Moral Science; a Compendium of Ethics Part 20

Now, as morality would never have existed but for the necessity of protecting one human being against another, the power of the mind that adopts other people's interests and views must always be of vital moment as a spring of moral conduct; and Adam Smith has done great service in developing the workings of the sympathetic impulse.

He does not discuss Free-will. On the question of Disinterested Conduct, he gives no clear opinion. While denying that our sympathetic impulses are a refinement of self-love, he would seem to admit that they bring their own pleasure with them; so that, after all, they do not detract from our happiness. In other places, he recognizes self-sacrifice, but gives no a.n.a.lysis of the motives that lead to it; and seems to think, with many other moralists, that it requires a compensation in the next world.

III.--His theory of the const.i.tuents of Happiness is simple, primitive, and crude, but is given with earnest conviction. Ambition he laughs to scorn. 'What, he asks, can be added to the happiness of the man who is in health, out of debt, and has a clear conscience?' Again, 'the chief part of happiness consists in the consciousness of being beloved, hence, sudden changes of fortune seldom contribute to happiness.' But what he dwells upon most persistently, as the prime condition of happiness, is Contentment, and Tranquillity.

IV.--On the Moral Code, he has nothing peculiar. As to the means and inducements to morality, he does not avail himself of the fertility of his own principle of Sympathy. Appeals to sympathy, and the cultivation of the power of entering into the feelings of others, could easily be shown to play a high part in efficacious moral suasion.

V.--He affords little or no grounds for remarking on the connexion of Morality with Politics. Our duties as citizens are a part of Morality, and that is all.

VI.--He gives his views on the alliance of Ethics with Religion. He does not admit that we should refer to the Religious sanction on all occasions. He a.s.sumes a benevolent and all-wise Governor of the world, who will ultimately redress all inequalities, and remedy all outstanding injustice. What this Being approves, however, is to be inferred solely from the principles of benevolence. Our regard for him is to be shown, not by frivolous observances, sacrifices, ceremonies, and vain supplications, but by just and beneficent actions. The author studiously ignores a revelation, and constructs for himself a Natural Religion, grounded on a benevolent and just administration of the universe.

In Smith's Essay, the purely scientific enquiry is overlaid by practical and hortatory dissertations, and by eloquent delineations of character and of beau-ideals of virtuous conduct. His style being thus pitched to the popular key, he never pushes home a metaphysical a.n.a.lysis; so that even his favourite theme, Sympathy, is not philosophically sifted to the bottom.

DAVID HARTLEY. [1705-1757.]

The 'Observations on Man' (1749) is the first systematic effort to explain the phenomena of mind by the Law of a.s.sociation. It contains also a philosophical hypothesis, that mental states are produced by the _vibration_ of infinitesimal particles of the nerves. This a.n.a.logy, borrowed from the undulations of the hypothetical substance aether, has been censured as crude, and has been entirely superseded. But, although an imperfect a.n.a.logy, it nevertheless kept constantly before the mind of Hartley the double aspect of all mental phenomena, thus preventing erroneous explanations, and often suggesting correct ones. In this respect, Aristotle and Hobbes are the only persons that can be named as equally fortunate.

The ethical remarks contained in the 'Observations,' relate only to the second head of summary, the Psychology of Ethics. We shall take, first, the account of disinterestedness, and, next, of the moral sense.

1. _Disinterestedness_. Under the name _Sympathy_, Hartley includes four kinds of feelings:--(1) Rejoicing at the happiness of others--Sociality, Good-will, Generosity, Grat.i.tude; (2) Grieving for the misery of others--Compa.s.sion, Mercy; (3) Rejoicing at the misery of others--Anger, Jealousy, Cruelty, Malice; and (4) Grieving for the happiness of others--Emulation, Envy. All these feelings may be shown to originate in a.s.sociation. We select as examples of Hartley's method, Benevolence and Compa.s.sion. Benevolence is the pleasing affection that prompts us to act for the benefit of others. It is not a primitive feeling; but grows out of such circ.u.mstances as the following. Almost all the pleasures, and few, in comparison, of the pains, of children, are caused by others; who are thus, in the course of time, regarded with pleasure, independently of their usefulness to us. Many of our pleasures are enjoyed along with, and are enhanced by, the presence of others. This tends to make us more sociable. Moreover, we are taught and required to put on the appearance of good-will, and to do kindly actions, and this may beget in us the proper feelings. Finally, we must take into account the praise and rewards of benevolence, together with the reciprocity of benefits that we may justly expect. All those elements may be so mixed and blended as to produce a feeling that shall teach us to do good to others without any expectation of reward, even that most refined recompense--the pleasure arising from a beneficent act. Thus Hartley conceives that he both proves the existence of disinterested feeling, and explains the manner of its developement.

