Loss Of The Steamship 'Titanic' Part 1

Loss of the Steams.h.i.+p 't.i.tanic'

by British Government.

INTRODUCTION.

On April 23, 1912, the Lord Chancellor appointed a wreck commissioner under the merchant s.h.i.+pping acts, and on April 26 the home secretary nominated five a.s.sessors. On April 30 the board of trade requested that a formal investigation of the circ.u.mstances attending the loss of the steams.h.i.+p _t.i.tanic_ should be held, and the court accordingly commenced to sit on May 2. Since that date there have been 37 public sittings, at which 97 witnesses have been examined, while a large number of doc.u.ments, charts, and plans have been produced. The 26 questions formulated by the board of trade, which are set out in detail below, appear to cover all the circ.u.mstances to be inquired into. Briefly summarized, they deal with the history of the s.h.i.+p, her design, construction, size, speed, general equipment, life-saving apparatus, wireless installation, her orders and course, her pa.s.sengers, her crew, their training, organization and discipline; they request an account of the casualty, its cause and effect, and of the means taken for saving those on board the s.h.i.+p; and they call for a report on the efficiency of the rules and regulations made by the board of trade under the merchant s.h.i.+pping acts and on their administration, and, finally, for any recommendations to obviate similar disasters which may appear to the court to be desirable. The 26 questions, as subsequently amended, are here attached:

1. When the _t.i.tanic_ left Queenstown on or about April 11 last--

(_a_) What was the total number of persons employed in any capacity on board her, and what were their respective ratings?

(_b_) What was the total number of her pa.s.sengers, distinguis.h.i.+ng s.e.xes and cla.s.ses, and discriminating between adults and children?

2. Before leaving Queenstown on or about April 11 last did the _t.i.tanic_ comply with the requirements of the merchant s.h.i.+pping acts, 1894-1906, and the rules and regulations made thereunder with regard to the safety and otherwise of "pa.s.senger steamers" and "emigrant s.h.i.+ps"?

3. In the actual design and construction of the _t.i.tanic_ what special provisions were made for the safety of the vessel and the lives of those on board in the event of collisions and other casualties?

4. Was the _t.i.tanic_ sufficiently and efficiently officered and manned?

Were the watches of the officers and crew usual and proper? Was the _t.i.tanic_ supplied with proper charts?

5. What was the number of the boats of any kind on board the _t.i.tanic_?

Were the arrangements for manning and launching the boats on board the _t.i.tanic_ in case of emergency proper and sufficient? Had a boat drill been held on board; and, if so, when? What was the carrying capacity of the respective boats?

6. What installations for receiving and transmitting messages by wireless telegraphy were on board the _t.i.tanic_? How many operators were employed on working such installations? Were the installations in good and effective working order, and were the number of operators sufficient to enable messages to be received and transmitted continuously by day and night?

7. At or prior to the sailing of the _t.i.tanic_ what, if any, instructions as to navigation were given to the master or known by him to apply to her voyage? Were such instructions, if any, safe, proper, and adequate, having regard to the time of year and dangers likely to be encountered during the voyage?

8. What was in fact the track taken by the _t.i.tanic_ in crossing the Atlantic Ocean? Did she keep to the track usually followed by liners on voyages from the United Kingdom to New York in the month of April? Are such tracks safe tracks at that time of the year? Had the master any, and, if so, what, discretion as regards the track to be taken?

9. After leaving Queenstown on or about April 11 last did information reach the _t.i.tanic_ by wireless messages or otherwise by signals of the existence of ice in certain lat.i.tudes? If so, what were such messages or signals and when were they received, and in what position or positions was the ice reported to be, and was the ice reported in or near the track actually being followed by the _t.i.tanic_? Was her course altered in consequence of receiving such information; and, if so, in what way?

What replies to such messages or signals did the _t.i.tanic_ send, and at what times?

10. If at the times referred to in the last preceding question or later the _t.i.tanic_ was warned of or had reason to suppose she would encounter ice, at what time might she have reasonably expected to encounter it?

Was a good and proper lookout for ice kept on board? Were any, and, if so, what, directions given to vary the speed; if so, were they carried out?

11. Were binoculars provided for and used by the lookout men? Is the use of them necessary or usual in such circ.u.mstances? Had the _t.i.tanic_ the means of throwing searchlights around her? If so, did she make use of them to discover ice? Should searchlights have been provided and used?

12. What other precautions were taken by the _t.i.tanic_ in antic.i.p.ation of meeting ice? Were they such as are usually adopted by vessels being navigated in waters where ice may be expected to be encountered?

13. Was ice seen and reported by anybody on board the _t.i.tanic_ before the casualty occurred? If so, what measures were taken by the officer on watch to avoid it? Were they proper measures and were they promptly taken?

