Some Account of the Public Life of the Late Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, Bart Part 3

In Sir George Prevost's despatch to Lord Bathurst on this subject, of the date of 30th October, 1813, he expresses himself fortunate at having arrived at the scene of action shortly after it commenced, as it enabled him personally to witness the conduct of the officers and men engaged in it, and to form a proper judgment of their merits, which he then severally details in his letter. The unqualified praise which he bestows upon the officer immediately commanding, (Lieut.-Colonel De Salaberry) is of itself a sufficient refutation of this libel on the part of the Reviewer.[71]

The checks thus received by the forces under Generals Wilkinson and Hampton, from Lieut.-Colonel Morrison, and Lieut.-Colonel De Salaberry, were, without doubt, no inconsiderable causes of their repulse in the attempt upon Lower Canada; but it was also the duty of the Reviewer to have noticed the prompt and judicious measures adopted by Sir George Prevost, as soon as he had ascertained that General Wilkinson was descending the St.

Lawrence to attack Montreal, for the defence of that place, by calling out the whole militia of the district, and by collecting all his disposable force at La Chine, where he commanded in person. The formidable defences which he had prepared both at Coteau du Lac, and at the Cedars, together with the imposing force of militia which had been a.s.sembled at a very short notice, must have convinced General Wilkinson that he could not hope to make any impression upon a people who shewed so much zeal and alacrity in defending themselves, and who were commanded by one who possessed their entire confidence and affection. Under these circ.u.mstances, and from the opposition already experienced to his attempt, the American Commander resolved to abandon it as impracticable, more particularly as he found himself without support from General Hampton, who had retired towards Lake Champlain.

In detailing the events of the campaign of 1814, the Reviewer has again not scrupled, in his account of Captain Pring's expedition to Vergennes, to distort the truth, for the purpose of attaching the blame of this failure to Sir George Prevost. So far from the Commander of the forces refusing to Captain Pring the a.s.sistance of the troops stationed at Isle aux Noix, as the Reviewer a.s.serts,[72] a strong detachment of the marines then in garrison at that post, was embarked on board of his squadron, and the despatch to Lord Bathurst from Sir George Prevost, of the 18th of May, 1814,[73] proves that this expedition was planned and directed by the Commander of the forces, and probably failed from the circ.u.mstance alone of Captain Pring being prevented by baffling winds for four days from reaching his destination, before the enemy had time to mature their preparations for defence.

A similar degree of incorrectness prevails in the Reviewer's statements with regard to the force retained by Sir George Prevost in Lower Canada.

That Lower Canada, in the middle of April, 1814,[74] had nothing to dread, may be confidently denied. On the 22d and 30th March, two attempts had been made by General Wilkinson to penetrate into that Province by the Montreal frontier, and in the latter instance, in considerable force. Though he was repulsed in both cases, and in the latter with severe loss, he still continued to keep a considerable body of men on the frontier line, from which he did not withdraw until towards the middle of May.[75] Sackett's Harbour, instead of being weakly garrisoned, had been strengthened by two regiments from General Wilkinson's army, besides other reinforcements; and our fleet on Lake Ontario was so far from being at that period ready for sea, that it was not until the 14th of April, that the two s.h.i.+ps, which were to const.i.tute its princ.i.p.al strength, had been launched, nor was our squadron in a situation to take the Lake until the beginning of May. The only reinforcements which, up to this period in 1814, and even until the beginning of June, had arrived in Lower Canada, were the 2d battalion of the 8th regiment, which the foresight of the Commander of the forces had induced him to draw in the depth of winter by land from New Brunswick, whence they arrived in the month of March, together with 200 picked seamen from Admiral Griffiths for the fleet on Lake Ontario, without a single accident. This regiment is enumerated by the Reviewer amongst his nine regular regiments of infantry, with three squadrons of dragoons, six strong battalions of militia, and a numerous _division_ of artillery, the _whole_ of which he has untruly a.s.serted, were crowded together in inactivity at Chambly, behind a strong frontier, without an enemy to oppose them;[76] adding, that although reinforcements were daily arriving or expected, not a man was sent to strengthen the inadequate force on the Niagara frontier, until the middle of July, when only two of the Peninsular regiments were reluctantly yielded for that service. Of the nine regular regiments of infantry, of which the Reviewer speaks, one was De Meuron's foreign corps, another the Canadian Fencibles, a third a battalion of Marines, a fourth the Canadian Voltigeurs, militia-men, subject to militia law, and whose force at the utmost was 450 men. Of the real regular regiments, viz. the 8th, 13th, 16th, 49th, and 70th, the 16th did not arrive until June, together with two companies of artillery. This regiment was almost immediately stationed at Montreal, where it remained the whole of July, and in August was despatched to Upper Canada. The 70th garrisoned Quebec, with a portion of artillery, and a small corps, composed of the recruits of the other regiments in the Province. The 13th was in advance at St. John, and La Cole Mill, and the battalion of marines garrisoned Isle aux Noix. Of the six battalions of embodied militia, one was at La Prairie, and another, if not two of the others, at different parts of the frontier; the Voltigeurs were also in advance, and part of the Canadian fencibles were at Coteau du Lac. From this statement, made out from doc.u.ments, the authenticity of which cannot be doubted, it will appear that the troops under Sir George Prevost in the Lower Province, which were barely adequate to its defence, in lieu of being all a.s.sembled at Chambly, were stationed in different parts of the Province, where their services were most required, and that they did not at any time, collectively form the camp of instruction of which the Reviewer speaks. Previous even to the 1st of May, when the Reviewer has stated that Sir James Yeo was ready with his fleet for any operation, no part of this force could, consistently with the safety of Lower Canada, have been despatched for the reinforcement of General Drummond. Still less could a sufficient portion of it have been spared, to have enabled that officer, with any prospect of success, to attempt an attack on Sackett's Harbour. General Drummond was, in fact, aware that, from the period of the first attack on that place, in May, 1813, the enemy had been indefatigable in fortifying it, and that it was at all times guarded by a large body of regular troops and militia, together with a number of able and experienced seamen. Nothing, therefore, short of the full co-operation of a superior fleet, and a large body of troops, could have afforded him a well-grounded expectation of succeeding. General Drummond well knew that, up to May, 1814, and for some time afterwards, no force of this description could be spared from the Lower Province. However desirable he might have thought it, to destroy the naval depot at Sackett's Harbour, he knew that no adequate means were within his power, or that of the Commander of the forces; and until, by fresh reinforcements from England, those means should be acquired, he was obliged to content himself with operations compatible with his resources. We accordingly find that, as soon as the fleet was in readiness to take the Lake, General Drummond, in consequence of the previous communication which had taken place between Sir George Prevost and himself, undertook the expedition against Oswego, which terminated in the capture of that place, together with a quant.i.ty of stores, provisions, and ordnance, most of which being designed for the squadron at Sackett's Harbour, must have materially delayed its equipment.

