Team Of Rivals Part 33

BY THE END OF 1861, Lincoln realized that he had made a serious mistake in placing Simon Cameron at the head of the War Department. For many decades, Cameron had maintained his power base in Pennsylvania through the skillful use of patronage to reward loyalists and punish opponents. Unfortunately, the expertise of a wily political boss proved inadequate to the tremendous administrative challenge of leading the War Department in the midst of a civil war. A central system of civilian command was essential to construct a machine capable of providing strategy, supplies, logistics, and training for an army that had grown from 16,000 in March to 670,000 in December. Careful record keeping was indispensable when contracts worth millions had to be negotiated for rifles, cannons, horses, uniforms, food, and blankets.

As Lincoln confided to Nicolay, Cameron was "incapable either of organizing details or conceiving and advising general plans." His primitive filing system consisted mainly of scribbled notes. According to Ohio congressman Albert Riddle, when Cameron was asked about the progress of a particular matter, "he would look about, find a sc.r.a.p of paper, borrow your pencil, make a note, put the paper in one pocket of his trousers and your pencil in the other."

The war was less than two months old when detailed accusations of corruption and inefficiency in the War Department began to surface in newspapers. In July, the Congress appointed a committee to investigate charges that middlemen had made off with scandalous profits on contracts for unworkable pistols and carbines, blind horses, and knapsacks that disintegrated when it rained. Though Cameron was not charged with pocketing the money himself, several of his political cronies had grown rich, vast public funds had been wasted, and the lives of Union soldiers had been jeopardized. As the charges multiplied, Republican newspapers began to call for his resignation, lest the entire administration become tainted by the scandal. "It is better to lose a mortified finger of the right hand at once," the New York Times declared, "than to cherish it till the arm is full of disease, and the whole system threatened with dissolution."

Determined to protect his position, Cameron sought to ingratiate himself with the increasingly powerful radical Republicans in Congress, led by Ma.s.sachusetts's Charles Sumner, Ohio's Ben Wade, Indiana's George Julian, and Maine's William Fessenden. Though known as a conservative on the issue of slavery, Cameron began by degrees to embrace the radicals' contention that the central purpose of the war was to bring the inst.i.tution of human bondage to an end. While he had allied himself initially with Seward, Cameron turned increasingly to Chase, the single cabinet member at the time not only in favor of allowing fugitive slaves to stay within Union lines but also of enlisting and arming them. "We agreed," Chase later recalled, "that the necessity of arming them was inevitable; but we were alone in that opinion."

Acting without Lincoln's approval, Cameron publicly endorsed the position of an army colonel who had sanctioned seizing slaves and using them for military service as one step in a more general policy of deploying "extremist measures against the rebels, even to their absolute ruin." In cabinet sessions and at private dinners, he instigated heated arguments with Bates, Blair, and Smith, who fiercely a.s.sailed his position. Cameron maintained that black soldiers would add an essential weapon in the quest for victory. Blair claimed that Cameron was riding the "n.i.g.g.e.r hobby" for his own political advantage.

The situation came to a head in early December. Each department customarily presented an annual report to the president as he prepared his own yearly message. While drafting the War Department report, the war secretary resolved to officially advocate arming slaves who came into Union lines. Well aware that he would ignite controversy, Cameron read his draft to a series of friends, most of whom urged him to keep silent on the contentious issue.

At this point, Cameron recalled, "I sought out another counsellor,-one of broad views, great courage, and of tremendous earnestness. It was Edwin Stanton." Cameron had called on Stanton during the summer and fall for legal advice on various contracts. This matter, however, was more delicate. Stanton "read the report carefully," according to Cameron, and "gave it his unequivocal and hearty support." In fact, he suggested his own provocative logic, which served to strengthen the argument for arming slaves: "It is clearly a right of the Government to arm slaves when it may become necessary," the addition read, "as it is to take gunpowder from the enemy."

