The Works of George Berkeley Part 60

_Hyl._ This I have already acknowledged.

_Phil._ The creation, therefore, according to them, was not the creation of things sensible, which have only a relative being, but of certain unknown natures, which have an absolute being, wherein creation might terminate?

_Hyl._ True.

_Phil._ Is it not therefore evident the a.s.sertors of Matter destroy the plain obvious sense of Moses, with which their notions are utterly inconsistent; and instead of it obtrude on us I know not what; something equally unintelligible to themselves and me?

_Hyl._ I cannot contradict you.

_Phil._ Moses tells us of a creation. A creation of what? of unknown quiddities, of occasions, or _substratum_? No, certainly; but of things obvious to the senses. You must first reconcile this with your notions, if you expect I should be reconciled to them.

_Hyl._ I see you can a.s.sault me with my own weapons.

_Phil._ Then as to _absolute existence_; was there ever known a more jejune notion than that? Something it is so abstracted and unintelligible that you have frankly owned you could not conceive it, much less explain anything by it. But allowing Matter to exist, and the notion of absolute existence to be as clear as light; yet, was this ever known to make the creation more credible? Nay, hath it not furnished the atheists and infidels of all ages with the most plausible arguments against a creation?

That a corporeal substance, which hath an absolute existence without the minds of spirits, should be produced out of nothing, by the mere will of a Spirit, hath been looked upon as a thing so contrary to all reason, so impossible and absurd, that not only the most celebrated among the ancients, but even divers modern and Christian philosophers have thought Matter co-eternal with the Deity(919). Lay these things together, and then judge you whether Materialism disposes men to believe the creation of things.

_Hyl._ I own, Philonous, I think it does not. This of the _creation_ is the last objection I can think of; and I must needs own it hath been sufficiently answered as well as the rest. Nothing now remains to be overcome but a sort of unaccountable backwardness that I find in myself towards your notions.

_Phil._ When a man is swayed, he knows not why, to one side of the question, can this, think you, be anything else but the effect of prejudice, which never fails to attend old and rooted notions? And indeed in this respect I cannot deny the belief of Matter to have very much the advantage over the contrary opinion, with men of a learned education.

_Hyl._ I confess it seems to be as you say.

_Phil._ As a balance, therefore, to this weight of prejudice, let us throw into the scale the great advantages(920) that arise from the belief of Immaterialism, both in regard to religion and human learning. The being of a G.o.d, and incorruptibility of the soul, those great articles of religion, are they not proved with the clearest and most immediate evidence? When I say the being of a G.o.d, I do not mean an obscure general Cause of things, whereof we have no conception, but G.o.d, in the strict and proper sense of the word. A Being whose spirituality, omnipresence, providence, omniscience, infinite power and goodness, are as conspicuous as the existence of sensible things, of which (notwithstanding the fallacious pretences and affected scruples of Sceptics) there is no more reason to doubt than of our own being.-Then, with relation to human sciences. In Natural Philosophy, what intricacies, what obscurities, what contradictions hath the belief of Matter led men into! To say nothing of the numberless disputes about its extent, continuity, h.o.m.ogeneity, gravity, divisibility, &c.-do they not pretend to explain all things by bodies operating on bodies, according to the laws of motion? and yet, are they able to comprehend how one body should move another? Nay, admitting there was no difficulty in reconciling the notion of an inert being with a cause, or in conceiving how an accident might pa.s.s from one body to another; yet, by all their strained thoughts and extravagant suppositions, have they been able to reach the _mechanical_ production of any one animal or vegetable body? Can they account, by the laws of motion, for sounds, tastes, smells, or colours; or for the regular course of things? Have they accounted, by physical principles, for the apt.i.tude and contrivance even of the most inconsiderable parts of the universe? But, laying aside Matter and corporeal causes, and admitting only the efficiency of an All-perfect Mind, are not all the effects of nature easy and intelligible? If the _phenomena_ are nothing else but _ideas_; G.o.d is a _spirit_, but Matter an unintelligent, unperceiving being. If they demonstrate an unlimited power in their cause; G.o.d is active and omnipotent, but Matter an inert ma.s.s. If the order, regularity, and usefulness of them can never be sufficiently admired; G.o.d is infinitely wise and provident, but Matter dest.i.tute of all contrivance and design. These surely are great advantages in _Physics_.

