The Works of George Berkeley Part 51

_Hyl._ It is.

_Phil._ Whatsoever therefore you suppose spread under anything must have in itself an extension distinct from the extension of that thing under which it is spread?

_Hyl._ It must.

_Phil._ Consequently, every corporeal substance, being the _substratum_ of extension, must have in itself another extension, by which it is qualified to be a _substratum_: and so on to infinity? And I ask whether this be not absurd in itself, and repugnant to what you granted just now, to wit, that the _substratum_ was something distinct from and exclusive of extension?

_Hyl._ Aye but, Philonous, you take me wrong. I do not mean that Matter is _spread_ in a gross literal sense under extension. The word _substratum_ is used only to express in general the same thing with _substance_.

_Phil._ Well then, let us examine the relation implied in the term _substance_. Is it not that it stands under accidents?

_Hyl._ The very same.

_Phil._ But, that one thing may stand under or support another, must it not be extended?

_Hyl._ It must.

_Phil._ Is not therefore this supposition liable to the same absurdity with the former?

_Hyl._ You still take things in a strict literal sense. That is not fair, Philonous.

_Phil._ I am not for imposing any sense on your words: you are at liberty to explain them as you please. Only, I beseech you, make me understand something by them. You tell me Matter supports or stands under accidents.

How! is it as your legs support your body?

_Hyl._ No; that is the literal sense.

_Phil._ Pray let me know any sense, literal or not literal, that you understand it in.-How long must I wait for an answer, Hylas?

_Hyl._ I declare I know not what to say. I once thought I understood well enough what was meant by Matter's supporting accidents. But now, the more I think on it the less can I comprehend it: in short I find that I know nothing of it.

_Phil._ It seems then you have no idea at all, neither relative nor positive, of Matter; you know neither what it is in itself, nor what relation it bears to accidents?

_Hyl._ I acknowledge it.

_Phil._ And yet you a.s.serted that you could not conceive how qualities or accidents should really exist, without conceiving at the same time a material support of them?

_Hyl._ I did.

_Phil._ That is to say, when you conceive the _real_ existence of qualities, you do withal conceive Something which you cannot conceive?

_Hyl._ It was wrong, I own. But still I fear there is some fallacy or other. Pray what think you of this? It is just come into my head that the ground of all our mistake lies in your treating of each quality by itself.

Now, I grant that each quality cannot singly subsist without the mind.

Colour cannot without extension, neither can figure without some other sensible quality. But, as the several qualities united or blended together form entire sensible things, nothing hinders why such things may not be supposed to exist without the mind.

_Phil._ Either, Hylas, you are jesting, or have a very bad memory. Though indeed we went through all the qualities by name one after another, yet my arguments, or rather your concessions, nowhere tended to prove that the Secondary Qualities did not subsist each alone by itself; but, that they were not _at all_ without the mind. Indeed, in treating of figure and motion we concluded they could not exist without the mind, because it was impossible even in thought to separate them from all secondary qualities, so as to conceive them existing by themselves. But then this was not the only argument made use of upon that occasion. But (to pa.s.s by all that hath been hitherto said, and reckon it for nothing, if you will have it so) I am content to put the whole upon this issue. If you can conceive it possible for any mixture or combination of qualities, or any sensible object whatever, to exist without the mind, then I will grant it actually to be so.

_Hyl._ If it comes to that the point will soon be decided. What more easy than to conceive a tree or house existing by itself, independent of, and unperceived by, any mind whatsoever? I do at this present time conceive them existing after that manner.

_Phil._ How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at the same time unseen?

_Hyl._ No, that were a contradiction.

_Phil._ Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of _conceiving_ a thing which is _unconceived_?

_Hyl._ It is.

_Phil._ The tree or house therefore which you think of is conceived by you?

_Hyl._ How should it be otherwise?

_Phil._ And what is conceived is surely in the mind?

_Hyl._ Without question, that which is conceived is in the mind.

_Phil._ How then came you to say, you conceived a house or tree existing independent and out of all minds whatsoever?

_Hyl._ That was I own an oversight; but stay, let me consider what led me into it.-It is a pleasant mistake enough. As I was thinking of a tree in a solitary place, where no one was present to see it, methought that was to conceive a tree as existing unperceived or unthought of; not considering that I myself conceived it all the while. But now I plainly see that all I can do is to frame ideas in my own mind. I may indeed conceive in my own thoughts the idea of a tree, or a house, or a mountain, but that is all.

And this is far from proving that I can conceive them _existing out of the minds of all Spirits_.

_Phil._ You acknowledge then that you cannot possibly conceive how any one corporeal sensible thing should exist otherwise than in a mind?

_Hyl._ I do.

_Phil._ And yet you will earnestly contend for the truth of that which you cannot so much as conceive?

_Hyl._ I profess I know not what to think; but still there are some scruples remain with me. Is it not certain I _see things at a distance_?

Do we not perceive the stars and moon, for example, to be a great way off?

Is not this, I say, manifest to the senses?

_Phil._ Do you not in a dream too perceive those or the like objects?

_Hyl._ I do.

_Phil._ And have they not then the same appearance of being distant?

_Hyl._ They have.

_Phil._ But you do not thence conclude the apparitions in a dream to be without the mind?

_Hyl._ By no means.

_Phil._ You ought not therefore to conclude that sensible objects are without the mind, from their appearance, or manner wherein they are perceived.

_Hyl._ I acknowledge it. But doth not my sense deceive me in those cases?

_Phil._ By no means. The idea or thing which you immediately perceive, neither sense nor reason informs you that _it_ actually exists without the mind. By sense you only know that you are affected with such certain sensations of light and colours, &c. And these you will not say are without the mind.