Neutral Rights and Obligations in the Anglo-Boer War Part 11

Lord Salisbury in his reply attempted to correct what he considered the misapprehension which underlay the statement of alternatives, namely, that neutral and non-contraband goods were not free in British bottoms between neutral ports, or else full compensation must be made to the owners for their seizure. It was a.s.serted that the British Government had neither exercised nor claimed any such right as that which was indicated, nor had they _seized_ neutral and non-contraband goods. He declared that the goods were not seized. Their pa.s.sage to Lorenzo Marques was merely interrupted, and by this interruption they were detained only to the extent that their being on board the s.h.i.+p which had been arrested made their detention unavoidable. It was further alleged that had the prize court held that the arrest of the s.h.i.+ps was not justified they would "_presumably_ have awarded damages against the captors of the s.h.i.+ps and the damages would _presumably_ have been so calculated as to enable the s.h.i.+p to meet the claims of merchants arising out of the unjustified interruption of the voyage."[40] The fact was alleged that the court had not so held and that it appeared that the s.h.i.+ps should, therefore, bear the consequences of the arrest and meet the merchants' claims. By the law of the flag under which the s.h.i.+ps sailed they could not carry goods destined for the enemy. If they s.h.i.+pped such goods they should bear the consequences. Among those consequences was the delaying of the goods until such time as they could be placed on a s.h.i.+p that could legally carry them on to their original port of destination.

[Footnote 40: For. Rel., 1900, p. 618; Salisbury to Choate, July 20, 1900.]

The result of such a decision is apparent. The American goods, in the words of Mr. Hay, were "as inaccessible to their owners as if they had been landed on a rock in mid-ocean," since no steamers not belonging to British lines plied between the ports of Cape Colony and Delagoa Bay.

But there seemed little chance of securing a revision of Great Britain's decision, which was based upon the principle that she might deal with English subjects and with English s.h.i.+ps in accordance with the law of the flag under which those s.h.i.+ps sailed. Mr. Hay, therefore, only endeavored to secure every possible guarantee for American interests involved, but incidentally emphasized the view that, although England might use her own as she saw fit she must show just ground for all injuries suffered by innocent American s.h.i.+ppers. Instructions were sent to Mr. Hollis, the United States consul at Lorenzo Marques, that he should investigate the seizures and make every effort to protect the property of American citizens, and later he was urged to ascertain the facts concerning the detention of American flour on board the s.h.i.+ps arrested by Great Britain.[41]

[Footnote 41: For. Rel, 1900, p. 538; Hay to Hollis, Dec. 28, 1899.]

It soon developed that freight had been prepaid and that the drafts drawn against the various s.h.i.+pments from New York would be protested for non-payment by the parties on whom they had been drawn at Delagoa Bay.[42] Consequently the t.i.tle to the property in such cases was vested in the American s.h.i.+ppers, and they urged their Government to see that their interests were protected against what they considered an undue extension of belligerent rights against ordinary neutral trade from one neutral port to another. Mr. Hay pointed out the obvious injustice of the goods being in the prize courts with the vessel, even granting that the s.h.i.+p as a common carrier of international commerce had violated the law of its flag, on the remote possibility of having carried for the enemy. He insisted that, although the s.h.i.+ppers might be required to furnish invoices and bills of lading, they should not be sent to the prize court for their property. Lord Salisbury, however, contended that the prize court had complete control of the situation, and that any neutral s.h.i.+ppers who were innocent could secure the release of their goods only by applying to the court with the proper evidence of owners.h.i.+p. The injustice of the vigorous enforcement of this rule of prize law was obvious, and the demand was made that the goods should be released by order of the proper British law officer and not be left to the mercy of the prize court.[43] It was urged that since the s.h.i.+ps had been seized because of a violation of the munic.i.p.al law of Great Britain, for trading with the enemy, and since the seizure and detention of the flour and other goods was only incidental to the seizure of the s.h.i.+ps, the flour, to which no such offense could be imputed, could not under the circ.u.mstances be admitted to be subject to capture because not contraband of war. Upon these grounds prompt rest.i.tution to the American owners was demanded.[44]

[Footnote 42: For. Rel, 1900, p. 540; Toomey to Hay, Jan. 3, 1900.]

