Loss Of The Steamship 'Titanic' Part 10

It is perhaps worth recording that there was an inspection of the boats themselves at Southampton by Mr. Clarke, the emigration officer, and that, as a result, Mr. Clarke gave his certificate that the boats were satisfactory. For the purpose of this inspection two of the boats were lowered to the water and crews exercised in them.

The collision took place at 11.40 p. m. (s.h.i.+p's time). About midnight it was realized that the vessel could not live, and at about 12.05 the order was given to uncover the 14 boats under davits. The work began on both sides of the s.h.i.+p under the superintendence of five officers. It did not proceed quickly at first; the crew arrived on the boat deck only gradually, and there was an average of not more than three deck hands to each boat. At 12.20 the order was given to swing out the boats, and this work was at once commenced. There were a few pa.s.sengers on the deck at this time. Mr. Lightoller, who was one of the officers directing operations, says that the noise of the steam blowing off was so great that his voice could not be heard, and that he had to give directions with his hands.

Before this work had been begun, the stewards were rousing the pa.s.sengers in their different quarters, helping them to put on life-belts and getting them up to the boat deck. At about 12.30 the order was given to place women and children in the boats. This was proceeded with at once and at about 12.45 Mr. Murdoch gave the order to lower No. 7 boat (on the starboard side) to the water. The work of uncovering, filling, and lowering the boats was done under the following supervision: Mr. Lowe, the fifth officer, saw to Nos. 1, 3, 5, and 7; Mr. Murdoch (lost) saw also to 1 and 7 and to A and C. Mr. Moody (lost) looked after Nos. 9, 11, 13, and 15. Mr. Murdoch also saw to 9 and 11.

Mr. Lightoller saw to Nos. 4, 6, 8, B, and D. Mr. Wilde (lost) also saw to 8 and D. Mr. Lightoller and Mr. Moody saw to 10 and 16 and Mr. Lowe to 12 and 14. Mr. Wilde also a.s.sisted at No. 14, Mr. Boxall helping generally.

The evidence satisfies me that the officers did their work very well and without any thought of themselves. Capt. Smith, the master, Mr. Wilde, the chief officer, Mr. Murdoch, the first officer, and Mr. Moody, the sixth officer, all went down with the s.h.i.+p while performing their duties. The others, with the exception of Mr. Lightoller, took charge of boats and thus were saved. Mr. Lightoller was swept off the deck as the vessel went down and was subsequently picked up.

So far as can be ascertained the boats left the s.h.i.+p at the following times, but I think it is necessary to say that these, and, indeed, all the times subsequent to the collision which are mentioned by the witnesses, are unreliable.

--------------------------------------- No. Starboard No. Port side. Side. ------------------- ------------------ _a. m._ _a. m._ 7 12.46 6 12.55 5 12.55 8 1.10 3 1.0 10 1.20 1 1.10 12 1.25 9 1.20 14 1.30 11 1.25 16 1.35 13 1.35 2 1.45 15 1.35 4 1.56 C 1.40 D 2.05 [1]A [3]B ---------------------------------------

As regards the collapsible boats, C and D were properly lowered; as to A and B, which were on the roof of the officers' house, they were left until the last. There was difficulty in getting these boats down to the deck, and the s.h.i.+p had at this time a list. Very few of the deck hands were left in the s.h.i.+p, as they had nearly all gone to man the lifeboats, and the stewards and firemen were unaccustomed to work the collapsible boats. Work appears to have been going on in connection with these two boats at the time that the s.h.i.+p sank. The boats seem to have floated from the deck and to have served in the water as rafts.

The following table shows the numbers of the male crew, male pa.s.sengers, and women and children who, according to the evidence, left the s.h.i.+p in each boat. In three or four instances the numbers of women and children are only arrived at by subtracting the numbers of crew and male pa.s.sengers from the total said to be in the boat (these are in italics). In each case the lowest figures given are taken:

Key A: Starboard side boat. No.

B: Men of crew.

C: Men pa.s.sengers.

D: Women and children.

E: Total.

F: Port side boat No.

G: Men of crew.

H: Men pa.s.sengers.

I: Women and children.

