The Calvinistic Doctrine of Predestination Examined and Refuted Part 3

Here it is argued that G.o.d, as an infinitely wise, benevolent, and powerful being, must have _known_ and _preferred_, and _decreed_, that just such beings should exist and events occur, as would, on the whole, be most for his own glory, and the _greatest good_ of the universe, _and such only_; and that, consequently, he has eternally, and unchangeably foreordained everything that does actually come to pa.s.s in time. Now it is plain that all the events which have come to pa.s.s in time must answer this description--must be for the best, for his highest glory--or the argument falls to the ground.

The Rev. Jas. McChain, one of the editors of the _Calvinistic Magazine_, in a discourse published in that periodical, December, 1847, thus undertakes to prove that G.o.d "has foreordained whatsoever comes to pa.s.s:" "Jehovah is infinitely _wise_; does he not, therefore, know what it is BEST should take place? He is infinitely _benevolent_; will he not choose, then, that _shall take place_ which he knows is FOR THE BEST? He is infinitely _powerful_; can he not, therefore, cause _to take place_ what he _chooses shall take place_? The Most High is infinitely wise, and _knows_ what it is BEST should come to pa.s.s--benevolent, and _chooses_ to bring to pa.s.s WHAT IS BEST--powerful, and _does_ bring to pa.s.s what he chooses as BEST." "Surely his infinite wisdom and goodness will choose and determine whatsoever it is best should take place, and his almighty power will perfectly carry out his plan."

It is not my intention, at this time, to point out the fallacy of these arguments. I quote them to show that the consequence which I have deduced from the doctrine that G.o.d has decreed whatsoever comes to pa.s.s--that sin is not an evil, but a good, and worthy of being preferred to holiness in every instance in which it occurs-- is actually recognized as a truth, and used as a premise in proof of the Calvinistic doctrine of the decrees.

8. And how can we avoid adopting as a legitimate conclusion, the licentious infidel maxim, that "WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT"?

9. It is obvious, at the first glance, that this doctrine destroys all reasonable ground for repentance. Of what shall we repent? Of sinning? Let it first be proved that, according to this doctrine, any one has sinned, or can sin. But, if sin be possible, yet in every instance of sinning we have done the will of G.o.d. He freely and unchangeably predestinated the act from all eternity. His providence brought it to pa.s.s. Before we feel ourselves authorized to repent we should be sure that G.o.d has repented of his purposes and acts. And, even then, there would be no good reason for repentance upon the part of his creatures.

For, if we, for the sake of the argument, allow that they are able to act otherwise than as they do, notwithstanding the Divine decrees, they are morally bound to submit cordially to those decrees, leaving to G.o.d the responsibility of decreeing wisely.

Hence there is no room for repentance.

This is precisely the application made of this doctrine by an intelligent Calvinistic lady of New England, Mrs. Elizabeth Stuart Phelps, daughter of the late Prof. Stuart, of Andover, and auth.o.r.ess of certain very popular works. In the memorial of her, prefixed to _The Last Leaf of Sunny Side_, she is quoted as saying in her diary: "I never _could_ understand or divine before, my claim upon the Deity's overruling care. Now I do get a glimpse of it--enough to make me feel like an infant in its mother's arms. Every event, of every day, of every hour, is unalterably fixed. Each day is but the turning over a new leaf of my history, already written by the finger of G.o.d--every letter of it. Should I wish to re-write--to alter--one? Oh, no! no!! no!!!"

Here, you perceive, is no ground for repentance. It is repudiated.

She would not alter an event of her life, a letter of her history.

She carries this acquiescence in the Divine decrees so far as to say in another place: "I have no hope but in my Saviour and if He has not saved me, then this too, I know, is just, and G.o.d's decrees I would not change."

10. Nor can prayer be more reasonable than repentance. For what shall we pray? That G.o.d would reverse his eternal decrees? This would be to reflect upon his attributes. Are his decrees wrong?

Besides, the doctrine in question affirms them to be unchangeable.

