Spycraft. Part 17

CHAPTER 21.

Cover and Disguise

They must lead a double life . . . it is a vexing existence.

-David Atlee Phillips, as quoted in The Literary Spy False or a.s.sumed ident.i.ties are a way of life for intelligence officers. While conducting their work, case officers and technical officers alike have learned to live "normally" with alias names by combining a con man's verbal skills to spin a plausible cover story with una.s.sailable identification papers. The intelligence officer must convincingly establish that he is who and what he claims, even though it is all a fabrication. Most officers use a dozen or more different alias names during a career.

For the CIA, creating false ident.i.ties and their supporting doc.u.mentation had its origin in 1942 in the Doc.u.mentation Division of the OSS Research and Development branch. Agents infiltrated by the OSS into Occupied Europe required "bullet-proof" identification papers, as the slightest whiff of duplicity could result in summary execution. OSS logbooks from October 1943 show requirements for fabricated doc.u.ments such as French stamps, ID papers, and travel certificates. Agents dispatched behind German lines by OSS officer William Casey, later Director of Central Intelligence, were regular "customers" for the output of the OSS doc.u.ment fabrication shop in London between 1944 and 1945.1 The London operation, manned by an a.s.sortment of craftsmen and forgers, was a field component of Stanley Lovell's OSS R&D branch and evolved in the postwar years into the Doc.u.ment Intelligence branch in the Operational Aids Division of the CIA's Office of Special Operations. The London operation, manned by an a.s.sortment of craftsmen and forgers, was a field component of Stanley Lovell's OSS R&D branch and evolved in the postwar years into the Doc.u.ment Intelligence branch in the Operational Aids Division of the CIA's Office of Special Operations.

In 1951, the CIA's consolidation of technical and scientific work in the Technical Services Staff included the capability to manufacture doc.u.ments and ident.i.ty papers. The significance of doc.u.mentation for Agency operations was reflected by the fact that three of TSS's six original divisions focused on some aspect of ident.i.ty and doc.u.ments.2 Hundreds of CIA officers working overseas, together with every agent dispatched into Eastern Europe or China, required an alias ident.i.ty along with una.s.sailable doc.u.ments to back up an airtight cover story. The alias protected the agent's true ident.i.ty, while the cover legitimized his presence in the area. TSS a.s.sembled a doc.u.mentation team of artists, forgers, engravers, printers, papermakers, and photographers from OSS veterans, U.S. trade schools, and selected German and j.a.panese artisans who had originally learned their craft while working against the United States. Hundreds of CIA officers working overseas, together with every agent dispatched into Eastern Europe or China, required an alias ident.i.ty along with una.s.sailable doc.u.ments to back up an airtight cover story. The alias protected the agent's true ident.i.ty, while the cover legitimized his presence in the area. TSS a.s.sembled a doc.u.mentation team of artists, forgers, engravers, printers, papermakers, and photographers from OSS veterans, U.S. trade schools, and selected German and j.a.panese artisans who had originally learned their craft while working against the United States.

Selection of appropriate cover for covert operatives was handled by a separate division within the DDP.3 TSS, and subsequently OTS, supported cover requirements by creating and/or reproducing paper or plastic doc.u.mentation that a person would normally be expected to carry, such as pa.s.sports, visas, licenses, credit cards, blood donor records, stationery, members.h.i.+p cards, business cards, and travel doc.u.ments. Paper doc.u.ments were at the heart of establis.h.i.+ng an officer's ident.i.ty and legitimacy, particularly in the decades before electronic databases. TSS, and subsequently OTS, supported cover requirements by creating and/or reproducing paper or plastic doc.u.mentation that a person would normally be expected to carry, such as pa.s.sports, visas, licenses, credit cards, blood donor records, stationery, members.h.i.+p cards, business cards, and travel doc.u.ments. Paper doc.u.ments were at the heart of establis.h.i.+ng an officer's ident.i.ty and legitimacy, particularly in the decades before electronic databases.4 Historically, officially issued and printed doc.u.ments carried on one's person were the standard form of identification for travelers, but in recent years, biometric identification and individual data stored on computer chips have become a required element of establis.h.i.+ng ident.i.ty. Historically, officially issued and printed doc.u.ments carried on one's person were the standard form of identification for travelers, but in recent years, biometric identification and individual data stored on computer chips have become a required element of establis.h.i.+ng ident.i.ty.

Fabricating high-quality ident.i.ty doc.u.ments has always been technically difficult and unforgiving. The OSS London shop reportedly checked doc.u.ments thirty times before issuance to an agent going behind German lines .5 Minor mistakes or errors in printing, format, color, paper texture, inks, or missing security features in government-issued doc.u.ments were quickly recognized in the home country. Immigration and customs officials, as well as border guards, were trained to spot false doc.u.mentation; likewise, local police were keenly aware of the typical contents of a traveler's wallet or purse. Hotel receptionists, ticket agents, and bank tellers were trained to be alert for fraudulent or counterfeit doc.u.ments. A suspicious doc.u.ment opened the door for additional investigation and questioning that, once begun, often led to an unraveling of the bearer's cover story and endangered the larger operation. Minor mistakes or errors in printing, format, color, paper texture, inks, or missing security features in government-issued doc.u.ments were quickly recognized in the home country. Immigration and customs officials, as well as border guards, were trained to spot false doc.u.mentation; likewise, local police were keenly aware of the typical contents of a traveler's wallet or purse. Hotel receptionists, ticket agents, and bank tellers were trained to be alert for fraudulent or counterfeit doc.u.ments. A suspicious doc.u.ment opened the door for additional investigation and questioning that, once begun, often led to an unraveling of the bearer's cover story and endangered the larger operation.

Intelligence officers working under an alias required doc.u.ments that were perfect reproductions of official issuances and contained the current authentication features necessary for travel. Credit cards had to be signed with the same name and same script as the bearer's pa.s.sport, driver's license, and club cards. Pa.s.sports had to contain valid visas and entry and exit "chops" (rubber-stamp impressions) that corresponded to travel reflected on other doc.u.ments. Dates on airline stubs or train tickets had to be consistent with dates showing entry into a country.

