Speeches on Questions of Public Policy Part 21

HOUSE OF COMMONS, FEBRUARY 23, 1855.

_From Hansard._

[On February 22 Lord Palmerston announced in the House of Commons that Mr. Gladstone, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Sidney Herbert, the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Cardwell, the President of the Board of Trade, and Sir James Graham, the First Lord of the Admiralty, had resigned the offices which they had accepted a fortnight before. The ground of this secession was the impression entertained by the above-named personages that the Committee of Inquiry moved for by Mr. Roebuck was equivalent to a vote of censure on them, as they had formed part of the Government of Lord Aberdeen, whose conduct of the Russian war was impugned by the appointment of the Committee. The places vacated by these secessions were filled up on February 28.]

I am one of those forming the majority of the House, I suspect, who are disposed to look upon our present position as one of more than ordinary gravity. I am one, also, of those, not probably const.i.tuting so great a majority of the House, who regret extremely the circ.u.mstances which have obliged the right hon. Gentlemen who are now upon this bench to secede from the Government of the n.o.ble Lord the Member for Tiverton. I do not take upon me for a moment to condemn them; because I think, if there be anything in which a man must judge for himself, it is whether he should take office if it be offered to him, whether he should secede from office, whether he should serve under a particular leader, or engage in the service of the Crown, or retain office in a particular emergency. In such cases I think that the decision must be left to his own conscience and his own judgment; and I should be the last person to condemn any one for the decision to which he might come. I think, however, that the speech of the right hon. Gentleman is one which the House cannot have listened to without being convinced that he and his retiring Colleagues have been moved to the course which they have taken by a deliberate judgment upon this question, which, whether it be right or wrong, is fully explained, and is honest to the House and to the country.

Now, Sir, I said that I regretted their secession, because I am one of those who do not wish to see the Government of the n.o.ble Lord the Member for Tiverton overthrown. The House knows well, and n.o.body knows better than the n.o.ble Lord, that I have never been one of his ardent and enthusiastic supporters. I have often disapproved of his policy both at home and abroad; but I hope that I do not bear to him, as I can honestly say that I do not bear to any man in this House--for from all I have received unnumbered courtesies--any feeling that takes even the tinge of a personal animosity; and even if I did, at a moment so grave as this, no feeling of a personal character whatever should prevent me from doing that which I think now, of all times, we are called upon to do--that which we honestly and conscientiously believe to be for the permanent interests of the country. We are in this position, that for a month past, at least, there has been a chaos in the regions of the Administration. Nothing can be more embarra.s.sing--I had almost said nothing can be more humiliating--than the position which we offer to the country; and I am afraid that the knowledge of our position is not confined to the limits of these islands.

It will be admitted that we want a Government; that if the country is to be saved from the breakers which now surround it, there must be a Government; and it devolves upon the House of Commons to rise to the gravity of the occasion, and to support any man who is conscious of his responsibility, and who is honestly offering and endeavouring to deliver the country from the embarra.s.sment in which we now find it. We are at war, and I shall not say one single sentence with regard to the policy of the war or its origin, and I know not that I shall say a single sentence with regard to the conduct of it; but the fact is that we are at war with the greatest military Power, probably, of the world, and that we are carrying on our operations at a distance of 3,000 miles from home, and in the neighbourhood of the strongest fortifications of that great military Empire. I will not stop to criticise--though it really invites me--the fact that some who have told us that we were in danger from the aggressions of that Empire, at the same time told us that that Empire was powerless for aggression, and also that it was impregnable to attack. By some means, however, the public have been alarmed as if that aggressive power were unbounded, and they have been induced to undertake an expedition, as if the invasion of an impregnable country were a matter of holiday-making rather than of war.

But we are now in a peculiar position with regard to that war; for, if I am not mistaken--and I think I gathered as much from the language of the right hon. Gentleman--at this very moment terms have been agreed upon-- agreed upon by the Cabinet of Lord Aberdeen; consented to by the n.o.ble Lord the Member for Tiverton when he was in that Cabinet; and ratified and confirmed by him upon the formation of his own Government--and that those terms are now specifically known and understood; and that they have been offered to the Government with which this country is at war, and in conjunction with France and Austria--one, certainly, and the other supposed to be, an ally of this country. Now, those terms consist of four propositions, which I shall neither describe nor discuss, because they are known to the House; but three of them are not matters of dispute; and with regard to the other, I think that the n.o.ble Lord the Member for the City of London stated, upon a recent occasion, that it was involved in this proposition--that the preponderant power of Russia in the Black Sea should cease, and that Russia had accepted it with that interpretation. Therefore, whatever difference arises is merely as to the mode in which that 'preponderant power' shall be understood or made to cease. Now, there are some Gentlemen not far from me--there are men who write in the public press--there are thousands of persons in the United Kingdom at this moment--and I learn with astonishment and dismay that there are persons even in that grave a.s.sembly which we are not allowed to specify by a name in this House-- who have entertained dreams--impracticable theories--expectations of vast European and Asiatic changes, of revived nationalities, and of a new map of Europe, if not of the world, as a result or an object of this war. And it is from those Gentlemen that we hear continually, addressed to the n.o.ble Lord the Member for Tiverton, language which I cannot well understand. They call upon him to act, to carry on the war with vigour, and to prosecute enterprises which neither his Government nor any other Government has ever seriously entertained; but I would appeal to those Gentlemen whether it does not become us--regarding the true interests and the true honour of the country--if our Government have offered terms of peace to Russia, not to draw back from those terms, not to cause any unnecessary delay, not to adopt any subterfuge to prevent those terms being accepted, not to attempt shuffles of any kind, not to endeavour to insist upon harder terms, and thus make the approach of peace even still more distant than it is at present?