Shall we pray that G.o.d may accomplish them? This can add nothing to the certainty of their accomplishment; for they cannot be defeated. So we are distinctly a.s.sured by the advocates of this theory. The only apology that can be offered for prayer, on the part of those who believe this doctrine, is that it is decreed they shall pray. But a prayer offered in strict logical accordance with this theory would be a manifest absurdity.

11. Another legitimate consequence of this doctrine is that man is not in a state of probation. There is a flat contradiction between the idea that man is in a state of probation and the affirmation that the whole series of volitions, states, actions, and events of his life is fixed, unchangeably, by the Divine decree, before he comes into existence. I have long regarded this as an inevitable deduction from the Calvinistic doctrine of decrees, but it was not until lately that I found it actually advanced as a doctrine by a Calvinistic writer. On page 77 of _Fisher's Catechism_, the following occurs:--

"_Q_. Is there any danger in a.s.serting that man is not now in a state of probation, as Adam was?--_Ans_. No."

"_Q_. What, then, is the dangerous consequence of a.s.serting that fallen man is still in a state of probation?--_Ans_. This dangerous consequence would follow, that mankind are hereby supposed to be still under a covenant of works that can justify the doer!"

I do not mean to be understood that this dogma is held by all Calvinists, but, whether held or not, it is a legitimate inference.

12. Let us now notice the bearing of this strange tenet upon some of the leading doctrines and facts of Christianity. Take the doctrine of the Fall--which is understood to be that G.o.d made man in his own image--holy; righteous, capable of standing in his integrity, yet liable to be seduced from it; and that man voluntarily transgressed, brought guilt and depravity upon himself, and involved his posterity in moral degradation and ruin. But, if the Calvinistic doctrine of decrees be true, there was obviously no fall in the case. There was a change in the condition of Adam, but that change was a part of G.o.d's eternal plan. Nothing occurred but what belonged to the divinely predetermined series of events. If Adam had acted otherwise than as he did, G.o.d's original purposes would have been frustrated. If there were any fall, it should be predicated of the Divine decrees rather than of the human subject thereof.

13. Again: The plan of redemption, it is supposed, was designed to rescue him from a deplorable, desperate condition, in which his perverseness had placed him; but, if the doctrine we are considering be true, the redemption, so called, is nothing but a part of a chain of predetermined events. He _was, and is, at no time_, in _any other condition_ than was _devised_ and _decreed_ by _Jehovah as most conducive to his own glory_ and _the highest good of the universe_. Thus, the redemption, about which so much is said, is resolved into a mere nullity.

14. Again: The glorious doctrine of Christ crucified thrills the bosom of the church with intense emotions of fear, and penitence, and hope, and grat.i.tude, and joy. Paul attached so much importance to it as to say: "For I determined to know nothing among men save Christ and him crucified." But, view it in the light of the doctrine that G.o.d has decreed whatsoever comes to pa.s.s, and what does it amount to? The sufferings and death of Christ derive their importance from the fact of their being propitiatory--an atonement. But for what shall they atone? For acts which were determined upon, as a part of G.o.d's plan, for his glory, and the good of the universe, millions of ages before the human actors were born; for acts which no more need to be atoned for than the actions of Jesus Christ himself. To say that those acts were wrong is to reflect upon the decrees of G.o.d, since "nothing has come to pa.s.s but what was decreed by him;" since, according to Mr. Barnes, we are "to interpret the decrees of G.o.d by facts, and the actual result, by whatever means brought about, expresses the design of G.o.d." If men need atonement, they need it for doing the will of G.o.d, and for nothing else. Need I add that, in view of the Calvinistic doctrine of decrees, the doctrine of atonement by the sufferings and death of Christ is absolute nonsense?

15. Again: I affirm of this doctrine that it renders utterly baseless the _doctrine of pardon_, or the remission of sins. It renders the offer of pardon a mockery. For what is pardon offered? For _doing the will of G.o.d_--for doing just _what he decreed_ we should do; for _carrying into effect_ his _eternal counsels_. How can any man need pardon if this doctrine be true?

Should it be said, in reply, that although the decrees of G.o.d have been invariably fulfilled, yet his _precepts_ have been violated, I rejoin that the violation of these precepts was, according to the Calvinistic hypothesis, specifically _decreed_.

