The Cavalry General Part 4

VII

If prudence may be spoken of as the one quality distinctive of true generals.h.i.+p, there are two respects in which a general of cavalry at Athens should pre-eminently excel. Not only must he show a dutiful submission to the G.o.ds; but he must possess great fighting qualities, seeing that he has on his borders a rival cavalry equal to his own in number and backed by a large force of heavy infantry. (1) So that, if he undertake to invade the enemy's territory unsupported by the other forces of the city (2)--in dealing with two descriptions of forces single-handed, he and his cavalry must look for a desperate adventure; or to take the converse case, that the enemy invades the soil of Attica, to begin with, he will not invade at all, unless supported by other cavalry besides his own and an infantry force sufficient to warrant the supposition that no force on our side can cope with him.

(1) The reference is doubtless to the Thebans. Unfortunately we do not know, on good authority, how many troops of either arm they had in the field at Leuctra or at Mantinea.

(2) Lit. "without the rest of the city," i.e. the hoplites, etc.

Now, to deal with this vast hostile array, if only the city will determine to sally out en ma.s.se to protect her rural districts, the prospect is fair. Under G.o.d, our troopers, if properly cared for, are the finer men; our infantry of the line are no less numerous, and as regards physique, if it comes to that, not one whit inferior, while in reference to moral qualities, they are more susceptible to the spur of a n.o.ble ambition, if only under G.o.d's will they be correctly trained.

Or again, as touching pride of ancestry, what have Athenians to fear as against Boeotians on that score? (3)

(3) See "Mem." III. v. 3, where it is contended that in pride of ancestry Athenians can hold their own against Boeotians.

But suppose the city of Athens determine to betake herself to her navy, as in the old days when the Lacedaemonians, leagued with the rest of h.e.l.las, brought invasion; (4) and is content once more simply to protect her walls through thick and thin. As to protecting what lies outside the city wall she looks to her cavalry for that; and single-handed her troopers must do desperate encounter against the united forces of the enemy. I say, under these circ.u.mstances, we shall need in the first place the strong support of Heaven; and in the second place, well will it be for us if our cavalry commander prove himself a consummate officer. (5) Indeed, he will have need of large wisdom to deal with a force so vastly superior in numbers, and of enterprise to strike when the critical moment comes.

(4) See Thuc. ii. 13, 14, 22, etc., and in particular iv. 95, Hippocrates' speech before the battle of Delium, 424 B.C.

(5) A "parfait marechal."

He must also, as it appears to me, be capable of great physical endurance; (6) since clearly, if he has to run full tilt against an armament present, as we picture, in such force that not even our whole state cares to cope with it, it is plain he must accept whatever fate is due, where might is right, himself unable to retaliate.

(6) So Jason, "h.e.l.l." VI. i. 4.

If, on the contrary, he elect to guard the territory outside the walls (7) with a number just sufficient to keep a look-out on the enemy, and to withdraw into safe quarters from a distance whatever needs protection--a small number, be it observed, is just as capable of vedette duty, as well able, say, to scan the distant horizon, as a large; and by the same token men with no great confidence in themselves or in their horses are not ill-qualified to guard, or withdraw within shelter (8) the property of friends; since fear, as the proverb has it, makes a shrewd watchman. The proposal, therefore, to select from these a corps of observation will most likely prove true strategy. But what then of the residue not needed for outpost duty? If any one imagines he has got an armament, he will find it miserably small, and lacking in every qualification necessary to risk an open encounter.

(7) Or, "His better plan would be to."

(8) Reading {anakhorizein}. Cf. "Cyrop." II. ii. 8; "Anab." V. ii. 10; or if {anakh.o.r.ein eis}, transl. "or retire into safe quarters."

See "h.e.l.l." IV. vi. 44.

But let him make up his mind to employ it in guerilla war, and he will find the force quite competent for that, I warrant. His business, so at least it seems to me, will be to keep his men perpetually in readiness to strike a blow, and without exposing himself, to play sentinel, waiting for any false move on the part of the hostile armament. And it is a way with soldiers, bear in mind, the more numerous they are, the more blunders they commit. They must needs scatter of set purpose (9) in search of provisions; or through the disorder incidental to a march, some will advance and others lag behind, beyond a proper limit. Blunders like these, then, our hipparch must not let pa.s.s unpunished (unless he wishes the whole of Attica to become a gigantic camp); (10) keeping his single point steadily in view, that when he strikes a blow he must be expeditious and retire before the main body has time to rally to the rescue.

(9) {epimeleia}. Cf. "Cyrop." V. iii. 47.

(10) Lit. "or else the whole of Attica will be one encampment." As at the date of the fortification of Decelea (413 B.C.), which permanently commanded the whole country. See Thuc. vii. 27. Al.

Courier, "autrement vous n'avez plus de camp, ou pour mieux dire, tout le pays devient votre camp."

Again, it frequently happens on the march, that an army will get into roads where numbers are no advantage. Again, in the pa.s.sage of rivers, defiles, and the like, it is possible for a general with a head on his shoulders to hang on the heels of an enemy in security, and to determine with precision (11) the exact number of the enemy he will care to deal with. Occasionally the fine chance occurs to attack the foe while encamping or breakfasting or supping, or as the men turn out of bed: seasons at which the soldier is apt to be unharnessed--the hoplite for a shorter, the cavalry trooper for a longer period. (12)

(11) See "Anab." II. v. 18; "Cyrop." III. iii. 47; IV. i. 18.

{tamieusasthai}, "with the precision of a controller."

(12) Cf. "h.e.l.l." II. iv. 6; VII. i. 16.

