy to fulfilment. In the minds of those conducting the war against j.a.pan, the mission of the Enola Gay Enola Gay represented only a huge technological leap forward in the campaign already waged for months by the fire-raisers. represented only a huge technological leap forward in the campaign already waged for months by the fire-raisers.

One further military point should be made. From August 1945 onwards Truman and other contemporary apologists for the bomb advanced the simple argument, readily understood by the wartime generation of Americans, that it rendered redundant an invasion of j.a.pan. It is now widely acknowledged that Olympic would almost certainly have been unnecessary. j.a.pan was tottering and would soon have starved. Richard Frank, author of an outstanding modern study of the fall of the j.a.panese empire, goes further. He finds it unthinkable that the United States would have accepted the blood-cost of invading Kyushu, in light of radio intelligence about j.a.panese strength.

Like any "counter-factual," it is hard to accept this proposition as an absolute. The prospect of the Kyushu landings was wholly unwelcome to America's military and political leaders.h.i.+p. Yet in the summer of 1945 Marshall, for one, was committed to keeping open an invasion option-possibly of northern Honshu-partly because he questioned whether the bomb's impact would be conclusive. The U.S. chief of staff recognised the wisdom of Churchill's view that "all things are always846 on the move simultaneously...One has to do the best one can, but he is an unwise man who thinks there is any on the move simultaneously...One has to do the best one can, but he is an unwise man who thinks there is any certain certain way of winning this war...The only plan is to persevere." So much that is today apparent was then opaque. So many forces were in play, the impacts of which were unclear. way of winning this war...The only plan is to persevere." So much that is today apparent was then opaque. So many forces were in play, the impacts of which were unclear.

At the beginning of August 1945, most of MacArthur's officers believed that they would would have to invade j.a.pan, and even some of those in Was.h.i.+ngton privy to the atomic secret and to impending Russian intervention thought they have to invade j.a.pan, and even some of those in Was.h.i.+ngton privy to the atomic secret and to impending Russian intervention thought they might might have to do so. It was impossible to be sure what an enemy nation which had displayed a resolute commitment to ma.s.s suicide might do, when confronted with the last ditch. A 27 July U.S. naval intelligence a.n.a.lysis of j.a.pan's behaviour, written with full access to Magic decrypts, was circulated to all Was.h.i.+ngton's top policy-makers: "Her unwillingness to surrender have to do so. It was impossible to be sure what an enemy nation which had displayed a resolute commitment to ma.s.s suicide might do, when confronted with the last ditch. A 27 July U.S. naval intelligence a.n.a.lysis of j.a.pan's behaviour, written with full access to Magic decrypts, was circulated to all Was.h.i.+ngton's top policy-makers: "Her unwillingness to surrender847 stems primarily from the failure of her otherwise capable and all-powerful Army leaders to perceive that the defenses they are so a.s.siduously fas.h.i.+oning actually are utterly inadequate...Until the j.a.panese leaders realize that an invasion cannot be repelled, there is little likelihood that they will accept any peace terms satisfactory to the Allies." Invasion was not a direct alternative to the bomb, but on 1 August 1945, who could be sure what might have to be done if the bomb was not dropped? stems primarily from the failure of her otherwise capable and all-powerful Army leaders to perceive that the defenses they are so a.s.siduously fas.h.i.+oning actually are utterly inadequate...Until the j.a.panese leaders realize that an invasion cannot be repelled, there is little likelihood that they will accept any peace terms satisfactory to the Allies." Invasion was not a direct alternative to the bomb, but on 1 August 1945, who could be sure what might have to be done if the bomb was not dropped?

So much for military context. What of the political decision? The most obvious question is that of whether j.a.pan might have behaved differently if the Potsdam Declaration had explicitly warned of atomic bombs. The answer, almost certainly, is no. If America's leaders found difficulty in comprehending the unprecedented force they were about to unleash, the j.a.panese were unlikely to show themselves more imaginative. More than that, the war party in Tokyo, which had crippled j.a.pan's feeble diplomatic gropings, was committed to acceptance of national annihilation rather than surrender. If LeMay's achievement in killing 200,000 j.a.panese civilians and levelling most of the country's major cities had not convinced the likes of General Anami that surrender was inevitable, there is no reason to suppose that a mere threat of atomic bombardment would have done so.

The princ.i.p.al beneficiary of a warning, even if unheeded, would have been Harry Truman. His decision to insist upon unconditional surrender can be justified for reasons offered above. j.a.pan had done nothing in China and South-East Asia throughout its occupation, or in the prison camps of its empire, to make any plausible moral claim upon terms less rigorous than those imposed upon Germany. j.a.pan would certainly have used atomic weapons if it possessed them. The nation had gambled upon launching a ruthless war of conquest. The gamble had failed, and it was time to pay. It would have well served Truman's historic reputation, however, to have been seen to offer j.a.pan an opportunity to escape nuclear retribution before this was administered. The Potsdam Declaration was a statement of honourable Allied objectives. It was a sham ultimatum, however, because it failed plausibly to describe the nature of the vague sanction which it threatened in the event of non-compliance. The words "prompt and utter destruction" meant much to American drafters, nothing at all to j.a.panese readers.

Why was no explicit warning given? Because the dropping of the bomb was designed to deliver a colossal shock, not only to the j.a.panese people but also to the leaders of the Soviet Union. Marshall said to Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, head of the British Military Mission in Was.h.i.+ngton: "It's no good warning them. If you warn them there's no surprise. And the only way to produce shock is surprise." This was precisely the same justification offered by the j.a.panese military to the emperor in 1941 for declining to give the U.S. notice of its intention to go to war before attacking Pearl Harbor. j.a.pan bears overwhelming responsibility for what happened at Hiros.h.i.+ma and Nagasaki, because her leaders refused to acknowledge that their game was up. However, the haste with which the U.S. dropped the bomb as soon as it was technically viable reflected aforementioned technological determinism, together with political fears focused upon the Russians, as much as military imperatives related to j.a.pan. It is possible to support Truman's decision not to stop the dropping of the bomb, while regretting his failure to offer warning of its imminence.

