The German Spy System from Within Part 4

One favourite system of espionage on active service, from the German point of view, consists in the use of the Red Cross van. Under the rules governing international war, the Red Cross van may go anywhere, even into the enemy's lines, to pick up wounded, and the German forces, "making war by all the violent means at their command," have not scrupled to make use of Red Cross vans both for espionage work and as shelter for machine-guns--authentic cases are reported in which treacherous fire has been opened on the troops of the Allies in this way. Another method of obtaining information consists in sending two scouts out with a coil of wire, when in the presence of the enemy. The scouts, bearing one end of the wire, are instructed to approach the enemy's lines, at night, and of course, when they have approached within sight, they are shot. The wire no longer "pays out" from the end kept in the lines, and the length unrolled, when hauled back and measured, gives the artillery-range almost to a nicety.

Communications in times of peace are never made direct to headquarters.

The fixed spies, as already remarked, employ such agents as they may choose and their rate of pay allows. Their reports are collected by the travelling spies, who are under the control of agents of sections, stationed in Belgium and Switzerland (up to the outbreak of war) but not in Germany. From the agents of sections reports go to the Central Bureau of the secret service at Berlin, where sorting and cla.s.sification of news supplied is pursued, and all that part of the world which could possibly be inimical to Germany is card-indexed. It is a sordid, sorry, mean business, utterly devoid of the romance and glamour with which the spy of fiction has invested it, and, whatever the fate of German armies in the field may be, the secret service of Germany has done more than anything else to pervert the moral sense of the nation.

CHAPTER EIGHT.

WOMEN SPIES.

In any account of the German spy system one invariably harks back to Stieber when pa.s.sing to a review of any fresh branch of the system.

Psychologist as he was, Stieber recognised that such a system as he proposed to establish in France prior to the war of 1870 could be rendered more effective if women were employed in conjunction with men.

Thus he requested that there might be sent from Prussia to France a certain number of domestic servants, governesses, women-workers, and others who might, by gaining access to the family life of the French people, pa.s.s on to the fixed agents information which might be useful.

Further, he requisitioned the services of a smaller number of attractive-looking girls who were to be placed out as barmaids, and in similar positions, where they could incite men to talk a little too freely for the benefit of the Grosser General Stab of Berlin. Stieber reckoned that women could learn what men would miss, in many cases, and the event proved him right.

He was careful, however, not to employ his women spies in positions of extreme trust, for he had learned, by the time that he was ready to organise his system, that the Prussian woman--it is unwise to include more--was not to be trusted with a secret. Out of the many failures to be credited to spies, most of all are laid to the accounts of women, mainly through the women in question having lost control of their heads through their hearts, and having become more or less infatuated with men whom they ought to have regarded as their prey, but whom they would no longer betray. It seems that the temperament in a woman which best fits her for spying also renders her likely to fall victim to her own affections, as far as her efficiency in espionage is concerned, for the German secret service, though it may overlook one mistake--no more--on the part of a male agent, disowns a woman spy as soon as she errs, without any exception.

The case of Lison, who ruined Lieutenant Ullmo, is partly a case in point. Not that this vampire lost her head in the things she did, or acquired any undue affection for Ullmo; but she bungled her case after having rendered good service to the German secret service. The mistake was not overlooked--the German secret service no longer knew that such a woman as Lison existed when once the trial of Ullmo had opened. Her error put her out of the spy system for ever, and, no matter what became of her, she never received another pfennig from her former paymasters.

The woman spy is largely utilised in the matter of internal espionage; in Berlin, for instance, society women are able to form _salons_, more or less worthy of that historic t.i.tle, at which they can hold gatherings of men and women and gather up the t.i.ttle-tattle from which scandals are constructed, and consequent pressure can be brought to bear on various persons as desired. In another circle, women keep houses at which men congregate, and here the charmer of fiction is dimly reflected, for personal attraction on the part of the female spy plays a large part in her power of acquiring useful information. Still lower in the scale are domestic servants, who overlook correspondence, overhear conversations, and in many other ways act as bearers of news which would otherwise go unheard by the Berlin headquarters.

