The Harwich Naval Forces Part 3

But the activities of the Harwich destroyers were extended far beyond the limits of the North Sea. At the beginning of the war, for example, a division of destroyers from Harwich had Newport in Wales for its base, and was constantly employed in patrolling, screening big s.h.i.+ps at sea, fighting submarines, convoying in the Atlantic, and so forth.

I will give a few details to show the sort of work that was done by the Harwich Force at the eastern approaches to the Channel. Through the winter of 1916-1917 there was always a division of the Harwich Force patrolling the Channel barrage in conjunction with the Dover Patrol. It was a one-month patrol. There was no leave, no short notice, and the s.h.i.+ps only returned to Harwich for boiler-cleaning.

One important duty of the Harwich Force was to patrol the mine-net barrage which extended along the Belgian coast, parallel to and at about ten miles distance from the sh.o.r.e, from Dunkirk to Holland.

There was nearly always one division of the Harwich Force, consisting of four destroyers, with one or two monitors, patrolling just outside the barrage by day, within effective range of the German guns on the sh.o.r.e (their range was 30,000 yards). By night the division used to patrol and protect the Downs. This patrol, based on Dover, used to carry on this work for three weeks at a stretch, always at sea, or ready to get off at a moment's notice. Its function outside the mine-net barrage was to prevent enemy submarines from pa.s.sing through the barrage, and to stop the enemy destroyers from leaving their base.

This channel patrolled by our destroyers was bordered on its south side by the mine-net barrage and on its north side by our minefields.

On the further side of the minefields our light cruisers and destroyers patrolled in support.

Our destroyers had frequent sc.r.a.ps with the enemy across the narrow mine-net barrage. It was while engaged in this work that the Harwich Patrol co-operated with the Dover Patrol in the bombardment of the coast. On one occasion, at daylight, the Harwich Force sighted four German destroyers making for Zeebrugge. The _Centaur_, at that time Admiral Tyrwhitt's flags.h.i.+p, with other cruisers and destroyers of the Harwich Force, sank one of the enemy destroyers, the S20, and badly damaged other destroyers.

In the course of the execution of this duty of ever keeping a watchful eye on the enemy, the Harwich Force had its full share of fighting.

Thus, on January 22, 1917, a calm, cold, very dark night, three of the light cruisers were on the lookout to intercept German destroyers that were known to be making for Zeebrugge. As they were steering in a south-westerly direction eight enemy destroyers were sighted pa.s.sing close under their stern. A general melee followed at short range, 1000 yards and less, the cruisers blazing away with their guns, the destroyers replying with their torpedoes. One who took part in the action says that the atmospheric conditions helped to make the scene an extraordinary one. The enemy destroyers, as they rapidly turned hither and thither in their manoeuvring across the limited s.p.a.ce which the action occupied, had their funnels crowned with a vivid red glow, and the smoke from them hung like a scarlet canopy over the engaging s.h.i.+ps. The enemy s.h.i.+ps must have been badly knocked about, for they soon retired, enveloped in a dense cloud of smoke. One was sunk in full view of our s.h.i.+ps, and one at least was so damaged that she sank later. About an hour afterwards British destroyers fought a short action with the same enemy destroyers. Soon another of the enemy was seen to be hurrying to the Dutch coast, apparently in a sinking condition. During this action, so close was the fighting that one British destroyer and a German T.B.D. were engaged within pistol range of each other. The German escaped in the darkness, and had to put into Ymuiden in a terribly damaged condition. In this fight one of our destroyers, the _Simoon_, was blown up by an enemy sh.e.l.l which exploded in her fore magazine.

It would take long to tell the whole heroic story of the Harwich Force during the great war. At Harwich, the people, who are in close touch with the Navy, and must know many things over which, hitherto, "Dora"

has drawn her discreet veil, speak in terms of the profoundest admiration, pride, and respect of the officers and men of the light force which played its part so gallantly in defending the inviolability of England. Commodore Tyrwhitt--since 1917 Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt--was the right man to lead such men. And how wonderful have been his experiences throughout this long war! He has fought in many actions; in his successive flags.h.i.+ps he has been torpedoed and mined--his first flags.h.i.+p, as we have seen, sank under him; he was ever cruising about enemy waters; he was ever finding himself in tight corners; and he always contrived to extricate his squadron from the most difficult situations.

_Part II_

THE HARWICH SUBMARINE FLOTILLA

CHAPTER VII

COMPOSITION OF THE FLOTILLA

CHAPTER VII

COMPOSITION OF THE FLOTILLA

The sh.o.r.e establishment--Heavy losses of the flotilla--Humorous incidents--Drowning the mascot--Bluffing the Huns.

The Submarine Flotilla at Harwich, acting as a separate unit and receiving its orders directly from the Admiralty, though also at times working in co-operation with the Harwich Force of light cruisers and destroyers, played a very useful part in the naval war, and was especially instrumental in making the North Sea too uncomfortable for German submarines. At the commencement of the war the _Maidstone_ was the only depot s.h.i.+p of the flotilla, but later she was joined by two others, the _Pandora_ and the _Forth_, while another s.h.i.+p, the _Alecto_, was stationed as a branch depot s.h.i.+p at Yarmouth, that port being somewhat nearer the usual objective of our submarines than Harwich.