Whatever may be said about the honour of the country in any other relation involved in this affair, this, at least, I expect every man who hears me to admit--that if terms of peace have been offered they have been offered in good faith, and shall be in honour and good faith adhered to; so that if, unfortunately for Europe and humanity, there should be any failure at Vienna, no man should point to the English Government and to the authorities and rulers of this Christian country, and say that we have prolonged the war and the infinite calamities of which it is the cause.

I have said that I was anxious that the Government of the n.o.ble Lord should not be overthrown. Will the House allow me to say why I am so?

The n.o.ble Lord at the head of the Government has long been a great authority with many persons in this country upon foreign policy. His late colleague, and present envoy to Vienna, has long been a great authority with a large portion of the people of this country upon almost all political questions. With the exception of that unhappy selection of an amba.s.sador at Constantinople, I hold that there are no men in this country more truly responsible for our present position in this war than the n.o.ble Lord who now fills the highest office in the State and the n.o.ble Lord who is now, I trust, rapidly approaching the scene of his labours in Vienna. I do not say this now to throw blame upon those n.o.ble Lords, because their policy, which I hold to be wrong, they, without doubt, as firmly believe to be right; but I am only stating facts. It has been their policy that they have entered into war for certain objects, and I am sure that neither the n.o.ble Lord at the head of the Government nor his late colleague the n.o.ble Lord the Member for London will shrink from the responsibility which attaches to them. Well, Sir, now we have those n.o.ble Lords in a position which is, in my humble opinion, favourable to the termination of the troubles which exist. I think that the n.o.ble Lord at the head of the Government himself would have more influence in stilling whatever may exist of clamour in this country than any other Member of this House. I think, also, that the n.o.ble Lord the Member for London would not have undertaken the mission to Vienna if he had not entertained some strong belief that, by so doing, he might bring the war to an end. n.o.body gains reputation by a failure in negotiation, and as that n.o.ble Lord is well acquainted with the whole question from beginning to end, I entertain a hope--I will not say a sanguine hope--that the result of that mission to Vienna will be to bring about a peace, to extricate this country from some of those difficulties inseparable from a state of war.

There is one subject upon which I should like to put a question to the n.o.ble Lord at the head of the Government. I shall not say one word here about the state of the army in the Crimea, or one word about its numbers or its condition. Every Member of this House, every inhabitant of this country, has been sufficiently harrowed with details regarding it. To my solemn belief, thousands--nay, scores of thousands of persons--have retired to rest, night after night, whose slumbers have been disturbed or whose dreams have been based upon the sufferings and agonies of our soldiers in the Crimea. I should like to ask the n.o.ble Lord at the head of the Government--although I am not sure if he will feel that he can or ought to answer the question--whether the n.o.ble Lord the Member for London has power, after discussions have commenced, and as soon as there shall be established good grounds for believing that the negotiations for peace will prove successful, to enter into any armistice? ['No!

no!']

I know not, Sir, who it is that says 'No, no,' but I should like to see any man get up and say that the destruction of 200,000 human lives lost on all sides during the course of this unhappy conflict is not a sufficient sacrifice. You are not pretending to conquer territory--you are not pretending to hold fortified or unfortified towns; you have offered terms of peace which, as I understand them, I do not say are not moderate; and breathes there a man in this House or in this country whose appet.i.te for blood is so insatiable that, even when terms of peace have been offered and accepted, he pines for that a.s.sault in which of Russian, Turk, French and English, as sure as one man dies, 20,000 corpses will strew the streets of Sebastopol? I say I should like to ask the n.o.ble Lord--and I am sure that he will feel, and that this House will feel, that I am speaking in no unfriendly manner towards the Government of which he is at the head--I should like to know, and I venture to hope that it is so, if the n.o.ble Lord the Member for London has power, at the earliest stage of these proceedings at Vienna, at which it can properly be done--and I should think that it might properly be done at a very early stage--to adopt a course by which all further waste of human life may be put an end to, and further animosity between three great nations be, as far as possible, prevented?