Of this enterprise the Reviewer has thought proper to say nothing, because he knew that it might in a great degree be attributed to the measures of Sir George Prevost. For a similar reason he has altogether omitted to notice the extraordinary and energetic measures which had been adopted by the Commander of the forces, for relieving Michilimachinac, and affording to that garrison an important reinforcement of troops, seamen, and provisions, under the command of an able and experienced officer, who afterwards gave ample proofs of his courage and talents in his successful defence of that post against a powerful attack of the enemy. The reinforcement of that distant position, whilst the enemy were in possession of the whole of the Michigan territory, and by a route never before attempted, reflected the greatest credit upon the Commander of the forces who directed, and upon Lieutenant Colonel M'Douall, who executed, this arduous enterprise, which was highly important in its consequences as respected our Indian allies, and the safety of the Upper Province.

Independently of this reinforcement to the troops in Upper Canada, we shall find that Sir George Prevost continued mindful of Lieutenant-General Drummond's situation, and desirous of a.s.sisting him, as soon as the means of doing so were placed within his power. It has been already shewn, that out of the force which the Commander of the forces possessed for the defence of Lower Canada, and of which the Reviewer has given so incorrect a statement, the 2nd battalion of the 8th arrived from New Brunswick in March, and the 16th with two companies of artillery in June. It was not until the month of July that the next reinforcements, consisting of the 90th regiment, from the West Indies, and the 6th and 82nd from the army under the Duke of Wellington, reached Montreal. These three regiments were immediately sent forward to the Niagara frontier. The despatch to the Secretary of State, announcing the arrival of these troops, sufficiently and satisfactorily explained the reasons which had hitherto prevented Sir George Prevost from strengthening General Drummond's force in the Upper Province. In the beginning of June, and previously to the arrival of these reinforcements, Sir James Yeo had retired into port after blockading Sackett's Harbour; and from that period, until October, the enemy had the ascendancy on Lake Ontario. Our operations in Upper Canada were, therefore, necessarily confined to the defensive; and although the superior numbers of the enemy gave them at times an advantage over us, and occasioned a considerable loss of valuable lives, the efforts made by the Commander of the forces, to supply these losses, enabled General Drummond successfully to maintain the contest, and to prevent the Americans from gaining any permanent footing in the Province. Upon the arrival of the Nova Scotia Fencibles, a battalion of the Royals, and the 97th regiment towards the end of July, the latter regiment was immediately sent to Kingston, and Sir George Prevost continued to make every exertion to reinforce the army on the Niagara frontier.

Before we proceed to the consideration of the much misrepresented affair of Plattsburg, the orders under which Sir George Prevost acted, and the plan of operations proposed upon the arrival of the reinforcements from the Duke of Wellington's army, it will be necessary to expose the perverted statement with which the Quarterly Reviewer has introduced his account of this expedition. "In _June_ and _July_," he says, "a numerous fleet arrived in the St. Lawrence from Bourdeaux, with the flower of the Duke of Wellington's army."[77] Now connecting this paragraph with the one that follows soon afterwards--"that the Peninsular troops were suffered to ascend no higher than the ill-fated camp of Chambly, where they were detained _during the whole month of August_"[78]--it is evident that the Reviewer meant his readers to believe that the brigades, under Generals Robinson, Brisbane, Power, and Kempt, had arrived in Canada in June and July, so as to enable Sir George Prevost to a.s.semble them for any service at Chambly by the beginning of August, and yet that he kept them the whole of that month unemployed. It appears, however, from Sir George Prevost's despatches to Lord Bathurst, dated 28th June, 1814, that the only part of the Duke of Wellington's army, which arrived in June, were the 6th and 82nd regiments. The transports having those regiments on board pa.s.sed Quebec for Montreal, about the 26th of that month, but did not reach the latter place until the first or second week in July, from whence they were immediately pushed forward to reinforce Lieutenant-General Drummond on the Niagara frontier. The brigade under Major-General Power, which was accompanied by Major-General Brisbane, did not arrive at Quebec until late in July; indeed so late, that Sir George Prevost, in his despatch to Lord Bathurst announcing their arrival, states, that they would scarcely be able to arrive at Montreal, with every exertion, before the _20th of August_. The two last brigades, under Generals Kempt and Robinson, arrived still later; and Sir George Prevost's despatch of the 5th August, 1814, announcing their approach to Quebec, stated that it would be impossible, with every exertion, to collect the whole force, viz. all the brigades in the neighbourhood of Montreal, _before the end of that month_. In fact, it was not until towards the end of August, that two of the brigades above mentioned were a.s.sembled at Chambly, and in the neighbourhood; the other brigade, under Major-General Kempt, being stationed partly at Montreal, and partly in advance towards Kingston, in order to be in readiness for the service for which it was designed, whenever our ascendancy on Lake Ontario should be required.