On foreign service women spies in responsible posts are rare, but dangerous in reverse proportion to their numbers. One of Stieber's women learned all the secrets she sought, simply by supplying a young French officer with as much cocaine as he asked. Had the officer in question discovered other means of procuring as much powdered cocaine as he wanted, the spy in question would have been forced to offer some other reward for information. But he relied on the spy, and, in common with most drug-takers, was sufficiently morally enfeebled to be persuaded to give up all the information at his command.

Some of these foreign service female spies are artists in their profession. One may take the case of such a one who keeps a discreet establishment, say, in a garrison town. She welcomes visitors, and is a very tactful sympathiser with hard-worked officials in government offices. She offers encouragement, advice, and sympathy as regards work and worries, and sides with the complainant in any grievance regarding the arrogance of superiors. Her introductions, in the first place, give her a definite social standing, and, like the male fixed agent, she is so connected with the life of the place as to seem quite a part of it-- she is above suspicion in every way. It follows, given the type of woman who attracts men, that men talk to her far more than to members of their own s.e.x; they find her companions.h.i.+p restful and soothing-- especially the younger men--and are easily led on to talk of themselves, their hopes and their work. They talk in all innocence, and are encouraged by the listener to talk always more and more; and, after a month, or two or three months, perhaps, there falls one sentence which is as a straw that marks the direction of the wind--and that sentence finds its way to Berlin, where it is card-indexed. Acquaintance ripens to friends.h.i.+p; to the outer world's sight two people talk of things that interest them, but in reality the spy, having completely won the confidence of the man she set out to make her victim, leads him to talk of his work in a manner that he would have deemed impossible when first he met this attractive woman.

There is on record one failure among women spies which ill.u.s.trates the danger of employing them. The spy in question was sent out to win the affections of a young attache at a French Emba.s.sy, and this she accomplished through the simple expedient of teaching him the German language. In a regular course of lessons which the young diplomat underwent at the hands of the lady he found out that he was not so much attracted by her, after all; but she fell in love with him in earnest.

Thenceforth she was not only useless, but a danger to the German headquarters, since she was in a position to impart information instead of to extract it as Berlin desired.

It must be obvious, when one considers the extent of the organisation that Stieber set up, and the nature of the reports furnished by the staff, that an enormous amount of service work is done to no purpose; but this is inevitable, like the keeping-up of a navy which remains idle for fifteen or twenty years, but must still be maintained at full strength. Thus this corps of women spies is maintained and its reports are received and studied and tabulated. Much of the information sent in by women is, of course, hopelessly useless; but out of the ma.s.s of chaff sufficient grain is sifted to make the continuance of the work worth while--in German estimation, at least. It is a known fact that the Government of Berlin have not only overlooked but favoured the establishment of houses of ill-repute in the city, simply because through the keepers of these houses valuable information is to be obtained. Young men were lured to a certain notorious establishment in Berlin from the foreign Emba.s.sies, and even from departments of the Berlin Government itself. In the first case the object was information with regard to the procedure at the Emba.s.sies, and in the second case information was desired as to the integrity or lack thereof on the part of those entrusted with the control of German national affairs. The woman who ran this establishment had laid to her own count many ruined reputations and ruined lives in the course of her career.

It is known that the permanent spies, known in the vernacular as "post offices," have to send in to headquarters certain information. This information is tabulated as follows:

All possible information relating to general officers and their equals in the country concerned, including personal as well as official details.

Particulars of all who pa.s.s from military colleges to commissions, and all who pa.s.s from naval colleges to the navy.

Particulars of all directors and examiners of military and naval colleges.

Particulars of the official duties add personal habits of all officials in charge of a.r.s.enals, powder factories, store depots, and other works connected with military and naval organisation.

Staff officers, aides-de-camp, and generals' orderlies--particularly concerning the lives and habits of these.