A production element within the OTS designed, printed, bound, laminated, and artificially aged the false doc.u.ments while a separate authentication division reviewed, verified, and prepared each doc.u.ment before issue. The separate authentication process confirmed that every piece of an individual's doc.u.ment package, including any government-issued identification papers, was complete, accurate, and up to date. Before issuance, authentication officers compared the doc.u.ment package to data maintained in CIA's exhaustive international doc.u.ment inventory and archives of current and historic samples of customs and immigration forms, rubber stamps, cachets, seals, pa.s.sports, and travel paperwork. To ensure that the doc.u.ment inventory and knowledge of international travel remained current, CIA officers or a.s.sets were sent on probes to survey travel routes, observe immigration practices, collect chops in pa.s.sports at foreign border crossings, and record changes in entrance/exit procedures in countries of operational interest.

A few months before the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, a CIA officer had his attache case stolen in a European country while registered as a guest at an upscale hotel near a major airport. OTS had modified the attache case by creating an inner cavity for secreting papers that doc.u.mented the officer as a resident of a neighboring country.

The attache case came into possession of the local internal security service where the secret compartment and contents were discovered. The alias doc.u.mentation was turned over to the country that had supposedly issued the doc.u.ments, where an investigation determined the papers were forgeries. Suspecting that the origin of the forgery was the work of a third country, not the United States, the offended service registered a blunt objection. The third country's intelligence service knew it had no role in the fabrication, but to calm matters simply acknowledged receipt of the materials without comment.

Nearly a year later, at a conference of intelligence services cooperating on detecting terrorist forgeries, the story was related and the doc.u.ments displayed. The OTS officers immediately recognized the doc.u.ments as ones they fabricated. Later a friendly colleague from the third country privately commented, "We know these aren't ours. They are really good, almost perfect. Better than anything we could do. We don't know who else can do such fine work, but we thought you should know that the capability is out there." Obscured by the language of intelligence diplomacy was a professional compliment for OTS's fabrication skills.

Alias travel doc.u.ments were critical to the success of a CIA sting operation in the late 1980s. The CIA needed intelligence on the capabilities of a tactical missile being designed in a country hostile to the United States. Tight security surrounded the missile program and foreign visitors were never given access to the facility where components were a.s.sembled. To attempt to gain access, a CIA agent a.s.sumed the persona of a Middle Eastern businessman and the cover of an international military equipment broker. The agent needed to find a way to get inside the building to photograph the equipment.

CIA planners contrived a scenario whereby the agent acquired information that a third country, also hostile to the United States, had interest in secretly buying several of the missile systems. The intelligence, in the form of official-appearing doc.u.ments, had all been fabricated by OTS. The agent made contact with a representative from the target country for a "confidential discussion" and presented the so-called intelligence with a proposal that he broker the sale. Suspicion was high but the a.s.set's intelligence, cover story, and identification papers were so convincing that follow-up meetings were arranged.

The a.s.set demonstrated good faith by putting several hundred thousand dollars on the table and serious negotiations about a possible sale began. He established the position of his client that any deal would be contingent on his inspecting the goods before signing a purchase contract. Over several weeks, discussions went back and forth until the target country's senior official called for a final meeting.

The negotiations lasted three days but eventually a verbal agreement was reached and formal papers drawn up for signature. The seller agreed to the a.s.set's demand to inspect the production facility and missile components. Then, with the contract papers on the table ready for signature, the senior negotiator abruptly called a halt. "Let me see your pa.s.sport," he demanded. The a.s.set, stunned by the request, had no choice but to comply. The negotiator slowly examined the pa.s.sport page by page before handing it back with a smile. "I just wanted to make sure," he explained, "that you were in Yemen in March three years ago like you told me yesterday. I see you were. Now let us conclude our business."

The tension subsided as the a.s.set struggled to maintain his composure. In fact, he had never been in Yemen although travel to that country had been built into his cover story. OTS had inserted the required visa into his pa.s.sport, valid for the month in question. The techs had properly dated the entry and exit immigration chops, complete with scrawled initials of the immigration officers. In fact, the entire pa.s.sport, visa, entry/exit stamps, chops, and signatures had been constructed by OTS. A concealed camera in the a.s.set's briefcase silently filmed the entire drama.

Some time later, a senior DO official called the operation "one of the best of the decade." Its success hinged on the work of the OTS's doc.u.ment fabrication and authentication officers.

From the cover perspective, CIA employees fall broadly into two cla.s.sifications: overt and undercover. The majority of CIA employees are overt, acknowledge their CIA affiliation, and each January receive W-2 forms issued by the Central Intelligence Agency. Typical of overt employees are individuals in senior management positions, those with a.s.signments in public affairs, the Center for Study of Intelligence, congressional liaison, personnel recruitment, a.n.a.lytical components of the Directorate of Intelligence, and research units in the Directorate of Science and Technology. These individuals perform work that does not require a covert ident.i.ty.

Within the Directorate of Operations, most employees have cover, as does any other Agency officer who partic.i.p.ates in covert operations. Cover doc.u.ments provide corroborating personal and public material to establish and support the legitimacy of a cover and a fabricated ident.i.ty.

The CIA categorizes cover in two types, official and commercial. Official covers are provided by other government agencies and departments while commercial covers are acquired from private-sector companies or private individuals. The cover of any individual officer can be adapted to the operational need and ranges from "light" to "deep."

Officers may have a cover that allows them to work using their true name or they may a.s.sume an alias as part of operational cover. Two types of aliases are frequently used. The most common is a created ident.i.ty. Officers are a.s.signed randomly selected names, consistent with their ethnic appearance and supported by standard identification doc.u.ments such as driver's license, credit cards, social security card, and pa.s.sport. Throughout their career, officers would be issued multiple aliases and supporting doc.u.ments. Since 1990, however, the created ident.i.ty has become increasingly vulnerable to detection as an alias due to interconnected databases containing official and personal information about individuals. The adage "If you don't exist in cybers.p.a.ce, you are probably a fraud" has become a truism that limits the long-term operational use of created ident.i.ties.

Borrowed ident.i.ties offer an alternative to fict.i.tious ident.i.ties but require the cooperation and temporary "disappearance" of the voluntary and cooperating donor. Borrowed ident.i.ties have the advantage of possessing a verifiable personal history and require no manufactured backstopping of the individual's college attendance, work history, social connections, or forged doc.u.ments. The borrowed ident.i.ty also exists as a "cyber persona" since, at minimum, credit history shows up on numerous databases. Reproduction of personal ID papers is simplified by a willing donor making the material available to doc.u.ment specialists. OTS technicians can provide effective disguise in the form of the donor's clothing and, within reason, body appearance. Borrowed ident.i.ty, normally reserved for particularly sensitive operations, was successfully employed to effect the single personal meeting that occurred between an agency officer and TRIGON TRIGON in Moscow in 1976. in Moscow in 1976.