LATE ON 6 August 1945, a Top Secret signal flashed from the Twentieth Air Force to Was.h.i.+ngton, where the time difference caused it to be read just before midnight the previous day: "Subject: Bombs Away 6 August 1945, a Top Secret signal flashed from the Twentieth Air Force to Was.h.i.+ngton, where the time difference caused it to be read just before midnight the previous day: "Subject: Bombs Away848 Report 509 SBM 13 Flown 6 August 1945...1 a/c bombed Hiros.h.i.+ma visually thru 1/10 cloud with good results. Time was 052315Z. No flak or E/A opposition." This was followed almost immediately by a second signal: "Alt.i.tude: 30,200 feet...Enemy air opposition: Nil...Bombing Results: Excellent." Report 509 SBM 13 Flown 6 August 1945...1 a/c bombed Hiros.h.i.+ma visually thru 1/10 cloud with good results. Time was 052315Z. No flak or E/A opposition." This was followed almost immediately by a second signal: "Alt.i.tude: 30,200 feet...Enemy air opposition: Nil...Bombing Results: Excellent."

"Little Boy," "an elongated trash can with fins" in the words of one of Enola Gay Enola Gay's crew, scrawled with rude messages for Hirohito, exploded 1,900 feet above Hiros.h.i.+ma's s.h.i.+ma Hospital, 550 feet from its aiming point. Tibbets, a supremely professional bomber pilot, described this simply as "the most perfect AP I've seen in this whole d.a.m.n war." The 8,900-pound device created temperatures at ground zero which reached 5,400 degrees and generated the explosive power of 12,500 tons of TNT. All but 6,000 of the city's 76,000 buildings were destroyed by fire or blast. The j.a.panese afterwards claimed that around 20,000 military personnel and 110,000 civilians died immediately. Though no statistics are conclusive, this estimate is almost certainly exaggerated. Another guesstimate, around 70,000, seems more credible.

The detonation of "Little Boy," the mushroom cloud which changed the world, created injuries never before seen on mortal creatures, and recorded with disbelief by survivors: the cavalry horse standing pink, stripped of its hide; people with clothing patterns imprinted upon their flesh; the line of schoolgirls with ribbons of skin dangling from their faces; doomed survivors, hideously burned, without hope of effective medical relief; the host of charred and shrivelled corpses. Hiros.h.i.+ma and its people had been almost obliterated, and even many of those who clung to life would not long do so. As late as June 1946, an official press release from the Manhattan Project a.s.serted defiantly: "Official investigation of the results849 of atom bomb bursts over the j.a.panese cities...revealed that no harmful amounts of persistent radio-activity were present after the explosions." Yet even at that date, thousands more stricken citizens of Hiros.h.i.+ma were still to perish. of atom bomb bursts over the j.a.panese cities...revealed that no harmful amounts of persistent radio-activity were present after the explosions." Yet even at that date, thousands more stricken citizens of Hiros.h.i.+ma were still to perish.

Truman received the news aboard Augusta Augusta, four days out from England on his pa.s.sage home from Potsdam, as he was lunching with members of the cruiser's crew: "Big bomb dropped on Hiros.h.i.+ma August 5 at 7:15 p.m. Was.h.i.+ngton time. First reports indicate complete success which was even more conspicuous than earlier test." The beaming president jumped up and told Augusta Augusta's skipper: "Captain, this is the greatest thing in history." At Truman's behest, the officer carried the signal to Byrnes, eating at another table, who said, "Fine! Fine!" Truman then addressed crewmen in the mess: "We have just dropped a new bomb on j.a.pan which has more power than 20,000 tons of TNT. It has been an overwhelming success!" The president's delight was apparently unburdened by pain or doubt. He simply exulted in a national triumph. Here was a vivid demonstration of the limits of his own understanding of what had been done. Sailors crowded around the president, asking the question on the lips of millions of Allied soldiers, sailors and airmen across the world: "Does this mean we can go home now?"

In the U.S., first reaction to Hiros.h.i.+ma was overwhelmingly enthusiastic. The British emba.s.sy in Was.h.i.+ngton reported: "The lurid fantasies850 of the comic strips seemed suddenly to have come true. Headlines sagged under the weight of the drama and the superlatives they had to carry." There was much unseemly flippancy, for American skins had been thickened by forty-four months of war. The Was.h.i.+ngton Press Club produced a sixty-cent "atomic c.o.c.ktail." A newspaper cartoonist depicted Truman presiding over an angelic gathering of his advisers, each sprouting wings as they contemplated a bowl of split atoms on the table. The caption read: "The Cabinet meets to discuss sending an amba.s.sador to Mars." At Los Alamos, scientist Otto Frisch recoiled from the exuberance of colleagues who telephoned the La Fonda Hotel in Santa Fe to book tables for a celebration. of the comic strips seemed suddenly to have come true. Headlines sagged under the weight of the drama and the superlatives they had to carry." There was much unseemly flippancy, for American skins had been thickened by forty-four months of war. The Was.h.i.+ngton Press Club produced a sixty-cent "atomic c.o.c.ktail." A newspaper cartoonist depicted Truman presiding over an angelic gathering of his advisers, each sprouting wings as they contemplated a bowl of split atoms on the table. The caption read: "The Cabinet meets to discuss sending an amba.s.sador to Mars." At Los Alamos, scientist Otto Frisch recoiled from the exuberance of colleagues who telephoned the La Fonda Hotel in Santa Fe to book tables for a celebration.

Among some ordinary people news of the bomb prompted not triumphalism, but the darkest reflections. A letter to the New York Times New York Times described Hiros.h.i.+ma as "a stain on our national life. When the exhilaration of this wonderful discovery has pa.s.sed, we will think with shame of the first use to which it was put." British housewife Nella Last recorded in her diary how she and her Lancas.h.i.+re neighbour received the news: "Old Joe called upstairs described Hiros.h.i.+ma as "a stain on our national life. When the exhilaration of this wonderful discovery has pa.s.sed, we will think with shame of the first use to which it was put." British housewife Nella Last recorded in her diary how she and her Lancas.h.i.+re neighbour received the news: "Old Joe called upstairs851, brandis.h.i.+ng the Daily Mail Daily Mail: 'By Goy, la.s.s, but it looks as if some of your daft fancies and fears are reet. Look at this.' I've rarely seen Jim so excited-or upset. He said: 'Read it-why, this will change all t'world. Ee, I wish I was thutty years younger and could see it aw.'" Mrs. Last, however, reacted very differently: "I felt sick-I wished I was thirty years older, and out of it all...This atomic bomb business is so dreadful."

