Spycraft. Part 14

The Franklin forgery complained that not enough Germans were being killed to turn a decent profit, since the British paid bonuses to German royalty for each fatality. Perhaps, the spurious doc.u.ment suggested, it would be more humane to deny the wounded mercenaries medical attention and let them die, rather than live as invalids. Combined with offers of amnesty and farmland from the American side, Hessian soldiers deserted en ma.s.se. According to records, 5,000 of a reported 30,000 Germans put down their arms.29 As the Cold War's geopolitical battlefield widened beyond Europe during the early 1950s, the KGB turned to forgeries and fabrications as an intelligence and foreign policy tool. A well-placed forgery could effectively strain diplomatic relations between otherwise friendly nations.30 When such doc.u.ments appeared in the media, they could also weaken support for a government's policies among its citizens or turn the tide of public opinion. When such doc.u.ments appeared in the media, they could also weaken support for a government's policies among its citizens or turn the tide of public opinion.

The KGB inherited an appreciation and expertise for disinformation from its predecessor organization, the Okhrana, which in 1903 published The Protocols of the Elders of Zion The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. The ambitious fabrication claimed existence of a worldwide Jewish conspiracy to create an "intensified centralization of government" and monopolies, and "revealed" the practice of ritual sacrifice of Christian children in religious ceremonies.31 A masterpiece of disinformation, the A masterpiece of disinformation, the Protocols Protocols reportedly sparked anti-Jewish pogroms across Czarist Russia. reportedly sparked anti-Jewish pogroms across Czarist Russia.

Although later a.n.a.lysis of the doc.u.ment placed it as a combination of an 1865 work opposing Napoleon II and a piece of fiction by a Prussian postal employee, the Protocols Protocols became an enduring "bestseller" of political forgeries. became an enduring "bestseller" of political forgeries.32 Eventually spreading beyond Russia's borders to the West, it was later adopted by Hitler as a propaganda tool. Remarkably, Eventually spreading beyond Russia's borders to the West, it was later adopted by Hitler as a propaganda tool. Remarkably, Protocols Protocols continues to have credibility-more than a hundred years after its appearance-particularly in Middle Eastern countries as well as with a handful of extremist groups in Europe and the United States. continues to have credibility-more than a hundred years after its appearance-particularly in Middle Eastern countries as well as with a handful of extremist groups in Europe and the United States.33 Political forgeries intensified with Soviet rule. Beginning with a program of forgeries in 1923, these actions would eventually become known as "active measures" (aktivnyye meropriyatiya).34 By the 1950s, Soviet forgeries were primarily crafted to discredit the West in general and the United States in particular as well as create divisions between Western Allies. By the 1950s, Soviet forgeries were primarily crafted to discredit the West in general and the United States in particular as well as create divisions between Western Allies. 35 35 In 1959, KGB forgers were consolidated into their own organization when the First Chief Directorate created Department D (for the Russian word dezinformatsiya dezinformatsiya) and staffed it with between forty and fifty specialists. When Western officials exposed the work of Department D, the KGB simply changed the name to Department A and continued turning out bogus doc.u.ments.36 So intense was the Soviet forgery campaign, the U.S. Senate called for hearings. Testifying before a Senate Subcommittee in 1961 and using a.n.a.lysis supplied by Crown and other TSD doc.u.ment examiners, then a.s.sistant Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Richard Helms presented 32 examples of forgeries or disinformation from the Soviet Bloc offensive.37 "Of the 32 doc.u.ments packaged to look like communications or from American officials, 22 were meant to demonstrate imperialistic American plans and ambitions," Helms testified. "Of these, 17 a.s.serted U.S. interference in the affairs of Communist-selected free world countries. The charge of imperialism is the first of the two major canards spread by the Soviet bloc in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and wherever else they command suitable outlets." "Of the 32 doc.u.ments packaged to look like communications or from American officials, 22 were meant to demonstrate imperialistic American plans and ambitions," Helms testified. "Of these, 17 a.s.serted U.S. interference in the affairs of Communist-selected free world countries. The charge of imperialism is the first of the two major canards spread by the Soviet bloc in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and wherever else they command suitable outlets."

The second theme, Helms pointed out, was that the United States was a menace to "world peace."38 Other doc.u.ments charged everything from secret agreements to plots by private businesses to take over local industries. Other doc.u.ments charged everything from secret agreements to plots by private businesses to take over local industries.39 In a world where new nations were emerging from former European colonies, the spread of Soviet lies could prove both destabilizing to fragile nations and devastating to U.S. foreign policy. In a world where new nations were emerging from former European colonies, the spread of Soviet lies could prove both destabilizing to fragile nations and devastating to U.S. foreign policy.

Technically and linguistically, the Soviet forgeries had little in common with the amateurish work of Walker and his doc.u.ments filled with misspellings and convoluted syntax. Unlike the fiery editorials or self-serving news stories printed in Pravda Pravda and broadcast over state-run airwaves, the Soviets gave their forged doc.u.ments credibility by eschewing the stultifying political rhetoric common to official Kremlin p.r.o.nouncements. In fact, the forgeries often appeared first in newspapers or press reports outside the Soviet Bloc countries before turning up as "news" in the USSR's government-run press. and broadcast over state-run airwaves, the Soviets gave their forged doc.u.ments credibility by eschewing the stultifying political rhetoric common to official Kremlin p.r.o.nouncements. In fact, the forgeries often appeared first in newspapers or press reports outside the Soviet Bloc countries before turning up as "news" in the USSR's government-run press.

These government-manufactured forgeries followed a pattern that separated them from the work of a single con man. They employed talented graphic artists who produced nearly flawless reproductions of letterheads and official stamps, paid close attention to the smallest details, such as the quality of the paper, and appropriately used colloquial or official language.

