History of the Origin, Formation, and Adoption of the Constitution of the United States Volume I Part 26

For six years out of the twelve that elapsed from 1775 to the summoning of the Convention of 1787, he was a member of Congress. Concerned in all the great measures of independence, the establishment of the Confederation, the peace, and the revenue system of 1783, he had acquired a fund of political experience, which became of great value to the country and to himself. Although a foreigner by birth, he was thoroughly American in all his sentiments and feelings, and, at the time he entered the Convention, there were few public men in the country who perceived more clearly the causes of the inherent weakness of the existing government. During the war, he had always considered the States, with respect to that war, as forming one community;[448] and he did not admit the idea, that, when the Colonies became independent of Great Britain, they became independent of each other.[449] From the Declaration of Independence he deduced the doctrine that the States by which that measure was adopted were independent in their confederated character, and not as individual communities. This rather subtile distinction may seem now to have been of no great practical moment, since the Confederation had actually united the States as such, rather than the inhabitants of the States. But it was one of the positions a.s.sumed by those who desired to combat the idea that the States, when a.s.sembled in Convention, were restrained, by their position as equal and independent sovereignties, from adopting a plan of government founded on a representation of the people. To this objection Mr. Wilson repeatedly addressed himself, and his efforts had great influence in causing the adoption of the principle by which the people of the States became directly represented in the government in the ratio of their numbers. He showed that this principle had been improperly violated in the Confederation, in consequence of the urgent necessity of forming a union, and the impossibility at that time of forming any other than a union of the States. As a new part.i.tion of the States was now impracticable, it became necessary for them to surrender a portion of their sovereignties, and to permit their inhabitants to enter into direct relations with a new federal union. He pointed out the twofold relation in which the people must henceforth stand;--in the one, they would be citizens of the general government; in the other, they would be citizens of their particular State. As both governments were derived from the people, and both were designed for them, both ought to be regulated on the same principles. In no other way could the larger States consent to a new union; and if the smaller States could not admit the justice of a proportionate representation, it was in vain to expect to form a const.i.tution that would embrace and satisfy the whole country.

This great idea of a representative government was in fact the aim of all Mr. Wilson's exertions; and when the Const.i.tution was formed, he enforced this idea in the Convention of Pennsylvania with singular power. His speech in that body is one of the most comprehensive and luminous commentaries on the Const.i.tution that have come down to us from that period. It drew from Was.h.i.+ngton a high encomium, and it gained the vote of Pennsylvania for the new government, against the ingenious and captivating objections of its opponents.

The life of this wise, able, and excellent man was comparatively short.

In 1789, he was appointed by Was.h.i.+ngton a Judge of the Supreme Court of the United States. While on a circuit in North Carolina, in the year 1798, he died at Edenton, at about the age of fifty-six. The character of his mind and the sources of his influence will be best appreciated, by examining some of the more striking pa.s.sages of his great speech on the Const.i.tution.[450]

FOOTNOTES:

[447] Encyclopaedia Americana, Art. "Wilson, James."

[448] Madison, Elliot, V. 78.

[449] Ibid. 213.

[450] The following extracts from the speech referred to will well repay a careful perusal.

"_Tacitus_,--the profound politician Tacitus,--who lived towards the latter end of those ages which are now denominated _ancient_, who undoubtedly had studied the const.i.tutions of all the states and kingdoms known before and in his time, and who certainly was qualified, in an uncommon degree, for understanding the full force and operation of each of them, considers, after all he had known and read, a mixed government, composed of the three simple forms, as a thing rather to be wished than expected. And he thinks that, if such a government could even be inst.i.tuted, its duration could not be long. One thing is very certain,--that the doctrine of representation in government was altogether unknown to the ancients. Now, the knowledge and practice of this doctrine is, in my opinion, essential to every system that can possess the qualities of freedom, wisdom, and energy.