Senator Edwin Johnson of Colorado declared that the bombs proved that universal military training was stupid. President Roosevelt's widow, Eleanor, said it showed the importance of goodwill visits such as Soviet trades unionists were then making to the United States. Leaders of the oil and coal industries issued statements rea.s.suring stockholders that for the foreseeable future the new discovery would have little effect on existing fuels. Some left-wingers demanded that atomic patent rights and means of production should remain controlled by Congress, and not be allowed to fall into the hands of large oil or munitions combines. To the embarra.s.sment even of many capitalists, the prospect of an end of hostilities caused the New York Stock Exchange to fall sharply. A correspondent of the London Sunday Times Sunday Times wrote: "It is always unedifying when moneyed interests are revealed as benefiting or believing themselves to benefit more from war than from peace." wrote: "It is always unedifying when moneyed interests are revealed as benefiting or believing themselves to benefit more from war than from peace."

Some senior U.S. soldiers in the Philippines were disgruntled to find themselves facing financial loss of a different kind. One of their number had returned from a liaison mission to the Marianas shortly before, reporting that Twentieth Air Force officers had created a $10,000 pool, to bet that the war would end before October. Since MacArthur's people knew that Olympic was not scheduled until November, some hastened to accept the air force wager. "From what we knew852 and the way it looked to us, that was an easy bet to win. We started taking up the $10,000, but we didn't get very far with it," Krueger's G3, Clyde Eddleman, wrote ruefully. "...The next thing we knew Hiros.h.i.+ma disappeared." and the way it looked to us, that was an easy bet to win. We started taking up the $10,000, but we didn't get very far with it," Krueger's G3, Clyde Eddleman, wrote ruefully. "...The next thing we knew Hiros.h.i.+ma disappeared."

A British corporal of Fourteenth Army in Burma, George MacDonald Fraser, noted: "It is now widely held853 that the dropping of atomic bombs was unnecessary because the j.a.panese were ready to give in...I wish those who hold that view had been present to explain the position to the little b.a.s.t.a.r.d who came howling out of a thicket near the Sittang, full of spite and fury, in that first week of August. He was half-starved and near naked, and his only weapon was a bamboo stave, but he was in no mood to surrender." that the dropping of atomic bombs was unnecessary because the j.a.panese were ready to give in...I wish those who hold that view had been present to explain the position to the little b.a.s.t.a.r.d who came howling out of a thicket near the Sittang, full of spite and fury, in that first week of August. He was half-starved and near naked, and his only weapon was a bamboo stave, but he was in no mood to surrender."

Nowhere was relief at the dropping of the bomb more intense and heartfelt than in prison camps throughout the j.a.panese empire. Yet even among those for whom Hiros.h.i.+ma promised deliverance, a few displayed more complex emotions. Lt. Stephen Abbott's closest friend, Paul, a devout Christian, entered their bleak barrack room in j.a.pan and said: "Stephen-a ghastly thing has happened854." He described the destruction of Hiros.h.i.+ma, as reported on the radio, then knelt in prayer. Eighteen months later, Abbott wrote a letter for publication in The Times The Times, citing his own status as a former POW, and arguing that a demonstration of the bomb would have sufficed: "The way it has been used has not only provided a significant chapter for future j.a.panese history books but has also convinced the people of j.a.pan that the white man's claim to the ethical and spiritual leaders.h.i.+p of the world is without substance."

PRESIDENT T TRUMAN'S statement to the world, approved before he left Potsdam, declared that the fate of Hiros.h.i.+ma represented a just retribution for Pearl Harbor: "It was to spare the j.a.panese people from utter destruction that the ultimatum of 26 July was issued at Potsdam...If they do not now accept our terms, they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth." This time there could be no doubt in the minds of j.a.pan's leaders about exactly what the president's words portended. More atomic bombs would follow "Little Boy." Other cities would share the fate of Hiros.h.i.+ma. statement to the world, approved before he left Potsdam, declared that the fate of Hiros.h.i.+ma represented a just retribution for Pearl Harbor: "It was to spare the j.a.panese people from utter destruction that the ultimatum of 26 July was issued at Potsdam...If they do not now accept our terms, they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth." This time there could be no doubt in the minds of j.a.pan's leaders about exactly what the president's words portended. More atomic bombs would follow "Little Boy." Other cities would share the fate of Hiros.h.i.+ma.

Yet the extraordinary aspect of j.a.panese behaviour in the wake of the 6 August bombing was that the event seemed to do almost nothing to galvanise j.a.panese policy-making, to end the prevarication which was already responsible for so much death. The emperor and prime minister learned of the attack only after a lapse of some hours. First reports spoke of "the complete destruction of Hiros.h.i.+ma and unspeakable damage inflicted by one bomb with unusually high effectiveness." At least one senior officer immediately guessed that this was an atomic device, as was soon confirmed by intercepted American radio broadcasts. Other army commanders remained sceptical, however, and saw nothing in the news to soften their implacable opposition to surrender. General Anami, the war minister, privately acknowledged that this was a nuclear attack, and dispatched an investigating team to Hiros.h.i.+ma. He proposed, however, that the government should take no action before hearing its report, which would not be available for two days. Hiros.h.i.+ma at first rendered some ministers more committed, rather than less, to resisting unconditional surrender.

Foreign Minister Togo dispatched a message to Amba.s.sador Sato in Moscow, seeking urgent clarification of the Soviet att.i.tude. Togo went to the Imperial Palace on the morning of 8 August. Hirohito told him that, in the new circ.u.mstances, "My wish is to make such arrangements as to end the war as soon as possible." Togo was asked to convey this message to Prime Minister Suzuki. Even now, however, the emperor was vague about means. He certainly did not urge immediate acceptance of the Potsdam terms. The j.a.panese government failed to adopt the course which could almost certainly have saved Nagasaki from destruction: a swift communication to the Americans declaring readiness to quit. Once again, we know why why this did not happen: because the decision-making process was so slow, the war party so resolute. But again, also, the question should be asked: how many days of stubborn enemy silence should the U.S., never the most patient society on earth, have been expected pa.s.sively to endure? this did not happen: because the decision-making process was so slow, the war party so resolute. But again, also, the question should be asked: how many days of stubborn enemy silence should the U.S., never the most patient society on earth, have been expected pa.s.sively to endure?