Disguise can either complement an alias or obscure the true ident.i.ty of the user. The history of OTS's disguise work, like doc.u.ments, began in OSS. At the formation of TSS, disguise became part of the Furnis.h.i.+ngs and Equipment Division and subsequently supported covert operations by altering the appearance of officers and agents to protect their true ident.i.ty or ensure against future visual recognition. Disguise also can make an individual's appearance consistent with photo identification doc.u.ments that are used to support an alias ident.i.ty. Disguise conceals personal ident.i.ty as wood blocks conceal microphones and transmitters.

CIA officers meeting with a.s.sets have often employed light disguise in conjunction with an alias. Such disguises may give the officer a visage that alters his true features. A light disguise might include a wig, gla.s.ses, mole, facial hair, dental appliance, or certain articles of clothing. Whether the disguise is realistic or believable is less important than the fact that it prevents the officer from being recognized later. Light disguises would typically be employed when meeting with an unknown volunteer who asks to speak to someone in intelligence. To avoid the risk of exposing an officer to someone who could be a terrorist or part of another intelligence service's dangle operation, the CIA representative would apply a light disguise before engaging the volunteer. Light disguises are also issued to members of surveillance teams to protect them from recognition by the target or by well-wis.h.i.+ng friends whom they might inadvertently encounter while on the job.

As necessary, more elaborate disguises using full or partial facial masks could perform an ethnic or s.e.x change to alter a person's racial or gender appearance. Among the options are padded clothing to alter body type and weight distribution, sculpted appliances that alter eye color, mouth lines, and affect speech tone, makeup and hair coloring, hand and arm "gloves" to match facial coloring, shoe lifts to add height, and torso devices to create a stooped posture. Individually and in combination, the disguise techniques can affect dramatic appearance change.6 For officers in need of a disguise subject to close attention and durable for hours or days, OTS specialists would spend several hours performing the transformations. These labor-intensive disguises were typically applied on individuals in high-risk situations such as illegal border crossings. Given time, the disguise specialists would alter hair color, apply facial hair, modify jaw lines, improvise dental work, create wrinkles, change complexion, or add gla.s.ses and warts to match any photographic doc.u.ments and thus avoid chance recognition at a border crossing or airport checkpoint.7 The use of disguise to maintain secrecy is a basic means of acquiring information otherwise unavailable. It is also one of the most ancient. The Old Testament describes several disguise incidents in the history of the Hebrew people such as Jacob's deception of his father Isaac to secure the family birthright. The Chinese strategist Sun Tzu offered instructions for disguising spies in The Art of War The Art of War with this comment: "Your surviving spy must be a man of keen intellect, though in outward appearance a fool; of shabby exterior, but with a will of iron." More recently, Shakespeare was famously fond of disguises, incorporating them into the plays, including with this comment: "Your surviving spy must be a man of keen intellect, though in outward appearance a fool; of shabby exterior, but with a will of iron." More recently, Shakespeare was famously fond of disguises, incorporating them into the plays, including Twelfth Night Twelfth Night, Measure for Measure Measure for Measure, and As You Like It As You Like It.

The twenty-first-century spy's disguise must not only be flawless in outward appearance, it must also reflect his a.s.sumed ident.i.ty in the array of sophisticated doc.u.mentation safeguards in use throughout the world. Disguise must match a digital persona that includes holographic images and microchips containing biometric data embedded into pa.s.sports and travel doc.u.ments. Personal information on the Internet that is compatible with one's disguise becomes as critical to the modern spy's ident.i.ty as the traditional counterfeit beard and eyegla.s.ses.

CHAPTER 22.

Concealments

The OTS concealment specialist combines the skills of a craftsman, the creativity of an artist and the illusion of a magician.

-An OTS concealment engineer In 1586, secret correspondence to Mary Queen of Scots from the French amba.s.sador was concealed inside barrels of beer and smuggled to her at the country estate of Chartley, England, where she was under house arrest.1 During the American Revolution, couriers who traveled by boat, carried intelligence reports inside weighted bottles that could be dropped overboard at the threat of capture. During the American Revolution, couriers who traveled by boat, carried intelligence reports inside weighted bottles that could be dropped overboard at the threat of capture.2 A hollowed-out lead bullet was used to conceal smaller written messages, but this was eventually replaced by a similar bullet made of silver that could be swallowed at the first sign of danger without incurring the ills of lead poisoning. A hollowed-out lead bullet was used to conceal smaller written messages, but this was eventually replaced by a similar bullet made of silver that could be swallowed at the first sign of danger without incurring the ills of lead poisoning.3 OTS's laboratory for concealments grew out of the OSS Research and Development-Camouflage Division in Fort Was.h.i.+ngton, Maryland, which had produced letter drops for use by World War II agents.4 The drops were originally made from tree limbs. The wood was split and a metal container inserted in such a fas.h.i.+on that the wood could be replaced and present an innocent appearance to any observer. The drops were originally made from tree limbs. The wood was split and a metal container inserted in such a fas.h.i.+on that the wood could be replaced and present an innocent appearance to any observer.5 An important principle learned after receiving comments back from the field was that the drops should never be constructed of anything burnable or edible, lest they be picked up and used by some pa.s.serby needing food or fuel. Afterward, better drops were produced in various forms that included stones and old tin cans. Such drops were designed to be be ignored by anyone not involved with the operation and could be left at public locations, such as at a prearranged distance from a mile-marker on a European road, for a two-way exchange of intelligence. An important principle learned after receiving comments back from the field was that the drops should never be constructed of anything burnable or edible, lest they be picked up and used by some pa.s.serby needing food or fuel. Afterward, better drops were produced in various forms that included stones and old tin cans. Such drops were designed to be be ignored by anyone not involved with the operation and could be left at public locations, such as at a prearranged distance from a mile-marker on a European road, for a two-way exchange of intelligence. 6 6

Sensitive notes and information could be protected by use of a Combustible Notebook. The ordinary-looking notebook contained Pryofilm, which when ignited by an incendiary pencil, would destroy the notebook and contents in thirty seconds, 1940s.

