History of the Origin, Formation, and Adoption of the Constitution of the United States Volume I Part 11

"In the name and by order of the General Court,

"We are your Excellency's most obedient humble servants,

"SAMUEL ADAMS, _President of the Senate_.

"TRISTRAM DALTON, _Speaker of the House of Representatives_.

"HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS."

This letter was thought worthy an answer, and accordingly a report upon it was brought in by Mr. Madison, and adopted in Congress, containing among other things the following:--

"Your committee consider the measure of Congress as the result of a deliberate judgment, framed on a general view of the interests of the Union at large. They consider it to be a truth, that no State in this Confederacy can claim (more equitably than an individual in a society) to derive advantages from a Union, without conforming to the judgment of a const.i.tutional majority of those who compose it; still, however, they conceive it will be found no less true, that, if a State every way so important as Ma.s.sachusetts should withhold her solid support to const.i.tutional measures of the Confederacy, the result must be a dissolution of the Union;--and then she must hold herself as alone responsible for the anarchy and domestic confusion that may succeed, and for exposing all these confederated States (who at the commencement of the late war leagued to defend her violated rights) an easy prey to the machinations of their enemies, and the sport of European politics; and therefore they are of opinion, that Congress should still confide that a free, enlightened, and generous people will never hazard consequences so perilous and alarming, and in all circ.u.mstances rely on the wisdom, temper, and virtue of their const.i.tuents, which (guided by an all-wise Providence) have ever interposed to avert impending evils and misfortunes.

Your committee beg leave further to observe, that, from an earnest desire to give satisfaction to such of the States as expressed a dislike to the half-pay establishment, a sum in gross was proposed by Congress, and accepted by the officers, as an equivalent for their half-pay. That your committee are informed, that such equivalent was ascertained on established principles which are acknowledged to be just, and adopted in similar cases; but that if the objections against the commutation were ever so valid, yet, as it is not now under the arbitration of Congress, but an act finally adopted, and the national faith pledged to carry it into effect, they could not be taken into consideration. With regard to the salaries of civil officers, it may be observed, that the necessaries of life have been very high during the war: hence it has happened that even the salaries complained of have not been found sufficient to induce persons properly qualified to accept of many important offices, and the public business is left undone." (Journals of Congress, VIII. 379--385.

September 25, 1783.)

NOTE TO PAGE 186.

ON THE NEWBURGH ADDRESSES.

There was a period in this business, when the officers would have accepted from Congress a recommendation to their several States for the payment of their dues. Their committee, consisting of General McDougall, Colonel Brooks of Ma.s.sachusetts, and Colonel Ogden of New Jersey, arrived in Philadelphia about the 1st of January. In their memorial to Congress, they abstained from designating the funds from which they desired satisfaction of their demands, because their great object was to get a settlement of their accounts and an equivalent for the half-pay established. But they were, in fact, at one time, impressed with the belief that their best, and indeed their only security, was to be sought for in funds to be provided by the States, under the recommendation of Congress. This plan would have involved a division of the army into thirteen different parts, leaving the claims of each part to be satisfied by its own State: a course that would unquestionably have led to the rejection of their demands in some States, and probably in many. To prevent this, there is little doubt that the influence of those members of Congress who wished to promote their interests, and to identify them with the interests of the other public creditors, was used; and by the middle of February the committee of the officers became satisfied, that the army must unitedly pursue a common object, insisting on the grant of revenues to the general government, adequate to the liquidation of all the public debts. (Letter of Gouverneur Morris to General Greene, February 15, 1783. Life, by Sparks, I. 250.) The point, however, which they continued to urge, was the commutation; and upon this they encountered great obstacles. The committee of Congress to whom their memorial was referred went into a critical examination of the principles of annuities, in order to determine on an equivalent for the half-pay for life, promised by the resolve of 1780. The result was a report, declaring that six years'

full pay was the proper equivalent. This report was followed by a declaratory resolve, which was pa.s.sed, "that the troops of the United States, in common with all the creditors of the same, have an undoubted right to expect security; and that Congress will make every effort to obtain, from the respective States, substantial funds, adequate to the object of funding the whole debt of the United States, and will enter upon an immediate and full consideration of the nature of such funds, and the most likely mode of obtaining them."