In Moscow, on 7 August Russia's media reported nothing about events in Hiros.h.i.+ma. All that day Stalin remained incommunicado. It is a.s.sumed that the Soviet leader was stunned by the news, and fearful that j.a.pan would immediately surrender. But Amba.s.sador Sato's urgent request to meet Molotov showed that this was not so. j.a.pan was still in the war. It was not, after all, too late for the Soviet Union to achieve its objectives. Sato was granted an appointment with Molotov for the evening of 8 August. Stalin meanwhile conducted meetings with a Chinese delegation led by T.V. Soong, Chiang's prime minister and brother-in-law, which was still stubbornly resisting endors.e.m.e.nt of some of the terms agreed by Roosevelt at Yalta. j.a.pan's leaders went to bed in Tokyo on the night of 8 August expecting to hear news from Moscow next morning about Sato's meeting with Molotov. This they did, but in a form drastically divergent from their expectations.

When Sato entered the foreign minister's office, Molotov brushed aside his greetings, invited him to sit, and read aloud the terms of his nation's declaration of war. Since j.a.pan had rejected the Potsdam Declaration, said the Russian, "the Allies approached the Soviet Union with a proposal to join in the war against j.a.panese aggression and thereby shorten the length of the war, reduce the number of victims, and a.s.sist in the prompt re-establishment of general peace." Russia accepted the Allied proposals, to save the j.a.panese people "from the same destruction as Germany had suffered." Less than an hour later, Molotov informed the British and American amba.s.sadors that, in fulfilment of its obligations, his country had declared war on j.a.pan. Harriman expressed the grat.i.tude and pleasure of the U.S., for he could do nothing else. A few hours later, shortly after Truman in Was.h.i.+ngton heard news of the Soviet action, Bock's Car Bock's Car took off from Tinian for Nagasaki. took off from Tinian for Nagasaki.

The second mission was launched without any further Was.h.i.+ngton directive, and simply because its weapon was ready. Twentieth Air Force's mandate left the timings of both atomic attacks in the hands of local commanders, to be determined by operational convenience. The generals advanced the second strike by two days in the face of warnings of bad weather after 10 August, and "a general feeling among those in the theater that the sooner this bomb was dropped the better it would be for the war effort." Was.h.i.+ngton's only contribution was pa.s.sive. The president and his advisers discerned in j.a.panese silence no cause to order the 509th Bomb Group to halt its operations. At 1102 on 9 August j.a.panese time, having found Kokura, its primary target, under cloud, Maj. Charles Sweeny dropped "Fat Man" on Nagasaki, his secondary objective, generating the explosive power of 22,000 tons of TNT, killing at least 30,000 people. Since midnight, Soviet armies had been sweeping into Manchuria.

TWENTY.

Manchuria: The Bear's Claws

IN THE EARLY hours of 9 August 1945, j.a.panese outposts on the Manchurian border were bewildered to find themselves first under heavy sh.e.l.lfire, then attacked by infantry, swiftly identified as Russian. In some sectors the picture was confused by torrential rain. "It was the worst hours of 9 August 1945, j.a.panese outposts on the Manchurian border were bewildered to find themselves first under heavy sh.e.l.lfire, then attacked by infantry, swiftly identified as Russian. In some sectors the picture was confused by torrential rain. "It was the worst855 thunderstorm I've ever seen," said Soviet sapper Ivan Kazintsev. "The lightning caused us to lose our night vision, our sense of direction-and lit us up for the enemy on Camel Hill. We managed to capture it by dawn, though." Kazintsev's general, A. P. Beloborodov of 1st Red Banner Army, wrote: "Lightning kept flas.h.i.+ng unexpectedly. Dazzling streaks split the darkening sky, thunder growing ever louder. Should we delay the attack? No...The rain would hinder the enemy as much as ourselves." Beloborodov was right about that. j.a.panese Imperial General Headquarters issued an emergency order, reporting that the Soviet Union had declared war and started entering Manchurian territory, but adding absurdly: "The scale of these attacks is not large." In reality, the first elements of a 1.5-million-strong Soviet host were in motion: infantry, tank formations, trotting columns of horsed cavalry and mounted infantry, supported by river flotillas, air fleets, guns in tens of thousands. a.s.sault operations extended across land and water fronts of 2,730 miles, from the Mongolian desert in the west to the densely forested coast of the Sea of j.a.pan. This was the last great military operation thunderstorm I've ever seen," said Soviet sapper Ivan Kazintsev. "The lightning caused us to lose our night vision, our sense of direction-and lit us up for the enemy on Camel Hill. We managed to capture it by dawn, though." Kazintsev's general, A. P. Beloborodov of 1st Red Banner Army, wrote: "Lightning kept flas.h.i.+ng unexpectedly. Dazzling streaks split the darkening sky, thunder growing ever louder. Should we delay the attack? No...The rain would hinder the enemy as much as ourselves." Beloborodov was right about that. j.a.panese Imperial General Headquarters issued an emergency order, reporting that the Soviet Union had declared war and started entering Manchurian territory, but adding absurdly: "The scale of these attacks is not large." In reality, the first elements of a 1.5-million-strong Soviet host were in motion: infantry, tank formations, trotting columns of horsed cavalry and mounted infantry, supported by river flotillas, air fleets, guns in tens of thousands. a.s.sault operations extended across land and water fronts of 2,730 miles, from the Mongolian desert in the west to the densely forested coast of the Sea of j.a.pan. This was the last great military operation856 of the Second World War. of the Second World War.