At the opening of the war, Commodore Roger Keyes was in command of the flotilla. Then Captain Waistell was in command until the end of the third year of the war. He was succeeded by Captain A.P. Addison, who is still in command. The average strength of the flotilla was eighteen submarines, the large majority of them being of the very useful "E"

type. This was the only organised flotilla existing in England at the opening of the war. It had the advantage, therefore, of taking to itself all the senior and most experienced submarine officers in the Navy, a fact that may account for the large percentage of hits made by the torpedoes of these submarines in the course of the war--a percentage of which officers and men naturally feel proud. At first the personnel of the flotilla comprised naval men only; but, later, numbers of men from the merchant service and artificers from sh.o.r.e works were absorbed into it. These latter became very keen and efficient, and are spoken of in terms of high praise by the officers.

It was the practice, when the submarines returned after one or other of their adventurous voyages, at once to remove the crews from their confined quarters to the depot s.h.i.+ps, in which they lived until the time came to put to sea again. But as the war progressed the accommodation afforded by the depot s.h.i.+ps became inadequate.

Consequently the _Maidstone_ and other depot s.h.i.+ps which had been moored in the harbour were brought alongside Parkeston quay; while, facing the quay, on the ground that had been taken over from the Great Eastern Railway Company (a company, by the way, which co-operated with the Admiralty in a zealous and patriotic fas.h.i.+on), there rapidly rose an extensive sh.o.r.e establishment, with store-rooms, workshops, offices, and comfortable quarters for the submarine crews, who lived here instead of in the depot s.h.i.+ps when their craft were in port.

The arrangements made for the comfort of the men were excellent. A church, a chapel, recreation rooms, a theatre, a cinema house, and canteens fronted the quay, and good companies were brought from London theatres and music-halls to entertain the sailors, while, of course, provision was also made for outdoor sports and games. There were, naturally, serious-minded people who considered that some of these arrangements were of a frivolous character, out of harmony with the tragedy of war. But those who organised these things knew better.

The strain of submarine work is very great. To occupy the minds of the men with amus.e.m.e.nts while they are resting awhile on sh.o.r.e after their trying duties cannot but help to keep up their _moral_. And that the _moral_ of the submarine men was wonderful all are agreed. Surely no other Service on land or sea can supply a greater test of sustained valour than does this submarine warfare. The conditions of it are uncanny, calculated to terrify the imagination. As a rule the submarine is playing a lone hand upon the seas. It is rare, when disaster comes, for a friendly s.h.i.+p to be near her to bring help or to carry tidings of her to England. In the great majority of cases, when one of our submarines has been lost, all that is known of the disaster is that she does not come home. What has happened to her remains a secret of the sea never to be revealed. An ordinary patrol for a submarine of the Harwich Flotilla was of about ten days; a mine-laying trip, of from three to six days' duration. When the overdue s.h.i.+p did not return there was suspense for several days, until at last it was realised that there was no longer room for hope.

In this little flotilla of eighteen submarines, s.h.i.+ps that disappeared had to be replaced by others. For in the course of the war twenty "E"

boats, two "D" boats, and one "L" boat belonging to the flotilla were lost, and these figures do not include the submarines that were detached from the Harwich Flotilla to be lost in the Mediterranean and Baltic. The sailor of to-day has not all the superst.i.tions of his forefathers, but, like most people, he has some belief in omens.

Certain coincidences made him regard it as very unlucky to sail in a submarine when a new captain was making his first voyage in her.

Within a short period four submarines that had sailed out of Harwich under new captains were never heard of again. It was also recognised that ill luck was likely to attend the first voyage of a newly launched submarine; but that, so soon as the first voyage had been safely accomplished, all was well with the s.h.i.+p, which would then be faced only by the ordinary chances of war.

To turn to an amusing example of the superst.i.tion of the sea. In the course of one cruise a submarine of the Harwich Flotilla had fired seven torpedoes at various enemy s.h.i.+ps without result. The captain discovered one of his crew kneeling on the deck over a bucket of sea-water. He was holding under the water and mercilessly wringing an object against which he was directing a volume of abuse in terms frankly nautical. Disgusted at the failure of the torpedoes, he was drowning the s.h.i.+p's mascot, a teddy bear or similar doll, hoping to change the luck. I wish that I could state that the next torpedo fired sank a Hun battles.h.i.+p, but I have no record of the sequel.

Even in war there are humorous incidents, and, indeed, there are many of them. One submarine captain of this flotilla attacked a German submarine on the surface and gave chase to her with the intention of torpedoing her. But the Hun had the greater speed; the British submarine had no gun, and could not get near enough to the receding foe to use a torpedo. So the captain had to content himself with signalling insulting messages to the Hun, hoping to taunt him into fighting; but the shocked Hun dived under the surface and disappeared in order to avoid the language.