After British MI6 officer Harold "Kim" Philby defected to the USSR, he found work in the early 1970s in the KGB's Active Measures Department churning out fabricated doc.u.ments. Working from genuine uncla.s.sified and public CIA or U.S. State Department doc.u.ments, Philby inserted "sinister" paragraphs regarding U.S. plans. The KGB would stamp the doc.u.ments "top secret" and begin their circulation. For the Soviets, the Cambridge-educated Philby, a one-time journalist and senior British intelligence officer, was an invaluable a.s.set, ensuring the correct use of idiomatic and diplomatic English phrases in their disinformation efforts. 40 40 One favorite KGB tactic was a pattern of "surfacing" a grainy photocopy or reprint of a slightly out of focus photograph, rather than a sham original doc.u.ment. The fuzzy photograph or barely legible photocopy not only added clandestine credibility to the spurious doc.u.ment for the gullible, it also made detailed a.n.a.lysis all the more difficult for the expert. "Newsworthy" doc.u.ments were often distributed to several recipients anonymously by a "concerned citizen" who asked for no payment in return.41 The KGB developed distribution lists of sympathetic newspapers or well-known writers whose replay of the information would add even more credibility. The KGB developed distribution lists of sympathetic newspapers or well-known writers whose replay of the information would add even more credibility.

Unlike the work of amateurs, who often overreached by professing to uncover large and complex plots filled with international intrigue, the professionally produced forgeries were focused, well written, and subtle in their content. They offered a facade of plausibility by implying, rather than directly stating, the propagandist's lie and by the arrangement of selected verifiable facts or the exclusion of others.

Walker's productions, the post-World War II emigre "paper mills," Soviet "active measures," and even Ben Franklin's forgeries, all played on the preexisting fears and prejudices of the intended audience or buyers.42 Just as important as the quality of the forgery, the Soviets well knew, was the ability of the forger to a.s.sess the emotional sensibilities of their targets. That is to say, a doc.u.ment confirming the fears of a target audience was likely to be believed, even if it was not perfect. Just as important as the quality of the forgery, the Soviets well knew, was the ability of the forger to a.s.sess the emotional sensibilities of their targets. That is to say, a doc.u.ment confirming the fears of a target audience was likely to be believed, even if it was not perfect.43 In the opinion of President Ahmed Sekou Toure of Guinea during the early 1970s, "Doc.u.ments can be forged, but the information is true." In the opinion of President Ahmed Sekou Toure of Guinea during the early 1970s, "Doc.u.ments can be forged, but the information is true." 44 44 For Crown and other techs working with questioned doc.u.ments, the discrediting of quality forgeries involved precise procedures and laborious, complex processes. Questioned signatures could be compared with known exemplars of an alleged writer. Examiners made comparisons of inks using ultraviolet light, infrared radiation, and the microscopic examination of ink tracks. To a.s.sist its examiners, the QDL maintained a collection of envelopes, inks, and specimens from typewriter fonts that could reveal the make, model, and date of manufacture. QDL files were always searched for evidence of prior use of specific typewriters in previous forgeries. The older typewriters with "swinging key bars," IBM Selectrics, and daisy-wheel typewriters could sometimes be identified by specific wear or damage to characters.

Paper a.n.a.lysis under x-ray diffraction and microscopic examination of fibers could identify paper filler type and establish the source of paper pulp. Because countries used different inorganic chemicals as paper fillers, the origin of the paper could be compared to the alleged ident.i.ty of the forger. For example, German paper would be filled with barium sulfate; French paper utilized talc. To the QDL examiner a doc.u.ment on paper containing barium sulfate that was said to originate in southern France became suspect.

With the introduction of photocopy technology, the Soviets began creating forgeries in the form of multigenerational copies to counter scientific examination. The technique a.s.sumed that laboratory a.n.a.lysis of photocopies could not establish whether a doc.u.ment was authentic. TSD examiners, however, found traces of evidence on photocopy doc.u.ments that revealed clues of fabrication and sometimes even the origin of a suspect doc.u.ment. Details such as minor differences between font b.a.l.l.s used on IBM Selectrics sold in Europe and those sold in the States could be detected in photocopies.

Subtle linguistic differences could reveal a doc.u.ment as a forgery. In one instance, a purported official U.S. doc.u.ment was labeled RESTRICTED! but carried a date after the U.S. government had ceased using the designation.45 Another telltale sign were formats used in official letters. A government organization might use the date format of "July 4, 1990" or "4 July 1990" but one form would be consistent on all official doc.u.ments. Another telltale sign were formats used in official letters. A government organization might use the date format of "July 4, 1990" or "4 July 1990" but one form would be consistent on all official doc.u.ments.46 While scientific a.n.a.lysis could confirm the authenticity of a doc.u.ment, determining the ultimate source of a forgery was more elusive. In this regard, the QDL examiners would offer their opinion based primarily on the forgery's delivery, audience, and public replay. To this end, the basic thrust of the doc.u.ment examination included consideration of the decidedly nontechnical question: Who would benefit if the doc.u.ments were believed? Through the combined skills of QDL examiners and counterintelligence specialists, data such as when a doc.u.ment surfaced and how it became known were evaluated to match prior modus operandi. "We found during the 1960s and 1970s," Crown observed, "that the Soviets could produce excellent technical forgeries but were rarely ever able to disguise their motives."

As the Soviet forgery offensive continued through the early 1970s, the QDL was regularly called on to debunk professionally constructed doc.u.ments appearing in the Middle East, South America, Africa, and even Europe. In one instance, the Soviets surfaced an Airgram (a form of telegram) aimed at destabilizing NATO. Dated December 3, 1974, the doc.u.ment outlined instructions for bribing foreign officials and engaging in espionage against friendly countries. The forgery was unmasked by the signature of a nonexistent official, Robert Pont, and several format mistakes, such as the use of slash marks in place of parentheses.47 The KGB was a longtime supporter of organizations with public-appeal names, such as the U.S. Peace Council, and cultivated members of the U.S. press.48 They trained forgery departments in Eastern Bloc intelligence services for the specific task of targeting the West. In the mid-1970s, the Soviets refocused their "active measures" campaign to capitalize on the Watergate scandal, Congressional hearings into alleged CIA abuses, and the Vietnam War aftermath after perceiving a receptive world audience for propaganda that described U.S. policy "mistakes" and "abuses of power." They trained forgery departments in Eastern Bloc intelligence services for the specific task of targeting the West. In the mid-1970s, the Soviets refocused their "active measures" campaign to capitalize on the Watergate scandal, Congressional hearings into alleged CIA abuses, and the Vietnam War aftermath after perceiving a receptive world audience for propaganda that described U.S. policy "mistakes" and "abuses of power." 49 49 In one particularly ugly case, a counterfeit doc.u.ment surfaced during the Carter administration intended to stir worldwide controversy. A small San Francisco newspaper called the Sun-Reporter Sun-Reporter published a 1980 forgery of a Presidential Review Memorandum on Africa. The headline the paper ran could not have been clearer: "Carter's Secret Plan to Keep Black Africans and Black Americans at Odds." As the White House issued angry denials, the Soviet news agency, Ta.s.s, made the story available in a variety of languages. published a 1980 forgery of a Presidential Review Memorandum on Africa. The headline the paper ran could not have been clearer: "Carter's Secret Plan to Keep Black Africans and Black Americans at Odds." As the White House issued angry denials, the Soviet news agency, Ta.s.s, made the story available in a variety of languages.50 This was not the first time the Soviets had "played the race card" in a disinformation campaign. In 1971, forged pamphlets supposedly from the Jewish Defense League were mailed to radical African-American groups. Yuri Andropov, then head of the KGB, approved the bogus pamphlets that called for a Jewish campaign against "black mongrels." Then, in 1984, the Soviets forged Ku Klux Klan material timed to coincide with the Olympic Games in Los Angeles. The taunting material, distributed to African and Asian countries, read, in part: "The Olympic Games For Whites Only! African Monkeys! A Grand reception awaits you in Los Angeles! We are preparing for the Olympic games by shooting at black moving targets . . ."51 Often believed by members of the press as well as heads of state, the Soviets' propaganda could not be ignored by U.S. diplomats and intelligence. However, even when programs such as QDL conclusively proved a doc.u.ment a forgery, it was only after the fact. When the doc.u.ments were verified false and, in the rare instances, a retraction printed, the initial damage had already been done, making disinformation a particularly effective weapon in developing countries. The intensity of these campaigns continued nearly unabated throughout the Cold War, prompting hearings in 1961, 1980, and 1982.