His account of _Compa.s.sion_ is similar. In the young, the signs and appearances of distress excite a painful feeling, by recalling their own experience of misery. In the old, the connexion between a feeling and its adjuncts has been weakened by experience. Also, when children are brought up together, they are often annoyed by the same things, and this tends powerfully to create a fellow-feeling. Again, when their parents are ill, they are taught to cultivate pity, and are also subjected to unusual restraints. All those things conspire to make children desire to remove the sufferings of others. Various circ.u.mstances increase the feeling of pity, as when the sufferers are beloved by us, or are morally good. It is confirmatory of this view, that the most compa.s.sionate are those whose nerves are easily irritable, or whose experience of affliction has been considerable.

2.--_The Moral Sense_. Hartley denies the existence of any moral instinct, or any moral judgments, proceeding upon the eternal relations of things. If there be such, let instances of them be produced prior to the influence of a.s.sociations. Still, our moral approbation or disapprobation is disinterested, and has a fact.i.tious independence. (1) Children are taught what is right and wrong, and thus the a.s.sociations connected with the idea of praise and blame are transferred to the virtues inculcated and the vices condemned. (2) Many vices and virtues, such as sensuality, intemperance, malice, and the opposites, produce _immediate_ consequences of evil and good respectively. (3) The benefits, immediate or (at least) obvious, flowing from the virtues of others, kindle love towards them, and thereafter to the virtues they exhibit. (4) Another consideration is the _loveliness of virtue_, arising from the suitableness of the virtues to each other, and to the beauty, order, and perfection of the world. (5) The hopes and fears connected with a future life, strengthen the feelings connected with virtue. (6) Meditation upon G.o.d and prayer have a like effect. 'All the pleasures and pains of sensation, imagination, ambition (pride and vanity), self-interest, sympathy, and theopathy (affection towards G.o.d), as far as they are consistent with one another, with the frame of our natures, and with the course of the world, beget in us a moral sense, and lead us to the love and approbation of virtue, and to the fear, hatred, and abhorrence of vice. This moral sense, therefore, carries its own authority with it, inasmuch as it is the sum total of all the rest, and the ultimate result from them; and employs the whole force and authority of the whole nature of man against any particular part of it that rebels against the determinations and commands of the conscience or moral judgment.'

Hartley's a.n.a.lysis of the moral sense is a great advance upon Hobbes and Mandeville, who make self-love the immediate const.i.tuent, instead of a remote cause, of conscience. Our moral consciousness may thus be treated as peculiar and distinguishable from other mental states, while at the same time it is denied to be unique and irresolvable.

THOMAS REID.[24] [1710-96.]

Reid's Ethical views are given in his Essays on the Active Powers of the Mind.

ESSAY III., ent.i.tled THE PRINCIPLES OF ACTION, contains (Part III.) a disquisition on the _Rational Principles of Action_ as opposed to what Reid calls respectively _Mechanical_ Principles (Instinct, Habit), and _Animal_ Principles (Appet.i.tes, Desires, Affections).

The Rational Principles of Action are Prudence, or regard to our own good on the whole, and Duty, which, however, he does not define by the ant.i.thetical circ.u.mstance--the 'good of others.' The notion of Duty, he says, is too simple for logical definition, and can only be explained by synonymes--_what we ought_ to do; what is fair and honest; what is approvable; the professed rule of men's conduct; what all men praise; the laudable in itself, though no man praise it.

Duty, he says, cannot be resolved into Interest. The language of mankind makes the two distinct. Disregard of our interest is folly; of honour, baseness. Honour is more than mere reputation, for it keeps us right when we are not seen. This principle of Honour (so-called by men of rank) is, in vulgar phrase, honesty, probity, virtue, conscience; in philosophical language, the moral sense, the moral faculty, rect.i.tude.

The principle is universal in men grown up to years of understanding.

Such a testimony as Hume's may be held decisive on the reality of moral distinctions. The ancient world recognized it in the leading terms, _honestum_ and _utile_, &c.

The abstract notion of Duty is a relation between the action and the agent. It must be voluntary, and within the power of the agent. The opinion (or intention) of the agent gives the act its moral quality.