It remains unclear whether Stanton offered his deliberately incendiary advice to encourage the war secretary openly to defy Lincoln, hoping that if Cameron were dismissed, he, Stanton, might be called upon to replace him. Perhaps he was "an abolitionist at heart," simply waiting for the right moment to reveal his honest convictions. He had, after all, given his boyhood pledge to his father that he would fight slavery until the end of his life, and had expressed similar sentiments to Chase in the bloom of their friends.h.i.+p in Ohio. More significant, Charles Sumner considered Stanton "my personal friend," who "goes as far [as] I do in directing the war against Slavery." Yet when Stanton talked with fellow Democrats during this same period of time, including McClellan and his former cabinet colleague Jeremiah Black, he expressed decidedly more conservative views on the issue of slavery. Whatever Stanton's purpose, his approval emboldened Cameron, who sent out advance copies of his report to a number of newspapers before submitting it to the president.

When the government printer brought the War Department report to the president for approval, Lincoln discovered the inflammatory paragraph. "This will never do!" he said. "Gen. Cameron must take no such responsibility. That is a question which belongs exclusively to me!" He deleted the paragraph and issued orders to seize every copy already sent. While Lincoln understood that the slaves coming into Union hands "must be provided for in some way," he did not believe, he later wrote, that he possessed the const.i.tutional authority to liberate and arm them. The only way that such actions, "otherwise unconst.i.tutional, might become lawful," was if those measures were deemed "indispensable" for "the preservation of the nation," and therefore for "the preservation of the const.i.tution" itself. At this juncture, he was not convinced that arming seized slaves was "an indispensable necessity." Moreover, he was undeniably aware that such a measure at this time would alienate the moderate majority of his coalition.

Lincoln informed Cameron of his action at the next cabinet meeting, emphasizing, as he had with Fremont, that any decision regarding the future of slavery rested with the president, not with a subordinate official. Although Cameron immediately conceded and agreed to delete the vetoed language, he complained that his excised recommendation was no different from the suggestion Welles had made in his annual report. "This was the moment that Welles dreaded most," his biographer observed. Like the secretary of war, the secretary of the navy had felt compelled to make some provision for fugitive slaves who "have sought our s.h.i.+ps for refuge and protection." In such cases, Welles declared, the slaves "should be cared for and employed" by either the navy or the army (depending on which branch had greater need), and "if no employment could be found for them in the public service, they should be allowed to proceed freely and peaceably, without restraint, to seek a livelihood."

Certain that he, too, would be commanded to revise his report, Welles resolved that he would resign before doing so. But to his bewilderment, Lincoln allowed the navy report to be printed without change. Shrewdly, Lincoln had recognized at once the political difference between the two situations: the army occupied territory in the border states, while the navy did not. Allowing blacks to find employment on naval s.h.i.+ps or in surrounding harbors on the coast was fundamentally different from providing weapons to blacks in the slave states of Kentucky or Missouri, whose continued loyalty was critical to the Union. Lincoln still believed that such a step would drive the loyal citizens of these states into the Confederacy.

In fact, the president had developed his own policy for the increasing numbers of fugitive slaves who had come into Union lines. As members of Congress gathered on Capitol Hill for the opening of the winter session, he outlined his ideas in his annual message. He recognized, he wrote, that under the Confiscation Act, when Union armies secured territory where slaves had been used by their masters "for insurrectionary purposes," the legal rights of the slaveholders were "forfeited"; slaves "thus liberated" had to be "provided for in some way." He was hopeful that some of the loyal border states might soon "pa.s.s similar enactments." If such actions were taken, Lincoln recommended that the Congress compensate the states for each freed slave.

Lincoln still believed that both cla.s.ses of freed slaves should be colonized on a purely voluntary basis, "at some place, or places, in a climate congenial to them. It might be well to consider, too,-whether the free colored people already in the United States could not, so far as individuals may desire, be included in such colonization."

So long as Lincoln remained hopeful that the Union could be restored before the conflict "degenerate[d] into a violent and remorseless revolutionary struggle," he was unwilling, he said, to sanction "radical and extreme measures" regarding slavery. Despite this a.s.sertion, he closed his message with a graceful and irrefutable argument against the continuation of slavery in a democratic society, the very essence of which opened "the way to all," granted "hope to all," and advanced the "condition of all." In this "just, and generous, and prosperous system," he reasoned, "labor is prior to, and independent of, capital." Then, reflecting upon the vicissitudes of his own experience, Lincoln added: "The prudent, penniless beginner in the world, labors for wages awhile, saves a surplus with which to buy tools or land for himself; then labors on his own account another while, and at length hires another new beginner to help him." Clearly, this upward mobility, the possibility of self-realization so central to the idea of America, was closed to the slave unless and until he became a free man.