Not to mention that the apprehension of a distant Deity naturally disposes men to a negligence in their moral actions; which they would be more cautious of, in case they thought Him immediately present, and acting on their minds, without the interposition of Matter, or unthinking second causes.-Then in _Metaphysics_: what difficulties concerning ent.i.ty in abstract, substantial forms, hylarchic principles, plastic natures,(921) substance and accident, principle of individuation, possibility of Matter's thinking, origin of ideas, the manner how two independent substances so widely different as _Spirit_ and _Matter_, should mutually operate on each other? what difficulties, I say, and endless disquisitions, concerning these and innumerable other the like points, do we escape, by supposing only Spirits and ideas?-Even the _Mathematics_ themselves, if we take away the absolute existence of extended things, become much more clear and easy; the most shocking paradoxes and intricate speculations in those sciences depending on the infinite divisibility of finite extension; which depends on that supposition.-But what need is there to insist on the particular sciences? Is not that opposition to all science whatsoever, that frenzy of the ancient and modern Sceptics, built on the same foundation? Or can you produce so much as one argument against the reality of corporeal things, or in behalf of that avowed utter ignorance of their natures, which doth not suppose their reality to consist in an external absolute existence? Upon this supposition, indeed, the objections from the change of colours in a pigeon's neck, or the appearance of the broken oar in the water, must be allowed to have weight.

But these and the like objections vanish, if we do not maintain the being of absolute external originals, but place the reality of things in ideas, fleeting indeed, and changeable;-however, not changed at random, but according to the fixed order of nature. For, herein consists that constancy and truth of things which secures all the concerns of life, and distinguishes that which is _real_ from the _irregular visions_ of the fancy(922).

_Hyl._ I agree to all you have now said, and must own that nothing can incline me to embrace your opinion more than the advantages I see it is attended with. I am by nature lazy; and this would be a mighty abridgment in knowledge. What doubts, what hypotheses, what labyrinths of amus.e.m.e.nt, what fields of disputation, what an ocean of false learning, may be avoided by that single notion of _Immaterialism_!

_Phil._ After all, is there anything farther remaining to be done? You may remember you promised to embrace that opinion which upon examination should appear most agreeable to Common Sense and remote from Scepticism.

This, by your own confession, is that which denies Matter, or the _absolute_ existence of corporeal things. Nor is this all; the same notion has been proved several ways, viewed in different lights, pursued in its consequences, and all objections against it cleared. Can there be a greater evidence of its truth? or is it possible it should have all the marks of a true opinion and yet be false?

_Hyl._ I own myself entirely satisfied for the present in all respects.

But, what security can I have that I shall still continue the same full a.s.sent to your opinion, and that no unthought-of objection or difficulty will occur hereafter?

_Phil._ Pray, Hylas, do you in other cases, when a point is once evidently proved, withhold your consent on account of objections or difficulties it may be liable to? Are the difficulties that attend the doctrine of incommensurable quant.i.ties, of the angle of contact, of the asymptotes to curves, or the like, sufficient to make you hold out against mathematical demonstration? Or will you disbelieve the Providence of G.o.d, because there may be some particular things which _you_ know not how to reconcile with it? If there are difficulties attending _Immaterialism_, there are at the same time direct and evident proofs of it. But for the existence of Matter(923) there is not one proof, and far more numerous and insurmountable objections lie against it. But where are those mighty difficulties you insist on? Alas! you know not where or what they are; something which may possibly occur hereafter. If this be a sufficient pretence for withholding your full a.s.sent, you should never yield it to any proposition, how free soever from exceptions, how clearly and solidly soever demonstrated.

_Hyl._ You have satisfied me, Philonous.

_Phil._ But, to arm you against all future objections, do but consider: That which bears equally hard on two contradictory opinions can be proof against neither. Whenever, therefore, any difficulty occurs, try if you can find a solution for it on the hypothesis of the _Materialists_. Be not deceived by words; but sound your own thoughts. And in case you cannot conceive it easier by the help of _Materialism_, it is plain it can be no objection against _Immaterialism_. Had you proceeded all along by this rule, you would probably have spared yourself abundance of trouble in objecting; since of all your difficulties I challenge you to shew one that is explained by Matter: nay, which is not more unintelligible with than without that supposition; and consequently makes rather _against_ than _for_ it. You should consider, in each particular, whether the difficulty arises from the _non-existence of Matter_. If it doth not, you might as well argue from the infinite divisibility of extension against the Divine prescience, as from such a difficulty against _Immaterialism_. And yet, upon recollection, I believe you will find this to have been often, if not always, the case. You should likewise take heed not to argue on a _pet.i.tio principii_. One is apt to say-The unknown substances ought to be esteemed real things, rather than the ideas in our minds: and who can tell but the unthinking external substance may concur, as a cause or instrument, in the productions of our ideas? But is not this proceeding on a supposition that there are such external substances? And to suppose this, is it not begging the question? But, above all things, you should beware of imposing on yourself by that vulgar sophism which is called _ignoratio clenchi_. You talked often as if you thought I maintained the non-existence of Sensible Things. Whereas in truth no one can be more thoroughly a.s.sured of their existence than I am. And it is you who doubt; I should have said, positively deny it. Everything that is seen, felt, heard, or any way perceived by the senses, is, on the principles I embrace, a real being; but not on yours. Remember, the Matter you contend for is an Unknown Somewhat (if indeed it may be termed _somewhat_), which is quite stripped of all sensible qualities, and can neither be perceived by sense, nor apprehended by the mind. Remember, I say, that it is not any object which is hard or soft, hot or cold, blue or white, round or square, &c. For all these things I affirm do exist. Though indeed I deny they have an existence distinct from being perceived; or that they exist out of all minds whatsoever. Think on these points; let them be attentively considered and still kept in view. Otherwise you will not comprehend the state of the question; without which your objections will always be wide of the mark, and, instead of mine, may possibly be directed (as more than once they have been) against your own notions.

