A Political Diary, 1828-1830 Part 14

I have written a letter to Lord W. Bentinck, stating confidentially the grounds of the change of opinion as to the disbanding of the six extra regiments. I added, 'However, such an event will not happen in your time, nor I hope in mine,' or something to that effect.

_September 11._

Chairs at 11. Read to them the Duke's letter on the six regiments. Told them I had written a private letter to Lord William to relieve his mind from the censure intended for former Governments (a very small portion of which is chargeable on him), and to caution him against similar errors.

Gave them the alteration I had intended to make in the draft respecting pensions granted to King's soldiers enlisted into their army. They will consider it.

_September 14._

Read the papers containing the correspondence with the local Governments respecting the provision of stores in India. It is hardly credible, yet it is true, that till within these few years the Medical Board indented upon England for drugs which were produced in India! From Madras as late at 1827 they indented for file handles and blacksmiths' tongs! From Bombay in 1826 for wooden canteens and triangles! It is evident the local Governments have never displayed any energy.

_September 16._

Received from the Duke his ideas on the subject of a campaign against Ava.

He would hold the great Dagon Temple at Rangoon, but only for the purpose of having vessels in the river to co-operate with the army.

_September 17._

To-day has been an idle day. I have done nothing; but I have taken exercise, and so acquired _health_, without which I cannot do business.

_September 20._

Met Mr. Conyngham of the Foreign Office. He told me the Turks were ready to make the required concessions. Of the disposition of the Russians nothing seems known. R. Gordon has of his own authority ordered up Sir Pulteney Malcolm from Vourla to the Dardanelles. I suppose to carry away Englishmen and their property in the event of an insurrection or of some terrible catastrophe at Constantinople.

Lord Stuart, as I suspected, gives no opinion as to the probable result of the political contest in France.

I had a letter from the Duke respecting half-Batta.

_September 24._

Cabinet room. Read all the letters from Petersburg, Paris, Berlin, and Constantinople during the last fortnight, and the despatches sent during the last month.

R. Gordon seems to have done very well. He and Guilleminot have acted cordially together, and when they had induced the Porte to consent to make peace on the terms prescribed by the Russians, Gordon managed very prudently to get General m.u.f.fling to send his secretary to the Russian head-quarters with the Turkish Plenipotentiaries. m.u.f.fling would have gone with them to the Reis Effendi had he been well enough; as it was, he sent his secretary, who afterwards went to the Russian head-quarters and was thus enabled to state distinctly what had pa.s.sed in the conference held with the Effendi. I think it very possible that without the intervention of the Prussian Minister, who was known to be acquainted with the feelings of the Emperor, General Dieb.i.t.c.h would not have agreed to an armistice. The armistice seems to have been made on August 29. We know of it from Seymour at Berlin.

Polignac seems excellently well disposed. He would act cordially with us if he dared. At present he is obliged to cover all he does under the instructions given to Guilleminot by his predecessor under a different state of things, before the great Russian successes. He talks of a Congress of the Powers interested, and of a joint declaration if Russia should not adhere to her promise.

Russia may be kept to her promises by the fear of a revolutionary movement in France. The French Opposition desire the success of the Russians, the dissolution of the Turkish Empire, and the occupation of the Dardanelles by the Emperor Nicholas, because they know that such events would lead to a _sotto sopra_ in Europe, a general scramble in which they would get the Rhine as their boundary. Generally, I have no doubt, young France wishes for confusion.

Austria is alarmed and would do nothing. The Prussians hold that the existence of the Ottoman Empire is not essential to the balance of power (that is, some of them do), and they would be glad to see Austria and Russia divide Turkey, Prussia having her compensation in Germany. However, m.u.f.fling, going rather beyond his instructions, has been made to do good.

I think all things tend to the preservation of peace if there should be no explosion at Constantinople or in France. The Ottoman Empire seems, however, to be falling to pieces. The Government has been so oppressive that the people will not fight for it. The Sultan has but 4,000 troops, and it is said the appearance of 10,000 Russians would lead to the capture of Constantinople.

Dieb.i.t.c.h seems to dread the catastrophe which might ensue, and the amba.s.sadors have placed before him in strong terms the fatal consequences of an explosion at Constantinople.

I must say R. Gordon has done ably and well.

The rascally Russians have been intriguing with our Ionian subjects, and Aberdeen has written a very strong letter to Lord Heytesbury on the subject.

Polignac, desirous as he is of withdrawing the French troops altogether from the Morea, is at present afraid of doing so.

Aberdeen told me things were not going on well here. The King has quite lost the sight of one eye, and the sight of the other is indistinct. It gives him pain, too, and the fear of blindness makes him nervous. The Duke of c.u.mberland is always about him, as mischievous as ever, but pretending not to be hostile.

The Duke of Wellington gives the King up as a bad job. He sees him very seldom. At first he liked seeing him and setting things to rights; but he says he found what he did one day was undone the next, and he is in despair. The King has no constancy. There is no depending upon him from one day to another.