As to the Sense of Duty, Reid p.r.o.nounces at once, without hesitation, and with very little examination, in favour of an original power or faculty, in other words, a Moral Sense. Intellectual judgments are judgments of the external senses; moral judgments result from an internal moral sense. The external senses give us our intellectual first principles; the moral sense our moral first principles. He is at pains to exemplify the deductive process in morals. It is a question of moral reasoning, Ought a man to have only one wife? The reasons are, the greater good of the family, and of society in general; but no reason can be given why we should prefer greater good; it is an intuition of the moral sense.

He sums up the chapter thus:--'That, by an original power of the mind, which we call _conscience_, or the _moral faculty_, we have the conceptions of right and wrong in human conduct, of merit and demerit, of duty and moral obligation, and our other moral conceptions; and that, by the same faculty, we perceive some things in human conduct to be right, and others to be wrong; that the first principles of morals are the dictates of this faculty; and that we have the same reason to rely upon those dictates, as upon the determinations of our senses, or of our other natural faculties.' Hamilton remarks that this theory virtually founds morality on intelligence.

Moral Approbation is the affection and esteem accompanying our judgment of a right moral act. This is in all cases pleasurable, but most so, when the act is our own. So, obversely, for Moral Disapprobation.

Regarding Conscience, Reid remarks, first, that like all other powers it comes to maturity by insensible degrees, and may be a subject of culture or education. He takes no note of the difficulty of determining what is primitive and what is acquired. Secondly, Conscience is peculiar to man; it is wanting in the brutes. Thirdly, it is evidently intended to be the director of our conduct; and fourthly, it is an Active power and an Intellectual power combined.

ESSAY IV. is OF THE LIBERTY OF MORAL AGENTS, which we pa.s.s by, having noticed it elsewhere. ESSAY V. is OF MORALS.

Chapter I. professes to enumerate the axiomatic first principles of Morals. Some of these relate (A) to virtue in general: as (1) There are actions deserving of praise, and others deserving blame; (2) the involuntary is not an object of praise or blame; (3) the unavoidable is not an object of praise or blame; (4) omission may be culpable; (5) we ought to inform ourselves as to duty; (6) we should fortify ourselves against temptation. Other principles relate (B) to particular virtues: (1) We should prefer a greater good to a less; (2) we should comply with the intention of nature, apparent in our const.i.tution; (3) no man is born for himself alone; (4) we should judge according to the rule, 'Do to others,' &c.; (5) if we believe in G.o.d, we should venerate and submit to him. A third cla.s.s of principles (C) settle the preference among opposing virtues. Thus, unmerited generosity should yield to grat.i.tude, and both to justice.

Chapter II. remarks upon the growth and peculiar advantages of Systems of Morals. Chapter III. is on Systems of Natural Jurisprudence. The four subsequent chapters of the Essay he states to have been composed in answer to the Ethical doctrines of Hume.

Chapter IV. enquires whether a moral action must proceed from a moral purpose in the agent. He decides in the affirmative, replying to certain objections, and more especially to the allegation of Hume, that justice is not a natural, but an artificial virtue. This last question is pursued at great length in Chapter V., and the author takes occasion to review the theory of Utility or Benevolence, set up by Hume as the basis of morals. He gives Hume the credit of having made an important step in advance of the Epicurean, or Selfish, system, by including the good of others, as well as our own good, in moral acts. Still, he demands why, if Utility and Virtue are identical, the same name should not express both. It is true, that virtue is both agreeable and useful in the highest degree; but that circ.u.mstance does not prevent it from having a quality of its own, not arising from its being useful and agreeable, but arising from its being virtue. The common good of society, though a pleasing object to all men, hardly ever enters into the thoughts of the great majority; and, if a regard to it were the sole motive of justice, only a select number would ever be possessed of the virtue. The notion of justice carries inseparably along with it a notion of moral obligation; and no act can be called an act of justice unless prompted by the motive of justice.

Then, again, good music and good cookery have the merit of utility, in procuring what is agreeable both to ourselves and to society, but they have never been denominated moral virtues; so that, if Hume's system be true, they have been very unfairly treated.

Reid ill.u.s.trates his positions against Hume to a length unnecessary to follow. The objections are exclusively and effectively aimed at the two unguarded points of the Utility system as propounded by Hume; namely, first, the not recognizing moral rules as established and enforced among men by the dictation of authority, which does not leave to individuals the power of reference to ultimate ends; and, secondly, the not distinguis.h.i.+ng between obligatory, and non-obligatory, useful acts.

Reid continues the controversy, with reference to Justice, in Chapter VI., on the Nature and Obligation of a Contract; and in Chapter VII.

maintains, in opposition to Hume, that Moral approbation implies a Judgment of the intellect, and is not a mere feeling, as Hume seems to think. He allows the propriety of the phrase 'Moral Sentiment,' because 'Sentiment' in English means judgment accompanied with feeling.