_Hyl._ I must needs own, Philonous, nothing seems to have kept me from agreeing with you more than this same _mistaking the question_. In denying Matter, at first glimpse I am tempted to imagine you deny the things we see and feel: but, upon reflexion, find there is no ground for it. What think you, therefore, of retaining the name _Matter_, and applying it to _sensible things_? This may be done without any change in your sentiments: and, believe me, it would be a means of reconciling them to some persons who may be more shocked at an innovation in words than in opinion.

_Phil._ With all my heart: retain the word _Matter,_ and apply it to the objects of sense, if you please; provided you do not attribute to them any subsistence distinct from their being perceived. I shall never quarrel with you for an expression. _Matter_, or _material substance_, are terms introduced by philosophers; and, as used by them, imply a sort of independency, or a subsistence distinct from being perceived by a mind: but are never used by common people; or, if ever, it is to signify the immediate objects of sense. One would think, therefore, so long as the names of all particular things, with the terms _sensible_, _substance_, _body_, _stuff_, and the like, are retained, the word _Matter_ should be never missed in common talk. And in philosophical discourses it seems the best way to leave it quite out: since there is not, perhaps, any one thing that hath more favoured and strengthened the depraved bent of the mind towards Atheism than the use of that general confused term.

_Hyl._ Well but, Philonous, since I am content to give up the notion of an unthinking substance exterior to the mind, I think you ought not to deny me the privilege of using the word _Matter_ as I please, and annexing it to a collection of sensible qualities subsisting only in the mind. I freely own there is no other substance, in a strict sense, than _Spirit_.

But I have been so long accustomed to the _term Matter_ that I know not how to part with it: to say, there is no _Matter_ in the world, is still shocking to me. Whereas to say-There is no _Matter_, if by that term be meant an unthinking substance existing without the mind; but if by _Matter_ is meant some sensible thing, whose existence consists in being perceived, then there is _Matter_:-this distinction gives it quite another turn; and men will come into your notions with small difficulty, when they are proposed in that manner. For, after all, the controversy about _Matter_ in the strict acceptation of it, lies altogether between you and the philosophers: whose principles, I acknowledge, are not near so natural, or so agreeable to the common sense of mankind, and Holy Scripture, as yours. There is nothing we either desire or shun but as it makes, or is apprehended to make, some part of our happiness or misery.

But what hath happiness or misery, joy or grief, pleasure or pain, to do with Absolute Existence; or with unknown ent.i.ties, _abstracted from all relation to us_? It is evident, things regard us only as they are pleasing or displeasing: and they can please or displease only so far forth as they are perceived. Farther, therefore, we are not concerned; and thus far you leave things as you found them. Yet still there is something new in this doctrine. It is plain, I do not now think with the philosophers; nor yet altogether with the vulgar. I would know how the case stands in that respect; precisely, what you have added to, or altered in my former notions.

_Phil._ I do not pretend to be a setter-up of new notions. My endeavours tend only to unite, and place in a clearer light, that truth which was before shared between the vulgar and the philosophers:-the former being of opinion, that _those things they immediately perceive are the real things_; and the latter, that _the things immediately perceived are ideas, which exist only in the mind_(924). Which two notions put together, do, in effect, const.i.tute the substance of what I advance.

_Hyl._ I have been a long time distrusting my senses: methought I saw things by a dim light and through false gla.s.ses. Now the gla.s.ses are removed and a new light breaks in upon my understanding. I am clearly convinced that I see things in their native forms, and am no longer in pain about their _unknown natures_ or _absolute existence_. This is the state I find myself in at present; though, indeed, the course that brought me to it I do not yet thoroughly comprehend. You set out upon the same principles that Academics, Cartesians, and the like sects usually do; and for a long time it looked as if you were advancing their philosophical Scepticism: but, in the end, your conclusions are directly opposite to theirs.