Officers or officials employed in the Ministry, secretaries and under-secretaries in government offices, _especially those whose circ.u.mstances are low or whose affairs are in disorder_.

If the varied nature of this work is borne in mind, and the many opportunities a woman would have for learning details of the personal side are considered, it will be seen that the work of the woman spy can be invaluable. As already remarked, Germany wants to know not only the things that are of immediate use, but also the little things that may be of use in certain contingencies--possibly useful as well as certainly useful and probably useful information is welcome. And, in the average French or English household of the official cla.s.s, either in France or England, a German domestic, perfectly capable at her work and in every way above suspicion on the part of her employers, can render enormous service to the German secret service, simply by keeping her ears open.

For the servant, whether spy or honest employee, knows nearly everything there is to be known about her employers. If the master's financial affairs are in such a state that bribery might be tried with a remote chance of success, she is aware of it; if the mistress has compromised herself in any way, and is open to blackmail, the domestic is more likely to know of it than any one else, for she has unquestioned access to letters where even the husband is ignorant of their existence--n.o.body thinks of suspecting her of more than mere curiosity, at the worst. The object of the system inaugurated by Stieber is to work along the lines of least resistance, to ensure safety and efficiency by choosing means so obvious as to be negligible--and that system has produced great results, past question. More especially is this method noticeable in the case of the German spy: it is not the adventuress of fiction who does most of the useful work, but the inconspicuous and apparently thoroughly trustworthy woman, who, whatever her station, has an obvious reason for occupying it, and is above reproach or suspicion.

Not that the adventuress has not her share as well. A woman carried out most of the underground work connected with the Morocco loan; a woman stopped the clandestine marriage of one of the imperial princes, and another woman arranged a marriage between a Bourbon king and a member of the house of Hohenzollern. Yet another, according to Von Blowitz, brought off as skilful a coup in connection with the theft of doc.u.ments as has ever been known. But these things are exceptions to the regular work of women spies, which is for the most part unromantic, petty, and mean--as is most espionage work, whether man or woman be concerned in its accomplishment.

In active service the woman plays a very small part, for the endurance of a man is required to undergo such rigours as usually fall to combatants and spies alike once the armies have taken the field. Here, however, women are of use in carrying messages and in similar minor capacities. Such of them as manage to keep their places in civilian establishments may be of great use in learning projected plans--though plans are usually kept too secret, since the organisation and extent of the German system of espionage is fairly well-known in official circles of other countries.

During the siege of Liege men masqueraded as women in order to obtain information for the German commander. In one particular case four ladies were observed in the town, and certain small points of make-up and attire caused the police to entertain suspicions. The ladies were seized and examined, and very few inquiries were sufficient to settle the question of their s.e.x, while further inquiries certified them as German spies--and they paid the penalty of their daring. Before execution, spies captured in the present war have stated that they have been forced to take on their tasks; certain persons are selected by lot out of the army, and are given choice of the disguise with which they must go out to the front. In many cases the disguises are hopelessly inadequate, and all the men who go out know that they are going to almost certain death. But the man who, without some rehearsal, goes out disguised as a woman, is not only facing death, but looking for it--as do these German soldiers in like case.

Cases have come to light in Belgium in which wearers of the Red Cross have proved to be spies; women have been caught acting as nurses, keeping to their posts simply for the purpose of obtaining such information as shall be useful to the German forces. Such cases are rare, for the Red Cross nurse is usually well authenticated and deservedly above suspicion, but the rarity of the cases and the very small likelihood of detection renders them correspondingly dangerous.

From their positions and duties they are in the very heart of things, and are able to get more information than those in other positions, though the transmission of news, after it has been obtained, is by no, means an easy business.