Unless decreed, it could not have come to pa.s.s. Hence, the violation was inevitable, from the very nature of the case. G.o.d offers pardon to his creatures, who have invariably, from the commencement of their being, fulfilled his decrees. He offers pardon to them for violating commands which it was impossible for them to keep, inasmuch as he had eternally decreed that they should not keep them, and his decrees are infinitely wise and holy, and cannot be, frustrated.

Further, if G.o.d's decrees are righteous (and we are told explicitly by the creed we are reviewing that they had their origin in his "wise and holy counsel"), it follows that his precepts must be unrighteous, whenever they are a.s.sumed to be in opposition to his decrees; and surely no one can need pardon for pursuing a righteous course in opposition to an unrighteous one.

If it be said that his precepts and his decrees are all equally righteous, it follows that a course in direct opposition, in all respects, to a righteous law is, nevertheless, a righteous course, and thus the distinction between righteousness and unrighteousness is destroyed. View the subject in whatever light you may, and the offer of pardon in connection with the Calvinistic doctrine of decrees, becomes an impertinence and an absurdity.

16. And what is the effect of the Calvinistic theory of predestination upon the doctrine of _regeneration_? Regeneration is usually understood to be a change by which unholy dispositions --dispositions at variance with the character and will of G.o.d --are subst.i.tuted by those in accordance therewith. But, if Calvinism be true, regeneration is nothing more than a preordained change from doing the will of G.o.d perfectly in one way, to doing it perfectly in another way.

17. A consequence of this theory has been incidentally brought to view in ill.u.s.trating a preceding argument, which deserves a distinct statement. It is that G.o.d has two hostile wills, in relation to the same thing--his decrees, and his published commands and prohibitions. He has enjoined certain modes of action, by the most solemn legislation, and yet decreed, from all eternity, that mult.i.tudes of those whom he has subjected to those obligations, shall constantly act at variance therewith; so that mult.i.tudes of human beings are doing his will perfectly, and yet violating his will at the same time.

18. This theory makes all civil government manifestly unreasonable.

Civil government proceeds upon the supposition that man is a free agent, capable of choosing and acting otherwise than as he does; but this theory, as we have seen, is incompatible with free agency.

And should we admit, for the sake of the argument, that it is not incompatible with free agency, it is still irreconcilable with civil government. Civil legislation prohibits various modes of acting. It a.s.sumes that the forbidden actions are wrong-- injurious to society--whereas, this theory represents that all the actions that have been performed, or will be performed, were freely willed, purposed, decreed, foreordained, and brought to pa.s.s by G.o.d himself--that there are no events, and can be none, but what are in precise harmony with his eternal purposes--so that, unless we suppose that G.o.d has from all eternity freely decreed what is wrong and injurious, thereby subjecting human legislators to the necessity of opposing his will in order to prevent outrage and injury, civil legislation admits of no justification or apology.

And if this theory is incompatible with civil legislation, it is not less so with civil jurisprudence. Men a.s.sume the right to inflict severe punishment upon their fellow-men for doing what cannot be avoided, or for not doing what they cannot possibly do.

Or, if it be admitted, for the sake of the argument, that they could act otherwise, still they are punished for doing and suffering, in all respects, the will of G.o.d, for merely exemplifying his eternal unchangeable decrees. Take either alternative, and human jurisprudence is palpably iniquitous.

The only plausible apology that can be offered in behalf of civil government is, either that human legislators and judges, and jurors, and counsel, and sheriffs, and constables are pa.s.sive instruments in the hands of G.o.d, in which case their proceedings are ludicrous, the actors being mere puppets, exhibiting all the appearance of self-determined motion, and yet, like those famous characters called _Punch_ and _Judy_, acting only as determined and effected by the wire-worker; or, admitting that they are free, and executing their own determinations, they too are doing precisely what G.o.d has foreordained; so that, in this respect, the jury who p.r.o.nounce the verdict of guilty, and the judge who p.r.o.nounces the sentence of death, are upon a level with the alleged criminal. All have done, and are doing, just the things which G.o.d has decreed they should do, neither more nor less.