J: Total

+------+----+----+------+----++------+---+----+------+----+ A B C D E F G H I J +------+----+----+------+----++------+---+----+------+----+ 7 3 4 _20_ 27 6 2 2 _24_ 28 5 5 6 30 41 8 4 35 39 3 15 10 _25_ 50 10 5 50 55 1 7 3 2 12 2 4 1 21 26 9 8 6 42 56 12 2 40 42 11 9 1 60 70 14 8 53 63 13 5 59 64 16 6 50 56 15 13 4 _53_ 70 4 4 36 40 C 5 2 64 71 D 2 2 40 44 A[1] B[1] +------+----+----+------+----++------+---+----+------+----+ Total 70 36 355 461 37 7 349 393 +------+----+----+------+----++------+---+----+------+----+

General total: Men of crew 107 Men pa.s.sengers 43 Women and children 704

This shows in all 107 men of the crew, 43 male pa.s.sengers, and 704 women and children, or a total of 854 in 18 boats. In addition, about 60 persons, two of whom were women, were said to have been transferred, subsequently, from A and B collapsible boats to other boats, or rescued from the water, making a total of 914 who escaped with their lives. It is obvious that these figures are quite unreliable, for only 712 were in fact saved by the _Carpathia_, the steamer which came to the rescue at about 4 a. m., and all the boats were accounted for. Another remarkable discrepancy is that, of the 712 saved, 189 were in fact men of the crew, 129 were male pa.s.sengers, and 394 were women and children. In other words, the real proportion of women to men saved was much less than the proportion appearing in the evidence from the boats. Allowing for those subsequently picked up, of the 712 persons saved only 652 could have left the _t.i.tanic_ in boats, or an average of about 36 per boat. There was a tendency in the evidence to exaggerate the numbers in each boat, to exaggerate the proportion of women to men, and to diminish the number of crew. I do not attribute this to any wish on the part of the witnesses to mislead the court, but to a natural desire to make the best case for themselves and their s.h.i.+p. The seamen who gave evidence were too frequently encouraged when under examination in the witness box to understate the number of crew in the boats. The number of crew actually saved was 189, giving an average of 10 per boat, and if from this figure the 58 men of the 60 persons above mentioned be deducted the average number of crew leaving the s.h.i.+p in the boats must still have been at least 7. The probability, however, is that many of the 60 picked up were pa.s.sengers.

The discipline both among pa.s.sengers and crew during the lowering of the boats was good, but the organization should have been better, and if it had been it is possible that more lives would have been saved.

The real difficulty in dealing with the question of the boats is to find the explanation of so many of them leaving the s.h.i.+p with comparatively few persons in them. No. 1 certainly left with only 12; this was an emergency boat with a carrying capacity of 40. No. 7 left with only 27, and No. 6 with only 28; these were lifeboats with a carrying capacity of 65 each; and several of the others, according to the evidence, and certainly according to the truth, must have left only partly filled.

Many explanations are forthcoming, one being that the pa.s.sengers were unwilling to leave the s.h.i.+p. When the earlier boats left, and before the _t.i.tanic_ had begun materially to settle down, there was a drop of 65 feet from the boat deck to the water, and the women feared to get into the boats. Many people thought that the risk in the s.h.i.+p was less than the risk in the boats. This explanation is supported by the evidence of Capt. Rostron, of the _Carpathia_. He says that after those who were saved got on board his s.h.i.+p he was told by some of them that when the boats first left the _t.i.tanic_ the people "really would not be put in the boats; they did not want to go in." There was a large body of evidence from the _t.i.tanic_ to the same effect, and I have no doubt that many people, particularly women, refused to leave the deck for the boats. At one time the master appears to have had the intention of putting the people into the boats from the gangway doors in the side of the s.h.i.+p. This was possibly with a view to allay the fears of the pa.s.sengers, for from these doors the water could be reached by means of ladders, and the lowering of some of the earlier boats when only partly filled may be accounted for in this way. There is no doubt that the master did order some of the partly filled boats to row to a position under one of the doors with the object of taking in pa.s.sengers at that point. It appears, however, that these doors were never opened. Another explanation is that some women refused to leave their husbands. It is said further that the officers engaged in putting the people into the boats feared that the boats might buckle if they were filled; but this proved to be an unfounded apprehension, for one or more boats were completely filled and then successfully lowered to the water.