In his next observations, the Reviewer has confounded both dates and facts, in order to make it appear that Sir George Prevost knew not how to dispose of the succours which had reached him; with which, in the Reviewer's opinion,[79] he ought instantly to have made a rapid movement towards Lake Ontario, for the purpose of attacking Sackett's Harbour; an attempt which, it is stated, should have been made whilst Sir James Yeo was blockading that place, instead of wasting some of the most valuable months of the summer in the camp at Chambly:[80] and further, that the march of General Izzard to Sackett's Harbour, with 3,000 or 4,000 regular troops, was a proof that the American Government felt (although our Commander did not), that all objects on the frontier were insignificant, in comparison with the protection of the numerous squadron which was blockaded in their ports on Lake Ontario.

Unfortunately for the Reviewer's consistency, he had previously stated, that in consequence of Commodore Chauncey having prepared two new frigates for sea, Sir James Yeo discontinued his blockade of Sackett's Harbour, and retired to Kingston, to await the equipment of the St. Lawrence, and that during the months of _August_ and _September_, Chauncey _held the Lake_.

General Izzard was despatched to Sackett's Harbour about the _end of August_, or _1st of September_, and consequently the American Government, from the Reviewer's own shewing, could not at that time have any apprehensions for their _numerous squadron_, blockaded _in their Port on Lake Ontario_. So far indeed from the American squadron being at this time in danger, Kingston, and Sir James Yeo's numerous squadron, were actually at the period of General Izzard's march to Sackett's Harbour, most rigorously blockaded by Chauncey, and so continued for nearly six weeks afterwards. Sackett's Harbour was in fact only blockaded by Sir James Yeo, from the beginning of May to the beginning of June, at which latter period he relinquished the blockade, and did not make his appearance on the Lake until the middle of October following.

It has been already shewn what Sir George Prevost's force really consisted of, in the Lower Province, during the period of this blockade, and until the month of July, when the first reinforcements from France reached him.

These reinforcements were immediately sent to the Upper Province. It is consequently most evident that he did not then possess the means of attacking Sackett's Harbour, and that after the blockade had ceased, tenfold the means he possessed would not have sufficed for the service, without the co-operation of the fleet.[81]

It is in the highest degree improbable, that any man in Sir George Prevost's army, or in the Provinces, possessing a knowledge of these facts, which were within the reach of all, should have thought it possible that on the arrival of the troops from Bourdeaux, Sackett's Harbour was or could be the point of attack, so long as our squadron was not able to take the Lake.

It will, it is apprehended, tend very materially to elucidate the subsequent operations of the war, to state the views which probably influenced His Majesty's Government in sending so large a force from the Duke of Wellington's army to Canada, and the manner in which it was directed to be employed. The circ.u.mstances under which the war had been commenced on the part of the Americans, and the refusal of their Government to consider the revocation of the Orders in Council, the ostensible ground of war as a cause for pacification, had justly offended both the Government and people of Great Britain. The efforts, however, which they were called upon to make in Europe, had, until the termination of the contest by the abdication of Buonaparte, prevented the British Government from furnis.h.i.+ng any other reinforcements for the army in the Canadas, than such as were barely sufficient, aided by the bravery of the troops, and the talents, zeal, and energy of their Commander, for the defence of the country from the repeated attacks of the enemy. As soon, however, as the peace with France placed a larger force at their disposal, His Majesty's Government resolved to avail themselves of a portion of it, in order to retaliate upon America her unjust aggressions, and to carry the war into such parts of her territory as might prove most a.s.sailable. In consequence of this determination, the expeditions to the Chesapeake and the Mississipi were planned; and with the same views three brigades were ordered from Bourdeaux to Canada. The objects contemplated in sending this reinforcement to Canada, will be best understood by a reference to Lord Bathurst's despatch to Sir George Prevost, of the 3d June, 1814, in which it is said, "The object of your operations will be, First, To give immediate protection, secondly, to obtain, if possible, ultimate security, to His Majesty's possessions in America. The entire destruction of Sackett's Harbour, and the naval establishment on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain, come under the first description."--"Should there be any advanced position on that part of our frontier which extends towards _Lake Champlain_, the occupation of which would materially tend to the security of the Province, you will, if you deem it expedient, expel the enemy from it, and occupy it by detachments of the troops under your command, _always, however, taking care not to expose his Majesty's troops to being cut off by too extended a line of advance_"--"At the same time, it is by no means the intention of His Majesty's Government to encourage such forward movements into the interior of the American territory, _as might commit the safety of the force placed under your command_." It must be evident to every person in the least acquainted with the territories of America bordering upon the Canadas, that none of the objects of offensive warfare contemplated in the foregoing despatch could be undertaken without the aid and co-operation of a fleet able to contend with that of the enemy. That His Majesty's Government might be aware of the impossibility of complying with the views and wishes above described, until the naval ascendancy should be secured on Lakes Ontario and Champlain, Sir George Prevost, in his despatch to Lord Bathurst, of the 12th July, before referred to, expresses his opinion on this head, stating that he did not expect from the reports he had received from Sir James Yeo, and the officer commanding our naval forces on the Richelieu, that their fleets would be in readiness before the middle of September.