The remainder of the report, however, was referred to a new committee of five, the number of years being considered too many. The second committee reported five years' whole pay as an equivalent, after another calculation of annuities; but the approval of nine States could not be obtained. A desire was then expressed by some of the members, who were opposed both to the commutation and the half-pay, to have more time for consideration, and this was granted.

This was the position of the matter on the 8th of February, when the committee of the officers wrote to General Knox on the part of the army. They stated that "Ma.s.sachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North and South Carolina were for the equivalent; New Hamps.h.i.+re, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Jersey against it. There is some prospect of getting one more of these States to vote for the commutation. If this is accomplished, with Maryland and Delaware, the question will be carried; whenever it is, as the report now stands, it will be at the election of the line, as such, to accept of the commutation or retain their claim to the half-pay, Congress being determined, that no alteration shall take place in the emolument held out to the army but by their consent. This rendered it unnecessary for us to consult the army on the equivalent for half-pay. The zeal of a great number of members of Congress to get continental funds, while a few wished to have us referred to the States, induced us to conceal what funds we wished or expected, lest our declaration for one or the other might r.e.t.a.r.d a settlement of our accounts, or a determination on the equivalent for half-pay. Indeed, some of our best friends in Congress declared, however desirous they were to have our accounts settled, and the commutation fixed, as well as to get funds, yet they would oppose referring us to the States for a settlement and security, till all prospect of obtaining continental funds was at an end. Whether this is near or not, as commutation for the half-pay was one of the princ.i.p.al objects of the address, the obtaining of that is necessary, previous to our particularizing what fund will be most agreeable to us: this must be determined by circ.u.mstances. If Congress get funds, we shall be secured. If not, the equivalent settled, a principle will be established, which will be more acceptable to the Eastern States than half-pay, if application must be made to them. As it is not likely that Congress will be able to determine soon on the commutation, (for the reasons above mentioned,) it is judged necessary that Colonel Brooks return to the army, to give them a more particular detail of our prospects than can be done in the compa.s.s of a letter." (Writings of Was.h.i.+ngton, VIII. 553, 554.)

Two cla.s.ses of persons existed at this time in Congress, of very different views; the one attached to State, the other to continental politics; the one strenuous advocates for funding the public debts upon solid securities, the other opposed to this plan, and finally yielding to it only in consequence of the clamors of the army and the other public creditors. The advocates for continental funds, convinced that nothing could be done for the public credit by any other measures, determined to blend the interests of the army and those of the other creditors in their scheme, in order to combine all the motives that could operate upon different descriptions of men in the different States. Was.h.i.+ngton, who naturally regarded the interests of the army as the first object in point of importance, and who had not given his attention so much to the general financial affairs of the country, seems to have thought it unadvisable to bring the claims of the army before the States, in connection with the other public debts. On the 4th of March, he wrote to Hamilton (then in Congress), that "the just claims of the army ought, and it is to be hoped will, have their weight with every sensible legislature in the United States, if Congress point to their demands, and show, if the case is so, the reasonableness of them, and the impracticability of complying with them without their aid. In any other point of view, it would in my opinion be impolitic to introduce the army on the tapis, lest it should excite jealousy and bring on its concomitants. The States surely cannot be so devoid of common sense, common honesty, and common policy, as to refuse their aid on a full, clear, and candid representation of facts from Congress; more especially if these should be enforced by members of their own body, who might demonstrate what the inevitable consequences of failure will lead to." (Writings, VIII. 390.)