On another occasion a submarine of this flotilla and a German submarine pa.s.sed very close to each other in such foul weather that nothing could be done in the way of fighting, so the two captains waved their hands cheerily at each other and went their respective ways. This is the only instance that I can recall of any Hun having displayed anything remotely resembling a sense of humour in the course of this war.

Our submarine commanders appear to have been adepts in the art of successfully bluffing the enemy when the occasion arose. For example, after one of our air raids on the German coast, a submarine of the Harwich Flotilla went to the rescue of one of our seaplanes that had fallen disabled to the water. While she was engaged in sinking the seaplane and taking off her pilot, a German aircraft came over very close. The captain of the submarine waved his cap to the enemy airmen, who concluded that the submarine was a German boat which had brought down an English seaplane and was capturing her pilot. As soon as the captain of the submarine had completed his task he dived quickly. The German must have then realised too late that he was dealing with an enemy, for as the submarine was moving away beneath the surface there was felt the shock caused by the bursting of bombs dropped by the Hun aircraft.

On another occasion, in June 1915, one of the Harwich submarines, on coming to the surface somewhere near the German coast, found that her engines were partly disabled. There was a German trawler in sight, and within range of the submarine's gun. The trawler would certainly have made a bolt for it, and in all probability would have got safely away, had she known that the submarine was incapable of giving chase to her.

But the captain of the submarine induced the German to surrender and compelled him to tow the crippled submarine across the North Sea back to Harwich, where the trawler and her crew of eight men were handed over to the authorities.

CHAPTER VIII

RECONNAISSANCE AND MINE-LAYING

CHAPTER VIII

RECONNAISSANCE AND MINE-LAYING

The eyes of the Fleet--The _Westphalen_ torpedoed--Mine-laying submarines--Destruction of U boats.

The princ.i.p.al duties of our submarines in the North Sea were reconnaissance, attack on the enemy's s.h.i.+ps, especially on his submarines, and mine-laying. The Germans were the first to introduce the system of laying mines with submarines, but we quickly followed their example and constructed submarines for this purpose. One of our submarines carries about twenty mines. The weapon of our submarines is, of course, the torpedo, of which an "E" boat carries ten. Our submarines, unlike the German, usually carry nothing heavier than the twelve-pound gun. But towards the end of the war we were constructing submarines with heavier armament. Our latest "M" boat is armed with a twelve-inch gun; she was despatched to the Mediterranean, but the armistice was signed, and prevented her from showing what she could do in the war.

For reconnaissance work in the North Sea our submarines were invaluable, for they could patrol close under the enemy sh.o.r.es, seeing much without being seen themselves, and could do what surface s.h.i.+ps could not do--remain there on the watch for several days at a time if necessary, for they were able to dive and disappear if detected and in serious danger. The submarines of the Harwich Flotilla had often to travel under our own and the enemy minefields. They were ever patrolling our own great minefields on the east side of the North Sea, and sending home wireless information as to the movements of the enemy light forces, and reporting any mine-sweeping operations on the part of the enemy that seemed to indicate preparations for a sortie. It was the ambition of every British submarine captain, by giving timely notice, to bring about what the Huns used to term "The Day," that is, an action between their somewhat over-shy capital s.h.i.+ps and our own.

It was regarded as being of so great importance to obtain the earliest possible warning of Hun activities in the North Sea that an order was issued by the Admiralty to the effect that a submarine on lookout patrol had for her primary duty to come to the surface and send home, by wireless, information as to _outward_-bound enemy surface craft; while her secondary duty was to attack. In the case of _homeward_-bound enemy surface craft, the primary duty was to attack. If there should be any doubt as to the destination of an enemy surface craft, it was the duty of the submarine first to report by wireless and then to attack.

I have already shown how, during the critical eight days that saw our First Expeditionary Force cross the Channel to France, the Harwich submarines kept a sleepless watch on the German coast, to attack the enemy s.h.i.+ps should they come out to interfere with the transport of our troops. I have also explained that these submarines had a good deal to do with the preparation for the action in Heligoland Bight.

It was the E23, too, of this flotilla that, while patrolling, sighted the German High Sea Fleet on August 19, 1916. She first wirelessed home the news that the Germans had come out, and then delivered a bold attack. She torpedoed the battles.h.i.+p _Westphalen_ on the port side.

The result of the explosion gave the battles.h.i.+p a big list, but for a while she still went on with the battle fleet. As the list increased, she at last left the line and turned for home, escorted by destroyers.

Thereupon the E23 set out to intercept her, pa.s.sed through the screen of enemy destroyers that were zigzagging round the _Westphalen_, and torpedoed her on the starboard side. The battles.h.i.+p contrived to get away, but in so damaged a condition that she must have been out of the war for a considerable time.

The strategical position occupied by the Harwich Flotilla also imposed upon it another duty of great responsibility. The submarines had to be ever ready to go south at a moment's notice to cover the eastern approach to the English Channel against the enemy capital s.h.i.+ps, should these attempt to break through. Had the Germans made the attempt in earnest, there is no doubt that they would have had to pay a very heavy toll.