I appeal to the n.o.ble Lord at the head of the Government and to this House; I am not now complaining of the war--I am not now complaining of the terms of peace, nor, indeed, of anything that has been done--but I wish to suggest to this House what, I believe, thousands and tens of thousands of the most educated and of the most Christian portion of the people of this country are feeling upon this subject, although, indeed, in the midst of a certain clamour in the country, they do not give public expression to their feelings. Your country is not in an advantageous state at this moment; from one end of the kingdom to the other there is a general collapse of industry. Those Members of this House not intimately acquainted with the trade and commerce of the country do not fully comprehend our position as to the diminution of employment and the lessening of wages. An increase in the cost of living is finding its way to the homes and hearts of a vast number of the labouring population.

At the same time there is growing up--and, notwithstanding what some hon. Members of this House may think of me, no man regrets it more than I do--a bitter and angry feeling against that cla.s.s which has for a long period conducted the public affairs of this country. I like political changes when such changes are made as the result, not of pa.s.sion, but of deliberation and reason. Changes so made are safe, but changes made under the influence of violent exaggeration, or of the violent pa.s.sions of public meetings, are not changes usually approved by this House or advantageous to the country. I cannot but notice, in speaking to Gentlemen who sit on either side of this House, or in speaking to any one I meet between this House and any of those localities we frequent when this House is up--I cannot, I say, but notice that an uneasy feeling exists as to the news which may arrive by the very next mail from the East. I do not suppose that your troops are to be beaten in actual conflict with the foe, or that they will be driven into the sea; but I am certain that many homes in England in which there now exists a fond hope that the distant one may return--many such homes may be rendered desolate when the next mail shall arrive. The Angel of Death has been abroad throughout the land; you may almost hear the beating of his wings. There is no one, as when the first-born were slain of old, to sprinkle with blood the lintel and the two sideposts of our doors, that he may spare and pa.s.s on; he takes his victims from the castle of the n.o.ble, the mansion of the wealthy, and the cottage of the poor and the lowly, and it is on behalf of all these cla.s.ses that I make this solemn appeal.

I tell the n.o.ble Lord, that if he be ready honestly and frankly to endeavour, by the negotiations about to be opened at Vienna, to put an end to this war, no word of mine, no vote of mine, will be given to shake his power for one single moment, or to change his position in this House. I am sure that the n.o.ble Lord is not inaccessible to appeals made to him from honest motives and with no unfriendly feeling. The n.o.ble Lord has been for more than forty years a Member of this House. Before I was born, he sat upon the Treasury bench, and he has spent his life in the service of his country. He is no longer young, and his life has extended almost to the term allotted to man. I would ask, I would entreat the n.o.ble Lord to take a course which, when he looks back upon his whole political career--whatever he may therein find to be pleased with, whatever to regret--cannot but be a source of gratification to him. By adopting that course he would have the satisfaction of reflecting that, having obtained the object of his laudable ambition-- having become the foremost subject of the Crown, the director of, it may be, the destinies of his country, and the presiding genius in her councils--he had achieved a still higher and n.o.bler ambition: that he had returned the sword to the scabbard--that at his word torrents of blood had ceased to flow--that he had restored tranquillity to Europe, and saved this country from the indescribable calamities of war.

RUSSIA.

IV.

ON THE PROSECUTION OF THE RUSSIAN WAR.

HOUSE OF COMMONS, JUNE 7, 1855.

_From Hansard_.

[On May 22 Mr. Disraeli moved, 'That this House cannot adjourn for the Recess without expressing its dissatisfaction with the ambiguous language and uncertain conduct of Her Majesty's Government in reference to the great question of peace or war, and that, under these circ.u.mstances, the House feels it a duty to declare that it will continue to give every support to Her Majesty in the prosecution of the war, until Her Majesty shall, in conjunction with her allies, obtain for the country a safe and honourable peace.' This was met by an amendment from Sir Francis Baring, 'That this House, having seen with regret that the Conferences at Vienna have not led to a termination of hostilities, feels it to be a duty to declare that it will continue to give every support to Her Majesty in the prosecution of the war until Her Majesty shall, in conjunction with her allies, obtain for this country a safe and honourable peace.' Mr. Disraeli's resolution was rejected by 319 votes to 219. Sir F. Baring's motion having become substantive, was met by an amendment of Mr. Lowe, to the effect, 'That this House having seen with regret, owing to the refusal of Russia to restrict the strength of her navy in the Black Sea, that the Conferences at Vienna have not led to a termination of hostilities, feels it to be a duty to declare that the means of coming to an agreement on the third basis of negotiation being by that refusal exhausted, it will continue,' &c. Mr. Lowe's amendment was negatived and Sir F. Baring's motion carried without a division on June 8.]

Last year, when the declaration of war was brought down to the House, I took the opportunity of addressing the House in opposition to the policy of the Government of that day. I was told I was too late; and it has been also said repeatedly in this debate that those who take the views which I take are too late on this occasion. It seems to be one of the consequences of the, I would say, irresponsible system of diplomacy in this country with regard to foreign affairs, that we are never allowed to discuss a mischief when it is growing, but only when it is completed, and when no remedy can be applied. And now we are at liberty to discuss the conduct of the Government in the Conferences at Vienna; and, though we were repeatedly told from the Treasury bench that it might be injurious to the public service to discuss what was going on till the affair was concluded, I suspect the House has come to the conclusion that we have been pursuing our true duty to the country in the debate that has taken place.