But while the advocates of the continental system were maturing their plans, new difficulties arose, in consequence of the proceedings of the officers at Newburgh, and of the jealousies which the army began to entertain. Among the resolutions adopted by the officers was one, which expressed their unshaken confidence in the justice of Congress and the country, and their conviction that Congress would not disband them, until their accounts had been liquidated, and adequate funds established for their payment. But Congress had no const.i.tutional power, under the Confederation, to demand funds of the States; and to determine that the army should be continued in service until the States granted the funds, which it was intended to recommend, would be to determine that it should remain a standing army in time of peace, until the States should comply with the recommendation. On the other hand, Congress had no present means of paying the army, if they were to disband them. This dilemma rendered it necessary to evade for a short time any explicit declaration of the purposes of Congress as to disbanding the army; and hence arose a jealousy, on the part of the army, that they were to be used as mere puppets to operate upon the country, in favor of a general revenue system. Was.h.i.+ngton himself communicated the existence of these suspicions to Hamilton, on the 4th of April, advising that the army should be disbanded as soon as possible, consulting its wishes as to the mode. He also intimated that the Superintendent of the Finances, Robert Morris, was suspected to be at the bottom of the scheme of keeping the army together, for the purpose of aiding the adoption of the revenue system.

Hamilton's reply explains the position of the whole matter, and the motives and purposes of those with whom he acted.

"But the question was not merely how to do justice to the creditors, but how to restore public credit. Taxation in this country, it was found, could not supply a sixth part of the public necessities. The loans in Europe were far short of the balance, and the prospect every day diminis.h.i.+ng; the court of France telling us, in plain terms, she could not even do as much as she had done; individuals in Holland, and everywhere else, refusing to part with their money on the precarious tenure of the mere faith of this country, without any pledge for the payment either of princ.i.p.al or interest. In this situation, what was to be done? It was essential to our cause that vigorous efforts should be made to restore public credit; it was necessary to combine all the motives to this end, that could operate upon different descriptions of persons in the different States. The necessity and discontents of the army presented themselves as a powerful engine. But, sir, these gentlemen would be puzzled to support their insinuations by a single fact. It was indeed proposed to appropriate the intended impost on trade to the army debt, and, what was extraordinary, by gentlemen who had expressed their dislike to the principle of the fund. I acknowledge I was one that opposed this, for the reasons already a.s.signed, and for these additional ones: _that_ was the fund on which we most counted to obtain further loans in Europe; it was necessary we should have a fund sufficient to pay the interest of what had been borrowed and what was to be borrowed. The truth was, these people in this instance wanted to play off the army against the funding system. As to Mr.

Morris, I will give your Excellency a true explanation of his conduct. He had been for some time pressing Congress to endeavor to obtain funds, and had found a great backwardness in the business. He found the taxes unproductive in the different States; he found the loans in Europe making a very slow progress; he found himself pressed on all hands for supplies; he found himself, in short, reduced to this alternative,--either of making engagements which he could not fulfil, or declaring his resignation in case funds were not established by a given time. Had he followed the first course, the bubble must soon have burst; he must have sacrificed his credit and his character, and _public_ credit, already in a ruined condition, would have lost its last support. He wisely judged it better to resign; this might increase the embarra.s.sments of the moment, but the necessity of the case, it was to be hoped, would produce the proper measures, and he might then resume the direction of the machine with advantage and success. He also had some hope that his resignation would prove a stimulus to Congress. He was, however, ill-advised in the publication of his letters of resignation. This was an imprudent step, and has given a handle to his personal enemies, who, by playing upon the pa.s.sions of others, have drawn some well-meaning men into the cry against him. But Mr. Morris certainly deserves a great deal from his country. I believe no man in this country but himself could have kept the money machine going during the period he has been in office. From every thing that appears, his administration has been upright as well as able. The truth is, the old leaven of Deane and Lee is at this day working against Mr. Morris. He happened in that dispute to have been on the side of Deane, and certain men can never forgive him.... The matter, with respect to the army, which has occasioned most altercation in Congress, and most dissatisfaction in the army, has been the half-pay. The opinions on this head have been two: one party was for referring the several lines to their States, to make such commutation as they should think proper; the other, for making the commutation by Congress, and funding it on continental security. I was of this last opinion, and so were all those who will be represented as having made use of the army as our puppets. Our princ.i.p.al reasons were:--First, by referring the lines to their respective States, those which were opposed to the half-pay would have taken advantage of the officers' necessities to make the commutation short of an equivalent. Secondly, the inequality which would have arisen in the different States when the officers came to compare, (as has happened in other cases,) would have been a new source of discontent. Thirdly, such a reference was a continuance of the old, wretched State system, by which the ties between Congress and the army have been nearly dissolved,--by which the resources of the States have been diverted from the common treasury and wasted: a system which your Excellency has often justly reprobated. I have gone into these details to give you a just idea of the parties in Congress. I a.s.sure you, upon my honor, sir, I have given you a candid statement of facts, to the best of my judgment. The men against whom the suspicions you mention must be directed, are in general the most sensible, the most liberal, the most independent, and the most respectable characters in our body, as well as the most unequivocal friends to the army; in a word, they are the men who think continentally." (Life of Hamilton, II. 162-164.)