"It is worthy of remark, and the remark may, perhaps, excite some surprise, that representation of the people is not, even at this day, the sole principle of any government in Europe. Great Britain boasts--and she may well boast--of the improvement she has made in politics by the admission of representation; for the improvement is important as far as it goes; but it by no means goes far enough. Is the executive power of Great Britain founded on representation? This is not pretended. Before the Revolution, many of the kings claimed to reign by divine right, and others by hereditary right; and even at the Revolution, nothing further was effected or attempted than the recognition of certain parts of an original contract (_Blackstone_, 233), supposed, at some former remote period, to have been made between the king and the people. A contract seems to exclude, rather than to imply, delegated power. The judges of Great Britain are appointed by the crown. The judicial authority, therefore, does not depend upon representation, even in its most remote degree. Does representation prevail in the legislative department of the British government? Even here it does not predominate, though it may serve as a check. The legislature consists of three branches,--the king, the lords, and the commons. Of these, only the latter are supposed by the const.i.tution to represent the authority of the people. This short a.n.a.lysis clearly shows to what a narrow corner of the British const.i.tution the principle of representation is confined. I believe it does not extend farther, if so far, in any other government in Europe. For the American States were reserved the glory and the happiness of diffusing this vital principle throughout the const.i.tuent parts of government. Representation is the chain of communication between the people and those to whom they have committed the exercise of the powers of government. This chain may consist of one or more links, but in all cases it should be sufficiently strong and discernible.

"To be left without guide or precedent was not the only difficulty in which the Convention were involved, by proposing to their const.i.tuents a plan of a confederate republic. They found themselves embarra.s.sed with another, of peculiar delicacy and importance. I mean that of drawing a proper line between the national government and the governments of the several States. It was easy to discover a proper and satisfactory principle on the subject. Whatever object of government is confined, in its operation and effects, within the bounds of a particular State, should be considered as belonging to the government of that State; whatever object of government extends, in its operation or effects, beyond the bounds of a particular State, should be considered as belonging to the government of the United States. But though this principle be sound and satisfactory, its application to particular cases would be accompanied with much difficulty, because, in its application, room must be allowed for great discretionary lat.i.tude of construction of the principle. In order to lessen or remove the difficulty arising from discretionary construction on this subject, an enumeration of particular instances, in which the application of the principle ought to take place, has been attempted with much industry and care. It is only in mathematical science that a line can be described with mathematical precision. But I flatter myself that, upon the strictest investigation, the enumeration will be found to be safe and unexceptionable, and accurate, too, in as great a degree as accuracy can be expected in a subject of this nature. Particulars under this head will be more properly explained, when we descend to the minute view of the enumeration which is made in the proposed Const.i.tution.

"After all, it will be necessary that, on a subject so peculiarly delicate as this, much prudence, much candor, much moderation, and much liberality should be exercised and displayed both by the federal government and by the governments of the several States. It is to be hoped that those virtues in government will be exercised and displayed, when we consider that the powers of the federal government and those of the State governments are drawn from sources equally pure. If a difference can be discovered between them, it is in favor of the federal government, because that government is founded on a representation of the _whole_ Union; whereas the government of any particular State is founded only on the representation of a part, inconsiderable when compared with the whole. Is it not more reasonable to suppose that the counsels of the whole will embrace the interest of every part, than that the counsels of any part will embrace the interests of the whole?

"I intend not, Sir, by this description of the difficulties with which the Convention were surrounded, to magnify their skill or their merit in surmounting them, or to insinuate that any predicament in which the Convention stood should prevent the closest and most cautious scrutiny into the performance which they have exhibited to their const.i.tuents and to the world. My intention is of far other and higher aim,--to evince, by the conflicts and difficulties which must arise from the many and powerful causes which I have enumerated, that it is hopeless and impracticable to form a const.i.tution which, in every part, will be acceptable to every citizen, or even to every government, in the United States; and that all which can be expected is, to form such a const.i.tution as, upon the whole, is the best that can possibly be obtained. Man and perfection!--a state and perfection!--an a.s.semblage of states and perfection! Can we reasonably expect, however ardently we may wish, to behold the glorious union?

"I can well recollect, though I believe I cannot convey to others, the impression which, on many occasions, was made by the difficulties which surrounded and pressed the Convention. The great undertaking sometimes seemed to be at a stand; at other times, its motion seemed to be retrograde. At the conclusion, however, of our work, many of the members expressed their astonishment at the success with which it terminated.

"Having enumerated some of the difficulties which the Convention were obliged to encounter in the course of their proceedings, I shall next point out the end which they proposed to accomplish. Our wants, our talents, our affections, our pa.s.sions, all tell us that we were made for a state of society. But a state of society could not be supported long or happily without some civil restraint. It is true, that, in a state of nature, any one individual may act uncontrolled by others; but it is equally true, that, in such a state, every other individual may act uncontrolled by him. Amidst this universal independence, the dissensions and animosities between interfering members of the society would be numerous and ungovernable. The consequence would be, that each member, in such a natural state, would enjoy less liberty, and suffer more interruption, than he would in a regulated society. Hence the universal introduction of governments of some kind or other into the social state.

