The Works of George Berkeley Part 18

Blind at 1st sight could not tell how near what he saw was to him, nor even whether it be wthout him or in his eye(205). Qu. Would he not think the later?

Blind at 1st sight could not know yt wt he saw was extended, until he had seen and touched some one self-same thing-not knowing how _minimum tangibile_ would look in vision.

(M345) Mem. That h.o.m.ogeneous particles be brought in to answer the objection of G.o.d's creating sun, plants, &c. before animals.

In every bodie two infinite series of extension-the one of tangible, the other of visible.

All things to a blind [man] at first seen in a point.

Ignorance of gla.s.ses made men think extension to be in bodies.

(M346) h.o.m.ogeneous portions of matter-useful to contemplate them.

Extension if in matter changes its relation wth _minimum visibile_, wch seems to be fixt.

Qu. whether m.v. be fix'd?

(M347) Each particle of matter if extended must be infinitely extended, or have an infinite series of extension.

(M348) If the world be granted to consist of Matter, 'tis the mind gives it beauty and proportion.

Wt I have said onely proves there is no proportion at all times and in all men between a visible & tangible inch.

Tangible and visible extension heterogeneous, because they have no common measure; also because their simplest const.i.tuent parts or elements are specifically different, viz. _punctum visibile & tangibile_. N. B. The former seems to be no good reason.

(M349) By immateriality is solv'd the cohesion of bodies, or rather the dispute ceases.

Our idea we call extension neither way capable of infinity, i.e. neither infinitely small or great.

Greatest possible extension seen under an angle wch will be less than 180 degrees, the legs of wch angle proceed from the ends of the extension.

(M350) Allowing there be extended, solid, &c. substances without the mind, 'tis impossible the mind should know or perceive them; the mind, even according to the materialists, perceiving onely the impressions made upon its brain, or rather the ideas attending these impressions(206).

Unity _in abstracto_ not at all divisible, it being as it were a point, or with Barrow nothing at all; _in concreto_ not divisible _ad infinitum_, there being no one idea demonstrable _ad infinitum_.

(M351) Any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities but one particular at once. Locke, b. 4. c. 3. s. 15.

Qu. whether we have clear ideas of large numbers themselves, or onely of their relations?

(M352) Of solidity see L. b. 2. c. 4. s. 1, 5, 6. If any one ask wt solidity is, let him put a flint between his hands and he will know.

Extension of body is continuity of solid, &c.; extension of s.p.a.ce is continuity of unsolid, &c.

Why may not I say visible extension is a continuity of visible points, tangible extension is a continuity of tangible points?

(M353) Mem. That I take notice that I do not fall in wth sceptics, Fardella(207), &c., in that I make bodies to exist certainly, wch they doubt of.

(M354) I am more certain of ye existence & reality of bodies than Mr.

Locke; since he pretends onely to wt he calls sensitive knowledge(208), whereas I think I have demonstrative knowledge of their existence-by them meaning combinations of powers in an unknown substratum(209).

(M355) Our ideas we call figure & extension, not images of the figure and extension of matter; these (if such there be) being infinitely divisible, those not so.

'Tis impossible a material cube should exist, because the edges of a cube will appear broad to an acute sense.

Men die, or are in [a] state of annihilation, oft in a day.

(M356) Powers. Qu. whether more or one onely?

Lengths abstract from breadths are the work of the mind. Such do intersect in a point at all angles. After the same way colour is abstract from extension.

Every position alters the line.

Qu. whether ideas of extension are made up of other ideas, v.g. idea of a foot made up of general ideas of an inch?

The idea of an inch length not one determin'd idea. Hence enquire the reason why we are out in judging of extension by the sight; for which purpose 'tis meet also to consider the frequent & sudden changes of extension by position.

No stated ideas of length without a minimum.

(M357) Material substance banter'd by Locke, b. 2. c. 13. s. 19.

(M358) In my doctrine all absurdities from infinite s.p.a.ce &c. cease(210).

Qu. whether if (speaking grossly) the things we see were all of them at all times too small to be felt, we should have confounded tangible & visible extension and figure?

(M359) Qu. whether if succession of ideas in the Eternal Mind, a day does not seem to G.o.d a 1000 years, rather than a 1000 years a day?

But one only colour & its degrees.

Enquiry about a grand mistake in writers of dioptricks in a.s.signing the cause of microscopes magnifying objects.

Qu. whether a born-blind [man] made to see would at 1st give the name of distance to any idea intromitted by sight; since he would take distance yt that he had perceived by _touch_ to be something existing without his mind, but he would certainly think that nothing _seen_ was without his mind(211)?

(M360) s.p.a.ce without any bodies existing _in rerum natura_ would not be extended, as not having parts-in that parts are a.s.signed to it wth respect to body; from whence also the notion of distance is taken. Now without either parts or distance or mind, how can there be s.p.a.ce, or anything beside one uniform Nothing?

Two demonstrations that blind made to see would not take all things he saw to be without his mind, or not in a point-the one from microscopic eyes, the other from not perceiving distance, i.e. radius of the visual sphere.