[Footnote 43: For. Rel, 1900, p. 543; Choate to Hay, Jan. 5, 1900.]

[Footnote 44: For. Rel., 1900, p. 543; Choate to Salisbury, Jan. 4, 1900.]

The view of the Department was that nothing seemed to justify the seizure of the American goods, for to all intents and purposes they were _seized_ although it was considered by Great Britain that they had merely been _detained_ as an incident of the seizure of the s.h.i.+ps on which they were carried. Since the flour was sold delivered at Delagoa Bay it was therefore the property of the United States s.h.i.+ppers until the obligation of delivery was fulfilled irrespective of the drafts made against it on Delagoa Bay. Upon the return of these drafts unpaid the flour was left in a critical position even if released.[45]

[Footnote 45: For. Rel., 1900, p. 548; Toomey to Hay, Jan. 10, 1900.]

It was clearly shown that the flour had been sold in the regular course of business as for a number of years past, s.h.i.+pments being made of so many bags each month to their regular users who antic.i.p.ated their ordinary requirements. The consignees, it was urged by the American s.h.i.+ppers, were reputable merchants in Delagoa Bay, and the consignments were not of an unusual character but were a part of the ordinary commerce with the East coast.[46] It was admitted that certain of the consignments had been to residents of Johannesburg, but it was at the same time a.s.serted that the consignees were legitimate flour merchants who were not contractors for the Transvaal Government at the time the purchases were made.[47]

[Footnote 46: For. Rel., 1900, p. 567; Choate to Salisbury, Jan. 15, 1900.]

[Footnote 47: For. Rel., 1890, p. 584. Affidavit of A.J. Toomey, President of the Penn. Milling and Export Co., Jan. 23, 1900.]

The Pennsylvania Milling and Export Company suggested that possibly their s.h.i.+pments had been confused with those of an English firm, Collier and Sons, of Bristol. It was alleged to be a notorious fact that this firm had made large s.h.i.+pments of flour to the Transvaal Government; that Arthur May and Company were the agents of the firm in the Republic, and that the Bristol firm had s.h.i.+pped on the same steamers on which American goods were carried. A.J. Toomey, President of the Pennsylvania firm, in alleging these facts pointed out that he mentioned only what was well known in s.h.i.+pping circles and did so merely to establish the fact that there had been no wrong intent with reference to his s.h.i.+pments. He urged that the question of the justice of indemnification should be settled, leaving the respective rights of consignors or consignees to the proceeds to be settled afterward.[48]

[Footnote 48: For. Rel., 1900, p. 589; Toomey to Hay, Feb. 12, 1900.]

Mr. Choate, in carrying out instructions received from Was.h.i.+ngton, insisted that where the s.h.i.+p was seized and taken into port on the charge of trading with the enemy, and where the flour was not held as contraband, and was not claimed to be contraband, and under the circ.u.mstances could not be involved in the specific charge against the s.h.i.+p, it was manifestly a great hards.h.i.+p for the owners of the flour to be compelled to go into the prize court at a port short of the original destination even for the purpose of proving their owners.h.i.+p, which he insisted would involve costs and damages for the detention and possible deterioration in value.[49] It was intimated that aside from the pecuniary features of the situation it was of primary importance to insist upon the principles involved, with a view to preventing an extension of belligerent rights to the detriment of all neutral commerce in time of war. Emphasis was therefore placed upon the point that evidence must be shown that the goods were really for the supply of the enemy's forces and that this was in fact their destination at the time of their seizure. The fact was pointed out that otherwise the action of the British authorities seemed to imply the right to exercise an embargo on the sale and delivery of non-contraband goods in the ordinary course of trade with the people of the Republics. It was intimated that this was inconsistent with the view of contraband expressed by the English Government, and wholly inadmissible from the point of view of the United States.[50]

[Footnote 49: For. Rel., 1900, p. 566; Choate to Salisbury, Jan. 13, 1900.]