Upon the arrival of the troops from France, and upon their being a.s.sembled as before stated in the neighbourhood of Montreal towards the end of August, it was ascertained that the new s.h.i.+p at Kingston would not be launched until towards the middle of September, and consequently, that Sir James Yeo would not be ready to take the Lake, at the earliest, until the beginning of October. All, therefore, that could be done with regard to the projected expedition against Sackett's Harbour, was to make such a disposition of the troops designed for the service, that they might be in readiness for it, whenever it might be deemed advisable to make the attempt. Major-General Sir James Kempt, who was to have the command, was accordingly dispatched to Kingston, and two brigades were quartered partly at Montreal and partly in advance, wherever he judged they might be best placed, with a view to the ultimate service for which they were designed.

The employment of the remainder of the force from France next became the subject of Sir George Prevost's consideration. The enemy had at that time a strong squadron on Lake Champlain, and their naval depot at Vergennes furnished them with the means of continually adding to it. They had also since the first attack fortified Plattsburg, a position which, provided we had the ascendancy on the Lake, it might be expedient for us to occupy for the security of the Lower Province. Should, therefore, our squadron, equipping in the Richelieu, be ready to co-operate with the army before the season was too far advanced for offensive operations, it was clear that one of the objects contemplated by Government might be undertaken with every prospect of success. The enemy's fleet, if they waited the attack upon them in Plattsburg bay, or elsewhere, might be destroyed, or the depot at Vergennes might fall into our hands by the occupation of Plattsburg, and the further advance of the army aided by the fleet. That the enemy were not a.s.sailable in any other quarter, (Sackett's Harbour being out of the question from what has been before stated,) it can scarcely be necessary to mention, nor has it ever been pretended that they were.

The State of Vermont on the east sh.o.r.e of the Lake might, indeed, have been entered from St. Amand, and our towns.h.i.+ps on that frontier, without the a.s.sistance of our squadron. But independently of there not being any object of sufficient consequence in that quarter to make an attack upon it advisable, it was deemed highly imprudent to molest that State by a mere predatory expedition, whilst two-thirds of the supplies of fresh meat for the army in Canada were furnished by American contractors, and whilst droves of cattle, as well as large sums of money in specie were constantly pa.s.sing by that route from the United States into Canada; a fact which is not generally known, and which strongly marks the wisdom of that policy which Sir George Prevost pursued during the American warfare. As the destruction of the enemy's naval depot on Lake Champlain was then the only operation contemplated by His Majesty's Government, which could be undertaken with any prospect of success, Sir George Prevost with a view to that object, had, immediately after the receipt of the despatch of the 3rd June, above referred to, used every possible exertion to accelerate the building of the new s.h.i.+p at Isle aux Noix, and the efficient arming and equipment of the squadron there, for the service in which it was proposed to be employed. Some time previous to this period it appears from Sir George Prevost's correspondence with Sir James Yeo, that he had repeatedly called the particular attention of that officer to the manning of the squadron for Lake Champlain.[82] In addition to this, his correspondence with Captain Fisher, and Vice Admiral Otway, tends to establish the fact of his unwearied and successful exertions to accomplish that object.

The Confiance was launched on the 26th of August, and Sir George Prevost having reason to believe that the efforts which were making for her equipment would enable Captain Fisher to take the Lake in the course of a few days, proceeded, on the 30th, to inspect the first brigade of troops quartered at Chambly; and on the 31st. established his head-quarters at Odell Town, close upon the enemy's frontier. Having here received information that General Izzard had suddenly quitted his position at Champlain Town, and had marched with a body of troops in the direction of Niagara, evidently for the purpose of joining General Brown, who had established a footing on the Niagara frontier, and was pressing upon Lieutenant General Drummond, Sir George Prevost determined to lose no time in entering the enemy's territory, (even though our fleet was not ready to co-operate,) in the hope by this movement of checking General Izzard's progress, and of thus making a diversion in favour of General Drummond. Our troops accordingly crossed the frontier line, and on the 3d of September took possession of Champlain Town, which the enemy had abandoned on their approach. Our forces advanced the following day to Chazy and Simpson's Inn, about eight miles from Plattsburg, where they halted on the 5th. Previously to this advance Captain Fisher, who had superintended the building of the Confiance, and whose local knowledge would have rendered his services peculiarly useful in the joint operations contemplated, had been suddenly and unexpectedly superseded by Sir James Yeo in the command of our naval force on the Richelieu, and Captain Downie had been appointed to succeed him. This officer did not arrive at Montreal from Lake Ontario until the 3rd September, and on the following day repaired to Isle aux Noix to superintend the equipment of the new s.h.i.+p. On the 5th of September, the day on which the troops halted at Simpson's Inn, an interview took place between Sir George Prevost and Captain Downie, when the latter a.s.sured the Commander of the forces, that his flotilla would be ready to co-operate with the army in less than forty-eight hours; that he had correctly ascertained the state and condition of the enemy's fleet; and that in consequence he entertained no apprehensions of the result of an action.

Sir George Prevost then explained to Captain Downie the reason of his having pressed forward before the latter was ready. On the following day, the 6th September, the army advanced to Plattsburg, and took possession of that part of it situate on the northern side of the Saranac, the enemy's troops having retreated thence to the south side, and to their fortified position on the crest of the hills.