The liberty of every member is increased by this introduction; for each gains more by the limitation of the freedom of every other member, than he loses by the limitation of his own. The result is, that civil government is necessary to the perfection and happiness of man. In forming this government, and carrying it into execution, it is _essential_ that the _interest_ and _authority_ of the whole community should be binding in every part of it.

"The foregoing principles and conclusions are generally admitted to be just and sound with regard to the nature and formation of single governments, and the duty of submission to them. In some cases, they will apply, with much propriety and force, to states already formed. The advantages and necessity of civil government among individuals in society are not greater or stronger than, in some situations and circ.u.mstances, are the advantages and necessity of a federal government among states. A natural and very important question now presents itself,--Is such the situation, are such the circ.u.mstances, of the United States? A proper answer to this question will unfold some very interesting truths.

"The United States may adopt any one of four different systems. They may become consolidated into one government, in which the separate existence of the States shall be entirely absolved. They may reject any plan of union or a.s.sociation, and act as separate and unconnected States. They may form two or more confederacies. They may unite in one federal republic. Which of these systems ought to have been formed by the Convention? To support, with vigor, a single government over the whole extent of the United States, would demand a system of the most unqualified and the most unremitted despotism. Such a number of separate States, contiguous in situation, unconnected and disunited in government, would be, at one time, the prey of foreign force, foreign influence, and foreign intrigue; at another, the victims of mutual rage, rancor, and revenge. Neither of these systems found advocates in the late Convention. I presume they will not find advocates in this. Would it be proper to divide the United States into two or more confederacies?

It will not be unadvisable to take a more minute survey of this subject.

Some aspects under which it may be viewed are far from being, at first sight, uninviting. Two or more confederacies would be each more compact and more manageable than a single one extending over the same territory.

By dividing the United States into two or more confederacies, the great collision of interests apparently or really different and contrary, in the _whole extent_ of their dominion, would be broken, and, in a great measure, disappear, in the several parts. But these advantages, which are discovered from certain points of view, are greatly overbalanced by inconveniences that will appear on a more accurate examination.

Animosities, and perhaps wars, would arise from a.s.signing the extent, the limits, and the rights of the different confederacies. The expenses of governing would be multiplied by the number of federal governments.

The danger resulting from foreign influence and mutual dissensions would not, perhaps, be less great and alarming in the instance of different confederacies, than in the instance of different, though more numerous, una.s.sociated States.

"These observations, and many others that might be made on the subject, will be sufficient to evince that a division of the United States into a number of separate confederacies would probably be an unsatisfactory and an unsuccessful experiment. The remaining system which the American States may adopt, is a union of them under one confederate republic. It will not be necessary to employ much time, or many arguments, to show that this is the most eligible system that can be proposed. By adopting this system, the vigor and decision of a wide-spreading monarchy may be joined to the freedom and beneficence of a contracted republic. The extent of territory, the diversity of climate and soil, the number and greatness and connection of lakes and rivers with which the United States are intersected and almost surrounded,--all indicate an enlarged government to be fit and advantageous for them. The principles and dispositions of their citizens indicate that, in this government, liberty shall reign triumphant. Such, indeed, have been the general opinions and wishes entertained since the era of independence. If those opinions and wishes are as well founded as they have been general, the late Convention were justified in proposing to their const.i.tuents one confederate republic, as the best system of a national government for the United States.

"In forming this system, it was proper to give minute attention to the interest of all the parts; but there was a duty of still higher import,--to feel and to show a predominating regard to the superior interests of the whole. If this great principle had not prevailed, the plan before us would never have made its appearance. The same principle that was so necessary in forming it is equally necessary in our deliberations, whether we should reject or ratify it.

"I make these observations with a design to prove and ill.u.s.trate this great and important truth,--that, in our decisions on the work of the late Convention, we should not limit our views and regards to the State of Pennsylvania. The aim of the Convention was to form a system of good and efficient government, on the more extensive scale of the United States. In this, and in every other instance, the work should be judged with the same spirit with which it was performed. A principle of duty, as well as candor, demands this.