FOOTNOTES:

[177] The debt due to the crown of France was ascertained in 1782 to be eighteen millions of livres; and by the contract entered into by the Unites States with the king of France, on the 16th of July, 1782, the princ.i.p.al of this debt was to be paid in twelve annual instalments of one million five hundred thousand livres each, in twelve years, to commence from the third year after a peace, at the royal treasury in Paris. The interest was payable annually, at the time and place stipulated for the payment of the instalments of the princ.i.p.al, at five per cent. The king generously remitted the arrears of interest due at the date of the contract. There was also due to the King of France ten millions of livres, borrowed by him of the States-General of the Netherlands for the use of the United States, and the payment of which he had guaranteed. This sum was to be paid in Paris in ten annual instalments of one million of livres each, commencing on the 5th of November, 1787. The interest on this loan was payable in Paris immediately, and the first payment of interest became due on the 5th of November, 1782. There was also due to the Farmers-General of France one million of livres, and to the king six millions of livres, on a loan for the year 1783; making in the whole thirty-eight millions of livres, or $7,037,037, due in France. There was also due to money-lenders in Holland $671,000; for money borrowed by Mr. Jay in Spain, $150,000; and a year's interest on the Dutch loan of ten millions of livres, amounting to $26,848;--making the whole foreign debt $7,885,085. The domestic debt amounted to $34,115,290. Five millions of this were due to the army, _under the commutation_ resolves of March, 1783. The residue was held by other citizens, or consisted of arrears of interest. The whole debt of the United States was estimated at $42,000,375, and the annual interest of this sum was $2,415,956.

[178] Mr. Madison (under the date of December 24, 1782) says, that, on the receipt of this intelligence, "the most intelligent members were deeply affected, and prognosticated a failure of the impost scheme, and the most pernicious effects to the character, the duration, and the interests of the Confederacy. It was at length, notwithstanding, determined to persist in the attempt for permanent revenue, and a committee was appointed to report the steps proper to be taken." Debates in the Congress of the Confederation, Elliot, I. 17.

[179] $1,545,818 and 30/90 was the whole amount.

[180] On the final question, as to the revenue system, Hamilton voted against it. His reasons were given in a letter to the Governor of New York, under date of April 14, 1783. They were, "First, that it does not designate the funds (except the impost) on which the whole interest is to arise; and by which (selecting the capital articles of visible property) the collection would have been easy, the funds productive, and necessarily increasing with the increase of the country. Secondly, that the duration of the funds is not coextensive with the debt, but limited to twenty-five years, though there is a moral certainty that in that period the princ.i.p.al will not, by the present provision, be fairly extinguished. Thirdly, that the nomination and appointment of the collectors of the revenue are to reside in each State, instead of, at least, the nomination being in the United States; the consequence of which will be, that those States which have little interest in the funds, by having a small share of the public debt due to their own citizens, will take care to appoint such persons as are the least likely to collect the revenue." Still, he urged the adoption of the plan by his own State, "because it is her interest, at all events, to promote the payment of the public debt in continental funds, independent of the general considerations of union and propriety. I am much mistaken, if the debts due from the United States to the citizens of the State of New York do not considerably exceed its proportion of the necessary funds; of course, it has an immediate interest that there should be a continental provision for them. But there are superior motives that ought to operate in every State,--the obligations of national faith, honor, and reputation. Individuals have been too long already sacrificed to the public convenience. It will be shocking, and, indeed, an eternal reproach to this country, if we begin the peaceable enjoyment of our independence by a violation of all the principles of honesty and true policy. It is worthy of remark, that at least four fifths of the domestic debt are due to the citizens of the States from Pennsylvania, inclusively, northward." Life of Hamilton, II. 185, 186.