Abolitionists condemned Lincoln's message. "Away with the unstatesmanlike scheme of Colonization, thrust so unfortunately into the face of the nation at this juncture!" the abolitionist Worthington G. Snethen wrote Chase. "Let the sword make a nation of four millions of black men free, and let them be free, as free as the white man." Frederick Dougla.s.s was so outraged both by the idea of colonizing freed slaves, and by the president's refusal to enlist blacks into the army, that he was close to losing all faith in Lincoln. The president did not understand that the black man was an American with no desire to live elsewhere; "his attachment to the place of his birth is stronger than iron." Moreover, why such fearful concern about the destiny of the freed slave? "Give him wages for his work, and let hunger pinch him if he don't work," Dougla.s.s declared. "He is used to [work], and is not afraid of it. His hands are already hardened by toil, and he has no dreams of ever getting a living by any other means than by hard work."

Since the beginning of the war, Dougla.s.s had avowed that nothing would terrify the South like the vision of thousands of former slaves wielding weapons on behalf of the Union Army. "One black regiment alone would be, in such a war, the full equal of two white ones. The very fact of color in this case would be more terrible than powder and b.a.l.l.s." Predicting that a "lenient war" would be "a lengthy war and therefore the worst kind of war," Dougla.s.s contended that the survival of the nation depended upon enlisting the "slaves and free colored people" into the army. In a speech in Philadelphia, he proclaimed: "We are striking the guilty rebels with our soft, white hand, when we should be striking with the iron hand of the black man, which we keep chained behind us. We have been catching slaves, instead of arming them.... We pay more attention to the advice of the half-rebel State of Kentucky, than to any suggestion coming from the loyal North."

While the radical press criticized Lincoln's message, moderate and conservative Republicans lauded his tact. "It appeals to the judgment,-the solid convictions of the people, rather than their resentments or their impatient hopes and aspirations," the New York Times concluded, and as "the moderate men compose nine-tenths of the population of the country, the message will doubtless meet with popularity." Even the normally critical New York Tribune conceded that the "country and the world will not fail to mark the contrast" between the magnanimity of Lincoln's message and a recent "truculent" address by Jefferson Davis. Though Davis was "commonly presumed the abler of the two" statesmen, and "certainly the better grammarian," the Tribune observed, the address of the Confederate chief was "boastful, defiant, and savage," whereas Lincoln "breathes not an unkind impulse" and "deals in no railing accusations."

CHAPTER 15

"MY BOY IS GONE"

THE LINCOLNS HOSTED the traditional New Year's Day reception to mark the advent of 1862. The day was "unusually beautiful," the New York Times reported, "the sky being clear and bright, and the air soft and balmy, more like May than January." Frances Seward, who had joined her husband for the holidays, found the festive atmosphere rea.s.suring. "For the first time since we have been here," she told her sister, "the carriages are rolling along the streets as they used to do in old times." Bates, too, was braced by the glorious day. "All the world was out," he noted. Thousands of citizens streamed into the White House when the gates were opened at noon. The Marine Band played as members of the public shook hands with the president and first lady. They mingled with Supreme Court justices, senators, congressmen, foreign ministers, military officers, and cabinet officials. At long last, f.a.n.n.y met the first lady, whom she described as "a compact little woman with a full round face," wearing "a black silk, or brocade, with purple cl.u.s.ters in it-and some appropriate velvet head arrangement."

Though Lincoln cordially greeted every guest, he was under great pressure. In the ninth month of the war, tales of corruption and mismanagement in the War Department combined with lack of progress on the battlefield to prevent Chase from raising the funds the Treasury needed to keep the war effort afloat. As public impatience mounted, Lincoln feared that "the bottom" was "out of the tub." While the disgruntled public might focus on various members of the military and the cabinet, the president knew that he would ultimately be held responsible for the choices of his administration. "If the new year shall be only the continuation of the faults, the mistakes, and the incapacities prevailing during 1861," diarist Count Gurowski warned, "then the worst is to be expected."