Another research and development unit, Division 19, Miscellaneous Weapons of the National Defense Research Committee, supported OSS's wartime requirements and established its first lab in June 1943 at the Congressional Country Club outside Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C, operating as the Maryland Research Laboratory.7 Under the project code-named MOTH, three containers were created for transporting concealed secret intelligence doc.u.ments with devices to destroy the contents "if opened by a person unfamiliar with its use." One device could be camouflaged inside a fountain pen or shaving kit and held two or three folded sheets that would be destroyed thirty seconds after initiation. The second was a medium-sized notebook with bound sheets that was destroyed summarily, and the third was a briefcase capable of destroying a special insertable pocket for maps and papers. Under the project code-named MOTH, three containers were created for transporting concealed secret intelligence doc.u.ments with devices to destroy the contents "if opened by a person unfamiliar with its use." One device could be camouflaged inside a fountain pen or shaving kit and held two or three folded sheets that would be destroyed thirty seconds after initiation. The second was a medium-sized notebook with bound sheets that was destroyed summarily, and the third was a briefcase capable of destroying a special insertable pocket for maps and papers.8 The U.S. Army operated a secret Escape and Evasion (E&E) laboratory and facility under the secret MIS-X program at Fort Hunt, Virginia, during World War II. This lab produced concealments and E&E aids including silk maps hidden in clothing and playing cards; compa.s.ses inside uniform b.u.t.tons, safety razors, pencils, and fountain pens; and shortwave radios inside mess kits, baseb.a.l.l.s, and cribbage boards.9 The true nature of the CIA's original concealment program, a charter function of the Technical Services Staff, was obscured by its name, "Furnis.h.i.+ngs and Equipment Division." During the Cold War, objects with un-apparent cavities such as furniture and automobiles were required when it became operationally desirable to hide a person, pa.s.sageway, or object. Concealment created the illusion that the object being used for hiding had no relations.h.i.+p to a clandestine operation.10 Camouflage was a less-secure means of hiding than concealment; like a cover, if camouflage is removed, the contents could be seen. A large safe with a tarp thrown on top may be camouflaged and removing the tarp would expose the object as a safe. However, if a false bottom was created inside the safe and the cavity door could be opened only by manipulating a hidden latch, the safe was transformed into a concealment. Camouflage was a less-secure means of hiding than concealment; like a cover, if camouflage is removed, the contents could be seen. A large safe with a tarp thrown on top may be camouflaged and removing the tarp would expose the object as a safe. However, if a false bottom was created inside the safe and the cavity door could be opened only by manipulating a hidden latch, the safe was transformed into a concealment.

A concealment device, or CD, includes a hidden compartment to which access is obtained by mechanical decipherment of locks, hinges, and latches. The mechanical actions necessary to open a CD are normally a sequence of unnatural twists, turns, and pulls. Intelligence services used CDs to mask the entrance to tunnels or hiding places as well as for hiding spy gear. OTS categorized concealments as being active or pa.s.sive.

An active CD possessed an obvious function that remained operable in addition to the internal cavity and the spy gear it housed. An example of an active CD was a fountain pen that wrote normally but contained a subminiature camera that could be operated without affecting the writing function. The writing instrument masked the presence of the concealment. Another example would be a video camera concealed inside a lamp with both devices performing their designed functions separately or simultaneously. A calculator modified with a concealment cavity for a beacon was considered active if it continued to add, subtract, multiply, and divide.

The 1960s Burma Shave-can active concealment produced shaving foam and masked an internal cavity. Years later such items were copied by criminals for use in smuggling.

A pa.s.sive CD provides a cavity for concealing materials but does not perform another function to mask its clandestine use. For example, a wooden statue with a cavity in the base would have no function other than for display. An attache case with a false bottom at its base or a book with a hollowed-out cover were other examples of pa.s.sive CDs that became a standard part of every case officer's and agent's operational equipment.

Concealments served five operational purposes: storing (bookcase at home), transporting (travel purse), exchanging (a loaded dirty mitten at a dead drop site), infiltrating (an audio transmitter inside a gift to a target), and masking (a wine rack placed in front of the entrance to a secret pa.s.sageway).

Spies with compromising equipment must secretly store and protect the clandestine gear in their possession. One-time pads for enciphering messages or subminiature cameras must be stored indefinitely for use at the appropriate time. Sensitive intelligence information or doc.u.ments must be hidden until pa.s.sed to the handler. CDs need to provide quick access to the equipment and information while protecting against accidental discovery by a family member or exposure during a more threatening security search. The size of the items to be stored in the concealment and the available method for getting the CD to the agent dictated what could be used.

Virtually any object that offers sufficient volume can be converted into a concealment device, but the object has to fit into the user's lifestyle. The local economy in the agent's country often restricts the variety of CDs issued. In areas where consumer goods are in short supply, it may be difficult to find items that could be given to the agent for storage purposes without causing neighbors to be envious and suspicious. Constructing a CD inside a false-bottomed five-liter petrol can be an effective storage device for an agent with a car or garage, but if the country was experiencing severe petrol shortages such a luxury might be seen as out of place or be a target for theft.

In the decades before data could be stored on discs and thumb drives, wooden desks and bookcases that could conceal a four-inch briefcase, a large doc.u.ment, disguise items, radios, and cameras were among the most popular concealment "hosts."11 Concealment furniture was constructed to blend in with the home decor of the user. Bookcases, in particular, were universally accepted as common furniture. They were durable and could be built with cavities throughout-at the top behind the molding, inside the shelves, in a false back, in the thickness of the sides, or with the largest cavity beneath the bottom shelf behind the skirt. Concealment furniture was constructed to blend in with the home decor of the user. Bookcases, in particular, were universally accepted as common furniture. They were durable and could be built with cavities throughout-at the top behind the molding, inside the shelves, in a false back, in the thickness of the sides, or with the largest cavity beneath the bottom shelf behind the skirt.