We are indebted to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghams.h.i.+re (Mr. Disraeli) for having placed his notice on the table of the House, and not less to my right hon. Friend and Colleague that he, before the recess, moved the adjournment of the debate. I am satisfied myself that the people of this country have no intention to go wrong either in home or foreign affairs, and it requires only that questions of this nature should be frequently discussed by the intelligent men of which this House is composed to set before them the true state of affairs, and to bring them to a wise opinion with regard to the policy which is being pursued. Now, we are not discussing the policy of the war--that is, of the origin of the war. If we were, I should lay claim to some degree of foresight in the opinion which I expressed a year ago, for there seems to be a general feeling that the sacrifices that have already been made are somewhat greater than the results that have been obtained. I am anxious, in the observations I may have to address to the House, to impress my opinions on them, if it be possible to do so, and to lay before my countrymen out of the House that which I believe involves their true interests with regard to this question. It is necessary, therefore, to have a basis for our discussion--to fix what were the objects of the war--to ascertain, if that be possible, whether those objects have been secured and accomplished--and whether there can be anything in prospect which we are likely to gain that will justify the Government and the House in proceeding further with the war.

Now, in my observations I am not about to carry on this discussion with the Gentlemen below me, who are interested in a question which is not the question before the House. They are interested in some vast, and, as it seems to me, imaginary scheme that would involve Europe in protracted and widely-extended hostilities; and I think that, so far as the House is concerned in discussing the question with the Government, these Gentlemen are almost, if not altogether, out of court. It appears to me, if they were logical in their course, finding that the objects of the Government and the objects of the Government of France were entirely different from those which they have at heart, and believing, as they do, that the objects of the allied Governments are not worth a war, that they ought rather to join us on this bench, and, instead of there being one Peace bench in the House, there would be two Peace benches, and the Peace party would clearly gain a considerable accession of strength. The n.o.ble Lord the Secretary of State for the Colonies has stated over and over again--and, amid the confusion of statements which he and his Colleagues have made, I think he will not find fault if I a.s.sume that the object of the war is simply the security of the Turkish territory from the grasp of Russia, and probably from the grasp of any other Power--the n.o.ble Lord has stated that he apprehends that if Russia were to extend her empire by the possession of Turkey, it would give her a power that would be unsafe with regard to the other nations of Europe.

When the n.o.ble Lord speaks in that vague, and, if I were not speaking of a man so eminent, I should say, absurd language of the liberties of Europe and the civilization of the world, I should say he means by that merely those great objects, so far as they can be conserved by the conservation of the Turkish territory.

The n.o.ble Lord tells us--we are now getting out of some of the mystifications--that he has no kind of sympathy that would lead him into war for the oppressed nationalities of Europe. The n.o.ble Lord the Member for Tiverton (Viscount Palmerston) a few nights ago turned the cold shoulder to the people of Hungary. He said he thought there could be no greater calamity to Europe than that Hungary should be separated from the Austrian Empire. Well, then, we have got rid of Hungary; and, next, the n.o.ble Lord the Member for the City of London (Lord John Russell) tells us it is quite a mistake to suppose that he ever intended to go to war for Poland. In fact, he stated--what will be very disheartening to hon. Gentlemen below me--that he never supposed we were going to war for such a Quixotic object; that the case of Poland is one that is hopeless, and therefore it would be madness in England and France--not indiscretion--not a doubtful undertaking--but positive madness in England and France to take any part in promoting resistance in that country.

Having now got rid of Hungary and Poland, we only require that some Member of the Cabinet should get up later in the evening--and that I have no doubt will be the case--to state that it is utterly impossible for this country to involve itself in hostilities with a view to the regeneration of any part of Italy. The n.o.ble Lord the Member for London tells us we are not going to war for the sake of conquest; and that, I think, is a matter which ought to be kept in mind by hon. Gentlemen who are urging the Government on to a prolonged war. He stated on Tuesday night, 'Be it always remembered that we are seeking no object of our own;'--it would be a very odd thing if we were to go to war for the objects of somebody else--'that we are seeking no object of our own; that when peace is concluded we shall not have acquired one ell of new territory, or secured any advantage whatever for ourselves. It is for Turkey and the general system of Europe that we are struggling.' In fact, the whole matter always resolves itself into some general mystification, and at this moment we are, every man of us, almost entirely in the dark as to what are the ultimate objects of the war.