No sooner had this position been taken, than Sir George Prevost, conceiving that the enemy, on the first approach of our troops, might not be fully prepared to receive them, proposed that the works should be immediately attacked;[83] but it being represented to him that one of the brigades was extremely hara.s.sed, having been brought forward from Chazy with great celerity, and that after allowing the men a reasonable time to rest, the afternoon would be too far advanced to attempt an operation for which it was desirable to have day-light, as the movement was to be made through so thick and intricate a country, Sir George was induced to acquiesce in this reasoning; and being likewise satisfied, from the a.s.surance given him, by Captain Downie, that the fleet would be ready to co-operate in a day or two at farthest, he finally resolved to defer the attack until the junction of the squadron. The enemy's fleet had retired from the mouth of the Chazy (where it was placed, when our troops entered the American territory), to Plattsburg Bay, and there, on the arrival of our army, it was found anch.o.r.ed; their gun-boats, which had been employed to interrupt the march of our army on the Lake road, being placed so as to manifest a determination to support their troops and position on the south side of the Saranac. On the morning of the 7th, it was discovered that the enemy's flotilla had changed their position since the preceding evening, and had moved further into the bay, out of the range of cannon from the sh.o.r.e, evidently with the object of avoiding the fire from the works, in case they should be attacked and carried.

As soon as Sir George Prevost had, by a thorough reconnoitring of the enemy's position, on sh.o.r.e and in the bay, satisfied his own mind that their fleet was moored too far from the sh.o.r.e to receive any support from their own batteries, or any injury from ours, he communicated the enemy's force and situation to Captain Downie, by a letter[84] dated the 7th September, seven o'clock a. m., and stated, that if Captain Downie felt the vessels under his command equal to the contest, the present moment afforded advantages that might not again occur, requesting, at the same time, his decision on the subject. This letter was delivered by Major Fulton, Aid-de-Camp to Sir George Prevost, who was ordered particularly to explain to Captain Downie the position of the enemy's squadron, and that they were, in his opinion, anch.o.r.ed out of range of shot from the sh.o.r.e. Major Fulton's statement[85] on this subject, shews most clearly the views which Captain Downie then entertained, and the confidence which he felt in the result of the contest, for which he declared he would be ready in 24 hours.

Captain Downie's letter, in reply to Sir George Prevost's communication, although more guarded in expression, contained in substance what he had said to Major Fulton, and confirmed the expectation of his being able to meet the enemy in a day or two. On the 8th of September Sir George Prevost again despatched a letter to Captain Downie, stating that he had sent his Aid-de-Camp, Major Coore, to give him correct information with regard to the enemy's naval force in the bay, and that he, Sir George Prevost, only waited the arrival of Captain Downie to proceed against General Macomb's position. In this letter he particularly points out the co-operation which he expected from Captain Downie. That officer's answer, dated on the same day, states, "that his s.h.i.+p was _not ready, and that until she should be, it was his duty not to hazard her before the enemy_;" and this determination of Captain Downie's appears to have been still more strongly expressed by him in his conversation with Major Coore. Hitherto, therefore it may be a.s.sumed as an incontrovertible fact, that nothing had been either said or written by Sir George Prevost to Captain Downie which might lead the latter to expect any a.s.sistance in his approaching contest with the American fleet, from the forces on sh.o.r.e, or that any simultaneous attack was to be made upon the enemy's works, with a view to afford such aid or support. Being thus perfectly aware of the number, force, and position of the enemy's fleet, and finding himself ready for a conflict, of the successful issue of which we may be a.s.sured that he had not a doubt, Captain Downie, on the 9th of September, wrote to Sir George Prevost, informing him that it was his intention to weigh and proceed with his squadron, so as to approach Plattsburg Bay at day-break on the 10th, and to commence an immediate attack on the enemy's squadron, if it should be found anch.o.r.ed in a position to afford any chance of success. Immediately upon the receipt of this letter, Sir George Prevost gave orders for the troops to be held in readiness to a.s.sault the enemy's works at the same time that the naval action should commence. On the 10th, the fleet not making its appearance, Sir George Prevost addressed a letter to Captain Downie, acknowledging the receipt of his communication of the 9th, and acquainting him that, in consequence of it, the troops had been held in readiness since six o'clock in the morning, to storm the enemy's works at nearly the same moment as the naval action should commence in the bay; that he ascribed the disappointment he had experienced to the unfortunate change of wind, and should rejoice to learn from him that his expectations had been frustrated by no other cause. At day-break, on the 11th, Sir George Prevost proceeded to the quarters of Lieutenant-General de Rottenburg, (who was second in command,) in company with the Adjutant-General, and acquainted him that, as the wind was then fair, the fleet, unless prevented by accident, might soon be expected, and therefore directed him immediately to circulate the orders for the troops to hold themselves in readiness, as directed on the preceding day. This was immediately done by Captain Burke, a.s.sistant-Adjutant-General, who personally delivered these orders to Major-Generals Brisbane, Robinson, and Power, viz. to cook, and hold themselves in readiness as on the preceding day. These orders were so delivered by Captain Burke _before the fleet had made its appearance, and before the scaling of their guns was heard_. It seems by the time on sh.o.r.e to have been about eight o'clock when the fleet was first discovered, and about nine when it rounded c.u.mberland head, and stood into the Bay. Orders having been given by the Commander of the forces that the batteries should open upon the enemy's works, the moment the naval action should commence, they were accordingly opened, and actually commenced the fire a full quarter of an hour before the Confiance had fired a shot at the enemy's vessels. The fire from our sh.o.r.e-battery was so well served, that the enemy's Lake battery, the only one which could possibly annoy our squadron, or afford protection to that of the enemy (but from which not a shot was fired in the direction of the Lake) was very soon silenced, and the men driven from it to seek shelter in the higher redoubt. Almost immediately upon the commencement of the naval action, orders were despatched for the troops to take their allotted positions for the a.s.sault of the enemy's works. In consequence of these orders, the two brigades under Major-Generals Robinson and Power, proceeded in the rear of their Bivouacs, to approach the ford of the Saranac, which it was intended they should cross and proceed through the wood, in order to conceal their movements from the enemy, whose position it was then contemplated to attack in reverse, the ground being broken and uneven, and the works much too strong to be attempted in front. Whilst these movements were making by our troops, which from their nature, must have been equally concealed from the fleet on the Lake, and from the enemy, Major-General Brisbane's brigade had formed, and was ready to force the bridge of the Saranac, on the right of the enemy's position, as soon as the troops under Generals Robinson and Power should have pa.s.sed the ford, and made their appearance before the enemy's works. These movements must necessarily have required time for their completion, but no person in the army for an instant doubted that the duration of the naval action would enable the troops to accomplish the design of penetrating, by the ford, and through the road, to the foot of the works which were the object of attack. Unfortunately, during this period, and whilst the two fleets were still engaged, a wrong direction, by the mistake of the guides, was taken through the wood which led to the ford of the Saranac. As soon as the error was discovered, the troops were counter-marched, but before they could recover the right direction, full three-quarters of an hour, and perhaps an hour was lost--an invaluable portion of time, which, had not the mistake occurred, must have brought the troops to the very foot of the enemy's position. On approaching the ford, it was found to be guarded by a strong force of the enemy on the other side. At this period cheers were distinctly heard, which General Robinson supposed to proceed, either from our squadron that had been successful, or from General Brisbane's brigade advancing to the a.s.sault. Major Cochrane was therefore despatched to head-quarters to ascertain the fact, and to learn whether there were any further orders. Upon his arrival there, the fleet having at that time surrendered, Sir George Prevost most reluctantly gave the order for the recal of the troops from the attack of the forts, and it is well known to those who were in his confidence, with what poignant regret he thus sacrificed his private feelings to what he considered his paramount public duty. Upon Major Cochrane's return with these orders, he found that the troops had only been enabled to force the ford of the Saranac, and were then in the act of advancing through the wood to the enemy's position. Under these circ.u.mstances, General Robinson felt himself bound to obey the orders, and the forces retired from the attack.