At 12.35 the message from the _Carpathia_ was received announcing that she was making for the _t.i.tanic_. This probably became known and may have tended to make the pa.s.sengers still more unwilling to leave the s.h.i.+p, and the lights of a s.h.i.+p (the _Californian_) which were seen by many people may have encouraged the pa.s.sengers to hope that a.s.sistance was at hand. These explanations are perhaps sufficient to account for so many of the lifeboats leaving without a full boat load; but I think, nevertheless, that if the boats had been kept a little longer before being lowered, or if the after gangway doors had been opened, more pa.s.sengers might have been induced to enter the boats. And if women could not be induced to enter the boats, the boats ought then to have been filled up with men. It is difficult to account for so many of the lifeboats being sent from the sinking s.h.i.+p, in a smooth sea, far from full. These boats left behind them many hundreds of lives to perish. I do not, however, desire these observations to be read as casting any reflection on the officers of the s.h.i.+p or on the crew who were working on the boat deck. They all worked admirably, but I think that if there had been better organization the results would have been more satisfactory.

I heard much evidence as to the conduct of the boats after the _t.i.tanic_ sank and when there must have been many struggling people in the water, and I regret to say that in my opinion some, at all events, of the boats failed to attempt to save lives when they might have done so, and might have done so successfully. This was particularly the case with boat No.

1. It may reasonably have been thought that the risk of making the attempt was too great; but it seems to me that if the attempt had been made by some of these boats it might have been the means of saving a few more lives. Subject to these few adverse comments, I have nothing but praise for both pa.s.sengers and crew. All the witnesses speak well of their behavior. It is to be remembered that the night was dark, the noise of the escaping steam was terrifying, the peril, though perhaps not generally recognized, was imminent and great, and many pa.s.sengers who were unable to speak or to understand English were being collected together and hurried into the boats.

CONDUCT OF SIR C. DUFF GORDON AND MR. ISMAY.

An attack was made in the course of the inquiry on the moral conduct of two of the pa.s.sengers, namely, Sir Cosmo Duff Gordon and Mr. Bruce Ismay. It is no part of the business of the court to inquire into such matters, and I should pa.s.s them by in silence if I did not fear that my silence might be misunderstood. The very gross charge against Sir Cosmo Duff Gordon that, having got into No. 1 boat, he bribed the men in it to row away from drowning people is unfounded. I have said that the members of the crew in that boat might have made some attempt to save the people in the water, and that such an attempt would probably have been successful; but I do not believe that the men were deterred from making the attempt by any act of Sir Cosmo Duff Gordon's. At the same time I think that if he had encouraged the men to return to the position where the _t.i.tanic_ had foundered they would probably have made an effort to do so and could have saved some lives.

As to the attack on Mr. Bruce Ismay, it resolved itself into the suggestion that, occupying the position of managing director of the steams.h.i.+p company, some moral duty was imposed upon him to wait on board until the vessel foundered. I do not agree. Mr. Ismay, after rendering a.s.sistance to many pa.s.sengers, found C collapsible, the last boat on the starboard side, actually being lowered. No other people were there at the time. There was room for him and he jumped in. Had he not jumped in he would merely have added one more life, namely, his own, to the number of those lost.

THE THIRD-CLa.s.s Pa.s.sENGERS.

It had been suggested before the inquiry that the third-cla.s.s pa.s.sengers had been unfairly treated; that their access to the boat deck had been impeded, and that when at last they reached that deck the first and second cla.s.s pa.s.sengers were given precedence in getting places in the boats. There appears to have been no truth in these suggestions. It is no doubt true that the proportion of third-cla.s.s pa.s.sengers saved falls far short of the proportion of the first and second cla.s.s, but this is accounted for by the greater reluctance of the third-cla.s.s pa.s.sengers to leave the s.h.i.+p, by their unwillingness to part with their baggage, by the difficulty of getting them up from their quarters, which were at the extreme ends of the s.h.i.+p, and by other similar causes. The interests of the relatives of some of the third-cla.s.s pa.s.sengers who had perished were in the hands of Mr. Harbinson, who attended the inquiry on their behalf. He said at the end of his address to the court:

I wish to say distinctly that no evidence has been given in the course of this case which would substantiate a charge that any attempt was made to keep back the third-cla.s.s pa.s.sengers. * * * I desire further to say that there is no evidence that when they did reach the boat deck there was any discrimination practiced either by the officers or the sailors in putting them into the boats.

I am satisfied that the explanation of the excessive proportion of third-cla.s.s pa.s.sengers lost is not to be found in the suggestion that the third-cla.s.s pa.s.sengers were in any way unfairly treated. They were not unfairly treated.

MEANS TAKEN TO PROCURE a.s.sISTANCE.