[Footnote 50: For. Rel., 1900, p. 578; Choate to Salisbury, Jan. 29, 1900.]

The argument was presented that the British Government had seized flour s.h.i.+pped to buyers at Delagoa Bay and had prevented it from reaching that point in time to meet a good market. Consequently, in view of the fact that it was not sold for any purposes hostile to Great Britain, it was urged that the latter should not be allowed to consider herself relieved of any responsibility for indemnity or direct loss a.s.sumed by the s.h.i.+ppers, or for any indirect loss for which the s.h.i.+ppers might have to compensate the buyers on account of the diversion and detention. It was the opinion of the United States that the mere release of the flour to qualified owners did not meet the obligation in the case because the owners could not possibly take the delivery of the flour owing to the obstacles of war at the points where the goods lay. Even if they could do so they would naturally suffer considerable loss by the condition of the market and by any diminution in value that might have occurred to the flour through climatic deterioration.

The American State Department, therefore, suggested as the only equitable plan apparent under the circ.u.mstances that Great Britain buy the flour and other innocent goods at their invoice price and pay over the proceeds of the purchases to those persons who could prove a just claim for its value. An additional sum was also asked as "reasonable compensation" for loss of market and other losses that might have been suffered by American interests.[51] In other words, the English Government should use the flour, pay the costs and indemnify the owners reasonably, since the latter were entirely innocent and had depended upon the usual rights and immunities of neutral s.h.i.+ppers in time of war.

The fact was pointed out that the situation was causing an uncertainty and hesitancy in business circles which was detrimental to all American interests. Although a number of the consignments were being delivered at Delagoa Bay, presumably by English s.h.i.+ps, it was alleged that the seizures and the unforeseen att.i.tude of Great Britain had compelled all later s.h.i.+pments to go by way of Hamburg or Bordeaux when seeking the ports of South Africa in the way of ordinary neutral commerce in order to avoid using British bottoms as a means of transportation. Many of the drafts had been returned unpaid and others were expected in due course, and whether paid or not they would finally have to be lifted by the s.h.i.+ppers from the United States, since they were the final recourse.[52]

All delay tended to reduce the value of the goods, which were perishable, on account of the climate and because of Cape Colony duties and loss of market.

[Footnote 51: For. Rel., 1900, p. 582; Toomey to Hay, Jan. 23, 1900.]

[Footnote 52: For. Rel., 1900, p. 540; Hay to Choate, Jan. 10, 1900.]

The offer was made by several of the American s.h.i.+ppers to sell to Great Britain for the value of the goods at the port of original destination at the time they would have arrived there had the voyage not been interrupted. And the American representative urged that it would be advisable for all American s.h.i.+ppers who were interested to agree to sell upon the same terms with a view to securing an arrangement which would include all neutral American property. He suggested that where the t.i.tle to property was doubtful both s.h.i.+pper and buyer might unite in the sale, since this course was preferable to incurring questions as between consignors and consignees in the prize courts.[53]

[Footnote 53: For. Rel., 1900, p. 551; Choate to Hay, Jan. 12, 1900.]

The English Government had naturally been unwilling to buy at current prices for the reason that prices were doubled at Delagoa Bay after the seizures, but it was considered that the price there on the day of the seizures was not unreasonable. Great Britain was willing to buy, but emphasized the point that the alleged owners must prove their t.i.tle to owners.h.i.+p beyond a doubt as an essential condition of the arrangement, since the Government could not incur the risk of paying one man only to have another appear later and prove that he was the real owner. Fears were expressed that the question of owners.h.i.+p would cause trouble, although the regular s.h.i.+pping doc.u.ments by which the goods had gotten into the s.h.i.+ps, it was thought, should be sufficient proof provided the joint consent of consignors and consignees could be secured.[54]