Having thus given a full and correct statement of the circ.u.mstances which attended the enterprise against Plattsburg, it is necessary to notice the animadversions which have been made upon the military character of Sir George Prevost, in consequence of the unfortunate result of that expedition. In no instance has the conduct of Sir George Prevost been attacked with more virulence and injustice, than by the writer in the Quarterly Review, whose representations are, as the reader must already have perceived, in the highest degree incorrect.

The charges which have been brought forward by the Reviewer and by others are, that Sir George Prevost improperly urged Captain Downie into action before his s.h.i.+p was adequately prepared; that he disregarded the signal for the supposed co-operation between the army and the fleet, as solemnly agreed upon by himself and Captain Downie, and neglected to a.s.sault the fort when our fleet was engaged with the enemy; and lastly, that he did not, after the defeat of our squadron, persist in his attack upon the fort, by which it is pretended, that our fleet might still have been saved.

With regard to the accusation, that Captain Downie was prematurely hurried, against his better judgment, into an unequal contest with the enemy, the correspondence between that officer and Sir George Prevost already referred to, fully negatives any such supposition. The co-operation of the fleet being deemed essentially necessary to the success of the land-forces, Sir George Prevost was naturally anxious that Captain Downie should be prepared as early as possible to meet the enemy. It has been seen, that upon the 7th of September, Captain Downie informed the Commander of the forces, that it would take a day or two at least, before the Confiance would be in an efficient state, and that the engagement did not take place till the 11th, four days after the above communication. So far was Sir George Prevost from attempting by "taunt and inuendo"[86]

improperly to hurry the fleet into action, that in his letter to Captain Downie, of the 9th of September, he says, "I need not dwell with you on the evils resulting to both services from delay, _as I am well convinced you have done every thing in your power to accelerate the armament and equipment of your squadron_, and I am also satisfied that nothing will prevent its coming off Plattsburg the moment it is ready." On the same day Captain Downie announced his intention of commencing an attack on the enemy's squadron the ensuing morning. Up to this time, therefore, it appears that however anxious Sir George Prevost was to make an immediate attack upon Plattsburg, for which purpose the a.s.sistance of the fleet was requisite, he never urged Captain Downie to engage the enemy while unprepared, but on the contrary, expressed his confidence that the moment _the fleet was ready_, it would appear before Plattsburg.

An expression in Sir George Prevost's letter, of the 10th, has indeed been construed by the Quarterly Reviewer into a "taunt," which is supposed to have driven Captain Downie to an engagement against his cooler judgment. In that letter the Commander of the forces, after informing Captain Downie that in consequence of his communication of the 9th, the troops had been held in readiness since six in the morning to storm the enemy's works: thus continues, "I ascribe the disappointment I have experienced to the unfortunate change of wind, and shall rejoice to learn that my expectations have been frustrated by no other cause." It must be obvious that many other causes, independent of the wind, might have prevented Captain Downie from sailing as he had intended to do on the 9th, although the state of the wind was in fact the real cause of the delay. In consequence of the despatch used in equipping his s.h.i.+p, articles might have been overlooked or omitted, which at the last moment only might have been discovered to be indispensably necessary; accidents might have happened to different parts of the squadron in their progress, and even the reinforcements of soldiers from the 39th, although they had been immediately ordered upon his requisition, might not, from various circ.u.mstances, have been supplied in time. All, or any of these causes might, as they naturally did, suggest themselves to the mind of the Commander of the forces, and his anxiety to be correctly informed upon the subject, as naturally induced him to express himself to Captain Downie in the terms above stated. It is in the highest degree improbable, that Captain Downie could for a moment construe those expressions in an unfavourable sense. But whatever might have been his impression, it is evident, that a letter written on the 10th, could not have influenced the determination which he took on the 9th, of engaging the enemy the following morning.