One other point that I ought to mention is the question of crippling and humbling Russia. I am, of course, willing to admit that when people go to war they are not expected to be very nice in their treatment of each other, and, if the taking of Sebastopol be an object of those who are in favour of the war, to take Sebastopol they will inflict any injury they can upon Russia. But the n.o.ble Lord told us last year that he still intended to leave Russia a great empire. I thought that exceedingly considerate of the n.o.ble Lord, and I understand--I think it has been stated in the public papers--that it is considered at St. Petersburg a great condescension on the part of so eminent a statesman. Well, then, if we are not going to war for nationalities, nor for conquest, nor for any such crippling of Russia as would be effected by her dismemberment, we come to this simple question--in the condition in which Turkey has long existed, what are the means by which the security of Turkey can be best guaranteed? No man a.s.serts that the security of Turkey can be absolute, but that it must be partial and conditional. As it is well to have high authority for these statements, I have here an extract from a speech made by Lord Clarendon a few nights ago on the Resolution moved by Lord Grey. The n.o.ble Lord then stated:--

'My n.o.ble Friend says, and says truly, that the attainment of all this would offer no security to Turkey. The value of a treaty must always depend upon the spirit in which it is agreed to, and the good faith with which it is entered into. No treaty can make a weak Power like Turkey perfectly safe against a powerful neighbour immediately in contact with her, if that neighbour is determined to act the aggressive towards her.'--[3 _Hansard_, cx.x.xviii. 1152.]

Thus Lord Clarendon admits, what is perfectly obvious to the common sense of all who have heard anything of Russia or Turkey, except from the lips of the Prime Minister, that what we are seeking to obtain is not an absolute security for Turkey, but a conditional security, such as her circ.u.mstances, her population, her government, and geographical position render attainable by her friends and allies. We have now been fourteen months at war, and two Cabinets--the Cabinets of Lord Aberdeen and of the present First Minister--I might say four Cabinets, for the Cabinets of France and Austria must have agreed to the same thing--have agreed to certain terms, and have offered them to Russia. They have been accepted as the basis of negotiations, conferences have been opened, and certain proceedings towards a settlement have taken place; and now I should like to know whether the terms which were offered were offered in earnest. Judging of the Cabinet of Lord Aberdeen by the conduct of some of its Members, and especially of Lord Aberdeen himself, I am certain that they were sincere in the terms they offered. But the _Times_ newspaper, which now in its many changes has become the organ and great stimulant of the present Cabinet, expresses its astonishment that any person should think that peace was intended by the Conferences at Vienna. The _Times_ states that the object of the Conferences was not to bring about a peace, but to shame Austria into becoming a faithful and warlike ally.

Now, when the n.o.ble Lord the Member for London was sent to Vienna to negotiate, I confess I was one of those who formed the opinion that the n.o.ble Lord, amid the many eccentricities of his career, would not have undertaken that mission unless he himself had been honest with regard to the terms to be offered, and anxious, if possible, to consolidate a peace. There were, however, certain persons--malicious people, of course--who found out that it would be convenient to the First Minister to have the n.o.ble Lord at a distance, at least for a time. But I never adopted that idea. I did not believe that the n.o.ble Lord's journey to Vienna, with a retinue that required him to occupy no less than thirty- two rooms in one hotel, would have been undertaken unless the n.o.ble Lord considered that the object was a reality, on which the interests of the country and of Europe depended. I think he would have been the last man in the country to lend himself to such a miserable hoax as going to Vienna, not to make peace, but to shame Austria into becoming a faithful and warlike ally. I a.s.sume, therefore, that terms were sincerely offered, and that those terms gave guarantees which were sufficient, and a security which was as ample as the circ.u.mstances admitted for the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire. It is from that starting-point that I would discuss this question.

There are hon. Members in this House who think that even if those terms were obtained they would still be in no degree a compensation for the enormous sacrifices which the country has made. I happen to hold the same opinion, and it was with that conviction that I protested against going into the war. Indeed, I think that the argument I used a year ago, that nothing to be obtained in the war could at all approach a compensation for the enormous sacrifices the country would be called upon to make, has been greatly strengthened. Well, Sir, the terms offered are called 'bases:' from which one understands, not that they are everything, but that they are something capable of what diplomatists call 'development.' I recollect a question asked of a child at school, in one of those lessons called 'object lessons,' 'What is the basis of a batter pudding?' It was obvious that flour was the basis, but the eggs and the b.u.t.ter and the rest were developments and additions. But if the bases are capable of development, so I take it for granted that the meaning of negotiation is not the offering of an _ultimatum_, but the word involves to every man's sense the probability of concession-- b.u.t.ter, it may be--but concession of one sort or another.

I will not go through all the Four Points, because the attention of the House ought really to be centred upon the third article and the matters connected with it. The House must remember that this article involves two most important subjects--first, the territorial guarantee, which if it were sufficiently secured would be everything the House and the country required from the war--namely, that the territories of Turkey shall never be molested, so long as the treaty shall continue, by any of the great Powers who are parties to such treaty; and, secondly, that the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea shall cease. Now, the territorial guarantee was granted without difficulty. [An hon. Member: 'No.'] Well, no difficulty was made about the territorial guarantee but this:--Prince Gortchakoff said, very wisely, that he would not enter into an absolute pledge to go to war in case of any infraction of the treaty, and the n.o.ble Lord who said 'No' will find, when he has examined the question a little more closely, that it does not make the slightest difference as to the actual results of a treaty whether a Power guarantees in the mode proposed by Russia, or in the manner proposed by the n.o.ble Lord the Member for the City of London, because, when an infraction of a treaty occurs, the power of judging whether any of the Governments who are parties to such treaty should go to war or not, is left with each individual Government. If, for example, France stretched her dominions westward towards Morocco, or eastward towards Tunis or Tripoli, it would, of course, have been the duty, and would have been in the power of Russia, even had she accepted the exact terms proposed by the allies, to judge for herself whether a case had arisen which required her to go to war, or which justified her in doing so.