Material being exchanged by dead drop was hidden inside specially constructed CDs designed to blend in with the site's surroundings and remain unrecognized until retrieved. If the drop site was in a park, a small piece of tree limb hollowed out to hold film ca.s.settes or a false pa.s.sport would have been a typical concealment.12 Waterproof containers, weighted with lead shot to compensate for the buoyancy, were constructed to fit inside drainpipes, toilet reservoirs, or submerged in the shallow water of a decorative pond or stream. Waterproof containers, weighted with lead shot to compensate for the buoyancy, were constructed to fit inside drainpipes, toilet reservoirs, or submerged in the shallow water of a decorative pond or stream.13 Other "natural environment" concealments resembled bricks or chunks of masonry. Other "natural environment" concealments resembled bricks or chunks of masonry.14 These items were collectively known within CIA as "sticks and bricks" because, when deployed, they were indistinguishable from the original pieces in their natural environment. These items were collectively known within CIA as "sticks and bricks" because, when deployed, they were indistinguishable from the original pieces in their natural environment.

Dead drop concealments normally must have no value to the society where used. Otherwise, the concealment may be collected for its a.s.sumed worth. In theory, the more repulsive a dead drop CD appeared, the more attractive its operational use. A crushed can still dripping oil, a piece of electrical cable coming out a wall with exposed wires that appeared "live," discarded bandages and medical waste, or animal excrement were unlikely to be picked up by a casual pa.s.serby.

Animal carca.s.ses, especially decaying ones, are universally offensive and thus effective for dead drop containers.15 OTS specialists periodically produced CDs from pigeons, rats, and an occasional roadkill. The lab animals were humanely killed, then gutted and treated to create an artificial cavity inside the stomach and chest. Some were freeze-dried and vacuum-packed in tin cans. Material intended for the agent was wrapped in aluminum foil and inserted inside the created cavity and the animal st.i.tched back together. Before the carca.s.s was deployed, it might be doused in Tabasco sauce as a deterrent to hungry cats roaming the streets. Pigeon carca.s.ses were typically dropped at sites around parks and the special rats were often just left by the side of the road. To make the dead rats even more repugnant, OTS constructed rubberized "gut parts" to spill out of the carca.s.s as it lay on the road. When deployed, the roadkill CD was intended to be retrieved quickly. OTS specialists periodically produced CDs from pigeons, rats, and an occasional roadkill. The lab animals were humanely killed, then gutted and treated to create an artificial cavity inside the stomach and chest. Some were freeze-dried and vacuum-packed in tin cans. Material intended for the agent was wrapped in aluminum foil and inserted inside the created cavity and the animal st.i.tched back together. Before the carca.s.s was deployed, it might be doused in Tabasco sauce as a deterrent to hungry cats roaming the streets. Pigeon carca.s.ses were typically dropped at sites around parks and the special rats were often just left by the side of the road. To make the dead rats even more repugnant, OTS constructed rubberized "gut parts" to spill out of the carca.s.s as it lay on the road. When deployed, the roadkill CD was intended to be retrieved quickly.

Agents needed a secure means to transport their spy gear. If recruited outside a denied area, the agent would be required to reestablish contact after they returned home and were ready to begin work. The techs found a solution by hiding one-time pads and commo schedules inside inexpensive tourist souvenirs such as statues of saints, reproductions of sculpture, and castings of famous buildings. These items could be collected in cities where the agent traveled, carried by hand, and readily explained as a tourist purchase if questioned. Low-cost items were less likely to be examined when packed in personal luggage. For greater security, these were one-time-use CDs that could not be opened without being broken to access their contents. Because there was no hidden latch or manipulation that might betray the method of opening the CD, the cavity was not likely to be detected even during a close examination.

People, as well as information often needed to be "transported."16 During the Cold War CIA and OTS worked successfully on more than 140 "illegal movement" operations without ever losing a person. During the Cold War CIA and OTS worked successfully on more than 140 "illegal movement" operations without ever losing a person.17 OTS constructed life-supporting human concealments for defectors or escapees in the form of specially designed exfiltration crates or modified automobiles. Refrigerator boxes could house an eight-hour life support system for a person weighing up to 250 pounds and measuring up to six foot six inches tall. The less than luxurious container included items needed to support basic life and body functionality such as "piddle packs" for urination, absorbent sponges, food, water, ice packs, gel packs, a warming source, and circulating battery fans. Constraints on the internal oxygen supply usually limited the time a system could be employed. OTS constructed life-supporting human concealments for defectors or escapees in the form of specially designed exfiltration crates or modified automobiles. Refrigerator boxes could house an eight-hour life support system for a person weighing up to 250 pounds and measuring up to six foot six inches tall. The less than luxurious container included items needed to support basic life and body functionality such as "piddle packs" for urination, absorbent sponges, food, water, ice packs, gel packs, a warming source, and circulating battery fans. Constraints on the internal oxygen supply usually limited the time a system could be employed.

During one exfiltration of an agent from a Soviet Bloc country, the border crossing took much longer than planned when the vehicle was held up at several checkpoints. The agent was wedged inside a concealment built in the car's trunk with virtually no room to move. Officers driving the car, although concerned about the agent's well-being, could do nothing. Finally, after several hours longer than expected, the automobile arrived at a safe location, the concealment opened and the individual pulled out. To the amazement of the officers present, the agent was smiling and seemed unperturbed by his claustrophobic adventure. When asked how he had tolerated the experience so well, the safe and grateful agent replied that he had been a tank driver in the Soviet army. As a result, he was accustomed to being a contortionist.

In a less successful operation, OTS received a requirement for a Mercedes sedan configured to conceal a man who would be driven out of Eastern Europe. The lead OTS specialist designed a concealment using s.p.a.ce created by reducing the car's fuel tank. He worked on the project for six months to remove the original tank, replace it with a smaller one, and make other external and interior configurations to accommodate the agent. When finished, the pa.s.senger area, trunk, and underside looked factory new. The tech received unanimous acclaim for doing a first-cla.s.s concealment job.

The automobile purchase had been disa.s.sociated from the Agency and the t.i.tle and paperwork showed no official connection between the car and the U.S. government. The station arranged for a driver who was not aware of the intended use of the car to deliver the vehicle to Berlin. Apparently, the driver failed to heed the fuel indicator and ran out of gas while in route. He contacted the nearest Mercedes dealer because something "wasn't working" right-the tank had been full when he started the trip, yet the fuel gauge had fallen quickly and he had run out of fuel well under the normal range for the vehicle. The technician examined the car for some time and then called the driver. "Sir, you have a problem," a.s.serted the technician as he pointed out the small tank and the cavity. The discovery immediately ended the operation but the U.S. government now owned a new limited-range Mercedes. Eventually the car became the VIP touring sedan at one of OTS's covert facilities.