Nor will the a.s.sertion, that Sir George Prevost disregarded the supposed signal of co-operation, and neglected to attack the fort according to his promise, be more difficult to disprove. No such signal was in fact ever arranged, nor was any such promise ever given. The destruction of the enemy's fleet being the primary object of the expedition, and until that was effected, the ulterior operations not being practicable, Sir George Prevost resolved not to a.s.sault the fort until he was satisfied that our squadron was actually proceeding to attack the enemy. Of the result of the action when the fleets were once engaged, neither the Commander of the forces, nor any one in our army allowed themselves to entertain a single doubt. That Sir George Prevost intended to a.s.sault the enemy's works simultaneously, or nearly so, with the commencement of the naval action, and that Captain Downie was aware of that determination, appears from the correspondence between those officers. But that Captain Downie should have gathered from these communications any thing like a promise or agreement on the part of the Commander of the forces to support, a.s.sist, or co-operate with him during the naval engagement, is quite impossible. Sir George Prevost had satisfied himself by personal observation, and by the most accurate intelligence, that the American fleet was anch.o.r.ed out of range of the batteries, and he must therefore have known that it was out of his power to offer any support to Captain Downie. To have held forth to that officer any hope or promise of a.s.sistance was consequently out of the question. It was of the first importance, with a view to the success of Sir George Prevost's operations, that the fleet should be engaged at the same time, or before the fort was a.s.saulted, but of no consequence whatever to Captain Downie, that the fort should be attacked simultaneously with the naval force. Sir George Prevost, therefore, in his communications with the naval Commander, and particularly in his letter of the 10th, mentioned his intention of making nearly a simultaneous attack, _as part of his own plan of operations_, with which it was necessary that Captain Downie should be acquainted. It is highly probable, that Captain Downie inferred from this communication, that the attack on the fort which Sir George Prevost had been in readiness to make on the morning of the 10th, would be made at the time when the fleets should engage, but there is not the _slightest_ ground for believing that this expectation led him to place any reliance upon the land attack, as a co-operation in support of the naval force, or that it induced him to hasten into action, at a time when he felt unequal to it, or unprepared for the contest. Had he considered the expressions used by Sir George Prevost, in his letter of the 10th, as importing an agreement to a.s.sist him by a simultaneous attack on sh.o.r.e, he would certainly have answered that communication, and have availed himself of the services of Captain Watson, who was left with him for that purpose, to express to the Commander of the forces his reliance on the promised aid, and his a.s.surance that it was the state of the wind alone, which had prevented him from appearing with the fleet on the morning of the 10th, as he had intended. At the time when this letter was written by the Commander of the forces, he was ignorant of the causes which had delayed the fleet, and he was ignorant, likewise, of Captain Downie's further intentions, with regard to the time when he would be prepared to attack the enemy's squadron. Had Captain Downie, therefore, relied, in the slightest degree, on the co-operation of the land forces, he would have informed Sir George Prevost of the exact time when he contemplated an engagement, that the troops on sh.o.r.e might be prepared to second his efforts. No reply, however, was despatched by him to the Commander of the forces, who thus remained in uncertainty with regard to the actual state and condition of the squadron, and the intentions of its commander. Captain Watson, whose directions were to proceed immediately to head-quarters, with intelligence of the sailing of the squadron, should not Captain Downie have previously despatched him, did not arrive until after the fleet had made its appearance. It has, indeed, been a.s.serted, by the Quarterly Reviewer, that the scaling of the guns of our squadron was to be the signal for the advance of the columns of attack. This misstatement appears to have arisen out of the evidence which was given before the Court-Martial on Captain Pring; for in no other place is any allusion to such a fact to be discovered. The error of that statement, which, without doubt, was unintentional, is manifest. The signal in question is said to have been concerted with Major Coore on the 10th, when, in fact, no interview or communication whatever took place between him and Captain Downie on that day; and that no such signal was mentioned to the former on the 8th, the day on which he _did_ see Captain Downie, is a fact to which the Major (now Colonel Coore) is ready to bear witness. In all probability Captain Watson, who was with Captain Downie on the 10th, was the person who was mistaken for Major Coore, and to him Captain Downie might have communicated his intention of scaling his guns, previous to rounding c.u.mberland Head, in order to announce to the Commander of the forces the approach of the squadron. Whatever may have been the nature of Captain Downie's communication by Captain Watson, it is certain that it never reached Sir George Prevost.

It has thus been shewn, that there was not even an understanding between Sir George Prevost and Captain Downie, that the attack by land and sea should take place simultaneously, for the purpose of affording protection or support to our squadron, much less that there existed any "solemn agreement" to that effect. It must also be evident, from the previous statement, that the attack on sh.o.r.e did actually take place at the commencement of the naval action, and that the sudden and unexpected termination of the latter engagement alone prevented the prosecution of the military operations. Orders, as we have already shewn, had been given by Sir George Prevost, on the 9th, for the troops to hold themselves in readiness for the attack of the enemy's works on the morning of the 10th, and those orders were accompanied, as every military man knows, and as the Reviewer[87] himself must have known, is usual, by an order _to cook_, when the time will admit.[88] It has also been shewn, that early on the morning of the 11th, and before the fleet was in sight, or the scaling of their guns was heard, similar orders were circulated for the troops to hold themselves in readiness for the attack, and so well prepared were the forces on sh.o.r.e to make the attack, that almost at the same moment when the Confiance began to engage the enemy, the troops were in motion for the a.s.sault. Our batteries, as mentioned above, opened on the enemy's works some time before the commencement of the naval action on the part of the Confiance. Until confidently a.s.sured that the fleets would engage (and many circ.u.mstances might have intervened to prevent it even after the appearance of our squadron) Sir George Prevost felt that it would be highly imprudent in him to commence the attack; but the moment he learned that Captain Downie was actually in contact with the enemy, the troops were immediately ordered to take their position for the a.s.sault.