Lincoln had been so reticent during the summer and fall, when Cameron was first criticized for his lax administration and questionable contracts, that Seward questioned whether the president was sufficiently attentive to the unsavory situation. Then, one night in January, the secretary of state recalled, "there was a ring at my door-bell." The president entered, seated himself on the sofa, "and abruptly commenced talking about the condition of the War Department. He soon made it apparent that he had all along observed and known as much about it as any of us...his mind was now settled, and he had come to consult me about a successor to Mr. Cameron."

Choosing the right successor to Cameron was vital. Lincoln's initial preferences may have included Joseph Holt, Buchanan's war secretary who had crucially supported the Union during the secession crisis, or West Point graduate Montgomery Blair. According to Welles, Blair "had exhibited great intelligence, knowledge of military men, sagacity and sound judgment" during cabinet discussions. Instead of either man, in a decision that would prove most significant to the course of the war, Lincoln selected Edwin Stanton, the gruff lawyer who had humiliated him in Cincinnati six years earlier and whose disparaging remarks about his presidency were well known in Was.h.i.+ngton circles.

Was.h.i.+ngton insiders attributed the choice to the combined influence of Seward and Chase. These two rivals rarely agreed on policy or principle, but each had his own reasons for advocating Stanton. Seward would never forget Stanton's contribution as his informant during the last weeks of the Buchanan tenure. The intelligence provided by Stanton had helped root out traitors and keep Was.h.i.+ngton safe from capture. It had also fortified Seward's role as the central figure in the critical juncture between Lincoln's election and inauguration. Chase's far more intimate friends.h.i.+p with Stanton had grown from their earlier days in Ohio when Stanton had a.s.sured Chase that "to be loved by you, and be told that you value my love is a gratification beyond my power to express." Equally important, Chase believed that Stanton would be a steadfast ally in the struggle against slavery.

Lincoln had his own recollections of Stanton, not all of which were negative. He had watched Stanton at work on the Reaper trial and had been impressed instantly by the powerful reasoning of Stanton's arguments, the pa.s.sion of his delivery, and the unparalleled energy he had devoted to the case. "He puts his whole soul into any cause he espouses," one observer noted. "If you ever saw Stanton before a jury," you would see that "he toils for his client with as much industry as if his case was his own...as if his own life depended upon the issue." Energy and force were desperately needed to galvanize the War Department, and Stanton had both in abundance.

On Sat.u.r.day, January 11, the president sent an uncharacteristically brusque letter to Cameron. In light of the fact that the war secretary had previously "expressed a desire for a change of position," he wrote, "I can now gratify you, consistently with my view of the public interest," by "nominating you to the Senate, next monday, as minister to Russia." After receiving the dismissal letter on Sunday, Cameron is said to have wept. "This is not a political affair," he insisted, "it means personal degradation."

After dinner that night, Cameron went to see Chase. They apparently talked over the troubled situation and decided to enlist Seward's help. Chase drove Cameron back to Willard's and then went alone to Seward's house. As planned, Cameron came in soon after, brandis.h.i.+ng the president's letter, which, he said, was "intended as a dismissal, and, therefore, discourteous." Cameron was finally convinced "to retain the letter till morning, and then go and see the President." Later that night, Chase confided in his diary: "I fear Mr. Seward may think Cameron's coming into his house pre-arranged, and that I was not dealing frankly." As usual, however, so long as the high-minded Chase was certain that he had "acted right, and with just deference to all concerned," he was able to rationalize his machinations.

The next day, presumably briefed by Seward and Chase, Lincoln agreed to withdraw his terse letter and subst.i.tute a warm note indicating that Cameron had initiated the departure. Since the desirable post at St. Petersburg was vacant, the president would happily "gratify" Cameron's desire. "Should you accept it, you will bear with you the a.s.surance of my undiminished confidence, of my affectionate esteem, and of my sure expectation that...you will be able to render services to your country, not less important than those you could render at home." He also asked Cameron to recommend a successor. Cameron expressed his fervent opinion that his fellow Pennsylvanian Stanton was the best man for the job. In fact, Lincoln had already made his decision, but Cameron left believing he was responsible for Stanton's selection. In the end, each of the three men-Seward, Chase, and Cameron-a.s.sumed he was instrumental in Lincoln's appointment of the new secretary of war.