Such a case arose very lately with reference to Schleswig-Holstein. We were bound, under an ancient treaty, to go to war in the event of the infraction of certain treaties affecting Schleswig-Holstein; but when this case occurred the subject was considered by the Government, the n.o.ble Lord (Lord Palmerston) being at the time, I believe, Foreign Secretary--who most wisely and properly, not only for this country, but for the interests of Schleswig-Holstein and of Europe, declined to act upon what was represented to be the strict letter of the treaty, and England did not engage in war in consequence of the disputes which then took place. I must say that what seems to me as the most statesmanlike and elevated declaration in the protocols is the statement of Prince Gortchakoff, that the blood of Russia is the property of Russia, and that he will not pledge himself that years hence--it may be even a century hence--the blood of Russia shall be shed in a cause which, when the time arrives, may be one which would be altogether unworthy of such a sacrifice.

With respect to the question of the Christian protectorate, the House will probably recollect that it was represented over and over again by Ministers in this House--it was stated in the speeches of Lord Clarendon in another place--that the proposition of Russia, as conveyed in the Menchikoff note, was intended to transfer the virtual sovereignty of 10,000,000 or 12,000,000 of Ottoman subjects to the Czar. If that were so, the Menchikoff note and all the old protectorate treaties being abolished, surely the House will consider whether the combination of the three propositions--the territorial guarantees, the Christian protectorate, and the Black Sea project--do not give such securities to Turkey as the condition of Turkey will permit. Now the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea, as I think my hon. Friend the Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden) showed very clearly the other evening, is in a certain sense a fact which all the negotiations in the world cannot write off. I see that one of the public journals this morning, commenting upon my hon. Friend's speech, says, 'Yes, truly, the commercial preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea is a fact which cannot be denied;' and then proceeds to argue that it does not follow that Russia should have a political and naval preponderance. But I do not know any case in which there is a commercial supremacy in a sea like the Black Sea that is not followed by a preponderance of every other kind. The question now is, however, how is that preponderance to cease?

The n.o.ble Lord the Member for the City of London referred the other night to a proposition made by the French Government, but which, I think, does not appear at all distinctly in the protocols, with regard to making the Black Sea a neutral sea. I conceive that was so monstrous a proposition, in the present condition of Europe, that I am surprised it should have been entertained for a moment by any sensible man. I supposed it was found so utterly indefensible that it does not appear as a distinct proposition in the protocols. This proposal of making the Black Sea a neutral sea gave place to another project, and it appears to me very like asking Russia, voluntarily or by compulsion, to perform the operation of amputation upon herself. I maintain that the third article as offered to Russia in December last could not mean what the n.o.ble Lord offered to Russia at Vienna, because the cessation of preponderance does not mean the transfer of preponderance, but rather the establishment of an equilibrium--not the destruction of an equilibrium and the establishment of preponderance on the other side.

Some hon. Gentlemen talk as if Russia were a Power which you could take to Bow Street, and bind over before some stipendiary magistrate to keep the peace for six months. Russia is a great Power, as England is, and in treating with her you must consider that the Russian Government has to consult its own dignity, its own interests, and public opinion, just as much at least as the Government of this country. Now, what was the proposition of this third article? The proposal was, that Russia should have eight s.h.i.+ps; but what was the proposition with regard to her present antagonists? That Turkey should also have eight s.h.i.+ps, that France should have four, and that England should have four; and I believe that in a preceding protocol, which has not been alluded to in this debate, it is proposed that the contracting Powers should have two s.h.i.+ps each at the mouth of the Danube, so that if these terms had been agreed upon, Russia would have had eight s.h.i.+ps in the Black Sea, while Turkey, France, and England would have had twenty. Now, that is not a mere cessation of a preponderance; it is not the establishment of an equilibrium; it is a transfer of the supremacy of the Black Sea from that country which, if any country should be supreme there, has the best claim--namely, Russia. Besides this, however, Turkey would have had whatever s.h.i.+ps she liked in the Bosphorus, and the allies would also have had as many s.h.i.+ps as they chose in the Mediterranean and the Levant.