Another exfiltration operation required a person be moved from a major hotel in a Middle Eastern country that was known to be under surveillance by the local service hostile to the United States. OTS techs covertly observed the comings and goings at the hotel for several days and determinedthat the surveillance focused exclusively on people entering and leaving but showed no interest in baggage or luggage. It was, a tech suggested, time to consult with some of OTS's Hollywood contacts who specialized in performing magic tricks. If a magician could saw his beautiful a.s.sistant in half and then have her emerge intact from a coffin half a stage away, surely he could sneak someone past a surveillance team.

A magician and his trick builders designed a dolly for rolling luggage that was loaded with varying sizes of suitcases, a steamer trunk, and an ice chest. The facade of the baggage on the dolly appeared completely realistic; each piece was designed to fit around the legs, arms, torso, and head of a person so that the agent could sit inside and be wheeled out of the hotel by the porter into a waiting van. The operation proceeded without incident, completely confounding the surveillance.

CDs are critical to infiltrating secret equipment into a facility. The "Trojan horse" is often an item desired by the target or a gift given as a gesture of goodwill that conceals a bug, a beacon, or even an explosive device.18 A Trojan horse operation against a communist country's amba.s.sador in Europe exploited the diplomat's interest in a piece of sculpture he openly admired at a dinner party. The local CIA station reasoned that the sculpture, an impressive large bronze of an old farmer, might be displayed by the amba.s.sador in his emba.s.sy conference room. The size of the piece made it an ideal host for an audio device and the batteries necessary for a long service life. The station obtained the original sculpture, but the techs could not create a hollow cavity inside the bronze and restore the original without leaving signs of alteration.

The alternative was to sculpt an identical statue and position the eavesdropping package inside the farmer's head before the final casting. By creating a forged sculpture, no visible scars would appear on the outside and the sealed bronze would limit access to the unit if examined by the emba.s.sy's technical team. OTS found an accomplished sculptor from among its artists and the final casting was declared a masterpiece; even its weight replicated that of the original. When the audio components were tested, the device accurately reproduced the room sounds using a microphone "airway" the tech had hidden inside the recesses of the farmer's mouth.

An access agent presented the statue to the amba.s.sador during a ceremony on the annual celebration of the communist country's national day. A listening post, a block away from the emba.s.sy, recorded the event as the access agent wheeled the bronze into the emba.s.sy and made the presentation. After several minutes of listening to diplomatic social chatter, the listening post's keeper remotely switched the device off until the next morning. All waited anxiously to hear where the amba.s.sador would display the sculpture.

When the audio was switched on again, the concealed statue continued performing splendidly. The amba.s.sador had it sitting next to him as he conducted his daily briefing of his senior ministers. The placement could not have been better, right in the amba.s.sador's conference room.

Congratulations for the CIA officers were, however, premature. The amba.s.sador then announced that a treasure like this statue deserved to stand in the emba.s.sy's most prestigious location. All important visitors would pa.s.s this prominent spot at the top of the stairs leading to the amba.s.sador's suite and thus could pause to admire the sculpture.

The announcement was terrible news for the operation. The top of the stairs would not be an area used for secret briefings and meetings. The listening post monitored the device for several weeks but obtained nothing of intelligence value. The concealment tech and sculptor had done their jobs, perhaps too well. a.s.sessment of the amba.s.sador had not antic.i.p.ated his need to display and show off the magnificent gift.19 OTS created masking or camouflage for equipment whose size, location, or function precluded concealment, but which could not be left visible. Roof antennas were masked by tool or storage sheds to prevent another security service from determining the antenna's direction and configuration. A laser communication device pointing out of the window of an agent's dining room might be camouflaged as a large decorative urn. The entrance to a secret tunnel in the bas.e.m.e.nt of a safe house could be masked by a bar and wine racks that slid easily aside for the tunnel access. Each masking system is designed to draw attention to the mask itself without attempting to hide the fact of its existence. Because the mask is something that would be expected in the environment, no particular curiosity is aroused and no further examination of the mask is invited.

OTS techs enjoyed James Bond movies for the beautiful women, daring men, quips, and especially for the clever ingenuity exhibited by Major Quentin Boothroyd, known as Q. They never failed to be amazed at how well Q's devices always worked in the field.20 The gadget master for Her Majesty's Service met with Bond before each operation and issued him devices drawn from a seemingly endless array of well-designed and highly crafted gadgets. Q always antic.i.p.ated needs and applied technology that pushed the boundaries of design, materials, and craftsmans.h.i.+p. In the character of Q, techs recognized a surprisingly realistic depiction of a scientist-craftsman-intelligence officer who shared many of their everyday problems. Q dealt with officers who were technophobic, worked with people who neither understood nor trusted technology, spent hours teaching the proper use of devices, and unsuccessfully admonished Bond to remember to return the gadget to stores when finished with it. At OTS, a real-life Q would have felt comfortable at a location known simply as "the lab." The gadget master for Her Majesty's Service met with Bond before each operation and issued him devices drawn from a seemingly endless array of well-designed and highly crafted gadgets. Q always antic.i.p.ated needs and applied technology that pushed the boundaries of design, materials, and craftsmans.h.i.+p. In the character of Q, techs recognized a surprisingly realistic depiction of a scientist-craftsman-intelligence officer who shared many of their everyday problems. Q dealt with officers who were technophobic, worked with people who neither understood nor trusted technology, spent hours teaching the proper use of devices, and unsuccessfully admonished Bond to remember to return the gadget to stores when finished with it. At OTS, a real-life Q would have felt comfortable at a location known simply as "the lab."

The OTS lab, an hour's drive (or more, depending on traffic) from downtown Was.h.i.+ngton, would have been the dream of any craftsman. One tech, with a university degree in mechanical engineering, remembered thinking that the array of equipment he saw on his first day on the job was awe inspiring. In the mid-1970s the lab employed craftsmen and -women specialists for all of the hand skills needed for professional concealments-metal and automotive shop; wood, plastic, and ceramic shop; electronics; leather; fabric; gla.s.s; seamstress; bookbinding; welding; tool making; photography; drafting-and others. The lab seemed to have virtually every piece of equipment available to work on any material.