After settling matters with Cameron, Lincoln asked George Harding, whom he had made head of the Patent Office, to bring his old law partner Stanton to the White House. Stanton was then forty-seven, though the grizzled brown hair and beard made him look older, as did the gla.s.ses that hid his bright brown eyes. Harding was afraid that disagreeable recollections from the Reaper trial would cast a pall on the meeting. Both Lincoln and Stanton seemed to have put the past behind them, however, leaving Harding "the most embarra.s.sed of the three."

The urgency of the situation left Stanton little time to deliberate. He consulted his wife, Ellen, who, according to her mother, "objected to his acceptance." The move to the War Department would substantially diminish the lifestyle of the Stanton family, slas.h.i.+ng a legal income of over $50,000 a year to $8,000. Stanton, too, tormented all his life by fears of insolvency, must have been concerned about the drastic diminution of income. Nevertheless, he could not refuse to serve as secretary of war in the midst of a great civil war. And if he served with distinction, his life, however short in years, might be made "long by n.o.ble deeds," as Chase had once prophesied. He accepted the post, on the condition that he could retain Peter Watson, his old friend and a.s.sistant on the Reaper trial, "to take care of the contracts," for he realized he would "be swamped at once" without Watson's aid.

The announcement of Cameron's resignation and Stanton's appointment took the majority of the cabinet by surprise. "Strange," Bates confided in his diary, that "not a hint of all this" was discussed at the cabinet council the previous Friday, "and stranger still," the president had sent for no one but Seward over the weekend. Welles heard the dramatic news from Monty Blair, whom he met on the street. Neither one of them, Welles confessed, had been "taken into Lincoln's confidence." Indeed, Welles had never even met Stanton. Stanton's nomination dismayed radical Republicans on Capitol Hill. The powerful William Fessenden, fearful that Stanton's Democratic heritage would incline him toward a soft policy on both slavery and the South, worked to delay the Senate confirmation until he ascertained more about Stanton's position. He conferred with Chase, who a.s.sured Fessenden that "he, Secretary Chase, was responsible for Mr. Stanton's selection," and that he would arrange a meeting that very evening between the Maine senator and Stanton. Seward's role in the selection was not publicized, allowing the radicals to a.s.sume that Chase, their man in the cabinet, was the chief architect of the appointment. After a lengthy conversation with Stanton, Fessenden told Chase that he was thoroughly convinced that Stanton was "just the man we want." The senator was delighted to find that he and Buchanan's former Attorney General concurred "on every point," including "the conduct of the war" and "the negro question." The Senate confirmed Stanton's nomination the next day.

News of Stanton's replacement for Cameron met with widespread approval. The public generally a.s.sumed that Cameron had retired voluntarily. "Not only was the press completely taken by surprise," Seward told his wife, "but with all its fertility of conjecture, not one newspaper has conceived the real cause." Cameron's reputation was preserved until the House Committee on Contracts published its 1,100-page report in February 1862, detailing the extensive corruption in the War Department that had led to the purchase of malfunctioning weapons, diseased horses, and rotten food. According to one newspaper report, the committee "resolved to advise the immediate pa.s.sage of a bill to punish with death any person who commits a fraud upon the Government, whereby a soldier is bodily injured, as for instance in the sale of unsound provisions." Though Cameron was never charged with personal liability, the House voted to censure him for conduct "highly injurious to the public service."

Cameron was devastated, knowing that he would never recover from the scandal. Lincoln, however, made a great personal effort to a.s.suage his pain and humiliation. He wrote a long public letter to Congress, explaining that the unfortunate contracts were sp.a.w.ned by the emergency situation facing the government in the immediate aftermath of Fort Sumter. Lincoln declared that he and his entire cabinet "were at least equally responsible with [Cameron] for whatever error, wrong, or fault was committed."