Aberdeen says the accession of Rosslyn has not produced the effect we antic.i.p.ated--that Lord Grey is very hostile. What we shall do for a majority next session I know not, but I think we shall stand, [Footnote: This might have been but for the events on the Continent in the year following, which formed a new starting-point in the politics of a large part of Europe.] although we shall not, I fear, be a strong Government. The Catholic Relief Bill has destroyed our unity and the spirit of party. It has likewise destroyed that of the Opposition, who have no longer any rallying point. Thus the formation of a strong Government is difficult. The Brunswickers cannot form one, and the King cannot be persuaded to make one out of the Opposition. Indeed, that the Duke of c.u.mberland would never advise. The Brunswickers will endeavour to make terms with us as a body--to make martyrs of some of the old Protestants, particularly of the Duke and Peel, and placing themselves at the head to go on as well as they could with the rest of us. This will not do.

_September 26._

The Chairs, or rather the Court, somewhat impertinently object to the addition I made to a recent draft, recommending an enquiry by practical and scientific men as to the powers India may possess of producing many articles of stores now sent from England. They say this is liable to misconstruction, and then misconstrue it themselves. They suppose these practical men, not being servants of the Company, to sit in judgment upon the proceedings of the military Board. I have corrected their intentional misconstruction, and have acquiesced in the subst.i.tution of a draft they propose to send instead, which will, I hope, practically effect my object, and therefore I have said we are willing our object should be attained in the manner most agreeable to the Court of Directors.

It is very lucky I had just sent them my letter about stores. It will appear to be written subsequently to theirs. They think to humbug and to bully me. They will find both difficult.

_September 30._

Read the collection respecting the health of the King's troops. It is incredible to me that so many things should remain to be done--nothing seems to have been done that ought to have been done. I fear our finances make the building of new barracks impossible at present. We could not build proper barracks for all the European troops in India much under a million.

Still much may be done for their health.

_October 5._

Arrived in London at 3. To the Cabinet room, where I found Lord Bathurst, come up to town for Seymour Bathurst's [Footnote: Hon. Seymour Bathurst, fourth son of third Earl Bathurst, married October 6, 1829, Julia, daughter of John Peter Hankey, Esq.] marriage, and afterwards Fitzgerald came in.

Fitzgerald was a fortnight in Ireland, and gives a bad account of it.

A letter from Metternich says peace was actually signed. Sir E. Gordon's despatches give every reason to expect it soon would be. The peace cannot last. I am inclined to think it would have been better for the Russians to have occupied Constantinople, and for the Ottoman Empire to have been overthrown that we might have known at once where we were, than to have had such a peace as this. It is practically present occupation (for a year) of _more_ than they now hold, for they are to have the fortresses ceded to them. They exact 750,000 for the pretended losses of their merchants, and five millions for themselves. The indemnity to the merchants to be paid by three instalments. On the payment of the first, Adrianople and a few places on the coast to be given up. On the payment of the second everything to the Balkan, and on the third Bulgaria. These payments occupy a year.

The five millions are to be paid in ten years, or sooner if the Turks can manage it. The Princ.i.p.alities to be occupied till the payment. The Turks to confirm the Government established during the ten years, and not to impose any taxes for two years more.

All the fortresses on the left bank to be destroyed. None of the islands to belong to Turkey. No Turk to enter the princ.i.p.alities. The princes to be for life. All payments _in kind_ from the Princ.i.p.alities to cease, and instead the Turks and the princes to _agree upon a compensation_! It is unnecessary to go through the other articles relative to the Princ.i.p.alities. The treaty contains a real cession of them to Russia.

The terms as to the navigation of merchantmen, their not being searched in a Turkish port, the refusal of acquiescence in the demands of the Russian Minister where any injury is pretended to have been done to a Russian, to be _just ground for reprisal_, &c., are of a nature intolerable to an independent Power, and not to be carried into execution.

On the side of Asia everything is ceded that can enable Russia to attack either Turkey or Persia with advantage.

The terms imposed with regard to indemnities are extravagant and altogether contrary to all the Emperor's promises. He has not deceived us; but he has lied to us most foully. Sir R. Gordon seems to have done all that could be done. Perhaps he has saved Constantinople from conflagration, and the Empire from dissolution. He has managed to settle the Greek question, Turkey consenting to everything the allies may determine under the protocol of March 22. Sir R. Gordon has taken upon himself to order up the English s.h.i.+ps, and Guilleminot has ordered up the French s.h.i.+ps, but they were still at Smyrna when the dispatch came away. These s.h.i.+ps, it is hoped, may be some check on the Russians, and ostensibly they only go up to Constantinople to save Christians. However, if the Russians advance they will probably lead the Turks to fight. Gordon and Guilleminot have very properly told the Sultan they will remain by him in any case.

The Turks declare the terms are, as regards payment, such as they have really no means of complying with. The allies will make representations to Petersburg to obtain a relaxation of these conditions.

In the meantime, while this was doing at Constantinople, Lord Heytesbury was asking Nesselrode what the terms he intended to propose were, and Nesselrode would not tell him. Lord Heytesbury's despatch and Gordon's are both dated on September 10. The 12th was to be the day of signature. Lord Stuart by Aberdeen's directions has been pressing Polignac very hard to withdraw the French troops from the Morea, and Polignac has been obliged to plead the weakness of his Government, and to put off Lord Stuart by referring it to the Conference. I should say from what the papers show of Polignac that he will not stand. I do not know what his antagonists may be, but he is evidently not a powerful man.

A Liberal told Fitzgerald their object was now in France to make the King of the Netherlands King of France, and give Holland to Prussia, taking Belgium and everything to the Rhine to themselves.