So significant was the threat to U.S. policy and the need to combat disinformation that in September 1979, DCI Stansfield Turner asked Crown to brief President Carter on the extent of the Soviet efforts and the CIA's capability to detect and defeat the campaigns. Turner and Crown met in the historic Old Executive Office Building, then walked through an underground pa.s.sage to the White House.

In the Oval Office were President Jimmy Carter and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. Using samples of forgeries to describe the OTS methodology for identification and debunking, Crown's presentation lasted several minutes beyond the allotted time. Fascinated by the Soviet offensive, Carter and his adviser recognized a powerful weapon that could strain diplomatic relations, generate headlines, and possibly determine elections both at home and abroad.

At a January 1984 conference of senior officers, the KGB's First Chief Directorate reaffirmed a priority to "work unweariedly [sic] at exposing the adversary's weak and vulnerable points."52 In the context of the statement, "exposing" meant fabricating disinformation by the Active Measures Department of the First Chief Directorate. In the context of the statement, "exposing" meant fabricating disinformation by the Active Measures Department of the First Chief Directorate.53 Some attendees at the conference may have been aware that one of the most cruel Soviet disinformation campaigns had already begun in 1983, aimed at laying blame for the spread of the AIDS virus at the U.S. doorstep. Some attendees at the conference may have been aware that one of the most cruel Soviet disinformation campaigns had already begun in 1983, aimed at laying blame for the spread of the AIDS virus at the U.S. doorstep.54 The Soviets launched a story in the Indian newspaper Patriot Patriot based on out-of-context U.S. Congressional testimony and quotes by anonymous scientists. The story, which attributed the disease to biological weapons research, seemed to have no journalistic legs at the time and quickly faded from sight. based on out-of-context U.S. Congressional testimony and quotes by anonymous scientists. The story, which attributed the disease to biological weapons research, seemed to have no journalistic legs at the time and quickly faded from sight.55 However, two years later, with AIDS spreading rapidly and public alarm growing, the Soviets replayed the allegations in a Soviet publication, However, two years later, with AIDS spreading rapidly and public alarm growing, the Soviets replayed the allegations in a Soviet publication, Literaturnaya Gazeta Literaturnaya Gazeta. Specific details included a.s.sertions that American scientists at Fort Detrick, Maryland, created the disease for use as a biological weapon on specific population groups and were using military personnel to spread it worldwide.56 Within days, newspapers in Europe, Latin America, and Asia picked up the story. Like a successful marketing campaign for a new brand of soap, as the lie sold, the Soviets increased their efforts. Within days, newspapers in Europe, Latin America, and Asia picked up the story. Like a successful marketing campaign for a new brand of soap, as the lie sold, the Soviets increased their efforts.

By 1986 at a Nonaligned Movement summit meeting in Harare, Zimbabwe, a bogus scientific paper in English was released detailing "evidence" that the United States had created AIDS. The story spread throughout Africa's media while the KGB supplemented the campaign with rumors, posters, and flyers along with repet.i.tion on radio and television broadcasts.57 The United States responded in 1987 by increasing the distribution of AIDS-related information worldwide and offering a stern warning from then Surgeon General, C. Everett Coop, that a joint AIDS research agreement would not progress until the disinformation campaign ceased. Shortly thereafter Soviet scientists held a press conference to confirm the natural origins of the disease.58 In fact, the fabricated AIDS story had historical precedent. It was essentially a rehash of a 1952 Soviet propaganda campaign claiming the United States used biological weapons in the Korean conflict. The new element was the hot-b.u.t.ton mention of AIDS. What was so damaging in the AIDS disinformation campaign was that fears of the dreaded disease gave the story credibility in popular culture. Similar to The Protocols of the Elders of Zion The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, the AIDS disinformation campaign continues to live in urban myth and conspiracy theory. A 2005 study conducted by the U.S. National Inst.i.tute of Child Health and Human Development showed that almost half of 500 African-Americans surveyed believed that the AIDS-causing HIV virus is man-made; more than one quarter believed that AIDS was produced in a government laboratory; and 12 percent believed it was created and spread by the CIA.59 In the Sudan in 1969, a group of goat herders found a cache of weapons in a drainpipe along a rural trail. Hidden for the purpose of discovery, the eclectic collection included a "pen gun," box of ammunition, and magnetic Limpet Limpet mine that could be attached to the side of a s.h.i.+p. There was also a note implicating a U.S. State Department official in an alleged political plot against the Sudanese government. mine that could be attached to the side of a s.h.i.+p. There was also a note implicating a U.S. State Department official in an alleged political plot against the Sudanese government.

The timing of the goat herders' discovery was nearly flawless. Sudan had broken diplomatic ties with the United States following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Thereafter, each country maintained "official" relations through "interest sections" housed in an emba.s.sy that flew the flag of a different nation. Adding to an already complicated situation were the policies of Sudan's new government that seemingly leaned toward Moscow.