Eastern and Northern France, before the war, were full of women spies, planted under the fixed post system. They were mainly auxiliaries, for it was seldom that the charge of a fixed post was entrusted to a woman, for the simple reason that it is not easy for a women to set up in any kind of business and maintain it--at least, not so easy as it is for a man. The majority of these women spies in French departments were domestic servants, teachers, or less reputably engaged as waitresses in establishments for the sale of alcoholic liquors. For the last-mentioned cla.s.s, the chief requirements in every case were that they should be decidedly attractive, unscrupulous, and able to make men talk. For remuneration, they depended mainly on their legitimate employers; the fixed agent, at his own discretion, paid out sums to them which made it worth their while to gather information, but they were expected to five on the country which they had come to betray to the staff at Berlin.

Since this treachery characterises the groundwork of all German espionage, and the plans of the military organisation are built on espionage, it follows that in the nature of things the German Empire must end: treachery is an ill foundation on which to build.

CHAPTER NINE.

GENERAL ESPIONAGE WORK.

The nature of the work undertaken by spies of the higher orders places them, at times, in possession of a good deal of information which, should the spies choose to use it improperly, becomes a danger to the German Government. This is not good for the spies concerned; in some cases they are trusted too far--for even such an organisation as the German secret service can make mistakes at times--and then they vanish.

One case was that of an ex-service officer on the Russian frontier, who, unfortunately for him, fell in love with a Russian lady, and found that his duty was not so strong as his love: it was ascertained that not only was he lax in his espionage, but that he was actually making his work of benefit to the Russian service rather than to his own people. A noted duellist was sent to the spot, with orders to challenge the recreant spy--and as a result the spy was killed.

The instance is not an isolated one, and in some cases the headquarters at Berlin, realising that a man or woman knows enough to be dangerous, deliberately betrays the person concerned to the authorities of some other Power, with a view to removing dangerous evidence, by means of imprisonment, until such time as the evidence shall be no longer dangerous. Such a case, undoubtedly, was that of the man Graves, whose arrest was largely due to a wrongly addressed letter sent to him from his headquarters--or at the instigation of his headquarters. The system pursued at the German headquarters is such that mistakes are not made by accident, but, if they occur, there is a definite purpose behind them.

Graves knew too much, and suffered for it; he was a clever man and a good spy--but there were others equally good, and, since he had come to know more than the heads of the German secret service thought fit, he was removed, by being imprisoned in an English prison, to a point where his knowledge was no longer available for his own use.

It may be urged that, in view of the nature of the work involved in espionage duty, it would be hard to find people to undertake that duty, at least, to the extent alleged in the case of the German Empire and its secret service. Such a contention as this, however, proves ignorance of the German, and especially of the Prussian character and way of viewing moral problems. In this connection it is worthy of note that Herr Richter, the leader of the Opposition in the Reichstag, once raised a protest with regard to "the more than doubtful morality of the individuals employed" in the police service of the country; that is, the persons employed in secret police work. In reply, the Minister for the Interior, Von Puttkamer, stated that "it is the right and duty of the State to employ special and extraordinary methods, and even if that honest and estimable functionary, Police-Councillor Rumpff, has employed the methods of which he is accused, in order to secure for the State the benefits of useful intelligence, I here publicly express to him my satisfaction and thanks."

The methods to which Herr Richter took exception included the suborning of high officials in magisterial, political, and industrial circles, more especially by the temptations afforded by the keeping of such disorderly houses as the woman Krausz made infamously notorious; the engaging, as secret agents, court officials, Reichstag deputies and their wives, and all who could in any way help on the business of information without regard to the moral or social degeneracy that might be brought about by these "honest and estimable" methods. Since the responsible Ministers of the country countenance rank immorality and vice in the search for information, it follows inevitably that the life of the nation as a whole is lowered in tone by the existence of the spy system; things that, to people of normal view-point appear detestable, become things that all may do without shame. Here in England a spy is given his real value--he is looked on as no true man: in Germany, on the other hand, the business of a spy is as honourable as any other; the outlook of the nation has become perverted by the system that Stieber set in working--Stieber himself was Germany's greatest enemy, but the country has not yet realised this. And, with this perverted morality, this condoning of evil for the sake of the good that may accrue, there is no lack of material from which to fas.h.i.+on spies. The German Empire has become not only commercialised, but debased; the German view of solemn treaties, and the German justification of broken oaths on the ground of expediency, are typical of the German view-point in all things. Nothing is dishonourable, except to be found out, is a fairly accurate way of expressing the German view-point as regards rules for the conduct of life.