[181] Address.

[182] Ibid.

[183] With what success this was attended may be seen from the fact, that, from the year 1782 to the year 1786, Congress made requisitions on the States for the purpose of paying the interest on the public debts, of more than six millions of dollars, and on the 31st of March, 1787, about one million only of this sum had been received. The interest of the debt due to domestic creditors remained wholly unpaid; money was borrowed in Europe to pay the interest on the foreign loans; and the domestic debt sunk to so low a value, that it was often sold for one tenth of its nominal amount.

[184] General Was.h.i.+ngton's letter to Hamilton, March 31, 1783. Writings, VIII. 409, 410. Circular Letter to the Governors of the States, on disbanding the army. Ibid. 439, 451.

[185] None of the doc.u.ments, connected with the Address to the People of the United States, issued by Congress in 1783, discussed the question as one of direct interest and advantage, except Hamilton's answer to the objections of Rhode Island. The Address itself appealed entirely to considerations of honor, justice, and good faith. Hamilton's paper, however, showed with great perspicacity, that the proposed impost would not be unfavorable to commerce, but the contrary; that it would not diminish the profits of the merchant, being too moderate in amount to discourage the consumption of imported goods, and therefore that it would not diminish the extent of importations; but that, even if it had this tendency, it was a tendency in the right direction, because it would lessen the proportion of imports to exports, and incline the balance in favor of the country. But the great question of yielding the control of foreign commerce to the Union, _for the sake of uniformity of regulation_, was not touched in any of these papers. The time for it had not arrived.

[186] See note at the end of this chapter.

[187] See note on page 194.

[188] As it was, the approach of peace had reduced the attendance upon Congress below the const.i.tutional number of States necessary to ratify the treaty, when it was received. On the 23d of December, 1783, a resolve was pa.s.sed, "That letters be immediately despatched to the executives of New Hamps.h.i.+re, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Georgia, informing them that the safety, honor, and good faith of the United States require the immediate attendance of their delegates in Congress; that there have not been during the sitting of Congress at this place [Annapolis] more than seven States represented, namely, Ma.s.sachusetts, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina, and most of those by only two delegates; and that the ratification of the definitive treaty, and several other matters, of great national concern, are now pending before Congress, which require the utmost despatch, and to which the a.s.sent of at least nine States is necessary." (Journals, IX. 12.)

CHAPTER III.

1781-1783.

OPINIONS AND EFFORTS OF WAs.h.i.+NGTON AND OF HAMILTON.--DECLINE OF THE CONFEDERATION.

The proposal of the revenue system went forth to the country, although not in immediate connection, yet nearly at the same time, with those comprehensive and weighty counsels which Was.h.i.+ngton addressed to the States, when the great object for which he had entered the service of his country had been accomplished, and he was about to return to a private station. His relations to the people of this country had been peculiar. He had been, not only the leader of their armies, but, in a great degree, their civil counsellor; for although he had rarely, if ever, gone out of the province of his command to give shape or direction to const.i.tutional changes, yet the whole circ.u.mstances of that command had constantly placed him in contact with the governments of the States, as well as with the Congress; and he had often been obliged to interpose the influence of his own character and opinions with all of them, in order that the civil machine might not wholly cease to move. At the moment when he was about to lay aside the sword, he saw very clearly that there were certain principles of conduct which must be called into action in the States, and among the people of the States, for the preservation of the Union. He, and he alone, could address to them with effect the requisite words of admonition, and point out the course of safety and success. This great service, the last act of his revolutionary official life, was performed with all the truth and wisdom of his character, before he proceeded to resign into the hands of Congress the power which he had held so long, and which he now surrendered with a virtue, a dignity, and a sincerity, with which no such power has ever been laid down by any of the leaders of revolutions whom the world has seen.

