The Works of George Berkeley Part 15

(M276) Ens, res, aliquid dic.u.n.tur termini transcendentales. Spinosa, p.

76, prop. 40, Eth. part 2, gives an odd account of their original. Also of the original of all universals-h.o.m.o, Canis, &c.

(M277) Spinosa (vid. Praef. Opera Posthum.) will have G.o.d to be "omnium rerum causa immanens," and to countenance this produces that of St. Paul, "in Him we live," &c. Now this of St. Paul may be explained by my doctrine as well as Spinosa's, or Locke's, or Hobbs's, or Raphson's(185), &c.

(M278) The Will is _purus actus_, or rather pure spirit not imaginable, not sensible, not intelligible, in no wise the object of the understanding, no wise perceivable.

(M279) Substance of a spirit is that it acts, causes, wills, operates, or if you please (to avoid the quibble yt may be made of the word "it") to act, cause, will, operate. Its substance is not knowable, not being an idea.

(M280) Why may we not conceive it possible for G.o.d to create things out of nothing? Certainly we ourselves create in some wise whenever we imagine.

(M281) "Ex nihilo nihil fit." This (saith Spinoza, Opera Posth. p. 464) and the like are called _veritates aeternae_, because "nullam fidem habent extra mentem." To make this axiom have a positive signification, one should express it thus: Every idea has a cause, i.e. is produced by a Will(186).

(M282) The philosophers talk much of a distinction 'twixt absolute & relative things, or 'twixt things considered in their own nature & the same things considered with respect to us. I know not wt they mean by "things considered in themselves." This is nonsense, jargon.

(M283) It seems there can be no perception-no idea-without Will, seeing there are no ideas so indifferent but one had rather have them than annihilation, or annihilation than them. Or if there be such an equal balance, there must be an equal mixture of pleasure and pain to cause it; there being no ideas perfectly void of all pain & uneasiness, but wt are preferable to annihilation.

Recipe in animum tuum, per cogitationem vehementem, rerum ipsarum, non literarum aut sonorum imagines. Hobbs against Wallis.

'Tis a perfection we may imagine in superior spirits, that they can see a great deal at once with the utmost clearness and distinction; whereas we can only see a point(187).

Mem. Wn I treat of mathematiques to enquire into the controversy 'twixt Hobbes and Wallis.

(M284) Every sensation of mine, which happens in consequence of the general known laws of nature, & is from without, i.e. independent of my will, demonstrates the being of a G.o.d, i.e. of an unextended, incorporeal spirit, which is omnipresent, omnipotent, &c.

(M285) I say not with J.S. [John Sergeant] that we _see_ solids. I reject his "solid philosophy"-solidity being only perceived by touch(188).

(M286) It seems to me that will and understanding-volitions and ideas-cannot be separated, that either cannot be possibly without the other.

(M287) Some ideas or other I must have, so long as I exist or will. But no one idea or sort of ideas being essential(189).

(M288) The distinction between idea and ideatum I cannot otherwise conceive than by making one the effect or consequence of dream, reverie, imagination-the other of sense and the constant laws of nature.

(M289) Dico quod extensio non concipitur in se et per se, contra quam dicit Spinoza in Epist. 2a ad Oldenburgium.

(M290) My definition of the word G.o.d I think much clearer than those of Des Cartes & Spinoza, viz. "Ens summe perfectum & absolute infinitum," or "Ens constans infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque est infinitum(190)."

'Tis chiefly the connexion betwixt tangible and visible ideas that deceives, and not the visible ideas themselves.

(M291) But the grand mistake is that we know not what we mean by "we," or "selves," or "mind," &c. 'Tis most sure & certain that our ideas are distinct from the mind, i.e. the Will, the Spirit(191).

(M292) I must not mention the understanding as a faculty or part of the mind. I must include understanding & will in the word Spirit-by which I mean all that is active. I must not say that the understanding diners not from the particular ideas, or the will from particular volitions.

(M293) The Spirit, the Mind, is neither a volition nor an idea.

(M294) I say there are no causes (properly speaking) but spiritual, nothing active but Spirit. Say you, This is only verbal; 'tis only annexing a new sort of signification to the word cause, & why may not others as well retain the old one, and call one idea the cause of another which always follows it? I answer, If you do so I shall drive you into many absurditys: you cannot avoid running into opinions you'll be glad to disown, if you stick firmly to that signification of the word Cause.

(M295) In valuing good we reckon too much on the present & our own.

(M296) There be two sorts of pleasure. The one is ordained as a spur or incitement to somewhat else, & has a visible relation and subordination thereto; the other is not. Thus the pleasure of eating is of the former sort, of musick of the later sort. These may be used for recreation, those not but in order to their end.

(M297) Three sorts of useful knowledge-that of Coexistence, to be treated of in our Principles of Natural Philosophy; that of Relation, in Mathematiques; that of Definition, or inclusion, or words (which perhaps differs not from that of relation), in Morality(192).

(M298) Will, understanding, desire, hatred, &c., so far forth as they are acts or active, differ not. All their difference consists in their objects, circ.u.mstances, &c.

(M299) We must carefully distinguish betwixt two sorts of causes-physical & spiritual.

(M300) The physical may more properly be called occasions. Yet (to comply) we may call them causes-but then we must mean causes yt do nothing.

(M301) According to Locke, we must be in an eternal uneasiness so long as we live, bating the time of sleep or trance, &c.; for he will have even the continuance of an action to be in his sense an action, & so requires a volition, & this an uneasiness.

(M302) I must not pretend to promise much of demonstration. I must cancell all pa.s.sages that look like that sort of pride, that raising of expectation in my friend.

(M303) If this be the case, surely a man had better not philosophize at all: no more than a deformed person ought to cavil to behold himself by the reflex light of a mirrour.

(M304) Or thus, like deformed persons who, having beheld themselves by the reflex light of a mirrour, are displeased with their diseases.

(M305) What can an idea be like but another idea? We can compare it with nothing else-a sound like a sound, a colour like a colour.

(M306) Is it not nonsense to say a smell is like a thing which cannot be smelt, a colour is like a thing wh cannot be seen?