With this much understood, it is easy to understand that, in dealing with a German--with any German--one is dealing with a potential spy, for the whole nation is subject to espionage and attuned to it, regarding it as a part of daily life. From money-lender and social hanger-on down to workman and loafer, spies may be made out of all grades of the social scale, and are made. Through the medium of a workman spy, the plans of the Lebel rifle were in German hands before ever one of the rifles in question was handed out for the use of French troops. At the other end of the scale is Von Puttkamer, Minister of the Interior, sanctioning anything and all things, irrespective of the harm they may do to the moral nature of the German race, so long as "information" is obtained.

The taint is in the race, so permeating all cla.s.ses that neither man nor woman can be regarded as free of it. The actual word "spy" is capable of various interpretations, and the real and acknowledged spies of the German system, numerous though they are, do not form nearly as large a total as the people who help the espionage system to maintain its efficiency.

The spy _par excellence_ is one who has in him or in her a decidedly criminal instinct. Men and women of this cla.s.s make the best spies, from the point of view of their employers; and by reason of this the German system, since Stieber pa.s.sed out from it, has been more effective in the elucidation of details than of large essentials--something is missing from the moral pervert who makes the best spy, or it may be that there is no longer at the head of the secret-service organisation such a genius as Stieber, who could make his small creatures accomplish large designs. Stieber, Zerniki--one may choose out half a dozen or so of names just as in criminal records one may choose out the names of Peace and Crippen, or even of the Borgias, as capable of great things in crime. But the spies of later days in the German secret service have not been put to great uses, or the temper of the British people would not have been misunderstood to the extent that led to Ireland being looked on as "a revolting province," or the colonies of Britain as only waiting for a chance to escape from British rule. The general work of the spy seems to have degenerated along with the nation that founded the system, down to petty ends and inconsequent results; we have seen, in this present war, that the occupation of Brussels was carried through without a hitch owing to the machine-like perfection of the German spy system--there was cause for congratulation, from a German point of view.

But we have seen none of the great coups that made the campaign of 1870 as great a triumph for Stieber as for Bismarck and his royal master.

The anti-espionage system of British secret service is worthy of note in connection with the decline of the German system of espionage. In this connection the _Scotsman_ report of the trial of Graves bears quotation, more especially the deposition of Inspector Trench, who described the effects found on Graves at the time of his arrest.

"The prisoner, on being arrested at his hotel, had in his possession a doctor's book, apparently empty. This was found, on inspection, to contain two leaves stuck together. In the middle were sentences and figures--a code which had been subsequently deciphered by a process of subtraction from the A.B.C. code.

"He also had... cartridge cases of the latest Army pattern. The code-notes contained phrases like `clearing practice,' `have lowered defending nets,' `land fortifications are manned,' etc."

Further, Graves had lived in Edinburgh as "a medical student taking his last degree in science," but had not been near any hospital, and had used the paper and envelopes of a well-known English firm for his correspondence, in order to avoid inspection of his letters by the post office.

The statement in court of facts like these points not so much to the cunning of the man Graves, but to the way in which, from the time of his taking up residence in Edinburgh as "a medical student," he must have been shadowed and kept under observation. The deciphering of the code, the certainty as to paper and envelopes used, and other things that came out at the trial, are small points in themselves; but they go to show that, if the German secret service were relatively as good to-day as in the days when Stieber used his intelligence to keep the system ahead of all others, Graves would never have come to a British jail; for, in the first place, the German secret service would not have employed a man who already knew too much, and, in the second place, as soon as any methods were known to the British police they would have been changed for others, even to the code which could be interpreted without the aid of a key.