[Footnote 54: For. Rel., 1900, pp. 553, 554, 579]

The English view had been that the whole cargo was included in the libel for trading with the enemy declared against the s.h.i.+p, but the plea of the American owners was heard, that the rules of prize procedure should not be so rigorously enforced in the present instances, since such an interpretation would have led to obvious injustice by requiring innocent American owners to appear before the court to prove the t.i.tle to their property.[55] Such a requirement, it was realized, would have led to difficulties of an almost unsurmountable character under the circ.u.mstances. Claimants would have had to submit evidence showing a _bona fide_ American citizens.h.i.+p and an actual t.i.tle to the owners.h.i.+p of the goods at the time they were seized. Within the rules of prize jurisdiction the consignee on whose account and at whose expense the goods were s.h.i.+pped is considered the owner of such goods during the voyage. And as a corollary the further rule is suggested that the right to claim damages caused for an illegal seizure would be in the owner. In the prize court the delay caused by all such questions as between consignor and consignee would have been almost endless.

[Footnote 55: For. Rel., 1900, p. 579; Choate to Hay, Feb. 2, 1900.]

The question might naturally have arisen whether there could be any basis for a claim for indirect loss sustained by an American s.h.i.+pper growing out of the sale on credit to citizens of the Transvaal. It might be a question, too, whether the consignor might, notwithstanding the seizures, be able to recover at law the full contract price of the goods s.h.i.+pped prepaid to the consignee, and if so, whether the seizure could be considered legally as a wrong against the American consignor. And even granting that the latter were unable to recover at law from the consignee, the question would still remain whether under all the circ.u.mstances such inability on the part of the American consignor could be legally imputable to the act of the British Government in making the seizure. The question might also have arisen where an agent had bought for the Transvaal Government on credit, so that the t.i.tle pa.s.sed when the goods went on board and the goods were discovered to have been contraband, whether an American s.h.i.+pper might not appear to have been privy to the real character of the purchases. In such a case the United States Government could hardly have championed the cause of a party who had s.h.i.+pped contraband. A prize court is filled with pitfalls of the kind, but the diplomacy of Secretary Hay, backed by the prestige of the United States and a reciprocal feeling of friends.h.i.+p between the two nations, was able to avoid all such questions by inducing Great Britain to agree upon a settlement without compelling the claimants to go into the prize court. Although it was pretty well ascertained that no actual contraband in the usual sense of the term had been carried from America by the s.h.i.+ps which were seized, difficult questions were thus avoided as between liens and general owners.h.i.+ps which might have arisen had American s.h.i.+ppers been compelled to go into court.

It is not a universal rule where the s.h.i.+pper has not been paid for his goods that the property is still in him, so as to const.i.tute him the owner in a prize court, or for the purposes of sale. By the terms of sale and s.h.i.+pment he may not have retained a lien on the goods. But in any case as a rule the t.i.tle of the absolute owner prevails in a prize court over the interests of a lien holder, whatever the equities between consignor and consignee may be.[56] Consequently the policy adopted by Secretary Hay in demanding that Great Britain should settle with all American s.h.i.+ppers on an equitable basis without forcing them to take their chances in a prize court was the wisest course that could have been pursued.

[Footnote 56: The _Winnifred_, Blatch. Prize Cases, 2, cited 2 Halleck, International Law, Engl. Ed. (1893), 392.]

In the final arrangement Great Britain admitted that the American goods had not been liable to seizure except as a result of the libel attaching to the s.h.i.+ps. But any claims for damages due to the owners of the cargoes on account of the failure of the vessels to deliver at the port mentioned in the freight contract, it was a.s.serted, should be made against those who entered into or became responsible for the execution of the contract for the delivery which they failed to perform, and the a.s.sumption that such damages could be sustained at law would depend on the terms of the contract of carriage. The English Government, however, did not admit that it was in any way liable for damages to the owners of the flour and other goods, since their detention was due entirely to the circ.u.mstance that the s.h.i.+ps were not able to complete their voyages, and the fact that they could not complete their voyages was due to the circ.u.mstance that such voyages were illegal by the law of the flag under which they were sailing.[57]

[Footnote 57: For. Rel., 1900, pp. 604-605; Salisbury to Choate, March 3, 1900.]

