The Works of George Berkeley Part 42

Is it said that the new conception is sceptical, and Berkeley another Protagoras, on account of it? His answer is, that the _reality_ of sensible things, as far as man can in any way be concerned with them, does not consist in what cannot be perceived, suggested, demonstrated, or even conceived, but in phenomena actually seen and touched, and in the working faith that future sense-experience may be antic.i.p.ated by the a.n.a.logies of present sense-experience.

But is not this negation of the Matter that is a.s.sumed to be real and independent of Spirit, an unproved conjecture? It is answered, that the affirmation of this abstract matter is itself a mere conjecture, and one self-convicted by its implied contradictions, while its negation is only a simple falling back on the facts of experience, without any attempt to explain them.

Again, is it objected that the _reality_ of sensible things involves their continued reality during intervals of our perception of them? It is answered, that sensible things are indeed permanently dependent on Mind, but not on this, that, or the other finite embodied spirit.

Is it further alleged that the reality of Spirit or Mind is open to all the objections against independent Matter; and that, if we deny _this_ Matter, we must in consistency allow that Spirit can be only a succession of isolated feelings? The answer is, that there is no parity between self-conscious Spirit, and Matter out of all relation to any Spirit. We find, in memory, our own personality and ident.i.ty; that _we_ are not our ideas, "but somewhat else"-a thinking, active principle, that perceives, knows, wills, and operates about ideas, and that is revealed as continuously real. Each person is conscious of himself; and may reasonably infer the existence of other self-conscious persons, more or less like what he is conscious of in himself. A universe of self-conscious persons, with their common sensuous experiences all under cosmical order, is not open to the contradictions involved in a pretended universe of Matter, independent of percipient realising Spirit.

Is it still said that sane people cannot help distinguis.h.i.+ng between the _real existence_ of a thing and its _being perceived_? It is answered, that all they are ent.i.tled to mean is, to distinguish between being perceived exclusively by me, and being independent of the perception of all sentient or conscious beings.

Does an objector complain that this ideal realism dissolves the distinction between facts and fancies? He is reminded of the meaning of the word _idea_. That term is not limited by Berkeley to chimeras of fancy: it is applied also to the objective phenomena of our sense-experience.

Is the supposition that Spirit is the only real Cause of all changes in nature declaimed against as baseless? It is answered, that the supposition of unthinking Power at the heart of the cosmos of sensible phenomena is absurd.

Is the negation of Abstract Matter repugnant to the common belief of mankind? It is argued in reply, that this unrealised Matter is foreign to common belief, which is incapable of even entertaining the conception; and which only requires to reflect upon what it does entertain to be satisfied with a relative or ideal reality for sensible things.

But, if sensible things are the real things, the real moon, for instance, it is alleged, can be only a foot in diameter. It is maintained, in opposition to this, that the term _real moon_ is applied only to what is an inference from the moon, one foot in diameter, which we immediately perceive; and that the former is a part of our previsive or mediate inference, due to what is perceived.

The dispute, after all, is merely verbal, it is next objected; and, since all parties refer the data of the senses and the _things_ which they compose to _a_ Power external to each finite percipient, why not call that Power, whatever it may be, Matter, and not Spirit? The reply is, that this would be an absurd misapplication of language.

But may we not, it is next suggested, a.s.sume the possibility of a third nature-neither idea nor Spirit? Not, replies Philonous, if we are to keep to the rule of having meaning in the words we use. We know what is meant by a spirit, for each of us has immediate experience of one; and we know what is meant by sense-ideas and sensible things, for we have immediate and mediate experience of them. But we have no immediate, and therefore can have no mediate, experience of what is neither perceived by our senses, nor realised in inward consciousness: moreover, "entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem."

Again, this conception of the realities implies, it is said, imperfection, because sentient experience, in G.o.d. This objection, it is answered, implies a confusion between being actually sentient and merely conceiving sensations, and employing them, as G.o.d does, as signs for expressing His conceptions to our minds.