14. What was the speed of the _t.i.tanic_ shortly before and at the moment of the casualty? Was such speed excessive under the circ.u.mstances?

15. What was the nature of the casualty which happened to the _t.i.tanic_ at or about 11.45 p. m. on April 14 last? In what lat.i.tude and longitude did the casualty occur?

16. What steps were taken immediately on the happening of the casualty?

How long after the casualty was its seriousness realized by those in charge of the vessel? What steps were then taken? What endeavors were made to save the lives of those on board and to prevent the vessel from sinking?

17. Was proper discipline maintained on board after the casualty occurred?

18. What messages for a.s.sistance were sent by the _t.i.tanic_ after the casualty, and at what times, respectively? What messages were received by her in response, and at what times, respectively? By what vessels were the messages that were sent by the _t.i.tanic_ received, and from what vessels did she receive answers? What vessels other than the _t.i.tanic_ sent or received messages at or shortly after the casualty in connection with such casualty? What were the vessels that sent or received such messages? Were any vessels prevented from going to the a.s.sistance of the _t.i.tanic_ or her boats owing to messages received from the _t.i.tanic_ or owing to any erroneous messages being sent or received?

In regard to such erroneous messages, from what vessels were they sent and by what vessels were they received, and at what times, respectively?

19. Was the apparatus for lowering the boats on the _t.i.tanic_ at the time of the casualty in good working order? Were the boats swung out, filled, lowered, or otherwise put into the water and got away under proper superintendence? Were the boats sent away in seaworthy condition and properly manned, equipped, and provisioned? Did the boats, whether those under davits or otherwise, prove to be efficient and serviceable for the purpose of saving life?

20. What was the number of (_a_) pa.s.sengers, (_b_) crew taken away in each boat on leaving the vessel? How was this number made up, having regard to (1) s.e.x, (2) cla.s.s, (3) rating? How many were children and how many adults? Did each boat carry its full load; and if not, why not?

21. How many persons on board the _t.i.tanic_ at the time of the casualty were ultimately rescued and by what means? How many lost their lives prior to the arrival of the steams.h.i.+p _Carpathia_ in New York? What was the number of pa.s.sengers distinguis.h.i.+ng between men and women and adults and children of the first, second, and third cla.s.ses, respectively, who were saved? What was the number of the crew, discriminating their ratings and s.e.x, that were saved? What is the proportion which each of these numbers bears to the corresponding total number on board immediately before the casualty? What reason is there for the disproportion, if any?

22. What happened to the vessel from the happening of the casualty until she foundered?

23. Where and at what time did the _t.i.tanic_ founder?

24. What was the cause of the loss of the _t.i.tanic_, and of the loss of life which thereby ensued or occurred? What vessels had the opportunity of rendering a.s.sistance to the _t.i.tanic_; and if any, how was it that a.s.sistance did not reach the _t.i.tanic_ before the steams.h.i.+p _Carpathia_ arrived? Was the construction of the vessel and its arrangements such as to make it difficult for any cla.s.s of pa.s.sengers or any portion of the crew to take full advantage of any of the existing provisions for safety?

25. When the _t.i.tanic_ left Queenstown, on or about April 11 last, was she properly constructed and adequately equipped as a pa.s.senger steamer and emigrant s.h.i.+p for the Atlantic service?

26. The court is invited to report upon the rules and regulations made under the merchant s.h.i.+pping acts, 1894-1906, and the administration of those acts and of such rules and regulations, so far as the consideration thereof is material to this casualty, and to make any recommendations or suggestions that it may think fit, having regard to the circ.u.mstances of the casualty with a view to promoting the safety of vessels and persons at sea.

In framing this report it has seemed best to divide it into sections in the following manner:

First. A description of the s.h.i.+p as she left Southampton on April 10 and of her equipment, crew, and pa.s.sengers.

Second. An account of her journey across the Atlantic, of the messages she received and of the disaster.

Third. A description of the damage to the s.h.i.+p and of its gradual and final effect with observations thereon.

Fourth. An account of the saving and rescue of those who survived.

Fifth. The circ.u.mstances in connection with the steams.h.i.+p _Californian_.

Sixth. An account of the board of trade's administration.

Seventh. The finding of the court on the questions submitted; and

Eighth. The recommendations held to be desirable.

I.--DESCRIPTION OF THE s.h.i.+P.

THE WHITE STAR LINE.

The _t.i.tanic_ was one of a fleet of 13 s.h.i.+ps employed in the transport of pa.s.sengers, mails, and cargo between Great Britain and the United States, the usual ports of call for the service in which she was engaged being Southampton, Cherbourg, Plymouth, Queenstown, and New York.