Although the financial settlement which Great Britain was willing to make was accepted by the United States, this acceptance did not imply an acquiescence in the view expressed by the English Government with reference to the conditions under which flour and other foodstuffs might become contraband of war, nor in the doctrine of continuous voyages as applied by Great Britain to trading with the enemy. It was preferred at Was.h.i.+ngton to follow the usual rule and avoid pa.s.sing upon hypothetical cases until occasion had called them into actual existence. The problem which had been before the Department of State was, not to force Great Britain to declare herself finally upon broad questions of international law, nor to express the final att.i.tude of the United States upon questions which were not immediately at issue, but to meet the demands of American s.h.i.+ppers and secure their immediate interests by some equitable agreement with Great Britain. The arrangement agreed upon, therefore, met only the necessity of the case immediately in view. The United States Consul-General at Cape Town was to arrange with Sir Alfred Milner, the British High Commissioner in South Africa, for the release or purchase by the British Government of any goods owned by citizens of the United States, which, if purchased, were to be paid for at the price they would have brought at the port of destination at the time they would have arrived there had the voyage not been interrupted.

Against certain articles, especially the oil consigned to the Netherlands South African Railway, an allegation of enemy's property was justly made and the oil confiscated.

In the end most of the American claims were withdrawn or paid in full.

In the former event the American owners threw the burden of proof of owners.h.i.+p upon the consignees, who were instructed to present their claims through their respective governments. But it should be noted that in acceding to the American demands by purchasing the goods, the British Government emphasized the fact that the act was purely _ex gratia_ on the part of England. The British representative clearly stated that the goods had been legally detained and that it was open for the owners to come and take them upon proof of owners.h.i.+p before the prize court. It was pointed out that the fact that none but British s.h.i.+ps ran between Cape Colony and Delagoa Bay, although an unfortunate circ.u.mstance, was one which could hardly be held to be a fault of the English Government.

The enforcement of the English law was the right of Great Britain no matter upon whom the inconvenience might happen to fall. Lord Salisbury said: "It must be distinctly understood that these payments are made purely _ex gratia_ and having regard to the special circ.u.mstances of this particular case. No liability is admitted by Her Majesty's Government either to purchase the goods or to compensate ... for the losses or for the expenses ... incurred."[58] The view held by the English statesman was that Great Britain's concession in these cases should not serve as a precedent in the future.

[Footnote 58: For. Rel., 1900, p. 618; Salisbury to Choate, July 20, 1900, with reference to the _Beatrice_.]

The att.i.tude which Great Britain had a.s.sumed with reference to the different seizures was generally considered a menace to neutral commercial interests should the British position be accepted as a precedent for similar cases that might occur. The danger of such a precedent had been realized by Secretary Hay and throughout the negotiations he had dwelt upon the fact that while the protection of American interests was the end immediately sought, the principles which underlay the disposition of the particular cases were of the greater importance.

Lord Roseberry, too, called attention to the danger of the precedent should England determine to treat foodstuffs in general as contraband of war. It was pointed out, however, that in the seizures of foodstuffs near Delagoa Bay the question of contraband did not necessarily arise, since all trade with the enemy, even in articles the most innocent, was forbidden under heavy penalty. The seizure of certain cla.s.ses of foodstuffs as of a contraband character did not of necessity involve the principle of treating all foodstuffs as contraband of war. The English view was that it had long been recognized that a belligerent might discriminate between foodstuffs obviously intended for the commissariat of an army in the field and foodstuffs which might be properly imported for the use of the non-combatant population.