Compared to a university environment, the lab wanted for neither money nor skilled craftsmen. If the concealment tech needed a new tool or piece of equipment, he could get it or make it. Men and women with twenty or more years of experience seemed eager to pa.s.s their knowledge on to the new arrival. Not only did the lab have talented techs, it also had the necessary tools and materials, such as industrial-quality sewing machines for professional work with textiles, fabric, and leather. Thousands of dollars' worth of the finest glove and belt-weight leathers, dyes of every color, along with cutting and buffing machines, were available to make items appear "factory new" or "old as dirt." The shop could produce handbags with fine st.i.tching and maintained a selection of needles, guards for hands, colors and weights of threads, and various types of fabrics. In the metal shop there were tools that few universities could afford, including special gauges and single-purpose cutters. The cabinetmaking shop turned out furniture, molding, or decorative boxes with the look, craftsmans.h.i.+p, and quality of the finest manufacturer. Exotic woods were available to match any operational need. The plastic and electronic shops were similarly equipped.

As clandestine ops in the Soviet Union accelerated, the lab devoted half of its concealment output to supporting these operations. Soviet operations were considered so sensitive that case officers demanded a different type of concealment item for every operation; and since no item was ever repeated, each required the full process from design to fabrication.21 Items with the largest cavities were usually wooden structures such as bookcases and desks. Techs in the 1970s designed and built all CD furniture from scratch, from unfinished raw wood to completed desk, bookcase, or bed stand.22 Later, in the 1980s, "solid" wood products began to be replaced on the commercial market with furniture constructed from particleboard, which was less expensive, but frequently heavier and less durable. Since the techs' job was to produce CDs that blended in with other contemporary furniture, the lab s.h.i.+fted its construction to particleboard as well. For the OTS craftsmen this change was accompanied by a noticeable fall-off in the quality of furniture and increased operational difficulties. A case officer who issued a particleboard CD bookcase learned that after one or two moves, the tolerances and alignment of latches necessary for the CD to function properly did not hold up nearly as well as those in solid wood. The techs found adjustments almost impossible, so the only solution was to build a new piece. Later, in the 1980s, "solid" wood products began to be replaced on the commercial market with furniture constructed from particleboard, which was less expensive, but frequently heavier and less durable. Since the techs' job was to produce CDs that blended in with other contemporary furniture, the lab s.h.i.+fted its construction to particleboard as well. For the OTS craftsmen this change was accompanied by a noticeable fall-off in the quality of furniture and increased operational difficulties. A case officer who issued a particleboard CD bookcase learned that after one or two moves, the tolerances and alignment of latches necessary for the CD to function properly did not hold up nearly as well as those in solid wood. The techs found adjustments almost impossible, so the only solution was to build a new piece.

Although wood was most frequently used, by no means was it the only host material employed for concealments. The lab could construct CDs in toolboxes, toasters, power supplies, large step-down transformers (2000-watt models that were available overseas), bases of small refrigerators, small air conditioners, and vehicles. The shop was equipped to work in plastics, a material that went through phases of popularity in the consumer marketplace. However, plastic generally was so light that if used as a CD for any weighty item, an explanation was required as to why this apparently lightweight plastic set of drawers seemed so heavy and solid.

The OTS concealment shop was the ultimate "form, fit, and function" business that encouraged imagination. "If you can think it, you can do it" became the unofficial motto. The techs called their lab "the greatest toy shop in the world."

Concealment techs understood that if there were an intuitive or obvious means of opening the host device, the CD would not meet the level of security required for its clandestine use. Therefore, they pursued a continuing search for a "hidden catch" or an inventive new way to keep something hidden from anyone other than the intended user. Catches and latches became the stock-in-trade of concealment specialists, since if the compartment could be opened by anyone, it was not an acceptable CD. Hinges, magnets, pins, slides, pneumatic tubes, and even old-fas.h.i.+oned pull bolts were used to create an array of concealed openings. Generally, to open a CD required twists, turns, or pulls in a precise combination that functioned as a form of mechanical code that had to be performed before gaining access.

The techs recognized that concealments in everyday items had to look normal, yet be easily opened by those who knew the "code." An OTS concealment tech in the 1970s remembers designing and building a concealment that required normal manual dexterity to open the device. However, word later came back to the tech that the device, though perfect in every other aspect, was not usable because the agent had nonfunctional arthritic thumbs. The case officer had not previously provided this information about the agent's limitations, and the tech never thought to ask for it. It was a lesson long remembered. Only by observing and asking probing questions during the design process could the techs devise a concealment that made the agent feel as if the device had always been part of him. The successful concealments matched the CD to the person and the CD became second nature when used and operated.

Every CD was designed to meet an antic.i.p.ated level of threat. A low-threat CD for the home of a case officer might be adequate for hiding his office attache case, which itself was a CD. At the other extreme were CDs used to transport sensitive materials across international borders where they were subjected to x-ray and magnetometer readings as well as physical examinations.

Sometimes a perfect-looking dead drop CD was not enough; it also had to pa.s.s the "smell test." In the late 1970s, the KGB determined that some of the OTS dead drop concealments made from wood to resemble tree limbs had been a.s.sembled using a type of epoxy whose odor was detectable by specially trained KGB dogs. The unfortunate success of the KGB in discovering some containers led the lab to identify the flaw in their production process and replace the epoxy with a nonscented adhesive.

The techs were ever conscious that an agent's life often depended on the skill and ingenuity they used to fabricate the CD. If spy gear inside a CD was discovered, it became prima facie evidence of espionage. Such a compromise would not only seal the fate of the agent, but could result in the detection of other agents using similar equipment and lead to the arrest of the handler.

The craftsmen of high-threat CDs worked under dual requirements that the host could always be subjected to physical search and an item's design had to fit with the agent's lifestyle and cover. When completed, the host would look and function exactly as expected in the agent's environment and the concealment cavity be inaccessible to anyone unaware of the mechanical cipher.

Detailed drawings of the concealment host and thorough doc.u.mentation of concealment issuances were maintained. These records became invaluable should a CD be lost or compromised. If other CDs like it had been issued in the same country, they might need to be recalled and replaced. Once hostile counterintelligence officers learned of a CD, and how it was manipulated and opened, they could be expected to be on the lookout for similar pieces.