Further, the negation of independent powerful Matter seems to annihilate the explanations of physical phenomena given by natural philosophers. But, to be a.s.sured that it does not, we have only to recollect what physical explanation means-that it is the reference of an apparently irregular phenomenon to some acknowledged general rule of co-existence or succession among sense-ideas. It is interpretation of sense-signs.

Is the proposed ideal Realism summarily condemned as a novelty? It can be answered, that all discoveries are novelties at first; and moreover that this one is not so much a novelty as a deeper interpretation of the common faith.

Yet it seems, at any rate, it is said, to change real things into mere ideas. Here consider on the contrary what we mean when we speak of sensible things as real. The changing appearances of which we are percipient in sense, united objectively in their cosmical order, are what is truly meant by the realities of sense.

But this reality is inconsistent with the _continued ident.i.ty_ of material things, it is complained, and also with the fact that different persons can be percipient of the _same_ thing. Not so, Berkeley explains, when we attend to the true meaning of the word _same_, and dismiss from our thoughts a supposed abstract idea of ident.i.ty which is nonsensical.

But some may exclaim against the supposition that the material world exists in mind, regarding this as an implied a.s.sertion that mind is extended, and therefore material. This proceeds, it is replied, on forgetfulness of what "existence in mind" means. It is intended to express the fact that matter is real in being an objective appearance of which a living mind is sensible.

Lastly, is not the Mosaic account of the creation of Matter inconsistent with the perpetual dependence of Matter for its reality upon percipient Spirit? It is answered that the conception of creation being dependent on the existence of finite minds is in perfect harmony with the Mosaic account: it is what is seen and felt, not what is unseen and unfelt, that is created.

The _Third Dialogue_ closes with a representation of the new principle regarding Matter being the harmony of two apparently discordant propositions-the one-sided proposition of ordinary common sense; and the one-sided proposition of the philosophers. It agrees with the ma.s.s of mankind in holding that the material world is actually presented to our senses, and with the philosophers in holding that this same material world is realised only in and through the percipient experience of living Spirit.

Most of the objections to Berkeley's conception of Matter which have been urged in the last century and a half, by its British, French, and German critics, are discussed by antic.i.p.ation in these _Dialogues_. The history of objections is very much a history of misconceptions. Conceived or misconceived, it has tacitly simplified and purified the methods of physical science, especially in Britain and France.

The first elaborate criticism of Berkeley by a British author is found in Andrew Baxter's _Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul_, published in 1735, in the section ent.i.tled "Dean Berkeley's Scheme against the existence of Matter examined, and shewn to be inconclusive." Baxter alleges that the new doctrine tends to encourage scepticism. To deny Matter, for the reasons given, involves, according to this critic, denial of mind, and so a universal doubt. Accordingly, a few years later, Hume sought, in his _Treatise of Human Nature_, to work out Berkeley's negation of abstract Matter into sceptical phenomenalism-against which Berkeley sought to guard by antic.i.p.ation, in a remarkable pa.s.sage introduced in his last edition of these _Dialogues_.

In Scotland the writings of Reid, Beattie, Oswald, Dugald Stewart, Thomas Brown, and Sir W. Hamilton form a magazine of objections. Reid-who curiously seeks to refute Berkeley by refuting, not more clearly than Berkeley had done before him, the hypothesis of a wholly representative sense-perception-urges the spontaneous belief or common sense of mankind, which obliges us all to recognise a direct presentation of the external material world to our senses. He overlooks what with Berkeley is the only question in debate, namely, the meaning of the term _external_; for, Reid and Berkeley are agreed in holding to the reality of a world regulated independently of the will of finite percipients, and is sufficiently objective to be a medium of social intercourse. With Berkeley, as with Reid, _this_ is practically self-evident. The same objection, more scientifically defined-that we have a natural belief in the existence of Matter, and in our own immediate perception of its qualities-is Sir W.

Hamilton's a.s.sumption against Berkeley; but Hamilton does not explain the reality thus claimed for it. "Men naturally believe," he says, "that _they themselves_ exist-because they are conscious of a Self or Ego; they believe that _something different from themselves_ exists-because they believe that they are conscious of this Not-self or Non-ego."