Cameron would never forget this generous act. Filled with grat.i.tude and admiration, he would become, Nicolay and Hay observed, "one of the most intimate and devoted of Lincoln's personal friends." He appreciated the courage it took for Lincoln to share the blame at a time when everyone else had deserted him. Most other men in Lincoln's situation, Cameron wrote, "would have permitted an innocent man to suffer rather than incur responsibility." Lincoln was not like most other men, as each cabinet member, including the new war secretary, would soon come to understand.

On his first day in office, the energetic, hardworking Stanton inst.i.tuted "an entirely new regime" in the War Department. Cameron's department had been so inundated by office seekers and politicians that officials had little time to answer letters or file telegraphs they received. As a result, requests for military supplies were often delayed for weeks. Stanton decreed that "letters and written communications will be attended to the first thing in the morning when they are received, and will have precedence over all other business." While Cameron had welcomed congressmen and senators every day but Sunday, Stanton announced that the War Department would be closed to all business unrelated to military matters from Tuesdays through Fridays. Congressmen and senators would be received on Sat.u.r.days; the general public on Mondays.

Stanton quickly removed many of Cameron's people and surrounded himself with men much like himself, full of pa.s.sion, devotion, and drive. He made it clear from the beginning that he would not tolerate unmerited requests for even the smallest job. The day after he took office, Stanton later recalled, he met with a man he instinctively judged to be "one of those indescribable half loafers, half gentlemen," who carried with him "a card from Mrs. Lincoln, asking that the man be made a commissary." Stanton was furious. He ripped up the note and sent the man away. The very next day, the man returned with an official request from Mary that he be given the appointment. Stanton did not budge, dismissing the job seeker once again. That afternoon, Stanton called on Mrs. Lincoln. He told her that "in the midst of a great war for national existence," his "first duty is to the people" and his "next duty is to protect your husband's honor, and your own." If he appointed unqualified men simply to return favors, it would "strike at the very root of all confidence." Mary understood his argument completely. "Mr. Stanton you are right," she told him, "and I will never ask you for anything again." True to her word, Stanton affirmed, "she never did."

Under Stanton's altered regime, the War Department opened early in the morning and the gas lamps remained lit late into the night. "As his carriage turned from Pennsylvania Avenue into Seventeenth Street," one of his clerks recalled, "the door-keeper on watch would put his head inside and cry, in a low, warning tone, 'The Secretary!' The word was pa.s.sed along and around till the whole building was traversed by it, and for a minute or two there was a shuffling of feet and a noise of opening and shutting of doors, as the stragglers and loungers everywhere fled to their stations."

Stanton kept his meetings brief and pointed. He was "fluent without wordiness," George Templeton Strong wrote, "and above all, earnest, warm-hearted, and large-hearted." His tireless work style invigorated his colleagues. "Persons at a distance," a correspondent in the capital city wrote, "cannot well realize what a revolution has been wrought in Was.h.i.+ngton by the change of the head of the War Department. The very atmosphere of the city breathes of change; the streets, the hotels, the halls of Congress speak it."

After nearly a year of disappointment with Cameron, Lincoln had found in Stanton the leader the War Department needed.

EARLY IN FEBRUARY 1862, Mary Lincoln pioneered a new form of entertainment at the White House. Instead of the traditional public receptions, which allowed anyone to walk in off the street, or the expensive state dinners, designed for only a small number, she sent out some five hundred invitations for an evening ball to be held at the White House on February 5. Since the party was not open to the public, an invitation became a mark of prestige in Was.h.i.+ngton society. Those who were not on the original list, according to Nicolay, "sought, and almost begged their invitations."

Mary prepared for her gala with great enthusiasm. She arranged for the Marine Band to play in the corridor and brought in a famous New York catering firm to serve the midnight supper. She had her black seamstress, Elizabeth Keckley, create a beautiful white satin gown with black tr.i.m.m.i.n.g, a long train, and a low-cut neckline that instantly attracted Lincoln's eye. He laughingly suggested that "if some of that tail was nearer the head, it would be in better style."