The consensus of opinion, however, seems to be that while there may be reasonable ground for including tinned or canned meats and the like in the former category, flour naturally belongs to the latter cla.s.s, and it has been pointed out that neither the British Government nor any other has the power of treating what it pleases as contraband without reference to the prize court, with which alone the decision rests. The prize courts of all countries have held at different times that foodstuffs under certain circ.u.mstances are contraband, as, for instance, where they are intended for the supply of a belligerent garrison as well as in less obvious cases, but any decision which considered foodstuffs generally as contraband would be disquieting to all neutral interests.

One writer has a.s.serted that such an innovation would not be alarming to Great Britain as long as she remained predominant at sea, since the more effectual her sea power were declared to be in preventing sustenance from going over sea to her enemy the better it would be for English predominance. It is believed by this writer that during the existence of this supremacy at sea she would be able to protect the pa.s.sage of general foodstuffs from foreign countries to her own ports. He concludes, however: "Of course if we lose our predominance at sea it is another matter. But then, e finita la Musica."[59]

[Footnote 59: Thos. Gibson Bowles, Jan. 4, 1900. For. Rel., 1900, p.

546.]

The acceptance of the principle that foodstuffs are contraband of war, it need hardly be said, is not even a remote probability except under very exceptional circ.u.mstances where they are for the immediate supply of the enemy's army or navy, and in most cases of this kind they can usually be confiscated as enemy's property without a direct implication of a distinctly contraband character. In other words, the use for which they are intended may give reasonable ground for the conclusive presumption that they are for the enemy's immediate supply, whether the t.i.tle to property in them vests in the enemy or in some other agency, and the last question is always to be decided by the prize court of the particular country which has made the seizure. The decision should be based upon a careful examination of the evidence which is submitted to the court, and not presumed from the fact that the political power has exercised the belligerent right of visit, search and detention. The final decision of confiscation rests with the prize court.

By way of recapitulation it may be pointed out that the goods seized or detained by the English authorities in South African waters were s.h.i.+pped by American merchants and manufacturers, many of them on regular monthly orders to alleged reputable merchants in Lorenzo Marques, Delagoa Bay, in Portuguese territory. Certain consignments were intended for alleged reputable firms in Johannesburg, South African Republic. The articles composing the cargoes of the s.h.i.+ps were of the general character of foodstuffs, chiefly flour, canned meats, and other food materials.

Lumber, hardware and various miscellaneous articles generally considered innocent in character were also included. There was a consignment of lubricating oil to the Netherlands South African Railway, the latter company held to be the property of the Transvaal Government, and a like consignment to the Lorenzo Marques Railway, a Portuguese concern. At first the seizures which occurred at points between Cape Colony and Delagoa Bay were supposed to have been made on account of contraband.

Later Great Britain declared that the s.h.i.+ps had been seized because of the violation of a munic.i.p.al ordinance forbidding British subjects to trade with the enemy. The _Mashona, Beatrice_ and _Sabine_ were British s.h.i.+ps sailing under the English flag. The _Maria_ was a Dutch vessel sailing under the flag of Holland, but was supposed by the English authorities to have been under charter to an English firm. In the latter case the s.h.i.+p would have been liable to the English law, but for the mistake the owners of the s.h.i.+p as well as the owners of the cargo were indemnified by the English Government. The seizure of the cargoes of the British s.h.i.+ps was declared to have been merely an unavoidable incident of the seizure of the alleged guilty s.h.i.+ps. Compensation was made to American s.h.i.+ppers by the purchase of the goods. The consignment of oil to the Netherlands South African Railway was confiscated as enemy's property.

The views of Great Britain and the United States were divergent with reference to the principle of treating foodstuffs as contraband. Rather as an _obiter dictum_ the former declared: "Foodstuffs with a hostile destination can be considered contraband of war only if they are supplies for the enemy's forces. It is not sufficient that they are capable of being so used; it must be shown that this was in fact their destination at the time of the seizure."[60]

[Footnote 60: For. Rel., 1900, p. 555.]