[Hamilton dissents, and thinks that sentiment means the higher feelings.] He says, if a moral judgment be no real judgment, but only a feeling, morals have no foundation but the arbitrary structure of the mind; there are no immutable moral distinctions; and no evidence for the moral character of the Deity.

We shall find the views of Reid substantially adopted, and a little more closely and concisely argued, by Stewart.

DUGALD STEWART. [1753-1828.]

In his 'Essays on the Active Powers of the Mind,' Stewart introduces the Moral Faculty in the same way as Reid. BOOK SECOND is ent.i.tled OUR RATIONAL AND GOVERNING PRINCIPLES OF ACTION. Chapter I., on Prudence or Self-love, is unimportant for our present purpose, consisting of some desultory remarks on the connexion of happiness with steadiness of purpose, and on the meanings of the words 'self-love' and 'selfishness.'

Chapter II. is on the Moral Faculty, and is intended to show that it is an original principle of the mind. He first replies to the theory that identifies Morality with Prudence, or Self-love. His first argument is the existence in all languages of different words for _duty_ and for _interest_. Secondly, The emotions arising from, the contemplation of right and wrong are different from those produced by a regard to our own happiness. Thirdly, although in most instances a sense of duty, and an enlightened regard to our own happiness, would suggest to us the same line of conduct, yet this truth is not obvious to mankind generally, who are incapable of appreciating enlarged views and remote consequences. He repeats the common remark, that we secure our happiness best by not looking to it as tho one primary end. Fourthly, moral judgments appear in children, long before they can form the general notion of happiness. His examples of this position, however, have exclusive reference to the sentiment of pity, which all moralists regard as a primitive feeling, while few admit it to be the same as the moral sense.

He then takes notice of the a.s.sociation Theory of Hartley, Paley, and others, which he admits to be a great refinement of the old selfish system, and an answer to one of his arguments. He maintains, nevertheless, that the others are untouched by it, and more especially the third, referring to the amount of experience and reflection necessary to discover the tendency of virtue to promote our happiness, which is inconsistent with the early period when our moral judgments appear. [It is singular that he should not have remarked that the moral judgments of that early age, if we except what springs from the impulses of pity, are wholly communicated by others.] He quotes Paley's reasoning against the Moral Sense, and declares that he has as completely mis-stated the issue, as if one were to contend that because we are not born with the knowledge of light and colours, therefore the sense of seeing is not an original part of the frame. [It would be easy to retort that all that Paley's case demanded was the same power of _discrimination_ in moral judgments, as the power of discriminating light and dark belonging to our sense of sight.]

Chapter III. continues the subject, and examines objections. The first objection taken up is that derived from the influence of education, with which he combines the farther objection (of Locke and his followers) arising from the diversity of men's moral judgments in various nations. With regard to education, he contends that there are limits to its influence, and that however it may modify, it cannot create our judgments of right and wrong, any more than our notions of beauty and deformity. As to the historical facts relating to the diversity of moral judgments, he considers it necessary to make full allowance for three circ.u.mstances--I.--Difference of situation with regard to climate and civilization. II.--Diversity of speculative opinions, arising from difference of intellectual capacity; and, III.--The different moral import of the same action under different systems of behaviour. On the first head he explains the indifference to theft from there being little or no fixed property; he adduces the variety of sentiments respecting Usury, as having reference, to circ.u.mstances; and alludes to the differences of men's views as to political a.s.sa.s.sination. On the second head he remarks, that men may agree on _ends_, but may take different views as to means; they may agree in recognizing obedience to the Deity, but differ in their interpretations of his will. On the third point, as regards the different moral import of the same action, he suggests that Locke's instance of the killing of aged parents is merely the recognized mode of filial affection; he also quotes the exceeding variety of ceremonial observances.

Chapter IV. comments farther on the objections to the reality and immutability of moral distinctions and to the universal diffusion of the moral faculty. The reference is, in the first instance, to Locke, and then to what he terms, after Adam Smith, the licentious moralists--La Rochefoucauld and Mandeville. The replies to these writers contain nothing special to Stewart.