American diplomats in Khartoum needed to reveal the materials as fabrications and defuse the potential for political crisis certain to follow any public release about the find. A break came when a senior Sudanese official, Major Farouk Othman Hamdallah, Minister of Interior and State Security, privately let one of his American contacts know that he would make the goat herders' find available for examination if the examiner was not an "official U.S." representative.

Crown was briefed on the situation and instructed to go to Ethiopia. With the Ethiopian visa in his pa.s.sport, he then sought a tourist visa from a Sudanese consular clerk in Was.h.i.+ngton. Since he would be in the neighboring country, Crown implored, he would like to take a few additional days as a tourist to visit the Sudan and experience its culture, history, people, and land. It was his lifelong dream to walk in the footsteps of the Great Mahdi who had slaughtered General Gordon in Khartoum in the 1880s. In return for the performance, Crown received a tourist visa and checked into Khartoum's Acropole Hotel a few days later.

Unnoticed by Sudanese officials, Crown was introduced to U.S. Charge d'Affaires George Curtis Moore, who had a reputation for being less than friendly to CIA activities. However, Moore's apprehension evaporated as the two discovered a common sense of humor along with the realization that Crown's expertise might resolve a difficult problem. Moore arranged for Crown to examine the goat herders' find at Major Hamdallah's private residence.

There Crown found the Limpet Limpet bomb, a pen gun, ammunition, and a typewritten note set out on a small table. After greeting the examiner, Hamdallah gave instructions to his servant and left the house along with Moore. "Have the servant call me when you're finished," said Moore, "and I'll come back to pick you up." bomb, a pen gun, ammunition, and a typewritten note set out on a small table. After greeting the examiner, Hamdallah gave instructions to his servant and left the house along with Moore. "Have the servant call me when you're finished," said Moore, "and I'll come back to pick you up."

"Great idea," Crown remembered thinking. "Here I am by myself, an American on an irregular tourist visa in a country the United States doesn't have diplomatic relations with, unable to speak the local language and sitting in the Minister of Interior's house handling deadly devices. If something happens, I don't even know how to use the phone. If a couple bad guys come through the door, I'm in deep trouble."

There was little to do except get to work. The servant offered the examiner bottles of c.o.ke and Fanta. Based on briefings he received prior to his trip, Crown, although not an explosives expert, identified the Limpet Limpet mine as a U.S. device, probably recovered by the Cubans from the Bay of Pigs and subsequently given to the Soviets. The pen gun was of Pakistani manufacture and easily available in the Horn of Africa region. mine as a U.S. device, probably recovered by the Cubans from the Bay of Pigs and subsequently given to the Soviets. The pen gun was of Pakistani manufacture and easily available in the Horn of Africa region.

Major Hamdallah's servant brought another round of c.o.ke and Fanta.

Crown examined each letter on the typewritten note under a microscope and referred often to his typewriter key cla.s.sification. He eventually concluded the note had been written on an Olympia typewriter of recent manufacture. While American government officials were not known to use that model of Olympia typewriter, it was widely available in both West Germany and East Germany. These findings, although limited, were based on solid data and professional examination.

That evening Moore, Crown, and Hamdallah sat on red vinyl cus.h.i.+ons in the Minister's green curtain-draped living room. In presenting his findings and his conclusions, Crown described the typewriter involved, talked about how the U.S. government produced its official doc.u.ments, and offered the determination that the circ.u.mstances of the find, the origin of the materials, and the content of the doc.u.ment itself pointed to a covert plot by the Soviets or their allies.

Hamdallah listened politely, said little, and offered no commitment to cooperate. He did consent to a request by Crown to pose for a photo, while Moore expressed appreciation for Crown's work, which, he believed, had been sufficient to instill doubt in Hamdallah. The case was closed.

Crown's visit had an unexpected impact on both Moore and Hamdallah. Within two months, Major Hamdallah requested to see Crown again. This time Sudan would welcome the examiner as an official visitor and Moore would insist that Crown stay at his residence. Hamdallah wanted more details about typewriter markings and other forgeries in Africa at the time. From Moore's perspective, the meetings between U.S. officials and a senior Sudanese minister represented otherwise un.o.btainable openings for diplomatic contacts.

Sudanese President Jaafar Numeiri gradually s.h.i.+fted away from his Soviet Bloc orientation in 1969 and 1970, prompting an unsuccessful leftist coup in 1971. Hamdallah, one of the coup supporters, was in London at the time, but decided to return to Sudan in an attempt to reestablish an anti-Numeri organization.60 Arrested en route, he was returned to Sudan in custody, tried, and shot. Arrested en route, he was returned to Sudan in custody, tried, and shot.

After Hamdallah's death, details of his secret life were revealed. The Sudanese minister had cooperated at various times with East German as well as U.S. intelligence services.61 Markus Wolf, former head of East Germany's foreign intelligence arm, described Hamdallah as an "intimate contact" with whom he had "developed a close personal as well as professional friends.h.i.+p." Markus Wolf, former head of East Germany's foreign intelligence arm, described Hamdallah as an "intimate contact" with whom he had "developed a close personal as well as professional friends.h.i.+p." 62 62 With Numeri still in power and Hamdallah replaced, Moore arranged for Crown to brief Ziada Satti, a senior Sudanese police official, on the scope of Soviet and indigenous forgeries circulating in the region. Satti listened attentively and recommended Moore and Crown take their information to the new Interior Minister. The Minister expressed particular interest in examination techniques, and quizzed Crown on U.S. prison construction before introducing the team to Brigadier General Ras.h.i.+d al-Din, head of the Sudanese National Security Agency. Al-Din was likewise receptive to the presentation, even mentioning the East Germans by saying, "You won't see them around here anymore." 63 63 Then, unexpectedly, al-Din brought up a name from Crown's past. "Major Hamdallah had been a patriot, although now a dead one." Then, unexpectedly, al-Din brought up a name from Crown's past. "Major Hamdallah had been a patriot, although now a dead one."

A month later, the climb up Sudan's diplomatic ladder continued with the CIA's senior doc.u.ment examiner meeting President Numeiri himself. Crown recited his well-practiced litany of the many Soviet-originated forgeries bouncing around Africa. Numeiri was attentive and raised the subject of the 1969 find and the .22 caliber pen gun. Crown retold the story and his conclusions that the cache likely originated with the Soviets or East Germans.