_Phil._ You see, Hylas, the water of yonder fountain, how it is forced upwards, in a round column, to a certain height; at which it breaks, and falls back into the basin from whence it rose: its ascent, as well as descent, proceeding from the same uniform law or principle of gravitation.

Just so, the same Principles which, at first view, lead to Scepticism, pursued to a certain point, bring men back to Common Sense.

DE MOTU: SIVE; DE MOTUS PRINCIPIO ET NATURA, ET DE CAUSA COMMUNICATIONIS MOTUUM

_First published in 1721_

Editor's Preface To De Motu

This Latin dissertation on Motion, or change of place in the component atoms of the material world, was written in 1720, when Berkeley was returning to Ireland, after he had spent some years in Italy, on leave of absence from Trinity College. A prize for an essay on the "Cause of Motion," had, it seems, been offered in that year by the Paris Academy of Sciences. The subject suggested an advance on the line of thought pursued in Berkeley's _Principles_ and _Dialogues_. The mind-dependent reality of the material world, prominent in those works, was in them insisted on, not as a speculative paradox, but mainly in order to shew the spiritual character of the Power that is continually at work throughout the universe. This essay on what was thus a congenial subject was finished at Lyons, and published early in 1721, soon after Berkeley arrived in London.

It was reprinted in his _Miscellany_ in 1752. I have not found evidence that it was ever submitted to the French Academy. At any rate the prize was awarded to Crousaz, the well-known logician and professor of philosophy at Lausanne.

The _De Motu_ is interesting biographically as well as philosophically, as a revelation of Berkeley's way of thinking about the causal relations of Matter and Spirit seven years after the publication of the _Dialogues_. In 1713 his experience of life was confined to Ireland. Now, after months in London, in the society of Swift, and Pope, and Addison, he had observed nature and men in France and Italy. His eager temperament and extraordinary social charm opened the way in those years of travel to frequent intercourse with famous men. This, for the time, superseded controversy with materialism and scepticism, and diverted his enthusiasm to nature and high art. One likes to see how he handles the old questions as they now arise in the philosophical treatment of motion in s.p.a.ce, which was regarded by many as the key to all other phenomena presented in the material world.

For one thing, the unreality of the data of sense after total abstraction of living mind, the chief Principle in the earlier works, lies more in the background in the _De Motu_. Yet it is tacitly a.s.sumed, as the basis of an argument for the powerlessness of all sensible things, and for refunding all active power in the universe into conscious agency. _Mens agitat molem_ might be taken as a motto for the _De Motu_. Then there is more frequent reference to scientific and philosophical authorities than in his more juvenile treatises. Plato and Aristotle are oftener in view. Italy seems to have introduced him to the physical science of Borelli and Torricelli. Leibniz, who died in 1716, when Berkeley was in Italy, is named by him for the first time in the _De Motu_. Perhaps he had learned something when he was abroad about the most ill.u.s.trious philosopher of the time. And it is interesting by the way to find in one of those years what is, I think, the only allusion to Berkeley by Leibniz. It is contained in one of the German philosopher's letters to Des Bosses, in 1715. "Qui in Hybernia corporum realitatem impugnat," Leibniz writes, "videtur nec rationes afferre idoneas, nee mentem suam satis explicare. Suspicor esse ex eo hominum genere qui per Paradoxa cognosci volunt." This sentence is interesting on account of the writer, although it suggests vague, and perhaps second-hand knowledge of the Irishman and his principles. The name of Hobbes does not appear in the _De Motu_. Yet one might have expected it, in consideration of the supreme place which motion takes in his system, which rests upon the principle that all changes in the universe may be resolved into change of place.

In the _De Motu_ the favourite language of ideal realism is abandoned for the most part. "Bodies," not "ideas of sense," are contrasted with mind or spirit, although body still means significant appearance presented to the senses. Indeed the term _idea_ occurs less often in this and the subsequent writings of Berkeley.

I will now give some account of salient features in the _De Motu_.

Like the _Principles_ the tract opens with a protest against the empty abstractions, and consequent frivolous discussions, which even mechanical science had countenanced although dealing with matters so obvious to sense as the phenomena of motion. _Force_, _effort_, _solicitation of gravity_, _nisus_, are examples of abstract terms connected with motion, to which nothing in what is presented to the senses is found to correspond. Yet corporeal power is spoken of as if it were something perceptible by sense, and so found _within_ the bodies we see and touch (sect. 1-3).