Now, let us for a moment consider the offer with which Russia met this proposal. The first proposition was that of the open Straits, which is disapproved by the hon. Baronet opposite. I am not about to say that this proposition should have been accepted in preference to the other, but I think it is the true interest of Europe, and also of Turkey itself, that the Straits should be thrown open. At any rate, it must be admitted that the preponderance of Russia, in the sense in which we now understand it, would be absolutely destroyed if the Straits were thrown open. Russia made a proposition which appears to me to be highly satisfactory--that such regulations should be made by the Sultan and his Government with regard to the position and duration of the anchorages of s.h.i.+ps between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea as would preclude the possibility, so far as there were means of doing so, of any inconvenience or danger to Constantinople from the opening of the Straits. If that had been agreed to, all nations would have been ent.i.tled to the pa.s.sage of the Straits, and I believe that all nations would equally have respected the privilege thus granted to them. Now, suppose these Straits, instead of being one mile wide, had been ten miles wide, what difference would it make to Turkey? If the Straits were ten miles wide they would be open. Turkey would have no right to close them, and European nations would not permit her to pretend to, or to exercise, any such power; but Constantinople would be no more secure then than it would be now with the Straits open, whether they were ten miles wide or one mile wide. If the Straits were open, the consequences to Constantinople and to Turkey appear to me to be precisely the same.

Turkey would be equally safe; Turkey would be equally menaced. Our fleets would visit the Black Sea in the course of the season, and the Russian Black Sea fleet, if it chose, would visit the Mediterranean.

There would be no sort of pretence for wrangling about the Straits; and the balance of power--if I may use the term--between the fleets of Russia, France, and England, would be probably the best guarantee that could be offered for the security of Constantinople and Turkey, so far as they are in danger of aggression either from the Black Sea or the Mediterranean.

But it is said, the Sultan's sovereignty would be menaced--that he has an undoubted right to close the Straits. I doubt whether that right will be very long maintained; but if it be maintained, and if you are to reject any proposition which interferes with the Sultan's sovereignty, I ask you whether the sovereignty of the Czar is not as dear to him? and whether, if, in negotiations of this kind, you can find any mode of attaining your object without inflicting injury upon either the sovereignty of the Sultan or the Czar, it would not be much more statesmanlike to adopt it, and so to frame your treaties that neither should feel that it was subjected to an indignity, and therefore seek to violate such treaties at the first opportunity? Well, but the second proposition, which I think the hon. Baronet approved, and which I think the n.o.ble Lord proposed, was, that the Sultan should open the Straits at will. I ask the House whether that proposition, if accepted, would not imply that the Sultan could have no other enemy than Russia?--which I think is doubtful. If the Black Sea were open to the West, and the Mediterranean closed to the East, surely that is a.s.suming that the Sultan could have no enemy but Russia. The Sultan could close the Straits to Russia, but the Western Powers could always proceed to the Black Sea. The French plan, in my opinion, exposed Turkey far more to the West than the Russian plan exposed her to the East. Nothing can be more short-sighted than the notion which the n.o.ble Lord the Member for London started at the conferences, that Turkey could have no enemy but Russia. In fact, everybody there seemed to be on exceedingly good terms with himself. The Austrian Minister said n.o.body would suspect Austria-- no one could be suspected but Russia. But our experience for many years will tell us that there has been just as much menace from the West as from the East--the rapacity of the West is not less perceptible than that of the East. ['Hear.'] Some one expresses a sentiment in opposition --it is a gentleman who has never read the Blue Books--he does not know that almost the whole of this business began in a threat of the most audacious and insulting character from the Amba.s.sador of France--a threat to order up the French fleet to the Dardanelles, and further to land an expedition in Syria to take possession of Jerusalem and the whole of the Holy Places. Do you mean to tell me, you and the n.o.ble Lord himself, who tried to frighten the country with the notion of the French fleet coming to invade England, that the fleet which three years ago threatened England, and more recently threatened the Dardanelles, has for ever abandoned rapacious desires, and that therefore there will never again be a menace against Turkey from France?

I understand, however, there is a very different opinion prevalent upon the southern sh.o.r.es of the Mediterranean. The Emperor of Morocco, a potentate somewhat allied to this country, as I am told his empress is an Irish lady--the Emperor of Morocco, who is not very well versed in what is going on in this House, has been making inquiries of the most anxious character as to whether the particular guarantee which the n.o.ble Lord was going to enter into included the territory of Morocco; and I understand he has not been able to find it out from the most a.s.siduous study of the Gibraltar newspapers. It so happens that the Governor of Gibraltar--the n.o.ble Lord at the head of the Government corrected me the other night when I called him an irrational man--has issued an ordinance by which he has entirely suppressed the newspaper press in that town and garrison.

Now we come to the question, which of the propositions would be most secure? I was very much struck by an observation which fell from my hon.

Colleague (Mr. M. Gibson) in the course of his speech the other night--a point I think very worthy of the attention of the House and of the Government; he said the limitation plan was one which must depend for its efficacy on the will and fidelity of Russia. I am not one of those who believe Russia to be the treacherous and felonious Power which she is described to be by the press of this country, as she is described by the n.o.ble Lord to be. I believe the right hon. Baronet the Member for Southwark gave her the same character. Although Russia may not be more treacherous than other Powers, when you are making a bargain with her, it is better you should make the efficacy of the terms depend more on your own vigilance than on her good faith. The n.o.ble Lord the Member for London has admitted that the limitation plan is, after all, an inefficient one. He said that Russia might get another s.h.i.+p--perhaps three or four--and when she had doubled the navy permitted to her, perhaps the n.o.ble Lord would be writing despatches about it, although I am not sure he would do that. I think it would be holding out a temptation to buy Mr. Scott Russell's great s.h.i.+p as one of the eight s.h.i.+ps she is to be allowed to keep by the treaty.

