The Works of George Berkeley Part 89

937 "meditatione subigenda sunt." Cf. _Theory of Vision Vindicated_, sect. 35, 70.

938 "distingui." It is here argued that so-called power within the things of sense is not distinguishable from the sensibly perceived sequences. To the meaningless supposition that it is, he attributes the frivolous verbal controversies among the learned mentioned in the following section. The province of natural philosophy, according to Berkeley, is to inquire what the rules are under which sensible effects are uniformly manifested. Cf. _Siris_, sect. 236, 247, 249.

_ 939 Principia Math._ Def. III.

_ 940 De Vi Percussionis_, cap. I.

941 "utiles." Such words as "force," "power," "gravity," "attraction,"

are held to be convenient in physical reasonings about the _phenomena_ of motion, but worthless as philosophical expressions of the _cause_ of motion, which transcends sense and mechanical science. Cf. _Siris_, sect. 234, 235.

942 Cf. sect. 67.

943 "candem." So in recent discussions on the conservation of force.

944 [Borellus.]-AUTHOR. See _De Vi Percussionis_, cap. XXIII.

945 [Leibnitius.]-AUTHOR.

946 On Berkeley's reasoning all terms which involve the a.s.sumption that real causality is something presentable to the senses are a cover for meaninglessness. Only through self-conscious experience of personal activity does real meaning enter into the portion of language which deals with active causation. This is argued in detail in sect. 21-35.

947 Our concrete experience is a.s.sumed to be confined to (_a_) _bodies_, i.e. the data of the senses, and (_b_) _mind_ or _spirit_-sentient, intelligent, active-revealed by internal consciousness. Cf.

_Principles_, sect. 1, 2, in which experience is resolved into _ideas_ and the _active intelligence_ which they presuppose. Here the word idea disappears, but, in accordance with its signification, "bodies" is still regarded as aggregates of external phenomena, the pa.s.sive subjects of changes of place and state: the idealisation of the material world is tacitly implied, but not obtruded.

948 "nihilque," &c. Cf. _Principles of Human Knowledge_, e.g. sect. 26, 65, 66. where the essential pa.s.sivity of the _ideas_ presented to the senses, i.e. the material world, is maintained as a cardinal principle-on the positive ground of our percipient experience of sensible things. To speak of the cause of motion as _something sensible_, he argues (sect. 24), is merely to shew that we know nothing about it. Cf. sect. 28, 29, infra.

949 The phenomena that can be presented to the senses are taken as the measure of what can be attributed to the material world; and as the senses present _only_ conditioned change of place in bodies, we must look for the active cause in the invisible world which internal consciousness presents to us.

950 "_genus rerum cogitantium._" Cf. _Principles_, sect. 2.

951 "experientia didicimus." Can the merely empirical data even of internal consciousness reveal this causal connexion between volition and bodily motions, without the venture of theistic faith?

952 "a primo et universali Principio" i.e. G.o.d, or the Universal Spirit, in whom the universe of bodies and spirits finds explanation; in a way which Berkeley does not attempt to unfold articulately and exhaustively in philosophical system.

_ 953 Phys._ ?. 4. 255 a 5-7.

_ 954 Princip. Math._ Def. III.

955 "resistentia." Our muscular _sensation_ of resistance is apt to be accepted empirically as itself _active power in the concrete_, entering very much, as has been said, into the often inaccurate idea of power which is formed. See Editor's Preface.

956 "nec incommode." Cf. sect. 17, and note.

957 "hypothesis mathematica." Cf. sect. 17, 35, 36-41, 66, 67; also _Siris_, sect. 250-251.

958 "nihil." This section sums up Berkeley's objections to crediting _matter_ with real power; the senses being taken as the test of what is contained in matter. It may be compared with David Hume, Thomas Brown, and J.S. Mill on Causation. Berkeley differs from them in recognising active power in spirit, while with them he resolves causation among bodies into invariable sequence.