(_Discussions_, p. 193.) Now, the existence of a Power that is independent of each finite Ego is at the root of Berkeley's principles. According to Berkeley and Hamilton alike, we are immediately percipient of solid and extended phenomena; but with Berkeley the phenomena are dependent on, at the same time that they are "entirely distinct" from, the percipient. The Divine and finite spirits, signified by the phenomena that are presented to our senses in cosmical order, form Berkeley's external world.

That Berkeley sows the seeds of Universal Scepticism; that his conception of Matter involves the Panegoism or Solipsism which leaves me in absolute solitude; that his is virtually a system of Pantheism, inconsistent with personal individuality and moral responsibility-these are probably the three most comprehensive objections that have been alleged against it.

They are in a measure due to Berkeley's imperfect criticism of first principles, in his dread of a departure from the concrete data of experience in quest of empty abstractions.

In England and France, Berkeley's criticism of Matter, taken however only on its negative side, received a countenance denied to it in Germany.

Hartley and Priestley shew signs of affinity with Berkeley. Also an anonymous _Essay on the Nature and Existence of the Material World_, dedicated to Dr. Priestley and Dr. Price, which appeared in 1781, is an argument, on empirical grounds, which virtually makes the data of the senses at last a chaos of isolated sensations. The author of the _Essay_ is said to have been a certain Russell, who died in the West Indies in the end of the eighteenth century. A tendency towards Berkeley's negations, but apart from his synthetic principles, appears in James Mill and J.S.

Mill. So too with Voltaire and the Encyclopedists.

The _Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous_ were published in London in 1713, "printed by G. James, for Henry Clements, at the Half-Moon, in St.

Paul's churchyard," unlike the _Essay on Vision_ and the _Principles_, which first appeared in Dublin. The second edition, which is simply a reprint, issued in 1725, "printed for William and John Innys, at the West End of St. Paul's." A third, the last in the author's lifetime, "printed by Jacob Tonson," which contains some important additions, was published in 1734, conjointly with a new edition of the _Principles_. The _Dialogues_ were reprinted in 1776, in the same volume with the edition of the _Principles, with Remarks_.

The _Dialogues_ have been translated into French and German. The French version appeared at Amsterdam in 1750. The translator's name is not given, but it is attributed to the Abbe Jean Paul de Gua de Malves(780), by Barbier, in his _Dictionnaire des Ouvrages anonymes et pseudonymes_, tom.

i. p. 283. It contains a Prefatory Note by the translator, with three curious vignettes (given in the note below) meant to symbolise the leading thought in each Dialogue(781). A German translation, by John Christopher Eschenbach, Professor of Philosophy in Rostock, was published at Rostock in 1756. It forms the larger part of a volume ent.i.tled _Sammlung der vornehmsten Schriftsteller die die Wirklichkeit ihres eignen Korpers und der ganzen Korperwelt laugnen_. This professed Collection of the most eminent authors who are supposed to deny the reality of their own bodies and of the whole material world, consists of Berkeley's _Dialogues,_ and Arthur Collier's _Clavis Universalis_, or _Demonstration of the Non-existence or Impossibility of an __ External World_. The volume contains some annotations, and an Appendix in which a counter-demonstration of the existence of Matter is attempted.

Eschenbach's princ.i.p.al argument is indirect, and of the nature of a _reductio ad absurdum_. He argues (as others have done) that the reasons produced against the independent reality of Matter are equally conclusive against the independent reality of Spirit.

An interesting circ.u.mstance connected with the _Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous_ was the appearance, also in 1713, of the _Clavis Universalis_, or demonstration of the impossibility of Matter, of Arthur Collier, in which the merely ideal existence of the sensible world is maintained. The production, simultaneously, without concert, of conceptions of the material world which verbally at least have much in common, is a curious coincidence. It shews that the intellectual atmosphere of the Lockian epoch in England contained elements favourable to a reconsideration of the ultimate meaning of Matter. They are both the genuine produce of the age of Locke and Malebranche. Neither Berkeley nor Collier were, when they published their books, familiar with ancient Greek speculations; those of modern Germany had only begun to loom in the distance. Absolute Idealism, the Panphenomenalism of Auguste Comte, and the modern evolutionary conception of nature, have changed the conditions under which the universal problem is studied, and are making intelligible to this generation a manner of conceiving the Universe which, for nearly a century and a half, the British and French critics of Berkeley were unable to entertain.