Meanwhile, Willie and Tad had settled into a happy routine. They worked with their tutor in the mornings and played with the two Taft boys in the afternoons and evenings, either at the White House or at the Taft home. Judge Taft became "much attached" to both Lincoln boys. He believed that Willie "had more judgment and foresight than any boy of his age that [he had] ever known." The four boys built a cabin on the mansion's flat roof, which was protectively encircled by "a high stone Ballistrade." They named their makes.h.i.+ft fortification the "s.h.i.+p of State," and equipped it with a spygla.s.s that enabled them to watch the movement of boats on the Potomac and troops on the sh.o.r.e. They invited guests to theatrical performances in the attic. Riding the pony given Willie as a gift became another favorite pastime. In mid-January, when Robert came home on vacation from Harvard College, the family was complete.

Then, a few days before Mary's grand party, Willie came down with a fever. Illness had been prevalent in Was.h.i.+ngton that January, as snow was followed by sleet and rain that left the ground covered with a thick layer of foul-smelling mud. Smallpox and typhoid fever had taken many lives. "There is a good deal of alarm in the City on account of the prevalence of the Small pox," Judge Taft recorded in his diary. "There are cases of it in almost every Street in the City."

Illness had struck the Stantons, the Sewards, and the Chases. Stanton's youngest son, James, had become critically ill after a smallpox vaccination caused "a dreadful eruption" on all parts of the baby boy's body. The illness continued for six weeks, during which time he was "not expected to live." In this same period, f.a.n.n.y Seward, who had gone to Philadelphia with her mother, contracted what was first suspected to be smallpox but was probably typhoid. Her "burning fever," back pains, and "ulcerated" throat lasted for nearly two weeks. Seward left Was.h.i.+ngton in alarm to be with f.a.n.n.y, one of the few departures from his work during the entire war. Nettie Chase was also seriously ill, having contracted scarlet fever on her way to boarding school in Pennsylvania.

Mary thought it best to cancel the party because of Willie's illness, but Lincoln hesitated, since the invitations had already been sent out. He called in Dr. Robert Stone, who was considered "the dean of the Was.h.i.+ngton medical community." After examining Willie, the renowned doctor concluded that the boy was "in no immediate danger" and "that there was every reason for an early recovery." Relieved by the diagnosis, the Lincolns decided to hold the ball.

The carriages began arriving at the brilliantly lit White House around 9 p.m. All the Was.h.i.+ngton elite were present-the cabinet members and their wives, generals and their high staff, the members of the diplomatic corps, senators and congressmen, lawyers and businessmen. McClellan, in dress uniform, attracted much attention, as did the new secretary of war. The Green, Red, and Blue parlors were open for inspection, along with the East Room, where the Lincolns received their guests. Society reporters commented on both the "exquisite taste with which the White House has been refitted under Mrs. Lincoln's directions" and the magnificence of the women's attire. The "violet-eyed" Kate Chase was singled out, as usual. "She wore a dress of mauve-colored silk, without ornament," one reporter wrote admiringly. "On her small, cla.s.sically-shaped head a simple wreath of minute white flowers mingled with the blond waves of her sunny hair, which was arranged in a Grecian knot behind."

At midnight, the crowd began to move toward the closed dining room. During a slight delay occasioned by a steward who had temporarily misplaced the key, someone exclaimed, "I am in favor of a forward movement," and everyone laughed, including General McClellan. The doors were thrown open to reveal a sumptuous banquet, which was to be served with excellent wine and champagne. "The brilliance of the scene could not dispel the sadness that rested upon the face of Mrs. Lincoln," Elizabeth Keckley, the seamstress who had become a close confidante, recalled. "During the evening she came up-stairs several times, and stood by the bedside of the suffering boy."

Despite Mary's worry and watchfulness, the ball was a triumph. "Those who were here," Nicolay told his fiancee, "will be forever happy in the recollection of the favor enjoyed, because their vanity has been tickled with the thought that they have attained something which others have not." Although there was some caviling about "frivolity, hilarity and gluttony, while hundreds of sick and suffering soldiers" were "within plain sight," reviews in the capital city were overwhelmingly favorable. The Was.h.i.+ngton Evening Star p.r.o.nounced the event "a brilliant spectacle," while Leslie's Ill.u.s.trated Newspaper described Mary as "our fair 'Republican Queen,'" garbed in a "l.u.s.trous white satin robe" and black and white headdress "in perfect keeping with her regal style of beauty."