959 Can the data presented to us reveal more than sequence, in the relation between our volitions and the corresponding movements of our bodies? Is not the difference found in the moral presupposition, which _supernaturalises_ man in his voluntary or morally responsible activity? This obliges us to see _ourselves_ as absolutely original causes of all bodily and mental states for which we can be morally approved or blamed.

960 "novumque genus." Cf. sect. 21. We have here Berkeley's ant.i.thesis of mind and matter-spirits and external phenomena presented to the senses-persons in contrast to pa.s.sive ideas.

_ 961 De Anima_, I. ii. 13, 22, 24.

962 "Cartesius." The ant.i.thesis of extended things and thinking things pervades Descartes; but not, as with Berkeley, on the foundation of the new conception of what is truly meant by matter or sensible things. See e.g. _Principia_, P. I. ---- 63, 64.

963 "alii." Does he refer to Locke, who suggests the possibility of matter thinking?

964 See Aristotle, _De Anima_, I. ii. 5, 13; Diogenes Laertius, Lib. VI.

i. 6.

_ 965 Nat. Ausc._ VIII. 15; also _De Anima_, III, x. 7.

966 Hardly any pa.s.sage in the _Timaeus_ exactly corresponds to this. The following is, perhaps, the most pertinent:-????s?? ??? ?p??e?e?

a?t? t?? t?? s?at?? ???e?a?, t?? ?pt? t?? pe?? ???? ?a? f????s??

???sta ??sa? (p. 34 a). Aristotle quotes the _Timaeus_ in the same connexion, _De Anima_, I. iii. ii.

967 "philosophi Cartesiani." Secundum Cartesium causa generalis omnium motuum et quietum est Deus.-Derodon, _Physica_, I. ix. 30.

_ 968 Principia Mathematica_-Scholium Generale.

969 "naturam naturantem esse Deum"-as we might say, G.o.d considered as imminent cause in the universe. See St. Thomas Aquinas, _Opera_, vol. XXII. Quest. 6, p. 27.

970 "juxta certam et constantem rationem." While all changes in Nature are determined by Will, it is not capricious but rational Will. The so-called arbitrariness of the Language of Nature is relative to us, and from our point of view. In itself, the universe of reality expresses Perfect Reason.

971 "permaneret." Cf. sect. 51.

972 "spectat potius ad philosophiam primam." The drift of the _De Motu_ is to distinguish the physical sequences of molecular motion, which the physical sciences articulate, from the Power with which metaphysics and theology are concerned, and which we approach through consciousness.

973 "regulas." Cf. _Siris_, sect. 231-235.

974 Having, in the preceding sections, contrasted perceived motions and their immanent originating Power-matter and mind-physics and metaphysics-he proceeds in this and the seven following sections to explain more fully what ha means by _principium_ and also the two meanings (metaphysical and mechanical) of _solutio_. By _principium_, in philosophy, he understands universally efficient supersensible Power. In natural philosophy the term is applied to the orderly sequences manifested to our senses, not to the active cause of the order.

975 "ratiocinio ... redditae universales." Relations of the data of sense to universalising reason are here recognised.

976 "natura motus." Sect. 43-66 treat of the nature of the _effect_-i.e.

perceptible motion, as distinguished from its true causal origin (_principium_) in mind or spirit. The origin of motion belongs to metaphysics; its nature, as dependent on percipient experience, belongs to physics. Is motion independent of a plurality of bodies; or does it involve bodies in relation to other bodies, so that absolute motion is meaningless? Cf. _Principles_, sect. 111-116.

977 "idea illa tenuissima et subtilissima." The difficulty as to definition of motion is attributed to abstractions, and the inclination of the scholastic mind to prefer these to concrete experience.

978 Motion is thus defined by Aristotle:-??? ? ????s?? ??te???e?a t??

????t??, ? ????t??. Nat. Ausc. III. ii; see also i. and iii. Cf.

Derodon, _Physica_, I. ix.

979 Newton.

980 Cf. sect. 3-42.

981 Descartes, _Principia_, P. II. -- 25; also Borellus, _De Vi Percussionis_, p. 1.

982 "res faciles difficillimas." Cf. _Principles_, "Introduction," sect.