The initial j.a.panese response accorded with every wider delusion about their nation's predicament. Even those in Tokyo who had accepted that Stalin was "waiting for the ripe persimmon to fall," who were warned of great Soviet troop movements eastwards, believed the Russians would not be ready to attack in Manchuria until that autumn, or even the spring of 1946. This was yet another gross miscalculation of the time available to j.a.pan to find a way out of the war. Among j.a.panese civilians, the reaction of aeronautical engineer Jiro Horikos.h.i.+ was typical. He was still reeling from news of Hiros.h.i.+ma when "a still more shocking report857 came in to us, announcing the bolt from the blue that Russia has declared war." In the early months of 1945, many refugees from the j.a.panese home islands had moved to Manchuria with all their possessions, supposing that the colony represented a safe haven. j.a.pan's Guandong Army was nowhere near operational readiness. Its best units had been sent to Okinawa or Kyushu. Few demolition charges were laid. Some senior commanders were absent from their posts. came in to us, announcing the bolt from the blue that Russia has declared war." In the early months of 1945, many refugees from the j.a.panese home islands had moved to Manchuria with all their possessions, supposing that the colony represented a safe haven. j.a.pan's Guandong Army was nowhere near operational readiness. Its best units had been sent to Okinawa or Kyushu. Few demolition charges were laid. Some senior commanders were absent from their posts.

In Nanjing, j.a.panese staff officer Maj. s.h.i.+geru Funaki and his colleagues at China Army headquarters said to each other: "At last!858" They had always antic.i.p.ated such an a.s.sault, "yet we felt very bitter towards the Russians for doing it now. It was so unfair! We had been obliged to send so many men to other Pacific fronts. It was as if they were burglars breaking into an empty house." In Manchuria, no steps had been taken to evacuate hundreds of thousands of j.a.panese civilians even from border regions, on the grounds that such precautions would promote defeatism. The Guandong Army's commanders found themselves in the same predicament as the British in Malaya and the Americans in the Philippines in December 1941: struggling to defend wide fronts with weak forces and negligible air support. It was now the turn of j.a.pan's most cherished colony to suffer the fate which had befallen the West's imperial possessions in Asia almost four years earlier.

Russia's official war history declares: "The Soviet Union's aims859...were...the provision of security for its own far eastern borders, which had been subjected to threat again and again by j.a.pan; the fulfilment of obligation to its allies;...to hasten the end of the Second World War, which continued to bring incalculable suffering to the people; the desire to provide a.s.sistance to the workers of east Asia in their liberation struggle; and the restoration of the USSR's historic rights in territory which j.a.pan had earlier seized from Russia." In truth, of course, Stalin's simple purpose was territorial gain, for which he was prepared to pay heavily. Before launching their a.s.sault in Manchuria, the Soviets made medical provision for 540,000 casualties, including 160,000 dead. Here was a forecast almost certainly founded upon an a.s.sessment of j.a.panese paper strength, of much the same kind as the Americans made about a landing on Kyushu.

Since 1941, Stalin had maintained larger forces on the Manchurian border than the Western Allies knew. In the summer of 1945 he reinforced strongly, to create ma.s.s sufficient to bury the j.a.panese. Three thousand locomotives laboured along the thin steel thread of the Trans-Siberian rail link. Men, tanks, guns fresh from the Red Army's triumphs in eastern Europe were loaded onto trains at Konigsberg and Insterberg, Prague and Brno, for a journey that took a month to accomplish. Moscow strove to disguise the significance of the huge migration. Soldiers were ordered to remove their Leningrad and Stalingrad medals, to repaint guns emblazoned with such slogans as "On to Berlin!" No one doubted their new objective, however. As the troop trains crawled across Russia, at stations sympathetic locals called to their pa.s.sengers, craning from windows: "Ah, boys, they are taking you860 off to fight the j.a.panese-the off to fight the j.a.panese-the yaposhki yaposhki." A veteran muttered wryly: "So this is military secrecy!" Men of Maj. Vladimir Spindler's rifle regiment gave away their bulky European loot to Russian civilians whom they met as they moved east. Spindler gazed pityingly on starving urchins crowding the rail tracks. Some asked wistfully: "Uncles, is our daddy861 among you by any chance? He fought against the Germans too." among you by any chance? He fought against the Germans too."

"Everyone slept a lot862, catching up on all the sleep we'd lost," said soldier Oleg Smirnov. They discussed the eastern campaign. Most soldiers grudgingly acknowledged that "the samurais," as Russians called the j.a.panese, had to be dealt with. "We reckoned it would take a month to sort them out," said Smirnov, "which proved about right. Myself, I couldn't help thinking what a pity it would be to die in a little war after surviving a big one." Lt. Stanislav Chervyakov and the men of his katyusha katyusha rocket unit travelled by train from Prague to Moscow, exhilarated by a delusion that they were going home. They had fought through four long years at Stalingrad and on the Don, in Romania, Austria and finally Czechoslovakia. The first intimation that their rulers had other plans came as they approached the capital. Their train, instead of proceeding to Moscow's central station, took the ring line. Chervyakov was less dismayed than most of his comrades. A career soldier, "I was twenty-two rocket unit travelled by train from Prague to Moscow, exhilarated by a delusion that they were going home. They had fought through four long years at Stalingrad and on the Don, in Romania, Austria and finally Czechoslovakia. The first intimation that their rulers had other plans came as they approached the capital. Their train, instead of proceeding to Moscow's central station, took the ring line. Chervyakov was less dismayed than most of his comrades. A career soldier, "I was twenty-two863, and I didn't give a d.a.m.n who I fought."

By contrast, Sgt. Anatoly Fillipov, radio operator with an intelligence unit, was weary of war. He was twenty-eight, and had been the first to bring news to his commander of the June 1941 German invasion, for which he was roundly cursed and told to "cut out the bulls.h.i.+t." In 1943 he was wounded and taken prisoner on a secret mission into neutral Turkey, and badly beaten by his Turkish captors before escaping. Fillipov was in Moscow in May 1945 when told that he was being posted to the Far East. He enlisted the good offices of his brother, a staff college student, to delay his departure until after Victory Day, Stalin's equivalent of VE-Day, twenty-four hours later: "Please, Lyosha, could you ask864 your commander to get permission for me to stay? I so much want to see the Parade!" Fillipov got this wish, but his wider ambitions went unfulfilled. He was a sailor at heart, raised aboard a Volga river steamer on which his father was an engineer. All he wanted now was a chance to join the merchant fleet and travel the world. He cherished a special dream of seeing Rio de Janeiro. Instead, he went to Manchuria. your commander to get permission for me to stay? I so much want to see the Parade!" Fillipov got this wish, but his wider ambitions went unfulfilled. He was a sailor at heart, raised aboard a Volga river steamer on which his father was an engineer. All he wanted now was a chance to join the merchant fleet and travel the world. He cherished a special dream of seeing Rio de Janeiro. Instead, he went to Manchuria.