Still suspicious about the CIA and its possible connection to the failed 1971 coup, the African leader probed Crown for information about his background and professional credentials.64 Crown responded that as a midlevel Pentagon forensic examiner, he cooperated with the Department of State and other U.S. government agencies when asked to do so. Crown responded that as a midlevel Pentagon forensic examiner, he cooperated with the Department of State and other U.S. government agencies when asked to do so.

Numeiri soon moved on to alleged Chinese support for Anyanya forces opposing his government, showing him photos and posters to a.n.a.lyze, then requested training for Sudanese examiners. The diplomat, Moore, quickly injected himself into the discussion, commenting that the U.S. government had "many ways" it could help and he would be pleased to work out the details.

As they left the president, Moore observed, "Dave, we make a great vaudeville team."

Crown replied, "Yes, and we played the Palace."

Both noted the irony in the fact that three years earlier a likely East German forgery intended to discredit the United States with the Sudanese had become the key to unlocking the door of normalized diplomatic relations.h.i.+ps between the two countries.

An invitation to return to Khartoum arrived on Crown's desk in March 1972. Satti, who had been promoted to Director General of Sudan's Ministry of Interior and President Numeiri, were asking for another briefing. Crown reviewed his findings on the Chinese photographs, which were likely the work of Soviet propaganda. Numeiri expressed annoyance at policies of the Soviet Bloc, Libya, and Egypt intended to influence the Sudan. The U.S.-Sudanese relations.h.i.+p warmed with Numeiri's changed policy, and career Foreign Service Officer Cleo Noel became the U.S. Amba.s.sador to the Sudan. George Moore remained at his post in Khartoum, serving with Amba.s.sador Noel until March of 1973 when both were taken hostage during a reception held at the Saudi Arabian Emba.s.sy and executed the next day by Black September terrorists.65 That event was one of many during the 1970s that would commit Crown, the QDL, and every other component of the TSD, to America's war on terrorism. Increasingly the doc.u.ment examiners would turn their attention to understanding, tracking, and exposing the travel and identification papers used by terrorists. Already it was evident that pa.s.sports, visas, and other doc.u.mentation essential for terrorism could be forged, purchased from a commercial vendor, created from stolen blanks, altered from valid pa.s.sports, or procured with a.s.sistance from corrupt officials.66 According to a CIA report, "Clandestine Travel Facilitators: Key Enablers of Terrorism," pa.s.sports for terrorists were available for purchase from drug addicts in foreign countries or forgers based in Chad or Saudi Arabia. A genuine pa.s.sport could be purchased in Pakistan with bogus visa stamps to age it. According to a CIA report, "Clandestine Travel Facilitators: Key Enablers of Terrorism," pa.s.sports for terrorists were available for purchase from drug addicts in foreign countries or forgers based in Chad or Saudi Arabia. A genuine pa.s.sport could be purchased in Pakistan with bogus visa stamps to age it.67 Putting their knowledge of forgeries to work, the QDL created a pa.s.sport examination manual, known as the Redbook. The manual, with a distinctive fire engine-red cover, included samples of forged pa.s.sports, stolen pa.s.sports, and fabricated entry/exit stamps.68 In all, the Redbook contained exemplars of thirty-five forged pa.s.sports and cachets from forty-five different countries. In all, the Redbook contained exemplars of thirty-five forged pa.s.sports and cachets from forty-five different countries.69 Each example was ill.u.s.trated in color with its faults clearly marked. Printed in six languages, the Redbook was made available to U.S. Customs and Immigration officials and countries cooperating with U.S. counterterrorism and counternarcotics programs. Each example was ill.u.s.trated in color with its faults clearly marked. Printed in six languages, the Redbook was made available to U.S. Customs and Immigration officials and countries cooperating with U.S. counterterrorism and counternarcotics programs.

The 1986 edition of the Redbook reported that over fifty individuals carrying forged pa.s.sports provided by terrorist organizations had been identified before they could carry out their terrorism a.s.signments. The Redbook's authors also concluded a brief introduction to doc.u.ment examination with a cautiously optimistic yet ominous paragraph that read: .

Terrorism is a plague that threatens all of us. It must be stopped. Use the REDBOOK! . . . whether at border control, police registration, or visa application. If we screen travelers and check their pa.s.sports, as experience proves, terrorists will lose their ability to travel undetected and international terrorism will come one step closer to being stopped! The threat is real!70 .

The threat was indeed real. In 1986, as international terrorism continued to grow, OTS doc.u.ment specialists trained hundreds of immigration and border control officials to spot spurious pa.s.sports, visas, travel cachets, and other forms of doc.u.mentation. OTS supplemented the Redbook and training with a film t.i.tled The Threat Is Real The Threat Is Real that was translated and distributed among law enforcement personnel in any country willing to cooperate with the U.S. counterterrorism effort. that was translated and distributed among law enforcement personnel in any country willing to cooperate with the U.S. counterterrorism effort.71 By 1992 use of the Redbook and a companion pa.s.sport-examination manual had been credited for the apprehension of more than 200 individuals carrying forged pa.s.sports provided by terrorist groups. The manuals were annually updated as the quality and sophistication of the terrorist doc.u.ments improved each year.72 Time showed that terrorists became better at forging pa.s.sports, and rapidly adapted computer software to help them with forgeries. Instruction booklets began circulating among terrorists on how to "clean" visa cachets and alter pa.s.sports. Genuine official doc.u.ments came from Arab "volunteers" fighting in Afghanistan who were ordered to give their pa.s.sports to commanders upon arrival at their unit. If killed, the "volunteer's" doc.u.ments were altered, usually by photo subst.i.tution, and pa.s.sed along to another operative.73 Prior to 9/11, al-Qaeda mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed traveled on a Saudi pa.s.sport with bogus cachet stamps to "age" it. Prior to 9/11, al-Qaeda mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed traveled on a Saudi pa.s.sport with bogus cachet stamps to "age" it.74 Now, twenty-five years after Curt Moore's death, the war on terrorism would dominate U.S. intelligence. Now, twenty-five years after Curt Moore's death, the war on terrorism would dominate U.S. intelligence.

CHAPTER 19.

Tracking Terrorist Snakes

We have slain a large dragon but we now live in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes . . .

-R. James Woolsey in Congressional testimony after the collapse of the USSR The Agency's war against terrorism began decades before September 11, 2001. The CIA's chief in Athens was a.s.sa.s.sinated in December 1975. In October 1983, terrorists used a truck bomb to blow up the Marine barracks in Beirut, murdering 241 U.S. soldiers. That same year, terrorists bombed the U.S. Emba.s.sy in Beirut, killing 63, including CIA officers. Then in 1984, CIA's chief in Lebanon, William Buckley, was kidnapped, tortured, and later murdered in 1986. That same year, DCI William Casey created the DCI Counterterrorist Center staffed by representatives from the princ.i.p.al intelligence community agencies, with a mission to "preempt, disrupt, and defeat terrorists."

While radical groups with diverse agendas, such as the Baader-Meinhof Gang, the IRA, and the Weathermen, committed terrorist acts during the 1960s, America saw the face of terrorism up close during the 1972 Olympics in Munich. Broadcast live on international television, the dramatic scenes of masked Palestinian terrorists killing eleven Israeli athletes seemed as senseless as it was shocking.

To the CIA, the only new aspect of the appalling spectacle in Munich was its global broadcast. Acts of terror carried out by religious and political fanatics, either independently or with government sponsors, have influenced societies and destabilized governments for centuries.1 In the eleventh century, a Muslim sect, the Order of the a.s.sa.s.sins, conducted suicide missions with the promise of "paradise to follow." In the eleventh century, a Muslim sect, the Order of the a.s.sa.s.sins, conducted suicide missions with the promise of "paradise to follow."2 English Catholics conspired to blow up Parliament in 1605 in hopes of creating an uprising against King James I. English Catholics conspired to blow up Parliament in 1605 in hopes of creating an uprising against King James I.3 The list of terrorist acts through history includes virtually every country and continent. However, in the last half of the twentieth century, the frequency of terrorist strikes accelerated dramatically. According to one account, 8,114 terrorist incidents occurred worldwide during the 1970s. In the 1980s, that number increased nearly 400 percent to more than 30,000. The list of terrorist acts through history includes virtually every country and continent. However, in the last half of the twentieth century, the frequency of terrorist strikes accelerated dramatically. According to one account, 8,114 terrorist incidents occurred worldwide during the 1970s. In the 1980s, that number increased nearly 400 percent to more than 30,000.4 Advances in technology have aided terrorists in their efforts. New chemistries have reduced the amount of explosives needed to inflict significant damage, and television coverage typically allocates airtime relative to the number of people killed or injured. It can be argued that the net effect motivates increasingly more heinous acts in an attempt to attract the attention that drives public fear.

Targeting civilians is a fundamental terrorist tactic. In the nineteenth century, the radical German revolutionary Karl Heinzen envisioned a time when weapons of ma.s.s destruction, powerful enough to destroy entire cities, would be in the hands of terrorists.5 Stopping that from happening became one of CIA's most important missions. Stopping that from happening became one of CIA's most important missions.

The first OTS officer a.s.signed to Vietnam, Pat Jameson, may have been the first OTS tech drafted into the war on terrorism. During the early 1970s, terrorists were using tools already well known to Jameson, including false ident.i.ties and doc.u.mentation along with special weapons and improvised explosive devices. His experiences in Vietnam and Laos with target a.n.a.lysis and planning paramilitary operations allowed him to understand how terrorists identified target vulnerabilities and traveled undetected.

When the United States left Vietnam in 1973, OTS rea.s.signed Jameson from Laos to one of its covert European bases. Now a seasoned tech with experience in both paramilitary and audio surveillance operations, he would become a primary Agency resource for creating counterintelligence programs in Europe and Middle Eastern countries. Early counterterrorism operations concentrated on putting audio devices into residences and offices of suspected terrorists. The strategy, Jameson recalled, "paid off handsomely," particularly in West European countries where members of terrorist cells were often longtime residents and believed their radical activities were protected. For the Agency, these operations not only a.s.sisted countries in preventing attacks, they also provided a means to solidify and expand cooperation with local security services.

Jameson found that many Middle Eastern countries were overly confident in their att.i.tudes, thinking themselves immune from terrorist acts. Several countries, including friends of the United States, ignored or failed to take action against terrorist groups at home, as long as they conducted their attacks elsewhere. In late 1974, a CIA chief invited Jameson to a.s.sess one country's overall counterterrorism security picture. He confided that his contact, a general who headed the local intelligence and security service, seemed unconcerned about the potential for terrorist attacks on the government. In keeping with a tradition established by Donovan and Lovell, Jameson and his counterpart spent an evening drinking good brandy and devising a plan that would form the country's first counterterrorism program.

A few days later, Jameson secured a meeting with the general, intending to offer a special training program for a new counterterrorism team. However, upon entering the general's office, Jameson faced an unreceptive host despite the recent problems in the country from a foreign terrorist cell. The general dismissed the incidents as insignificant and isolated and remained adamant that the country had no terrorist problem that needed CIA a.s.sistance.

Jameson saw an opening. "Well, that's good," he responded, "but I have a bet for you. I believe I can walk down to your marketplace, make a few purchases, and within a few days create an explosive device that I can then plant in a public location to kill any important foreign guest that comes into this country."

The intelligence chief nearly exploded with anger. Jameson had challenged his fundamental responsibility, the protection of the country's leader, and his international guests. Several minutes pa.s.sed and when the conversation calmed Jameson suggested that the general personally choose one of his officers to accompany him as a guide and translator for a few days to prove or disprove his bold wager.

During the next three days, Jameson and his guide wandered the markets of the capital city and purchased remote-controlled model airplanes, ammonium nitrate fertilizer, diesel fuel, and parts to make improvised detonators-everything necessary to make a powerful bomb.6 Jameson then checked into the hotel directly across the street from the intelligence chief's office and spent two days observing and making notes about security at the hotels, on the streets, and at entrances to government buildings. Jameson then checked into the hotel directly across the street from the intelligence chief's office and spent two days observing and making notes about security at the hotels, on the streets, and at entrances to government buildings.

Returning to brief the general, Jameson was greeted with a slight smile. "So, you wasted your time, didn't you? You see, we're really secure here," the intelligence chief said. Jameson pulled a small U.S. government-issued green-covered notebook from his pocket and began reading from his notes.