His object in this Address was not so much to urge the adoption of particular measures, as to inculcate principles which he believed to be essential to the welfare of the country. So clearly, however, did it appear to him, that the honor and independence of the country were involved in the adoption of the revenue system which Congress had recommended, that he did not refrain from urging it as the sole means by which a national bankruptcy could be averted, before any different plan could be proposed and adopted.

But how far, at this time, any other or further plans, for the formation of a better const.i.tution, had been formed, or how far any one perceived both the vicious principle of the Confederation and the means of subst.i.tuting for it another and more efficient power, we can judge only by the published writings of the Revolutionary statesmen. It is quite certain that at this period Was.h.i.+ngton saw the defects of the Confederation, as he had seen them clearly, and suffered under them, from the beginning. He saw that in the powers of the States, which far exceeded those of the Continental Congress, lay the source of all the perplexities which he had experienced in the course of the war, and of almost the whole of the difficulties and distresses of the army; and that to form a new const.i.tution, which would give consistency, stability, and dignity to the Union, was the great problem of the time.

He saw, also, that the honor and true interest of this country were involved in the development of continental power; that local and State politics were destined to interfere with the establishment of any more liberal and extensive plan of government, which the circ.u.mstances of the country required, as they had perpetually weakened the bond by which the Union had thus far been held together; and that such local influences would make these States the sport of European policy. He predicted, moreover, that the country would reach, if it reached at all, some system of sufficient capabilities, only through mistakes and disasters, and through an experience purchased at the price of further difficulties and distress. Such were his general views, at the close of the war.[189]

But there was one man in the country who had looked more deeply still into its wants, and who had formed in his enlarged and comprehensive mind the clearest views of the means necessary to meet them, even before the Confederation had been practically tried. A reorganization of the government had engaged the attention of Hamilton, as early as 1780; and, with his characteristic penetration and power, he saw and suggested what should be the remedy.

He entertained the opinion, at this time, as he had always entertained it, that the discretionary powers originally vested in Congress for the safety of the States, and implied in the circ.u.mstances and objects of their a.s.sembling, were fully competent to the public exigencies. But their practice, from the time of the Declaration of Independence through all the period that preceded the establishment of the Confederation, had accustomed the country to doubts of their original authority, and had at last amounted to a surrender of the ground from which they might have exercised it. No remedy, therefore, remained, applicable to the circ.u.mstances, and capable of rescuing the affairs of the country from their deplorable situation, but to vest in Congress, expressly and by a direct grant, the powers necessary to const.i.tute an efficient government and a solid, coercive union. The project then before the country, in the Articles of Confederation, had been designed to accomplish what the revolutionary government had failed to do. But it was manifestly destined to fail in its turn; for it left an uncontrollable sovereignty in the States, capable of defeating the beneficial exercise of the very powers which it undertook to confer upon Congress. It made the army, not a unit, formed and organized by a central and supreme authority, and looking up to that authority alone, but a collection of several armies, raised by the several States. It gave to the State legislatures the effective power of the purse, by withholding all certain revenues from Congress. It proposed to introduce no method and energy of administration; and without an executive, it left every detail of government to be managed by a deliberative body, whose const.i.tution rendered it fit for none but legislative functions.

Under these circ.u.mstances, it was Hamilton's advice, before the Confederation took effect, that Congress should plainly, frankly, and unanimously confess to the States their inability to carry on the contest with Great Britain, without more ample powers than those which they had for some time exercised, or those which they could exercise under the Confederation; and that a convention of all the States be immediately a.s.sembled, with full authority to agree upon a different system. He suggested that a complete sovereignty should be vested in Congress, except as to that part of internal police which relates to the rights of property and life among individuals, and to raising money by internal taxes, which he admitted should be regulated by the State legislatures. But in all that relates to war, peace, trade, and finance, he maintained that the sovereignty of Congress should be complete; that it should have the entire management of foreign affairs, and of raising and officering armies and navies; that it should have the entire regulation of trade, determining with what countries it should be carried on, laying prohibitions and duties, and granting bounties and premiums; that it should have certain perpetual revenues of an internal character, in specific taxes; that it should be authorized to inst.i.tute admiralty courts, coin money, establish banks, appropriate funds, and make alliances offensive and defensive, and treaties of commerce. He recommended also that Congress should immediately organize executive departments of foreign affairs, war, marine, finance, and trade, with great officers of state at the head of each of them.[190]