Oleg Smirnov was deeply saddened by his unit's journey east. In East Prussia on VE-Day, he had emptied his pistol into the air, holstered it with finality, and declared: "Those were the last shots I shall ever fire." Now he was called upon to fight again. Crossing Lithuania, his train was attacked by anti-Communist partisans, who had to be driven off. Despite the bands and welcomes from local people at every Russian station halt, "we came to realise the price865 we had paid for victory. Day after day while the train crawled slowly through European Russia we saw around us only burnt-out ruins, chimneys amid charred wastelands, fields scarred by trenches and craters...Even beyond the Volga where the villages stood intact, one saw no fit men-only women, old men and cripples. I remember looking out at women dragging ploughs and homeless kids at the stations." A railway guard at Chita scrounged a cigarette from Smirnov and said: "What a host is moving east! we had paid for victory. Day after day while the train crawled slowly through European Russia we saw around us only burnt-out ruins, chimneys amid charred wastelands, fields scarred by trenches and craters...Even beyond the Volga where the villages stood intact, one saw no fit men-only women, old men and cripples. I remember looking out at women dragging ploughs and homeless kids at the stations." A railway guard at Chita scrounged a cigarette from Smirnov and said: "What a host is moving east!866 The samurais are in for a bad time, and those rats must know it. Look at the j.a.panese consul here-he sits every day by the river with his fis.h.i.+ng rod, counting trains. He can count as many as he likes, but his lot are for it!" The samurais are in for a bad time, and those rats must know it. Look at the j.a.panese consul here-he sits every day by the river with his fis.h.i.+ng rod, counting trains. He can count as many as he likes, but his lot are for it!"

After travelling 6,000 miles from Europe by rail, some units, including Vladimir Spindler's, marched the last two hundred to the Manchurian border across the treeless Mongolian desert in blazing heat. A large influx of young recruits joined them, many weak from malnutrition. These were given hasty training, and as much food as could be spared. "Frankly, most of us hated having to do this," said anti-aircraft gunner Georgy Sergeev, a veteran of the European campaign. "I was due to turn twenty in September. I kept thinking, would I now live to be twenty?" After all that they had survived in the west, now they were back under the sun and stars, living on field rations. Once again, in Sergeev's words, "there was that perpetual uncertainty867, not knowing what would happen tomorrow, or whether there would even be a tomorrow."

"I'd taken part in plenty of offensives868, but I'd never seen a build-up like this one," said one soldier. "Trains arrived one after another, off-loaded men who formed ranks and marched away across the steppe. The diesels of hundreds of brand-new tanks roared, as they were started up by crews of veterans, frontoviks frontoviks, who had fought in Europe. There were tractors towing heavy artillery, katyushas katyushas, cavalry, dust-covered trucks, and ever more infantry. Even the sky was crowded: there were always bombers, sturmoviks sturmoviks, transports overhead." Machine-gunner Anatoly s.h.i.+lov869 was bemused to find himself at a wayside station where he was presented with 5 mechanics, 130 raw recruits, and crates containing 260 Studebaker, Chevrolet and Dodge trucks which he was ordered to a.s.semble, then deliver to a formation sixty miles away. He managed this notable feat by coupling the vehicles in pairs, the front wheels of the rearmost lashed high onto the body of the one in front. was bemused to find himself at a wayside station where he was presented with 5 mechanics, 130 raw recruits, and crates containing 260 Studebaker, Chevrolet and Dodge trucks which he was ordered to a.s.semble, then deliver to a formation sixty miles away. He managed this notable feat by coupling the vehicles in pairs, the front wheels of the rearmost lashed high onto the body of the one in front.

As the infantry marched, "the earth smelt not of sagebrush, but of petrol," wrote a soldier. "Dust hung in a dense cloud over the column, it lay on our faces, rasped between our teeth. It was hot as h.e.l.l, a hundred degrees or more. Sweat dripped into our eyes, our throats were parched-we could fill only one waterbottle a day." Dust storms whipped the steppe. Captured German mess tins with covers became much prized, because only these excluded sand from everything eaten. Most men lost their appet.i.tes for food or cigarettes, caring only about thirst. When they reached a lake, the water proved saline. Those who drank retched in disgust. They marched day and night, with four-hour halts which offered little respite, because the bare earth was too hot for a man to lie upon without discomfort. "It took us a week870 to reach the Manchurian border. By the finish we were stumbling, falling asleep as we moved. The tramp of marching feet was always audible, even above the roar of tank and vehicle engines, the clatter of tracks." to reach the Manchurian border. By the finish we were stumbling, falling asleep as we moved. The tramp of marching feet was always audible, even above the roar of tank and vehicle engines, the clatter of tracks."

By early August, 136,000 railway cars had transferred eastwards a million men, 100,000 trucks, 410 million rounds of small-arms ammunition, 3.2 million sh.e.l.ls. Even firewood had to be collected from forests and s.h.i.+pped four hundred miles, to enable units deployed in treeless regions to cook their rations. Thirty-five thousand tons of fuel were needed on the Trans-Baikal Front alone, requiring as much haulage capacity as ammunition. As part of Stalin's bargain with the Western Allies, he insisted that the U.S. should help to feed and arm the Soviet soldiers whose partic.i.p.ation in the eastern war was expected to save so many American lives. This aspect of their forthcoming campaign did not escape the Red Army: "Guys rubbished the Americans871 for wanting to get other people to do their fighting," said Oleg Smirnov. Moscow called on the U.S. for 860,410 tons of dry goods, 206,000 tons of liquids-mostly fuel-and 500 Sherman tanks. Most of these commodities and weapons were indeed s.h.i.+pped to Russia's Pacific ports. for wanting to get other people to do their fighting," said Oleg Smirnov. Moscow called on the U.S. for 860,410 tons of dry goods, 206,000 tons of liquids-mostly fuel-and 500 Sherman tanks. Most of these commodities and weapons were indeed s.h.i.+pped to Russia's Pacific ports.