Berkeley's _Principles_ appeared three years before the _Clavis Universalis_. Yet Collier tells us that it was "after a ten years' pause and deliberation," that, "rather than the world should finish its course without once offering to inquire in what manner it exists," he had "resolved to put himself upon the trial of the common reader, without pretending to any better art of gaining him than dry reason and metaphysical demonstration." Mr. Benson, his biographer, says that it was in 1703, at the age of twenty-three, that Collier came to the conclusion that "there is no such thing as an external world"; and he attributes the premises from which Collier drew this conclusion to his neighbour, John Norris. Among Collier's MSS., there remains the outline of an essay, in three chapters, dated January, 1708, on the non-externality of the _visible_ world.

There are several coincidences between Berkeley and Collier. Berkeley virtually presented his new theory of Vision as the first instalment of his explanation of the Reality of Matter. The first of the two Parts into which Collier's _Clavis_ is divided consists of proofs that the Visible World is not, and cannot be, external. Berkeley, in the _Principles_ and the _Dialogues_, explains the reality of Matter. In like manner the Second Part of the _Clavis_ consists of reasonings in proof of the impossibility of an external world independent of Spirit. Finally, in his full-blown theory, as well as in its visual germ, Berkeley takes for granted, as intuitively known, the existence of sensible Matter; meaning by this, its relative existence, or dependence on living Mind. The third proposition of Collier's system a.s.serts the real existence of visible matter in particular, and of sensible matter in general.

The invisibility of distances, as well as of real magnitudes and situations, and their suggestion by interpretation of visual symbols, propositions which occupy so large a s.p.a.ce in Berkeley's Theory of Vision, have no counterpart in Collier. His proof of the non-externality of the visible world consists of an induction of instances of visible objects that are allowed by all not to be external, although they seem to be as much so as any that are called external. His Demonstration consists of nine proofs, which may be compared with the reasonings and a.n.a.lyses of Berkeley. Collier's Demonstration concludes with answers to objections, and an application of his account of the material world to the refutation of the Roman doctrine of the substantial existence of Christ's body in the Eucharist.

The universal sense-symbolism of Berkeley, and his pervading recognition of the distinction between physical or symbolical, and efficient or originative causation, are wanting in the narrow reasonings of Collier.

Berkeley's more comprehensive philosophy, with its human sympathies and beauty of style, is now recognised as a striking expression and partial solution of fundamental problems, while Collier is condemned to the obscurity of the Schools(782).

Dedication

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE LORD BERKELEY OF STRATTON(783),

MASTER OF THE ROLLS IN THE KINGDOM OF IRELAND, CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER, AND ONE OF THE LORDS OF HER MAJESTY'S MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL.

MY LORD,

The virtue, learning, and good sense which are acknowledged to distinguish your character, would tempt me to indulge myself the pleasure men naturally take in giving applause to those whom they esteem and honour: and it should seem of importance to the subjects of Great Britain that they knew the eminent share you enjoy in the favour of your sovereign, and the honours she has conferred upon you, have not been owing to any application from your lords.h.i.+p, but entirely to her majesty's own thought, arising from a sense of your personal merit, and an inclination to reward it. But, as your name is prefixed to this treatise with an intention to do honour to myself alone, I shall only say that I am encouraged by the favour you have treated me with to address these papers to your lords.h.i.+p.

And I was the more ambitious of doing this, because a Philosophical Treatise could not so properly be addressed to any one as to a person of your lords.h.i.+p's character, who, to your other valuable distinctions, have added the knowledge and relish of Philosophy.

I am, with the greatest respect,

My Lord,