My hon. Friend the Member for the West Riding remarked that Russia might purchase vessels of large size from the United States, and still keep within the prescribed limit; but if this great s.h.i.+p, now building in the Thames, should succeed, as I hope she will, Russia might buy her and send her into the Black Sea. Somebody says she could not go there without pa.s.sing the Straits, but, as she is built for mercantile purposes, that monster vessel might freely be taken up, and then form one of the eight s.h.i.+ps allowed to Russia. Another proposition has been alluded to by the hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets (Sir W. Clay)--that pointed out by the Russian Plenipotentiary--that Russia and Turkey should enter into a friendly treaty between themselves and arrange that point; but the other diplomatists would not allow it, unless it were done under the eyes of the conference and bearing the same features of force and compulsion as their proposal of the limitation possessed. I was astonished to hear the hon. Baronet, as I understood him, say that, even although it could be shown that the Russian propositions were better than our own, he thought the proposition which bore on its face coercion of Russia was most desirable. A more unstatesman-like and immoral view upon a great question between nations I have rarely heard of. [Sir William Clay rose, and was understood to deny the sentiments imputed to him by the hon. Member.] I understood my hon. Friend so.

Perhaps he did not mean what I thought he did mean, but that was the conclusion I came to from his argument, and I do not think he will say I entirely misrepresented him. It has, however, been said by the press that, whether we were sincere or not at the conference, Russia was not.

Hon. Gentlemen have read in the _Times_ and other papers blowing the flames of war, that from first to last Russia was treacherous and insincere. I would put it to the n.o.ble Lord the Member for London whether he can say that was the case, for I observe he said, in his speech in this House on the 23rd of January last, in answer to a question from the hon. Member for Aylesbury, or some other Member--

'My hon. Friend will see that by that act the Russian Plenipotentiary accepted this interpretation as the basis of negotiation, of course reserving to himself the power, when this basis shall have been laid down in a definite article, of making any observations on the part of his Government which he should think proper.'--[3 _Hansard_ cx.x.xvi. 911]

Of course the Russian Plenipotentiary, when he accepted it, did so upon the understanding that it was the basis of negotiation and discussion, as no one will deny it was a question capable of being solved in more ways than one, and it was no indication of insincerity for him to refuse the precise mode proposed by the Plenipotentiary for England. With regard to the terms proposed, I should like to read to the House a statement I have on very good authority as to the language which Prince Gortchakoff held at Vienna. The statement I have is not to be found in the protocols, but I believe it may be relied upon as the precise words he used. The n.o.ble Lord insisted, as I understand, that it was no indignity to ask Russia to limit the number of her s.h.i.+ps in the Black Sea; but I would submit it is precisely the same in principle as if she were asked to limit the amount of her force in the Crimea to four or six regiments. Prince Gortchakoff said--

'To ask from an independent Power that it should limit its force, is to a.s.sail its rights of sovereignty on its own territory. It is with a bad grace that they would sustain the rights of the Sultan and wish to attack those of the Emperor of Russia. The proposition to render the Black Sea inaccessible to vessels of war of all nations is so strange (_si bizarre_) that one is astonished to see the fate of nations confided to men such as those who have conceived it. How could it be believed that Russia would consent to give herself up disarmed at the good pleasure of the Napoleons and the Palmerstons, who will be able themselves to have armed forces in the Mediterranean?'

There was no answer to that. If any diplomatist from this country, under the same circ.u.mstances as Russia was placed in, had consented to terms such as the n.o.ble Lord had endeavoured to force upon Russia--I say, that if he entered the door of this House, he would be met by one universal shout of execration, and, as a public man, would be ruined for ever.

I wish to ask the House this question--whether it has deliberately made up its mind that this was a proposition which ought to have been imposed upon Russia? If they have ascertained which is the best--and I rather think the general opinion is that the proposition of the Government is the worst; but, a.s.suming that it is not so, and that there may be some little difference--I want to know what that difference is, and if there is any difference which can be measured even by the finest diplomatic and statesmanlike instrument ever invented, I ask, is that difference worth to this country the incalculable calamities which a prolonged war must bring upon us? I am of opinion that, with the territorial guarantee and the abolition of the Christian protectorate, either the terms proposed by the n.o.ble Lord or by Prince Gortchakoff would have been as secure for Turkey as it is possible under existing circ.u.mstances for Turkey to be by any treaty between the great Powers of Europe. And, recollect that we have been thrown a little off the original proposition, for when that proposition was first agreed to in the Cabinet of Lord Aberdeen I am satisfied in my own mind that it meant something very like that which the Russians themselves have proposed.