19. I cannot but regard this theory as subversive of every rational idea of a Divine moral government. Moral government implies precepts or prohibitions, or both, enforced by rewards and penalties, and addressed authoritatively to beings capable of either obedience or disobedience. But of what use are precepts or prohibitions if every act of every individual is fixed beforehand by the Divine decrees? As well might moral codes be addressed to steam-engines or to whirlwinds. The only plausible attempt that can be made to reconcile this theory of predestination with a Divine moral government, is to apply the term moral government to a certain cla.s.s of preordained influences designed to bring about a certain cla.s.s of preordained results. But this is moral government in name merely. The process which the advocates of this theory call moral government is just as mechanical as that by which the motions of the planets are controlled. The judiciary system of the Divine government, with all its solemn pageantry, is thus reduced to a mere farce. Beings are arraigned, with great judicial pomp, and condemned, or approved, punished or rewarded for actions which were decreed innumerable ages before they were born, and brought to pa.s.s by influences beyond their control, for actions which were devised, decreed, and irresistibly brought to pa.s.s by the judge himself.

20. We are now prepared for another consequence, which hangs like a millstone around the neck of this theory, and is sufficient, of itself, to sink it to the depths. It represents G.o.d not only as decreeing one thing and commanding another directly adverse thereto, but also as decreeing and bringing to pa.s.s opposite and contradictory events. He ordained that one man should believe the Holy Scriptures, and reverence them, and that another man should, at the same time, deny, and hate, and vilify them. He ordained that men should at one period of their lives preach the gospel, and write in favor of Christianity, and at another period become infidel lecturers and disputants. He decreed that some should believe the Calvinistic doctrine of decrees, and teach it, and that others should, at the same time, regard it as false and oppose it. He has ordained that men shall take opposite sides on all great questions, religious, philosophical, or political. He ordained the fugitive slave law and the recent Nebraska and Kansas enactment, and all the opposition from ministers and laymen, with which these measures have been regarded. He has ordained that one party shall laud them as just and patriotic, and that another party shall condemn and hate them as diabolical.

He ordained the arrest of that man on the suspicion of murder, with all the conflicting opinions as to his guilt or innocence, the contradictory testimony of the witnesses, the contrary pleadings of the counsel, the verdict of the jury p.r.o.nouncing him guilty, the sentence of the judge condemning him to death, and the pardon of the governor under the full conviction of his innocence. All the conflicting opinions and acts in the fiercest controversy that ever raged, this theory traces up to the Divine foreordination.

21. It must have appeared to the audience, by this time, that the character of G.o.d is fearfully involved in this inquiry.

(1). We have already seen that this theory draws after it the logical consequences that G.o.d is the author of sin, or, if not the author of it in the strict and proper sense of the term, at least the plotter--the prime mover of it; that he prefers sin to holiness in every instance in which sin takes place; that he regards sin as the necessary means of the greatest good; that he has, at the same time, two hostile wills relative to the same thing. And now what shall we say of his _wisdom_, when we find him decreeing acts, and bringing them to pa.s.s, and yet, peremptorily forbidding them--enjoining acts, by formal solemn legislation, which, from all eternity he has foreordained shall never be performed? When we find him ordaining measures for the promotion, and measures for the counteraction, of his own plans?

When we find him ordaining all the contradictions and vacillations by which human conduct is diversified and disgraced?--when every example of the most contemptible folly that ever turned the laugh, or the sneer, or the frown, or the sentiment of pity upon its immediate perpetrators, can be traced to the free counsels and designs of G.o.d, and finds its origin there?

(2). What shall we say of the _sincerity_ of G.o.d when we find him enjoining one cla.s.s of actions on pain of eternal d.a.m.nation, while yet he has decreed, and by unfailing means brings to pa.s.s, in the same subjects, an entirely opposite cla.s.s?--when we find him threatening, and expostulating, and professing to be grieved, on account of conduct which had its origin in his own free purposes, and is effected by his own providence?--when we find him engaged in enforcing two wills respecting the same thing, one directly the opposite of the other, one of which must necessarily fail of accomplishment, and then, wrathfully charging the failure upon those who have acted in all respects as he ordained they should?--when we find him offering salvation to all men, and solemnly a.s.severating that it is his will that all men should come to the knowledge of the truth, while yet the sinning, and ultimate d.a.m.nation of myriads, were decreed innumerable ages before they existed?