As to vedettes and advanced outposts, you should never cease planning and plotting against them. For these in their turn, as a rule, are apt to consist of small numbers, and are sometimes posted at a great distance from their own main body. But if after all it turns out that the enemy are well on their guard against all such attempts, then, G.o.d helping, it would be a feat of arms to steal into the enemy's country, first making it your business to ascertain (13) his defences, the number of men at this, that, and the other point, and how they are distributed throughout the country. For there is no booty so splendid as an outpost so overmastered; and these frontier outposts are especially p.r.o.ne to be deceived, with their propensity to give chase to any small body they set eyes on, regarding that as their peculiar function. You will have to see, however, in retiring that your line of retreat is not right into the jaws of the enemy's reliefs hastening to the scene of action.

(13) Or, "having first studied." Cf. "Mem." III. vi. 10.

VIII

It stands to reason, however, that in order to be able to inflict real damage upon a greatly superior force, the weaker combatant must possess such a moral superiority over the other as shall enable him to appear in the position of an expert, trained in all the feats of cavalry performance in the field, and leave his enemy to play the part of raw recruits or amateurs. (1)

(1) Cf. "Cyrop." I. v. 11; "Mem." III. vii. 7.

And this end may be secured primarily on this wise: those who are to form your guerilla bands (2) must be so hardened and inured to the saddle that they are capable of undergoing all the toils of a campaign. (3) That a squadron (and I speak of horse and man alike) should enter these lists in careless, disorderly fas.h.i.+on suggests the idea of a troop of women stepping into the arena to cope with male antagonists.

(2) Or, add, "for buccaneers and free-lances you must be."

(3) Lit. "every toil a soldier can encounter."

But reverse the picture. Suppose men and horses to have been taught and trained to leap trenches and scale d.y.k.es, to spring up banks, and plunge from heights without scathe, to gallop headlong at full speed adown a steep: they will tower over unpractised opponents as the birds of the air tower over creatures that crawl and walk. (4) Their feet are case-hardened by constant training, and, when it comes to tramping over rough ground, must differ from the uninitiated as the sound man from the lame. And so again, when it comes to charging and retiring, the onward-das.h.i.+ng gallop, the well-skilled, timely retreat, expert knowledge of the ground and scenery will a.s.sert superiority over inexpertness like that of eyesight over blindness.

(4) See "Horse." viii. 6; cf. "Hunting," xii. 2; "Cyrop." I. vi. 28 foll.

Nor should it be forgotten, that in order to be in thorough efficiency the horses must not only be well fed and in good condition, but at the same time so seasoned by toil that they will go through their work without the risk of becoming broken-winded. And lastly, as bits and saddle-cloths (to be efficient) (5) need to be attached by straps, a cavalry general should never be without a good supply, whereby at a trifling expense he may convert a number of nonplussed troopers into serviceable fighting men. (6)

(5) ({khresima}) L.D. For the {upomnema} itself cf. "Cyrop." VI. ii.

32.

(6) Or, "thus at a trifling outlay he will be able to render so many non-efficients useful." Al. "make the articles as good as new."

But if any one is disposed to dwell on the amount of trouble it will cost him, if he is required to devote himself to horsemans.h.i.+p so a.s.siduously, let him console himself with the reflection that the pains and labours undergone by any man in training for a gymnastic contest are far larger and more formidable than any which the severest training of the horseman will involve; and for this reason, that the greater part of gymnastic exercises are performed "in the sweat of the brow," while equestrian exercise is performed with pleasure. Indeed, there is no accomplishment which so nearly realises the aspiration of a man to have the wings of a bird than this of horsemans.h.i.+p. (7) But further, to a victory obtained in war attaches a far greater weight of glory than belongs to the n.o.blest contest of the arena. (8) Of these the state indeed will share her meed of glory, (9) but in honour of victory in war the very G.o.ds are wont to crown whole states with happiness. (10) So that, for my part, I know not if there be aught else which has a higher claim to be practised than the arts of war.

(7) Cf. "Cyrop." IV. iii. 15; Herod. iv. 132; Plat. "Rep." v. 467 D.

(8) Cf. Eur. "Autolycus," fr. 1, trans. by J. A. Symonds, "Greek Poets," 2nd series, p. 283.

(9) Cf. Plut. "Pelop." 34 (Clough, ii. p. 235): "And yet who would compare all the victories in the Pythian and Olympian games put together, with one of these enterprises of Pelopidas, of which he successfully performed so many?"

(10) "To bind about the brows of states happiness as a coronal."

And this, too, is worth noting: that the buccaneer by sea, the privateersman, through long practice in endurance, is able to live at the expense of far superior powers. Yes, and the life of the freebooter is no less natural and appropriate to landsmen--I do not say, to those who can till and gather in the fruit of their fields, but to those who find themselves deprived of sustenance; since there is no alternative--either men must till their fields or live on the tillage of others, otherwise how will they find the means either of living or of obtaining peace? (11)

(11) Cf. "Econ." v. 7.

Here, too, is a maxim to engrave upon the memory: in charging a superior force, never to leave a difficult tract of ground in the rear of your attack, since there is all the difference in the world between a stumble in flight and a stumble in pursuit.

There is another precaution which I feel called upon to note. Some generals, (12) in attacking a force which they imagine to be inferior to their own, will advance with a ridiculously insufficient force, (13) so that it is the merest accident if they do not experience the injury they were minded to inflict. Conversely, in attacking any enemy whose superiority is a well-known fact, they will bring the whole of their force into action.

(12) Or, "one knows of generals," e.g. Iphicrates at Oneion, 369 B.C.

Cf. "h.e.l.l." VI. v. 51.

(13) Lit. "an absolutely weak force."

Now, my maxim would be precisely converse: if you attack with a prospect of superiority, do not grudge employing all the power at your command; excess of victory (14) never yet caused any conqueror one pang of remorse.

(14) Or, "a great and decided victory." Cf. "Hiero," ii. 16.