As soon as the dangerous condition of the s.h.i.+p was realized, messages were sent by the master's orders to all steamers within reach. At 12.15 a. m. the distress signal CQD was sent. This was heard by several steams.h.i.+ps and by Cape Race. By 12.25 Mr. Boxall, the fourth officer, had worked out the correct position of the _t.i.tanic_, and then another message was sent: "Come at once, we have struck a berg." This was heard by the Cunard steamer _Carpathia_, which was at this time bound from New York to Liverpool and 58 miles away. The _Carpathia_ answered, saying that she was coming to the a.s.sistance of the _t.i.tanic_. This was reported to Capt. Smith on the boat deck. At 12.26 a message was sent out, "Sinking; can not hear for noise of steam." Many other messages were also sent, but as they were only heard by steamers which were too far away to render help, it is not necessary to refer to them. At 1.45 a message was heard by the _Carpathia_, "Engine-room full up to boilers."

The last message sent out was "CQ" which was faintly heard by the steamer _Virginian_. This message was sent at 2.17. It thus appears that the Marconi apparatus was at work until within a few minutes of the foundering of the _t.i.tanic_.

Meanwhile Mr. Boxall was sending up distress signals from the deck.

These signals (rockets) were sent off at intervals from a socket by No.

1 emergency boat on the boat deck. They were the ordinary distress signals, exploding in the air and throwing off white stars. The firing of these signals began about the time that No. 7 boat was lowered (12.45 a. m.), and it continued until Mr. Boxall left the s.h.i.+p at about 1.45.

Mr. Boxall was also using a Morse light from the bridge in the direction of a s.h.i.+p whose lights he saw about half a point on the port bow of the _t.i.tanic_ at a distance, as he thought, of about 5 or 6 miles. He got no answer. In all, Mr. Boxall fired about eight rockets. There appears to be no doubt that the vessel whose lights he saw was the _Californian_.

The evidence from the _Californian_ speaks of eight rockets having been seen between 12.30 and 1.40. The _Californian_ heard none of the _t.i.tanic's_ messages; she had only one Marconi operator on board and he was asleep.

THE RESCUE BY THE STEAMs.h.i.+P "CARPATHIA."

On the 15th of April the steams.h.i.+p _Carpathia_, 13,600 tons gross, of the Cunard Line, Mr. Arthur Henry Rostron, master, was on her pa.s.sage to Liverpool from New York. She carried some 740 pa.s.sengers and 325 crew.

On receipt of the _t.i.tanic_'s first distress message the captain immediately ordered the s.h.i.+p to be turned around and driven at her highest speed (17-1/2 knots) in the direction of the _t.i.tanic_. He also informed the _t.i.tanic_ by wireless that he was coming to her a.s.sistance, and he subsequently received various messages from her. At about 2.40 a.

m. he saw a green flare which, as the evidence shows, was being sent up by Mr. Boxall in No. 2 boat. From this time until 4 a. m. Capt. Rostron was altering his course continually in order to avoid icebergs. He fired rockets in answer to the signals he saw from Boxall's boat. At 4 o'clock he considered he was practically up to the position given and he stopped his s.h.i.+p at 4.05. He sighted the first boat (No. 2) and picked her up at 4.10. There was then a large number of icebergs around him, and it was just daylight. Eventually he picked up in all 13 lifeboats, two emergency boats, and two collapsible boats, all of which were taken on board the _Carpathia_, the other boats being abandoned as damaged or useless. From these boats he took on board 712 persons, one of whom died shortly afterwards. The boats were scattered over an area of 4 or 5 miles, and it was 8 a. m. before they had all been picked up. He saw very little wreckage when he got near to the scene of the disaster, only a few deck chairs, cork life belts, etc., and only one body. The position was then 41 46' N., 50 14' W.

The _Carpathia_ subsequently returned to New York with the pa.s.sengers and crew she had rescued.

The court desires to record its great admiration of Capt. Rostron's conduct. He did the very best that could be done.

NUMBERS SAVED.

The following were the numbers saved:

First cla.s.s: Adult males 57 out of 175, or 32.57 per cent.

Adult females 140 out of 144, or 97.22 per cent.

Male children (all saved) 5 Female children (all saved) 1 ----- 203 out of 325, or 62.46 per cent.

Second cla.s.s: Adult males 14 out of 168, or 8.33 per cent.

Adult females 80 out of 93, or 86.02 per cent.

Male children (all saved) 11 Female children (all saved) 13 ----- 118 out of 285, or 41.40 per cent.

Third cla.s.s: Adult males 75 out of 462, or 16.23 per cent.

Adult females 76 out of 165, or 46.06 per cent.