(3). What shall we say of his _holiness_, when the vilest crimes that ever caused the blush of shame, or the feeling of indignation or horror--_fornication, adultery, b.e.s.t.i.a.lity, fraud, oppression, lying, murder_--are in perfect coincidence with his eternal purposes, parts of his great plan, when he chose them in preference to their opposites, with all the means and appliances, great and small, by which they were brought to pa.s.s?

(4). And what shall we say of his _equity_ and _justice_, when we find him placing his subjects under the necessity of violating his will in one way or another, either his secret decrees or his published enactments? When we find him rewarding one cla.s.s of his subjects for fulfilling his decrees, and d.a.m.ning another cla.s.s with everlasting tortures for doing precisely the same thing?

(5). And where is his _benevolence_, when he freely chooses, prefers, ordains, and brings to pa.s.s all the sin and misery in the universe?

22. Again: It is obvious that this theory lays the foundation of a new system of morals. If it be insisted upon that, notwithstanding G.o.d has decreed whatsoever comes to pa.s.s, he is perfectly sincere, just, holy, and benevolent, we shall have obtained certain ethical principles which, if carried out into universal practice, would subvert all social order, and destroy all confidence. For instance, it will follow:--

First. That a ruler may secretly will, purpose, decree, foreordain, that his, subjects shall act in a certain way. He may put into operation effective measures to secure their concurrence with his designs. Meantime, he may profess a profound and insuperable dissatisfaction with a very large proportion of the actions which he has predetermined and induced; he may indignantly condemn and threaten to punish the actors; he may do all this, and yet be perfectly sincere. In other words, what men usually regard as the most thorough-paced duplicity, is in entire accordance with perfect sincerity. By this principle, the worst hypocrite that ever lived may be fully vindicated from the charge of hypocrisy.

Again: A being may give existence to a vast mult.i.tude of other beings, inferior, dependent, but yet intelligent. He may a.s.sert over their actions the most absolute control. He may predetermine and bring to pa.s.s every one of their actions. He may "shut up all other ways of acting, and leave that only open which he had determined to be done." Meanwhile, he may issue laws peremptorily requiring conduct directly opposite to his unchangeable predeterminations, thus placing his creatures under the dire necessity of violating his secret decrees, or his published laws; and yet he may, with perfect justice, arraign, condemn, and punish them for the violation of these laws, consigning them to eternal misery. This theory will furnish us with a criterion of moral character--a code by which the Neros, Domitians, Caligulas, and Diocletians, whom men have reprobated and abhorred as tyrants, may be triumphantly vindicated and made honorable.

Again: A being may be the author, or, if not, in the strictest sense, the author, at least the planner, the prime mover of all the wickedness that ever existed. He may use effective influences in bringing it to pa.s.s, so that it may be said, in truth, that he freely and unchangeably preordained and produced it, and yet he may be perfectly holy.

And again: A being may purpose, foreordain, and bring to pa.s.s all the sin and misery in the universe, and yet be perfectly benevolent. Here is a principle of ethics which will more than cover and vindicate the most atrocious cruelties of the Romish inquisition. The rum-seller, so called, who is the agent of incalculable mischief, may find under it the most ample protection. His designs terminate upon the sale of his liquors, and the gains which result. If he could sell his fiery commodity, and secure his gains without the misery, he would. But, according to our new code of ethical principles, he might go much further.

He might design, as an end, all the wretchedness that results, and prosecute his traffic as a means to secure that end, and yet be perfectly benevolent.

Is it not plain that this theory, if adopted and carried out to its legitimate logical results, must revolutionize and reverse all our established conceptions of wisdom, sincerity, holiness, equity, justice, and benevolence, and introduce an entirely new estimate of moral conduct?