With regard to the quality of treachery, latent in all spies, the German secret service does its best to overcome this difficulty by the retention of a certain portion of the pay with which the spies are credited. When once a man or woman has fairly entered on the work of espionage a proportion of the pay is held back by the paymaster, so that there is always a considerable sum owing. This is supposed to act as an incentive to loyalty, and in most cases it undoubtedly has that effect, for no man likes to commit an act which will involve the forfeiture of a sum of money really due to him. Bearing in mind the cupidity of the average spy, it will be seen that no stronger deterrent of treachery could be devised.

In the case of the military spy, the French service affords more opportunities for the German agent than does the British. In the British service the officers of commissioned rank have many faults, but they are in nearly every case gentlemen, in the best sense of that much-abused word. In the citizen army of France, on the other hand, an officer may be anything--and in this is intended no disparagement on the brave Army of our present allies. The Republican system admits all to its ranks--perhaps it would be better to say that it compels all to enter its ranks--and the Republican ideal places a commission in the reach of all, without regard to birth or social standing. In many ways this is to the good, for it fosters the Republican spirit in the Army, and at the same time makes an efficient fighting machine; but it admits to the commissioned ranks, perhaps once in five hundred times, a man who is sufficiently unworthy of his country and its uniform to be guilty of acts which point to his openness to corruption. The case of Ullmo, though it concerns a naval officer, was one in point; it is not to be alleged that a British officer, enslaved by drugs and otherwise debased, would not have done as Ullmo did; but it is to be alleged that the debasing of Ullmo, which brought him down to the point at which subsequent corruption was not only possible but easy, is almost impossible in the British service--such a man would have been cas.h.i.+ered before he reached the point at which Ullmo fell to actual treachery and crime. The Republican system has its drawbacks, and a retention of the laws of caste to an extent which compels all commissioned officers to an acknowledgment of caste, is not altogether undesirable--except from the view-point of the spy. On the confession of a French writer on the subject, there are officers in the French service who form a "cla.s.s of officers whose private life is no better regulated than their professional conduct." In such the spy finds comparatively easy prey; but their counterparts do not exist in the British services, for the caste laws of Army and Navy alike forbid ill-regulated lives, and officers of both services must be above suspicion when off parade. The universal service of France renders such a state of affairs almost impossible in the Republican Army. Where every man is a soldier, the staff of officers is so much greater that the presence of a few black sheep is practically unavoidable--and it must be said in common fairness that the French officer is more sternly supervised than his British confrere--yet lapses on the part of commissioned officers are more common than in the British services.

Yet one other point must be borne in mind in connection with the general work of the spy. Happenings in 1870, combined with Stieber's Memoirs, make clear that the hanging of peasants in the later stages of the war excited even the criticism of stone-hearted Bismarck, who saw in these occurrences a policy which might some day bring retribution. But to this Stieber answered: "In war one must take the measures of war. It is the duty of our soldiers to kill the soldiers of the enemy who from motives of duty oppose our march. We spies claim the right to hang those who spy on us."

The declaration is illuminating. Here were the members of the German secret service facilitating a conquest by dastardly measures, by abuse of the hospitality of the country which the Prussian troops subsequently invaded. Yet, if the inhabitants of that country dared to attempt to give information to their own countrymen, they were to be hanged.

Espionage is responsible for many evils: Stieber shows here that it is responsible for the blunting of the moral sense of his fellow-countrymen, and that the espionage system of 1870 laid the foundations of the Prussian disregard of human life, and the utter brutality and savagery displayed by Prussians in this present war of 1914.

"A peasant was caught in the act of watching a Prussian convoy," Stieber writes in his Memoirs, "and was falsely accused of having fired upon it; he was hung up by ropes under his arms in front of his own house, and was slowly done to death with thirty-four bullets fired in succession.

In order to make an example, I decided that the body should remain hanging for two days, under the guard of two sentries."