Hamilton's entry into Congress in 1782 marks the commencement of his public efforts to develop the idea of a general government, whose organs should act directly, and without the intervention of any State machinery. He first publicly propounded this idea in the paper which he prepared, as chairman of a committee, to be addressed to the legislature of Rhode Island, in answer to the objections of that State to the revenue system proposed in 1781. One of these objections was, that the plan proposed to introduce into the State officers unknown and unaccountable to the State itself, and therefore that it was against its const.i.tution. From the prevalence of this notion, we may see how difficult it was to create the idea of a national sovereignty, that would consist with the sovereignty of the States, and would work in its appropriate sphere harmoniously with the State inst.i.tutions, because directed to a different cla.s.s of objects. The nature of a federal const.i.tution was little understood. It was apparent that the exercise of its powers must affect the internal police of its component members, to some extent; but it was not well understood that political sovereignty is capable of part.i.tion, according to the character of its subjects, so that powers of one cla.s.s may be imparted to a federal, and powers of another cla.s.s remain in a State const.i.tution, without destroying the sovereignty of the latter. Hamilton presented this view, and at the same time pointed out, that, unless the const.i.tution of a State expressly prohibited its legislature from granting to the federal government new power to appoint officers for a special purpose, to act within the State itself, it was competent to the legislative authority of the State to communicate such power, just as it was competent to it originally to enter into the Confederation.[191]

In the same paper, also, he urged the necessity of vesting the appointment of the collectors of the proposed revenue in the general government, because it was designed as a security to creditors, and must therefore be general in its principle and dependent on a single will, and not on thirteen different authorities. This was the earliest suggestion of the principle, that, in exercising its powers, the federal government ought to act directly, through agents of its own appointment, and thus be independent of State negligence or control. When the debate came on in January, 1783, upon the new project of a revenue system, he again urged the necessity of strengthening the federal government, through the influence of officers deriving their appointments directly from Congress;--a suggestion that was received at the moment with pleasure by the opponents of the scheme, because it seemed to disclose a motive calculated to touch the jealousy rather than to propitiate the favor of the States. But the temporary expedients of the moment always pa.s.s away. The great ideas of a statesman like Hamilton, earnestly bent on the discovery and inculcation of truth, do not pa.s.s away. Wiser than those by whom he was surrounded, with a deeper knowledge of the science of government and the wants of the country than all of them, and constantly enunciating principles which extended far beyond the temporizing policy of the hour, the smiles of his opponents only prove to posterity how far he was in advance of them.[192]

The efforts of Hamilton to effect a change in the rule of the Confederation, as to the ratio of contribution by the States to the treasury of the Union, also evince both the defects of the existing government and the foresight with which he would have obviated them, if he could have been sustained. The rule of the Confederation required that the general treasury should be supplied by the several States in proportion to the value of all lands within each State, granted or surveyed, with the buildings and improvements thereon, to be estimated according to such mode as Congress should from time to time direct and appoint; the taxes for paying such proportion to be laid and levied by the State legislatures, within the time fixed by Congress. But Congress had never appointed any mode of ascertaining the valuation of lands within the States. The first requisition called for after the Confederation took effect was apportioned among the several States without any valuation,--provision being made by which each State was to receive interest on its payments, as far as they exceeded what might afterwards be ascertained to be its just proportion, when the valuation should have been made.[193] At the outset, therefore, a practical inequality was established, which gave rise to complaints and jealousies between the States, and increased the disposition to withhold compliance with the requisitions. The dangerous crisis in the internal affairs of the country which attended the approach of peace, had arrived in the winter and spring of 1783, and nothing had ever been done to carry out the rule of the Confederation, by fixing upon a mode of valuation. When the discussion of the new measures for sustaining the public credit came on, three courses presented themselves, with regard to this part of the subject;--either, first, to change the principle of the Confederation entirely; or, secondly, to carry it out by fixing a mode of valuation, at once; or, thirdly, to postpone the attempt to carry it out, until a better mode could be devised than the existing state of the country then permitted.