23. Further: This theory furnishes the most complete justification of all the conduct of the worst men that ever lived, both by the ethical principles which may be deduced from it, and by the single consideration that their every action is in perfect harmony with the Divine will. The New Testament speaks of men being without excuse; but I ask, what better excuse can be desired than that the conduct in question is in precise accordance with the will of G.o.d? Men sometimes think it an apology to say that they acted hastily--that they were misled by others--that they were not aware of the mischief likely to result from their course; but this doctrine puts them at once upon the highest possible ground of justification. The poor reprobate may be silenced, at the day of judgment, by the terrors which surround him, and by the stern authority of the judge, but _not by the want of a valid plea_. When the sentence shall go forth consigning him to perdition for the deeds done in the body, he will have in readiness, whether allowed to utter it or not, the unanswerable answer: "Lord, the deeds for which I am condemned were in all respects what thou didst predetermine. I have executed from first to last thy wise and holy counsels. Had I acted otherwise, I should have frustrated thy free purposes, formed before the foundation of the world. I have, indeed, gone contrary to thy published law, but that thou didst render inevitable by making that law antagonistic to thy eternal decree, which thou dost not allow to be thwarted, in any instance, by man or angel."

This plea would be equally conclusive before any human tribunal.

There are Calvinistic lawyers, or lawyers who are members of Calvinistic churches or congregations. The names of some of these are appended to a note soliciting for publication Dr. Boardman's sermons on _Election_. In defending alleged criminals, men of their profession often tax their ingenuity to the utmost for arguments. If the insanity of the prisoner can be established, they expect his acquittal, though he may have perpetrated the fatal violence. But why do they never offer, in behalf of the prisoner intrusting his case to them, that he has done nothing but what G.o.d willed and decreed from all eternity he should do?

that, from the beginning to the end of the affair, he was but executing the counsels of Heaven--counsels which Heaven never suffers to be frustrated, either as to the end, or the instrument.

Some of them believe the doctrine, and desire that the public should believe it. Why, then, do they never plead it when pledged to give their client the benefit of every available argument? Is it nothing to be able to say for him that he has not swerved a hair's-breadth from the designs of the great Sovereign of the universe, at whose judgment-seat all the decisions of human tribunals will be reviewed? They dare not offer such a plea.

They know that common sense would laugh them out of countenance, if not out of court. And if all present were believers in the doctrine, they could not attempt to reduce it to its legitimate practical application without laughing in each other's faces-- such is its essential absurdity. They may circulate it in sermons, in which eloquent nonsense is drivelled with impunity, but they will not venture to propound it in a court, where common sense and equity bear sway.

24. If this doctrine be true, it is wholly unnecessary for any of you to impose any restraint upon your pa.s.sions or wills. Are you tempted to indulge in sensuality, or to defraud your neighbor, and even to a.s.sa.s.sinate him? And does the inquiry arise in your mind whether the act to which you are tempted is according to the will of G.o.d? You have only to do it, and the result proves that it is decreed. So says Mr. Barnes: "The result, by whatever means brought about, expresses the design of G.o.d." If the act be not decreed, you cannot do it, though you try. If you can, it is decreed _that you should_; and your doing it is as inevitable as destiny itself. So you may just go forward, and the result will be right; that is, if G.o.d's decrees are right.

25. It is also an obvious consequence of this doctrine that no man can contribute anything to hip personal salvation; that his salvation or d.a.m.nation is fixed wholly by the Divine decrees. He.

cannot influence his destiny by any effort he can make. There is no use in his trying. Indeed, the _Westminster Confession of Faith_ informs us directly that man is "altogether pa.s.sive" in "regeneration," and that his "perseverance" "depends not upon his own free will, but upon the immutability of the decree of election." So that all the exhortations of the gospel and of the pulpit, are utterly irrelevant. There is a very significant pa.s.sage bearing upon this point in Chalmer's discourse on Predestination: "And now," says he, "you can have no difficulty in understanding how it is that we make our calling and election sure. _It is not in the power of the elect to make their election surer in itself than it really is, for this is a sureness which is not capable of receiving any addition_. It is not in the power of the elect to make it surer to G.o.d--for all futurity is submitted to his all-seeing eye, and his absolute knowledge stands in need of no confirmation. But there is such a thing as the elect being ignorant for a time of their own election, and their being made sure of it in the way of evidence and discovery."