"We have remarked, that civil government is necessary to the perfection of society; we now remark, that civil liberty is necessary to the perfection of civil government. Civil liberty is natural liberty itself, divested of only that part which, placed in the government, produces more good and happiness to the community than if it had remained in the individual. Hence it follows that civil liberty, while it resigns a part of natural liberty, retains the free and generous exercise of all the human faculties, so far as it is compatible with the public welfare.

"In considering and developing the nature and end of the system before us, it is necessary to mention another kind of liberty, which has not yet, as far as I know, received a name. I shall distinguish it by the appellation of _federal liberty_. When a single government is inst.i.tuted, the individuals of which it is composed surrender to it a part of their natural independence, which they before enjoyed as men.

When a confederate republic is inst.i.tuted, the communities of which it is composed surrender to it a part of their political independence, which they before enjoyed as States. The principles which directed, in the former case, what part of the natural liberty of the man ought to be given up, and what part ought to be retained, will give similar directions in the latter case. The States should resign to the national government that part, and that part only, of their political liberty, which, placed in that government, will produce more good to the whole than if it had remained in the several States. While they resign this part of their political liberty, they retain the free and generous exercise of all their other faculties, as States, so far as it is compatible with the welfare of the general and superintending confederacy.

"Since _States_, as well as citizens, are represented in the Const.i.tution before us, and form the objects on which that Const.i.tution is proposed to operate, it was necessary to notice and define _federal_ as well as _civil_ liberty.

"These general reflections have been made in order to introduce, with more propriety and advantage, a practical ill.u.s.tration of the end proposed to be accomplished by the late Convention.

"It has been too well known, it has been too severely felt, that the present Confederation is inadequate to the government, and to the exigencies, of the United States. The great struggle for Liberty in this country, should it be unsuccessful, will probably be the last one which she will have for her existence and prosperity in any part of the globe.

And it must be confessed that this struggle has, in some of the stages of its progress, been attended with symptoms that foreboded no fortunate issue. To the iron hand of Tyranny, which was lifted up against her, she manifested, indeed, an intrepid superiority. She broke in pieces the fetters which were forged for her, and showed that she was una.s.sailable by force. But she was environed with dangers of another kind, and springing from a very different source. While she kept her eye steadily fixed on the efforts of oppression, licentiousness was secretly undermining the rock on which she stood.

"Need I call to your remembrance the _contrasted_ scenes of which we have been witnesses? On the glorious conclusion of our conflict with Britain, what high expectations were formed concerning us by others!

What high expectations did we form concerning ourselves! Have those expectations been realized? No. What has been the cause? Did our citizens lose their perseverance and magnanimity? No. Did they become insensible of resentment and indignation at any high-handed attempt that might have been made to injure or enslave them? No. What, then, has been the cause? The truth is, we dreaded danger only on one side: this we manfully repelled. But, on another side, danger, not less formidable, but more insidious, stole in upon us; and our unsuspicious tempers were not sufficiently attentive either to its approach or to its operations.

Those whom foreign strength could not overpower have wellnigh become the victims of internal anarchy.

"If we become a little more particular, we shall find that the foregoing representation is by no means exaggerated. When we had baffled all the menaces of foreign power, we neglected to establish among ourselves a government that would insure domestic vigor and stability. What was the consequence? The commencement of peace was the commencement of every disgrace and distress that could befall a people in a peaceful state.

Devoid of _national power_, we could not prohibit the extravagance of our importations, nor could we derive a revenue from their excess.

Devoid of national _importance_, we could not procure for our exports a tolerable sale at foreign markets. Devoid of national _credit_, we saw our public securities melt in the hands of the holders, like snow before the sun. Devoid of national _dignity_, we could not, in some instances, perform our treaties on our part; and, in other instances, we could neither obtain nor compel the performance of them on the part of others.

Devoid of national _energy_, we could not carry into execution our own resolutions, decisions, or laws.

"Shall I become more particular still? The tedious detail would disgust me. The years of languor are now over. We have felt the dishonor with which we have been covered; we have seen the destruction with which we have been threatened. We have penetrated to the causes of both, and when we have once discovered them, we have begun to search for the means of removing them. For the confirmation of these remarks, I need not appeal to an enumeration of facts. The proceedings of Congress, and of the several States, are replete with them. They all point out the weakness and insufficiency as the cause, and an _efficient_ general government as the only cure, of our political distempers.