Hamilton's preference was for the first of these courses, as the one that admitted of the application of those principles of government which he was endeavoring to introduce into the federal system; for he saw that in the theory of the Confederation there was an inherent inequality, which would constantly increase in practice, and which must either be removed, or destroy the Union. He maintained, that, where there are considerable differences in the relative wealth of different communities, the proportion of those differences can never be ascertained by any common measure; that the actual wealth of a country, or its ability to pay taxes, depends on an endless variety of circ.u.mstances, physical and moral, and cannot be measured by any one general representative, as _land_, or _numbers_; and therefore that the a.s.sumption of such a general representative, by whatever mode its local value might be ascertained, would work inevitable inequality. In his view, the only possible way of making the States contribute to the general treasury in an equal proportion to their means, was by general taxes imposed under continental authority; and it is a striking proof of the comprehensive sagacity with which he looked forward, that, while he admitted that this mode would, for a time, produce material inequalities, he foresaw that balancing of interests which would arise in a continental legislation, and would relieve the hards.h.i.+ps of one tax in a particular State by the lighter pressure of another bearing with proportional weight in some other part of the Confederacy.[194]

Accordingly, after an attempt to postpone the consideration of a mode of carrying out the Confederation, he made an effort to have its principle changed, by subst.i.tuting specific taxes on land and houses, to be collected and appropriated, as well as the duties, under the authority of the United States, by officers to be nominated by Congress, and approved by the State in which they were to exercise their functions, but accountable to and removable by Congress.[195] These ideas, however, as he himself saw, were not agreeable to the spirit of the times, and his plan was rejected. After many fruitless projects had been suggested and discussed, for making the valuation required by the Confederation,--some of them proposing that it should be done by commissioners appointed by the United States, and some by commissioners appointed by the States,--it was determined to propose no other change in the principle of making requisitions on the States, than to subst.i.tute population in the place of land, as the rule of proportion.[196]

Equally extensive and important were his views on the subject of a peace establishment, for which he saw the necessity of providing, as the time approached when the Confederation would necessarily be tested as a government for the purposes of peace. To adapt a const.i.tution, whose princ.i.p.al powers were originally designed to be exercised in a state of war, to a state of peace, for which it possessed but few powers, and those not clearly defined, was a problem in the science of government of a novel character. It might prove to be an impossible task; for on applying the const.i.tutional provisions to the real wants and necessities of the country, it might turn out that the Confederation was in some respects dest.i.tute of the capacity to provide for them; and in undertaking to carry out its actual and sufficient powers, which had never hitherto been exercised, opposition might spring up, from State jealousy and local policy, which, in the real weakness of the federal government, would be as effectual a barrier as the want of const.i.tutional authority. Still the effort was to be made; and Hamilton approached the subject with all the sagacity and statesmans.h.i.+p for which he was so distinguished.

He saw that the Confederation contained provisions which looked to the continuance of the Union after the war had terminated, and that these provisions required practical application, through a machinery which had never been even framed. The Articles of Confederation vested in Congress the exclusive management of foreign relations; but the department of foreign affairs had never been properly organized. They also gave to Congress the exclusive regulation of trade and intercourse with the Indian nations; but no department of Indian affairs had been established with properly defined powers and duties. Nothing had been done to carry out the provision for fixing the standard of weights and measures throughout the United States, or to regulate the alloy and value of coin. Above all, the great question of means, military and naval, for the external and internal defence of the country during peace, for the preservation of tranquillity, the protection of commerce, the fulfilment of treaty stipulations, and the maintenance of the authority of the United States, had not been so much as touched. To regulate these important subjects was the design of a committee, at the head of which Hamilton was placed; and his earliest attention was directed to the most serious and difficult of them,--the provision for a peace establishment of military and naval forces.[197]