Although our naval official accounts of the transaction state the engagement to have lasted for two hours and a half, that is from eight o'clock in the morning until half-past ten, when the Confiance struck, the American naval account, which is corroborated by the testimony of all who witnessed the action from the sh.o.r.e, represents the engagement to have terminated in about an hour and a half. The American account also corresponds with the statements of our officers on sh.o.r.e, that our fleet did not round c.u.mberland Head until between eight and nine o'clock, before which time all the statements of persons on sh.o.r.e agree in admitting that the action did not begin on the part of our fleet. With regard to the period when the engagement terminated, all the accounts appear to coincide.

It has already been shewn, that notwithstanding the unfortunate mistake of the attacking columns taking a wrong route, they had at that very period forced the ford of the Saranac, and were then in the vicinity of the enemy's works, and prepared to make an instant a.s.sault, and that the unexpected result of the naval action was the sole cause which induced Sir George Prevost to countermand that a.s.sault. It now remains to explain more fully the reasons of the Commander of the forces for giving those orders, which will afford an answer to the last charge brought against him.

It has been often and confidently a.s.serted, that both the enemy's squadron and our own were within reach, of the guns of the works. It is not, therefore, surprising that an unfavourable impression should have been made upon the minds of many persons with regard to the policy of not persevering in an attack, which might, under such circ.u.mstances, have led to the recovery of our own fleet, or the destruction of that of the enemy. The fact of the relative situation of the two squadrons and of the enemy's works, has, like most of the other facts connected with this expedition, been grossly misrepresented. Had an opportunity been offered by a public investigation of the transaction, it could and would have been satisfactorily proved, that neither of the fleets was within the range of the enemy's guns from any part of their works, and that their own squadron was anch.o.r.ed more than a mile and a half from the sh.o.r.e.

The grounds of the Reviewer's statement upon this subject it is impossible to ascertain; but, in opposition to what he affirms[89] on the testimony of Captain Pring, and "_numerous_ other _eye-witnesses_" it can be proved by testimony from on board the Confiance, as well as by officers without number on sh.o.r.e, that she was taken possession of within half an hour after she struck; and it can also be proved, in opposition to the decided opinion of the number of officers, who are stated to have visited Plattsburg after the peace, that the anchorage of the American squadron was not within range of the forts.

The evidence of the greater part of the General Officers accompanying the expedition to Plattsburg, who viewed the naval action; of the commanding officer, and others of the Artillery; of naval men on board of our fleet, and of various other persons on sh.o.r.e, could and would have been produced upon the trial of the question, had it taken place, in proof of the fact as here stated. But independently of all opinion upon the subject, is it probable or credible that the American naval Commander would have placed his squadron in such a situation, that by possibility they could be annoyed or injured from works which he saw it was the evident intention of Sir George Prevost to attack, and which he must have felt convinced would in such a case have fallen? That he was aware of the danger to which his squadron was exposed by its vicinity to the forts, appears from the circ.u.mstance before adverted to, of his having moved further into the Bay from the station which he occupied on the 6th, the day of the arrival of our troops before Plattsburg. The position which the American Commander thus took, was one in which, according to his judgment, he could not have been annoyed by the fall of the works on sh.o.r.e, an event for which he was prepared. This opinion was expressed in the presence of a British officer who had been made prisoner during the naval action. The same opinion was entertained by Captain Henley, of the American brig, Eagle, who had himself reconnoitred the position in which the fleet was anch.o.r.ed, and which upon his report was selected by the American Commander, because it was evidently out of the range of the guns from the sh.o.r.e. If any thing more were wanting in confirmation of this fact, it will be amply supplied by the opinions of the two officers most capable of forming a correct judgment on the subject.

The following letters of Commodore Macdonough and General Macomb, the American Naval and Military Commanders, will, it is apprehended, set the question at rest in the mind of every unprejudiced person.

"_Portsmouth, New Hamps.h.i.+re, July 3, 1815._

"Dear Sir,

Your letter of the 26th ult. came to hand yesterday; the letter you addressed to me at Was.h.i.+ngton has not been received, or it a.s.suredly should have been attended to.

In reply to yours of the 26th ult. it is my opinion that our squadron was anch.o.r.ed one mile and a half from the batteries at Plattsburg, during the contest between it and the British squadron on the 11th September, 1814.

I am, with much respect,

Your obedient servant, (Signed) J. MACDONOUGH."

"_Cadwr. Colden, Esq._"

"_City of New York, June 15, 1815._

"Sir,

I should have replied earlier to your letter of the 26th ultimo, had it not been mislaid amidst a ma.s.s of communications on the subject of the army.

With respect to the distance of the American squadron from the batteries at Plattsburg, I will state that it is my decided opinion that the squadron was moored beyond the effectual range of the batteries, and this I know from a fruitless attempt made to elevate our guns so as to bear on the British squadron during the action of the 11th of September last. No guns, however, were fired, all being convinced that the vessels were beyond their reach. This opinion was strengthened by observations on the actual range of the guns of the Confiance--her heaviest metal falling several hundred yards short of the sh.o.r.e when closely engaged with our vessels.

With a hope that this reply will be satisfactory, I subscribe myself,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(Signed) ALEX. MACOMB."

"_Cadwr. R. Colden, Esq._"

"_New York, August 1, 1815._