"I bought radio control switches to activate a bomb. I bought ammonium nitrate for the explosive. I bought a tourist suitcase to hold the bomb," he recited. "I bought fuses, timers, and initiators. Here's a list of the prices I paid for each item. I can get as many as I want. I can make one or several bombs and I can make a big one or a small one. See, it's all here and your man knows that I have it all in my hotel room."

The general remained unconvinced. "That might be so, but you can never use it operationally here," he said. "You could never get close to my VIP guests."

Jameson was prepared. "Sir, look outside your window. There's a big sedan parked across the street right in front of the hotel where all your guests stay. I would load that car up with explosives, sit on my balcony, and wait for your guest to come out. I'd push the b.u.t.ton and boom boom-no more VIP."

The general was stubborn. "No, that wouldn't work either. My security guys are well trained, well armed, and know how to protect VIPs. They would spot anything out of the ordinary like that car."

"We've checked," Jameson shot back. "That car hasn't been moved for three weeks."

The intelligence chief agreed to consider what Jameson had reported.

Included in Jameson's final security report was an item that would prove eerily prophetic. It warned of the dangers posed by a longstanding tradition in the country whereby pet.i.tioners could ask the head of state for a.s.sistance by pleading their case in person. Jameson a.s.sessed the vulnerabilities of the pet.i.tioners' ceremony and concluded that a high probability of a.s.sa.s.sination against the leader existed. He noted that pet.i.tioners approached the ruler one at a time without being screened, searched, or x-rayed. To emphasize the point, he added that close a.s.sociates and extended family members had nearly unrestricted access to the head of state. Nothing would prevent one of these from carrying a concealed pistol and shooting at close range.

While that portion of Jameson's report was ignored, other pieces of a U.S.-proposed counterterrorism program began falling into place. The general understood the vulnerability presented by the example of the unidentified automobile parked near his office and a few weeks later a commercial airplane with its windows covered with blackout paper landed at a covert CIA training site. The pa.s.sengers were members of a special counterterrorism and VIP-protection team sent by the general for a month of intense training by OTS specialists. As the team disembarked, Jameson personally greeted each one. Now having proved himself a friend of the country, he began having regular meetings with the general to offer advice and planning a.s.sistance.

In the mid-1970s, after completing one of his now frequent meetings with the general, Jameson headed home. During a stopover, as he approached the boarding gate to catch a connecting flight, he was surprised to see another CIA officer waiting for him. The general was demanding that Jameson return immediately. The country's leader had been a.s.sa.s.sinated.

"Let me guess. He was holding an audience, the people were standing in line and he was sitting there talking to one of them and they shot him in the head," Jameson said.

"How do you know that?" the colleague asked, taken back by the specific details.

"I told the general six months ago that could happen. I didn't have a premonition. But I saw how the pet.i.tioners approached and how he was unprotected from his inner circle, the risk was obvious."

"You were right. The a.s.sa.s.sin was a relative."

Jameson knew he was in a delicate situation. Not only had the a.s.sa.s.sination occurred uncomfortably soon after his report, but he had just departed the country hours before the shooting. If the general believed he was somehow implicated in the murder, Jameson could be arrested the instant he stepped off the plane. On the other hand, if Jameson didn't honor the request to return, they might a.s.sume that he, along with the CIA, was guilty of something.

Jameson spent a sleepless night in limbo as cable traffic was exchanged with Headquarters. All eventually agreed that it would be best for the OTS officer to go directly to the general, tell what was known, and offer personal as well as Agency a.s.sistance.

It was not a comfortable meeting. The general launched a tirade about the ineffectiveness of CIA counterintelligence training while implying that Jameson might have had some connection with the a.s.sa.s.sination. Letting the accusations pa.s.s without comment, Jameson replied, "I told you how I would go about doing this, I didn't say I was going to do it. I told you what was needed to correct the situation, but you didn't correct it. What has happened is past. Where do we go in the future?"

"You stay here for now," the chief ordered, concluding the meeting.

After several days of being under virtual house arrest, Jameson requested another meeting. The general had calmed down and conceded that no blame for the a.s.sa.s.sination lay with Jameson or the CIA. He was free to leave the country. However, for the remainder of his career, Jameson would be part of CIA's counterterrorism mission and within a few months tragedy struck first hand. In December 1975, Jameson's CIA chief in Athens, Richard Welch, died from a terrorist's bullet.

Among terrorists' standard weapons are small amounts of explosives fas.h.i.+oned into improvised devices and concealed in everyday items. Although small, these bombs can create physical damage as well as instill fear in a larger population. Less than an ounce of explosive is needed for a letter bomb capable of killing or maiming anyone around it. A few pounds of explosive hidden in a purse, briefcase, or suitcase can bring down an airliner, while a few hundred pounds in a car or van is capable of destroying an entire office building or emba.s.sy.

Bill Parr had a cramped office in Southern Europe during the late 1970s but that mattered little since most of his work was on the road. As one of the few OTS "bomb techs," Parr frequently received the first call after bombings in Africa or the Middle East. CIA stations found that after bombings foreign services were especially receptive to hosting techs like Parr who knew how to conduct post-blast investigations and a.n.a.lyze security weaknesses.

Parr was asleep at home when a phone call awakened him at 2 AM. "Come in immediately." The caller did not need to identify himself. Parr recognized the urgency in the voice of the CIA's senior communicator. Arriving at the office, Parr saw the message headed with the word IMMEDIATE and followed by NIACT, for "night action," which required an immediate response regardless of the time of day.

This message originated from a country friendly to the United States, and whose political leaders were frequent targets of terrorists. Reportedly, the country's intelligence chief had acquired what seemed to be a suitcase bomb from a terrorist cell. For reasons unknown, the intelligence chief had taken the suitcase to his office, opened it, and noticed wires in one corner along with some unidentified materials wrapped in black tape.

"Then he apparently suffered a sudden attack of brilliance and decided not to mess with it anymore," Parr recalled. "That's when he called the CIA for help."

Parr replied with his own IMMEDIATE-NIACT with questions about the appearance of the device and remained at the office for the rest of the night responding to additional messages before catching the morning flight out to see the device in person. Reaching his destination before noon, Parr was taken to an office where the opened suitcase sat on a desk. Almost certainly a bomb, the suitcase contained a messy collection of wires, small boxes wrapped in black tape, and miscellaneous packing materials. When an x-ray machine was located at a nearby prison, the suitcase was carefully transported there. The x-ray image revealed a coil pattern in one of the taped packages that Parr concluded was detonator cord wrapped around another unidentifiable substance, probably high explosive.