"Under these impressions, and with these views, was the late Convention appointed; and under these impressions, and with these views, the late Convention met.

"We now see the great end which they proposed to accomplish. It was to frame, for the consideration of their const.i.tuents, one federal and national const.i.tution,--a const.i.tution that would produce the advantages of good, and prevent the inconveniences of bad government;--a const.i.tution whose beneficence and energy would pervade the whole Union, and bind and embrace the interests of every part;--a const.i.tution that would insure peace, freedom, and happiness to the States and people of America.

"We are now naturally led to examine the means by which they proposed to accomplish this end. This opens more particularly to our view the discussion before us. But, previously to our entering upon it, it will not be improper to state some general and leading principles of government, which will receive particular application in the course of our investigations.

"There necessarily exists, in every government, a power from which there is no appeal, and which, for that reason, may be termed supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable. Where does this power reside? To this question writers on different governments will give different answers.

Sir William Blackstone will tell you, that in Britain the power is lodged in the British Parliament; that the Parliament may alter the form of the government; and that its power is absolute, without control. The idea of a const.i.tution, limiting and superintending the operations of legislative authority, seems not to have been accurately understood in Britain. There are, at least, no traces of practice conformable to such a principle. The British Const.i.tution is just what the British Parliament pleases. When the Parliament transferred legislative authority to Henry VIII., the act transferring could not, in the strict acceptation of the term, be called unconst.i.tutional.

"To control the power and conduct of the legislature by an overruling const.i.tution, was an improvement in the science and practice of government reserved to the American States.

"Perhaps some politician, who has not considered with sufficient accuracy our political systems, would answer that, in our governments, the supreme power was vested in the const.i.tutions. This opinion approaches a step nearer to the truth, but does not reach it. The truth is, that, in our governments, the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power _remains_ in the people. As our const.i.tutions are superior to our legislatures, so the people are superior to our const.i.tutions. Indeed, the superiority, in this last instance, is much greater; for the people possess over our const.i.tutions control in _act_, as well as right.

"The consequence is, that the people may change the const.i.tutions whenever and however they please. This is a right of which no positive inst.i.tution can ever deprive them.

"These important truths, Sir, are far from being merely speculative. We, at this moment, speak and deliberate under their immediate and benign influence. To the operation of these truths we are to ascribe the scene, hitherto unparalleled, which America now exhibits to the world,--a gentle, a peaceful, a voluntary, and a deliberate transition from one const.i.tution of government to another. In other parts of the world, the idea of revolutions in government is, by a mournful and an indissoluble a.s.sociation, connected with the idea of wars, and all the calamities attendant on wars. But happy experience teaches us to view such revolutions in a very different light,--to consider them only as progressive steps in improving the knowledge of government, and increasing the happiness of society and mankind.

"Oft have I marked, with silent pleasure and admiration, the force and prevalence, through the United States, of the principle that the supreme power resides in the people, and that they never part with it. It may be called the _panacea_ in politics. There can be no disorder in the community but may here receive a radical cure. If the error be in the legislature, it may be corrected by the const.i.tution; if in the const.i.tution, it may be corrected by the people. There is a remedy, therefore, for every distemper in government, if the people are not wanting to themselves; if they are wanting to themselves, there is no remedy. From their power, as we have seen, there is no appeal; of their error, there is no superior principle of correction.

"There are three simple species of government;--monarchy, where the supreme power is in a single person; aristocracy, where the supreme power is in a select a.s.sembly, the members of which either fill up, by election, the vacancies in their own body, or succeed to their places in it by inheritance, property, or in respect of some _personal_ right or qualification; a republic or democracy, where the people at large _retain_ the supreme power, and act either collectively or by representation.

"Each of these species of government has its advantages and disadvantages.

"The advantages of a _monarchy_ are strength, despatch, secrecy, unity of counsel. Its disadvantages are tyranny, expense, ignorance of the situation and wants of the people, insecurity, unnecessary wars, evils attending elections or successions.

"The advantages of _aristocracy_ are wisdom, arising from experience and education. Its disadvantages are dissensions among themselves, oppression to the lower orders.

"The advantages of _democracy_ are liberty, equality, cautious and salutary laws, public spirit, frugality, peace, opportunities of exciting and producing abilities of the best citizens. Its disadvantages are dissensions, the delay and disclosure of public counsels, the imbecility of public measures, r.e.t.a.r.ded by the necessity of a numerous consent.