OTS concealment makers were masters of craft and illusion. Whimsy, smoke, and mirrors were as much the materials of CDs as wood and metal and fabric. It was expected that the techs would be masters of the fabrication skills required of their craft, but they constantly challenged each other to reach the next level by making materials do things they were not intended or expected to do. The best CDs used materials in ways not done elsewhere and possibly never done before. Fabrication skills were one part of creating an illusion; the thought process for the initial idea was of equal importance and an indispensable step in designing a device. Concealments worked because people a.s.sumed what they observed was the only reality. A person looking at a lamp could not imagine that illumination was its secondary feature. The primary function of the lamp was storage-storing the hidden camera that was taking the observer's picture. For clandestine operations, illusion and CDs worked together because people want to believe what they see. The OTS techs succeeded brilliantly in fabricating concealments from physical materials; in time, their next challenge would be to do the same with electronic software.

CHAPTER 23.

Clandestine Surveillance

He was now "black"-free of surveillance. Moscow was his.

-Milt Bearden in The Main Enemy The word "surveillance" comes from the French surveiller surveiller, to watch over. The CIA broadened the definition to "watching from anywhere" and relied on TSS and its successor organizations to build and deploy special equipment for surveillance and countersurveillance operations. The CIA has used surveillance for both offensive and defensive purposes by secretly collecting information about the movement and activity of recruitment targets and using countersurveillance to protect CIA officers engaged in clandestine acts.

Surveillance operations employ stationary (fixed or static) or mobile a.s.sets as needed. "Stationary surveillance" refers to sustained observations made from fixed sites, which can be apartment buildings, cafes, airports, or intersections. The monitoring attempts to identify either the people transiting the site or the type of activity conducted at the location. The target site would be observed from an observation post manned by trained surveillance personnel using still and video camera systems. As the capability and reliability of visual surveillance equipment improved, unmanned observation posts that recorded and transmitted images to a control point significantly reduced the number of personnel required for multiple fixed-surveillance sites.1 "Mobile surveillance," conducted primarily by foot, automobile, or airplane, tracks a person or other moving target, such as a vehicle or s.h.i.+pping container. OTS supplied concealed surveillance cameras, disguises, and specialized communication equipment for mobile teams. Mobile surveillance becomes particularly important when terrorists are identified and their movements need to be observed and plotted.

The Fiberscope is composed of a pistol-grip viewer and a flexible shaft designed to enable inspection of remote or inaccessible locations. A panoramic view was obtained by drilling a .315-inch hole in the adjacent wall or ceiling, or by sliding the tip through the target's keyhole or under the doorway, circa 1968.

Surveillance photography serves dual operational purposes: to establish positive photo identification of a target and operational acts, such as meetings, exchanges of doc.u.ments, and payoffs. The quality of the photography depends on selecting the right camera for the operational environment. In a stationary observation post, typically located inside a building, camouflaged cameras are prepositioned to photograph a target and can be controlled manually or remotely. Inside an apartment or hotel room with a common wall to the target, covert photographs can be taken from behind a ventilation grille, through a pinhole lens, or using a pre-installed camera "port." Images from digital cameras may be immediately transmitted to an operational base. In the early 1990s, film cameras began to be replaced by high-resolution digital cameras. At first, images were recorded to videotape and then later to digital storage media. The advantages of advanced storage capacity and digital transmission of captured images expanded the applications for photographic surveillance. Miniaturization and capacity advances in the 1990s of small, low-light video cameras allowed video concealments to employ many of the same techniques previously used by audio surveillance to hide small microphones in wood blocks, books, or office equipment.

Mobile observation posts, using surveillance cameras carried by a person on foot, or riding on a bicycle, car, train, or aircraft, add another capability for covert collection. Concealment requirements and the need to compensate for the target's movement limit the choice of cameras for mobile posts when compared to the fixed sites. At close range to the target, traditional camera systems will often be concealed beneath the user's clothing or inside a briefcase or purse. The ubiquitous presence of cell phones and their integrated imaging features fundamentally altered the nature of visual surveillance by creating the reality that any action done in public is likely to have been photographed by someone.

Historically, for intelligence photography, 35mm cameras with varying lengths of standard and telephoto lenses provided the highest possible level of detail (resolution) in still images. In 2001, with the advent of the Nikon D1X (5.9 million effective pixels), OTS accelerated its movement toward digital imaging for all photographic requirements.

At greater distances, cameras with long lenses make a target appear closer and enlarge the image on the film media. These telephoto lenses could be 500mm, 1,000mm, 2,000mm, or even longer.2 A lens 300mm or longer is almost impossible to hand-hold without a tripod or other means of support. The commercially available Questar Seven 2,800mm lens with a 35mm camera and tripod can read the numbers on a license plate from more than two miles away with adequate lighting and favorable atmospheric conditions. A lens 300mm or longer is almost impossible to hand-hold without a tripod or other means of support. The commercially available Questar Seven 2,800mm lens with a 35mm camera and tripod can read the numbers on a license plate from more than two miles away with adequate lighting and favorable atmospheric conditions.3 Because surveillance pictures using film cameras are often taken at night during periods of little light, careful selection of available light, ultra-high-speed film, or infrared materials are required. Available-light photography requires the fastest available film and steady support. The sensitivity of commercially available ultra-high-speed film to ASA 6400 can be "push processed" to sensitivity above ASA 50,000 by manipulating the developing time, development temperature, or both.4 At these extreme ASA levels, it is possible to photograph a subject at night illuminated by a single birthday candle. Infrared surveillance photography that takes place at the end of the light spectrum is not visible to the unaided eye and requires only a standard 35mm camera, infrared film, and a strobe flash unit with an infrared filter . At these extreme ASA levels, it is possible to photograph a subject at night illuminated by a single birthday candle. Infrared surveillance photography that takes place at the end of the light spectrum is not visible to the unaided eye and requires only a standard 35mm camera, infrared film, and a strobe flash unit with an infrared filter .5

The spring-wound advance on the German robot camera could be remotely activated while the camera remained concealed in a leather attache case.

"Tracking devices," particularly beacons, aid mobile surveillance when close surveillance is impractical or undesirable. Tracking devices are selected based on the nature of the target and operational issues. In practice, beacons are most useful in tracking inanimate objects such as vehicles and s.h.i.+pping containers. Success in implanting a covert beacon inside the human body, despite a.s.sertions by some that "my teeth contain government-installed devices," eluded the CIA. Contrary to certain remarkable scenes in spy movies, OTS found that human behavior, combined with technical limitations imposed by laws of physics, made "personal beaconing" practically impossible.