The trigger mechanism to control the detonation was circuit board wired to the coil. Parr calculated that he could pull the electronics away from the explosives without initiating a detonation. Taking the device to a remote area, he attached a hook on a long line to the electronics, and gave it a hard yank from a safe distance. The electronics, which had been attached to the blasting cap with black tape, pulled cleanly away from the explosives. After cutting off the blasting cap, he x-rayed the device again to recheck the circuitry.

With the device rendered safe, follow-up operational ideas began emerging. The bomb had been obtained through an agent who penetrated a terrorist cell. If a signaling device could be attached, and the suitcase reinserted into the cache, it could be tracked to determine its intended target. However, to do so, the bomb would have to be rea.s.sembled.

Parr knew that since he took it apart, he could put it back together, but the agent had only a few hours to return the device to the cache before someone discovered it missing. Not only did that rule out a tracking operation, Headquarters, quite sensibly, disapproved of returning a live bomb to a terrorist cache. The tech would have to rea.s.semble a disabled bomb without leaving any traces of tampering. Using a layer of epoxy to short out the wiring from the switch to the blasting cap was relatively simple, but rea.s.sembling the bomb in its case without leaving signs of alteration required several hours. The sleep-deprived tech finally completed the rea.s.sembly and delivered the bomb to the local service for return to the cache. Sometime in the future at an unknown time and place, a terrorist's plot would fail.

In the course of disa.s.sembling and rea.s.sembling the components, Parr examined the electronic circuit board, took photos, and made sketches. The device contained components he had not seen in terrorist devices, revealing a new type of timing device that subsequently appeared in other bombs as a trademark for a particular PLO bomb maker.

"You deserve a medal," the chief told Parr as he departed.

"I don't think so," Parr replied, "I've spent most of my life in Vietnam and Laos making devices that help kill people. It seems a little ridiculous to give me a medal when I disarm a device." Nevertheless, a few months later, based on the recommendation of the chief, Parr did, in fact, receive the CIA's Intelligence Star for "a voluntary act of courage performed under hazardous conditions."

In December 1988, John Orkin was heading an OTS unit responsible for conducting technical design and performance a.s.sessments of spy equipment deployed against American targets by the Soviets or other adversaries. These devices were usually discovered either through technical surveillance countermeasures or acquired from a friendly liaison service.

Typically, Orkin's engineers a.n.a.lyzed each recovered device to determine its country of origin, function, materials, design, and capabilities. This was no easy task, since intelligence organizations routinely mask the country of origin of a device by "sanitizing" spy gear. Since a bug found in the wall of a diplomat's office was not usually stamped MADE IN THE SOVIET UNION or came with an instruction manual, Orkin's job was to figure out how a mysterious device worked, who made it, and how it might have been deployed.

With a well-equipped suite in the sprawling OTS covert laboratory outside Was.h.i.+ngton, Orkin joked that he was far enough from the Langley Headquarters to do "real engineering work" without interruption or micro-management. The lab was largely immune from the crisis-to-crisis atmosphere that dominated many intelligence operations.

Orkin began his CIA career during the early 1970s evaluating OTS equipment. Responsible for testing every piece of spy gear produced by OTS before certifying it for deployment to the field, the unit functioned as the Agency's in-house "Underwriters Laboratory." Far removed from the glamour a.s.sociated with agents, spies, and back-alley intrigue, testing the frequencies of transmitters and battery life of communication devices in a government laboratory seemed a world away from the frontlines of espionage.

The certification of OTS devices and a.n.a.lysis of hostile gear involved both elements of reverse engineering and similar testing procedures. However, during the 1970s, a.n.a.lysis of foreign devices was an ad hoc affair. "As a device was recovered the lucky engineer-of-the-day got a.s.signed the project to test and write a report on how the foreign equipment performed," explained Orkin. "We were dealing with mostly technical surveillance equipment-microphones, transmitters, communication and concealment devices. Eventually it became apparent that we were reinventing the wheel with each a.n.a.lysis. When a device came in, we often didn't remember if we'd seen the same thing three years before or if there was already a report in the file. So, one of the engineers finally said, 'Give them all to me. I'll do the work.' Over time he became the in-house repository of knowledge about foreign equipment."

Eventually, this led OTS to establish a unit with expertise in reverse-engineering foreign equipment and a proficiency in spotting patterns that accompanied technological evolution. Although the number of new devices might be fewer than ten a year, a.n.a.lysis was needed to establish continuity. "We needed to develop data to do a side-by-side comparison to look at the evolution of devices," he said. "We needed to know with certainty if two devices were identical and, if not, then doc.u.ment the changes and record the improvements."

The Soviet Union remained the focus for OTS foreign-equipment testing well into the 1980s. The work a.n.a.lyzing Soviet and East European spy devices offered invaluable counterintelligence data for the FBI, State Department, and U.S. military security components that were also developing countermeasures.

However, with the number of terrorist organizations multiplying in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia in the 1970s, the Agency began acquiring explosives and bomb fragments from terrorist caches and post-blast investigations. As most early terrorist bombs were individually fabricated from whatever parts and materials the bomb maker had at hand, these were collectively known as Improvised Explosive Devices or IEDs. The OTS expertise in reverse engineering and knowledge of foreign electronic circuits proved to be the perfect match for unraveling the firing, triggering, and timing mysteries of these weapons. It was in this way, almost by accident, that Orkin and his colleagues became the Agency's focal point for collecting, a.n.a.lyzing, and cataloging instruments of terror.

"The a.n.a.lysis of terrorist devices evolved slowly; it was an occasional item here and there. In fact we initiated some activity ourselves, going to the counterterrorism officers and asking them, 'What do you have?' And they'd say, 'Oh, here's a device that I picked up in Jordan in 1978.' And we'd offer to do a report," remembered Orkin. "Initially we were working backwards on stuff found a few years before. If anything looked like it had been made in more than one quant.i.ty or if it looked like something we might see again, we'd take it and do a report on it."

Orkin began detecting a disturbing pattern of state-of-the-art technology making its way into terrorist devices in the early 1980s. Terror organizations that relied on crude timers and other components for their bombs a few years earlier were now acquiring advanced technology that greatly increased the lethality of terrorist bombs.