But it turns out differently when philosophers and naturalists try to imagine the _physical force_ that is supposed to inhabit bodies, and to explain their motions. The conception of motion has been the parent of innumerable paradoxes and seeming contradictions among ancient Greek thinkers; for it presents, in a striking form, the metaphysical difficulties in the way of a reconciliation of the One and the Many-difficulties which Berkeley had already attributed to perverse abstractions, with which philosophers amused themselves and blocked up the way to concrete knowledge; first wantonly raising a dust, and then complaining that they could not see. Nor has modern mechanical science in this respect fared better than the old philosophies. Even its leaders, Torricelli, for instance, and Leibniz, offer us scholastic shadows-empty metaphysical abstractions-when they speak about an active power that is supposed to be lodged within the things of sense. Torricelli tells us that the forces within the things around us, and within our own bodies, are "subtle quintessences, enclosed in a corporeal substance as in the enchanted vase of Circe"; and Leibniz speaks of their active powers as their "substantial form," whatever that can be conceived to mean. Others call the power to which change of place is due, the hylarchic principle, an appet.i.te in bodies, a spontaneity inherent in them; or they a.s.sume that, besides their extension, solidity, and other qualities which appear in sense, there is also something named force, latent in them if not patent-in all which we have a flood of words, empty of concrete thought.

At best the language is metaphorical (sect. 2-9).

For showing the active cause at work in the production of motion in bodies, it is of no avail to name, as if it were a datum of sense, what is not presentable to our senses. Let us, instead, turn to the only other sort of data in realised experience. For we find only two sorts of realities in experience, the one sort revealed by our senses, the other by inward consciousness. We can affirm nothing about the contents of _bodies_ except what our senses present, namely, concrete things, extended, figured, solid, having also innumerable other qualities, which seem all to depend upon change of place in the things, or in their const.i.tuent particles. The contents of _mind_ or _spirit_, on the other hand, are disclosed to inner consciousness, which reveals a sentient Ego that is actively percipient and exertive. And it must be in the second of these two concrete revelations of reality, that active causation, on which motion and all other change depends, is to be found-not in empty abstractions, covered by words like _power_, _cause_, _force_, or _nisus_, which correspond to nothing perceived by the senses (sect. 21).

So that which we call body presents _within itself_ nothing in which change of place or state can originate causally. Extension, figure, solidity, and all the other perceptible const.i.tuents of bodies are appearances only-pa.s.sive phenomena, which succeed one another in an orderly cosmical procession, on which doubtless our pains and pleasures largely depend. But there is no sensibly perceptible power found among those sensuous appearances. They can only be _caused causes_, adapted, as we presuppose, to signify to us what we may expect to follow that appearance. The reason of their significance, i.e. of the constancy of their sequences and coexistences, must be sought for _outside of themselves_. Experimental research may discover new terms among the correlated cosmical sequences or coexistences, but the newly discovered terms must still be only pa.s.sive phenomena previously unperceived. Body means only what is presentable to the senses. Those who attribute to it something not perceptible by sense, which they call the force or power in which its motions originate, say in other words that the origin of motion is unknowable by sense (sect. 22-24).

Turn now from things of sense, the data of perception, to Mind or Spirit, as revealed in inner consciousness. Here we have a deeper and more real revelation of what underlies, or is presupposed in, the pa.s.sive cosmical procession that is presented to the senses. Our inward consciousness plainly shews the thinking being actually _exercising_ power to move its animated body. We find that we can, by a causal exertion of which we are distinctly conscious, either excite or arrest movements in bodies. In voluntary exertion we have thus a concrete example of force or power, _producing_ and not merely _followed by_ motion. In the case of human volition this is no doubt conditioned power; nevertheless it exemplifies Power on a greater scale than human, even Divine power, universally and continuously operative, in all natural motions, and in the cosmical laws according to which they proceed (sect. 25-30).

Thus those who pretend to find force or active causation _within_ bodies, pretend to find what their sensuous experience does not support, and they have to sustain their pretence by unintelligible language. On the other hand, those who explain motion by referring it to conscious exertion of personal agents, say what is supported by their own consciousness, and confirmed by high authorities, including Anaxagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and Newton, demonstrating that in Spirit only do we find power to change its own state, as well as the states and mutual relations of bodies. Motion in nature is G.o.d continuously acting (sect. 31-34). But physical science is conveniently confined to the order of the pa.s.sive procession of sensuous appearances, including experiments in quest of the rules naturally exemplified in the motions of bodies: reasoning on mathematical and mechanical principles, it leaves the contemplation of active causation to a more exalted science (sect. 35-42).