Chapter V. is the a.n.a.lysis of our Moral Perceptions and Emotions. This is a somewhat singular phrase in an author recognizing a separate inborn faculty of Right. His a.n.a.lysis consists in a separation of the entire fact into three parts:--the perception of an action as right or wrong; (2) an emotion of pleasure or pain, varying according to the moral sensibility: (3) a perception of the merit or demerit of the agent. The first is of course the main question; and the author gives a long review of the history of Ethical doctrines from Hobbes downwards, interspersing reflections and criticisms, all in favour of the intuitive origin of the sense. As ill.u.s.trative parallels, he adduces Personal Ident.i.ty, Causation, and Equality; all which he considers to be judgments involving simple ideas, and traceable only to some primitive power of the mind. He could as easily conceive a rational being formed to believe the three angles of a triangle to be equal to one right angle, as to believe that there would be no injustice in depriving a man of the fruits of his labours.

On the second point--the pleasure and pain accompanying right and wrong, he remarks on the one-sidedness of systems that treat the sense of right and wrong as an intellectual judgment purely (Clarke, &c.), or those that treat it as a feeling purely (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume). His remarks on the sense of Merit and Demerit in the agent are trivial or commonplace.

Chapter VI. is 'Of Moral Obligation.' It is needless to follow him on this subject, as his views are substantially a repet.i.tion of Butler's Supremacy of Conscience. At the same time, it may be doubted whether Butler entirely and unequivocally detached this supremacy from the command of the Deity, a point peculiarly insisted on by Stewart. His words are these:--

'According to some systems, moral obligation is founded entirely on our belief that virtue is enjoined by the command of G.o.d. But how; it may be asked, does this belief impose an obligation? Only one of two answers can be given. Either that there is a moral fitness that we should conform our will to that of the Author and the Governor of the universe; or that a rational self-love should induce us, from motives of prudence, to study every means of rendering ourselves acceptable to the Almighty Arbiter of happiness and misery. On the first supposition We reason in a circle. We resolve our sense of moral obligation into our sense of religion, and the sense of religion into that of moral obligation.

'The other system, which makes virtue a mere matter of prudence, although not so obviously unsatisfactory, leads to consequences which sufficiently invalidate every argument in its favour. Among others it leads us to conclude, 1. That the disbelief of a future state absolves from all moral obligation, excepting in so far as we find virtue to be conducive to our present interest: 2. That a being independently and completely happy cannot have any moral perceptions or any moral attributes.

'But farther, the notions of reward and punishment presuppose the notions of right and wrong. They are sanctions of virtue, or additional motives to the practice of it, but they suppose the existence of some previous obligation.

'In the last place, if moral obligation be const.i.tuted by a regard to our situation in another life, how shall the existence of a future state be proved, or even rendered probable by the light of nature? or how shall we discover what conduct is acceptable to the Deity? The truth is, that the strongest presumption for such a state is deduced from our natural notions of right and wrong; of merit and demerit; and from a comparison between, these and the general course of human affairs.'

In a chapter (VII.) ent.i.tled 'certain principles co-operating with our moral powers,' he discusses (1) a regard to character, (2) Sympathy, (3) the Sense of the Ridiculous, (4) Taste. The important topic is the second, Sympathy; which, psychologically, he would appear to regard as determined by the pleasure that it gives. Under this head he introduces a criticism of the Ethical theory of Adam Smith; and, adverting to the inadequacy of the theory to distinguish the _right_ from the _actual_ judgments of mankind, he remarks on Smith's ingenious fiction 'of _an abstract man_ within the breast;' and states that Smith laid much greater stress on this fiction in the last edition of the Moral Sentiments published before his death. It is not without reason that Stewart warns against grounding theories on metaphorical expressions, such as this of Smith, or the Platonic Commonwealth of the Soul.

In Book IV. of the Active Powers, Stewart discusses our Duties to Men,--both our fellow-creatures and ourselves. Our duties to our fellows are summed up in Benevolence, Justice, and Veracity. He devotes a chapter to each. In Chapter I., on Benevolence, he re-opens the consideration of the Ethical systems founded on Benevolence or Utility, and argues against them; but merely repeats the common-place objections--the incompetency of individuals to judge of remote tendencies, the pretext that would be afforded for the worst conduct, and each one's consciousness that a sense of _duty_ is different from enlightened benevolence.

Chapter II. is on Justice; defined as the disposition that leads a man, where his own interests or pa.s.sions are concerned, to act according to the judgment he would form of another man's duty in his situation. He introduces a criticism on Adam Smith, and re-a.s.serts the doctrine of an innate faculty, explained as the _power of forming_ moral ideas, and not as the innate possession of ideas. For the most part, his exposition is didactic and desultory, with occasional discussions of a critical and scientific nature; as, for example, some remarks on Hume's theory that Justice is an artificial virtue, an account of the basis of Jurisprudence, and a few observations on the Right of Property.