As troops approached the frontier, elaborate camouflage and deception schemes were adopted to mask their deployments. Senior generals travelled under false names: the commander-in-chief and victor of the East Prussian campaign, Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky, became "Colonel-General Vasil'ev." Vasilevsky, only forty-nine in 1945, was originally educated for the priesthood. He started his military career as a Tsarist officer, joined the Red Army in 1918 and was commanding a regiment a year later. Big, handsome, silver-haired, a surprisingly benign figure for a Soviet commander, he served as the Stavka's representative at Stalingrad and Kursk. He was Zhukov's closest colleague, yet never achieved the celebrity of some other marshals-nor incurred the consequent resentment of Stalin.

The Soviet plan called for ma.s.sive envelopments of the j.a.panese defences by offensives on three axes, followed by the capture of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, and then if possible northern Hokkaido. The Trans-Baikal Front, commanded by Malinovsky, was to attack western Manchuria; Meretskov's 1st Far Eastern Front was to drive into eastern Manchuria, heading for Mukden-modern Shenyang-Harbin and Jilin. In the north, Purkaev's 2nd Far Eastern Front would launch supporting attacks, while a mechanised group headed directly for Beijing. This was to be a blitzkrieg, relying on speed to pre-empt j.a.panese responses. The Guandong Army-which Moscow estimated at a million men, instead of the actual 713,724, organised in twenty-four divisions-would be denied any respite to form new defensive lines. The so-called Manchukuo Army, raised from local Chinese collaborators, numbered 170,000 but possessed neither will nor means to give much combat support to the j.a.panese.

The Russians, with 3,704 tanks and 1,852 self-propelled guns, enjoyed a paper superiority of two to one in men, five to one in tanks and artillery, two to one in aircraft. In quality, however, the disparity was much greater. More than a third of the Soviet troops were veterans, as were their commanders. j.a.panese divisions were woefully understrength. The Guandong Army had been progressively stripped of its best units to reinforce other fronts. Its heavy weapons were entirely outcla.s.sed by those of the Red Army. Some j.a.panese bayonets872 were forged from the springs of sc.r.a.pped motor vehicles. Many mortars were homemade. There was sufficient ammunition to issue riflemen only a hundred rounds apiece, without reserves. The j.a.panese themselves estimated that their formations in China and Manchuria possessed one-third their pre-war combat power. were forged from the springs of sc.r.a.pped motor vehicles. Many mortars were homemade. There was sufficient ammunition to issue riflemen only a hundred rounds apiece, without reserves. The j.a.panese themselves estimated that their formations in China and Manchuria possessed one-third their pre-war combat power.

Soviet soldiers grumbled when, on approaching the border, they were ordered to dig in. "We're supposed to be attacking, aren't we?" they said. They were warned that the j.a.panese might use biological weapons, and were inoculated against cholera and typhoid. Veterans were dismayed when they saw the poor quality of reinforcements sent to swell their ranks. "These were 'war babies,'" wrote Oleg Smirnov, "weak boys reared on the meagre food available behind the fronts." Men fed to fight under Zhukov and Konev in Europe were amazed to see the condition of those who had served in eastern garrison units, subsisting on starvation rations: "They were simply skin and bones873, dressed in shabby uniforms, shod in foot-bandages such as we had never seen." There was a deep psychological divide between "westerners" and "easterners" in the ranks of Vasilevsky's armies.

The marshal's original orders from the Stavka called for his forces to attack on the morning of 11 August, Far East time. Following news of Hiros.h.i.+ma, however, on the afternoon of the seventh he was abruptly directed to advance his timetable by two days. In the hours before the a.s.sault874, senior officers were briefed on what little was known about the atomic bomb. Implausibly, they were urged to seek any available intelligence about the new weapon which they could extract from j.a.panese prisoners.

It was evident to Moscow that j.a.pan's surrender had become imminent. It thus became vital to secure Russia's promised prizes, lest the victorious Americans have second thoughts about acquiescence. Soviet reasoning was indistinguishable from that of the British in Burma. It was perceived that only physical occupation of territory could ensure subsequent jurisdiction over it. On 8 August, like thousands of others, Lt. Alexander Fadin and his fellow officers of 20th Guards Tank Brigade were summoned to the unit commander's tent. Hitherto, though every man knew the purpose of the huge mobilisation, it had never been openly avowed. Now, the colonel said: "The time has come to erase the black stain of history from our homeland..." Political officers believed that the most plausible motivation which they could offer Soviet soldiers was to invite them to reverse Russia's 1905 defeat by j.a.pan.

To achieve surprise, the Soviets denied themselves air reconnaissance of j.a.panese positions behind the Manchurian frontier. Their maps were poor, and few displayed contours. The Soviet 15th Army in the north crossed the Amur River with the aid of a makes.h.i.+ft flotilla of commercial steams.h.i.+ps, barges and pontoons. In some places the j.a.panese sought to impede landings by setting fire to floating timber and barges. Soviet gunboats with such names as Proletariat Proletariat and and Red Star Red Star duelled with sh.o.r.e batteries. There was fierce street fighting in Fuchin, until Soviet tanks landed to reinforce the first wave of infantry. One armoured brigade's lead elements were sixty-two miles deep in Manchuria before its rear units got ash.o.r.e. In nine days, the Amur River Flotilla transported 91,000 men, 150 tanks, 3,000 horses, 413 guns and 28,000 tons of stores. The operation was chaotic, but against weak opposition it worked. duelled with sh.o.r.e batteries. There was fierce street fighting in Fuchin, until Soviet tanks landed to reinforce the first wave of infantry. One armoured brigade's lead elements were sixty-two miles deep in Manchuria before its rear units got ash.o.r.e. In nine days, the Amur River Flotilla transported 91,000 men, 150 tanks, 3,000 horses, 413 guns and 28,000 tons of stores. The operation was chaotic, but against weak opposition it worked.

The Russian invasion of China, August 1945 1945

In the north-west, as Sgt. Anatoly Fillipov's vehicles approached the border at Atpor with their unit of the Trans-Baikal Front, a Soviet frontier guard waved enthusiastically: "Say h.e.l.lo to the Manchurians875 for me!" The central plain, where all the region's important industries and commerce were concentrated, could be reached only by traversing great expanses of marsh, forest, mountains or desert. At H-hour in Oleg Smirnov's sector, a T-34 with its lights on rattled past his infantry unit, slowed just short of the crest beyond which lay Manchuria, and fired its gun. "Immediately, hundreds of engines roared all over the steppe," said Smirnov, "hundreds of lights blazed, and everything began to move." The armoured columns met only isolated resistance from border posts. Pillboxes were quickly silenced. At dawn the tanks began to race forward across the Manchurian plain, dry riverbeds their roads, motorised infantry and fuel trucks in their wake. "Soon there was this crazy heat for me!" The central plain, where all the region's important industries and commerce were concentrated, could be reached only by traversing great expanses of marsh, forest, mountains or desert. At H-hour in Oleg Smirnov's sector, a T-34 with its lights on rattled past his infantry unit, slowed just short of the crest beyond which lay Manchuria, and fired its gun. "Immediately, hundreds of engines roared all over the steppe," said Smirnov, "hundreds of lights blazed, and everything began to move." The armoured columns met only isolated resistance from border posts. Pillboxes were quickly silenced. At dawn the tanks began to race forward across the Manchurian plain, dry riverbeds their roads, motorised infantry and fuel trucks in their wake. "Soon there was this crazy heat876 and dust-and no water." Men developed nosebleeds from exhaustion and dehydration. They glimpsed lakes, rushed forward shouting with joy, only to perceive them as mirages. They pa.s.sed their first dead j.a.panese without sentiment. "We knew it was necessary to finish the last battle of this great war." and dust-and no water." Men developed nosebleeds from exhaustion and dehydration. They glimpsed lakes, rushed forward shouting with joy, only to perceive them as mirages. They pa.s.sed their first dead j.a.panese without sentiment. "We knew it was necessary to finish the last battle of this great war."

The j.a.panese had constructed fortified zones to protect recognised roads over the mountain pa.s.ses, but they lacked men and materials to hold a continuous perimeter. In the first hours of the Soviet invasion, the defenders reacted with dazed bewilderment. It is hard to comprehend how the Guandong Army allowed itself to suffer such tactical surprise, when for years Tokyo had feared a Soviet invasion. j.a.panese officers knew of the huge deployment across the border. As so often in j.a.pan's high command, however, evasion of unpalatable reality prevailed over rational a.n.a.lysis of probabilities. Now, hasty staff meetings were held. A struggle began to evacuate tens of thousands of j.a.panese civilians and undertake belated demolitions. One j.a.panese commander led a convoy of trucks laden with evacuees and supplies to the Mudanjiang River, only to find that j.a.panese sappers had already blown the crossing, which proved too deep to ford. Eventually, soldiers and civilians alike took to their heels, throwing away weapons and baggage. Many artillery pieces were abandoned for lack of tractors.

Outposts reported by telephone that they were being overrun by "overwhelmingly superior forces." A pitiful signal from one local j.a.panese commander on 10 August described how the hundred men of his kamikaze unit sought to stop a Soviet armoured column: "Each man of the Raiding Battalion's 1st Company equipped himself with an explosive charge and dashed at the enemy. However, although minor damage was inflicted, the charges-seven to sixteen pounds-were not powerful enough to stop tanks." The j.a.panese were astonished and dismayed by their first encounters with Soviet rocket launchers, the katyushas katyushas whose ma.s.sed salvoes carpeted the paths of attacks. whose ma.s.sed salvoes carpeted the paths of attacks.

Engineer a.s.sault groups of 1st Far Eastern Front were parachuted ahead of the ground advance, to seize intact tunnels and bridges on the vital eastern China railway. Most j.a.panese guards were stealthily dispatched with knives and clubs, but a few pillboxes offered resistance. After the tunnels were secured, Maj. Dmitry Krutskikh met a cart taking his casualties to the rear. He looked at one boy, no more than eighteen, obviously badly wounded, unlikely to live. Krutskikh asked: "Does it hurt?" The soldier said: "It does indeed, comrade officer, but I'll fight again!" Krutskikh wrote long afterwards: "Sixty years have pa.s.sed877, but still I remember that soldier's voice and eyes. Those firefights were pretty rough." The advancing Russians heard news of the atom bomb attack on Nagasaki. "To be frank," said Major Krutskikh, "we had too much on our minds to pay much attention. And, of course, none of us could imagine the scale of destruction."

ON THE MORNING of 9 August, the Guandong Army's commander, Otozo Yamada, called on the palace of Emperor Pu Yi at Changchun. Yamada, a slight, moustachioed cavalry veteran of the 1905 Russo-j.a.panese war, was habitually solemn and taciturn. Now, crisis rendered him voluble. His a.s.sertions of confidence in victory were somewhat discredited by the sudden wail of air-raid sirens, followed by the concussions of falling Russian bombs. Emperor and general retreated to continue their conversation in a shelter. of 9 August, the Guandong Army's commander, Otozo Yamada, called on the palace of Emperor Pu Yi at Changchun. Yamada, a slight, moustachioed cavalry veteran of the 1905 Russo-j.a.panese war, was habitually solemn and taciturn. Now, crisis rendered him voluble. His a.s.sertions of confidence in victory were somewhat discredited by the sudden wail of air-raid sirens, followed by the concussions of falling Russian bombs. Emperor and general retreated to continue their conversation in a shelter.

Pu Yi, a hypochondriac prey to superst.i.tion and p.r.o.ne to tears, was consumed with terror that either the j.a.panese or Chinese would now kill him. A tall, gangling, immature creature of thirty-nine, for years he had indulged his s.e.xual enthusiasms with a bevy of consorts and concubines, his petulant sadism by beating domestics. Under the j.a.panese, he enjoyed a much-diminished portion of the trappings of majesty. At his court, only ten eunuchs remained of the 100,000 who had served the Ming emperors, or of the hundreds whose quarters he liked to snipe at with an airgun in his earlier life as child-emperor. As nominal ruler of Manchukuo, Pu Yi signed official doc.u.ments, death warrants and industrial plans without discrimination, earning the loathing of the Chinese people for his collabora