Loss Of The Steamship 'Titanic' Part 8

III.--DESCRIPTION OF THE DAMAGE TO THE s.h.i.+P AND OF ITS GRADUAL AND FINAL EFFECT, WITH OBSERVATIONS THEREON.

The damage done to the s.h.i.+p was as follows:

EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE.

The collision with the iceberg, which took place at 11.40 p. m., caused damage to the bottom of the starboard side of the vessel at about 10 feet above the level of the keel, but there was no damage above this height. There was damage in--

The forepeak, No. 1 hold, No. 2 hold, No. 3 hold, No. 6 boiler room, No.

5 boiler room.

The damage extended over a length of about 300 feet.

TIME IN WHICH THE DAMAGE WAS DONE.

As the s.h.i.+p was moving at over 20 knots, she would have pa.s.sed through 300 feet in less than 10 seconds, so that the damage was done in about this time.

THE FLOODING IN FIRST TEN MINUTES.

At first it is desirable to consider what happened in the first 10 minutes.

The forepeak was not flooded above the orlop deck--i.e., the peak tank top, from the hole in the bottom of the peak tank.

In No. 1 hold there was 7 feet of water.

In No. 2 hold five minutes after the collision water was seen rus.h.i.+ng in at the bottom of the firemen's pa.s.sage on the starboard side, so that the s.h.i.+p's side was damaged abaft of bulkhead B sufficiently to open the side of the firemen's pa.s.sage, which was 3-1/2 feet from the outer skin of the s.h.i.+p, thereby flooding both the hold and the pa.s.sage.

In No. 3 hold the mail room was filled soon after the collision. The floor of the mail room is 24 feet above the keel.

In No. 6 boiler room, when the collision took place, water at once poured in at about 2 feet above the stokehold plates, on the starboard side, at the after end of the boiler room. Some of the firemen immediately went through the water-tight door opening to No. 5 boiler room because the water was flooding the place. The water-tight doors in the engine rooms were shut from the bridge almost immediately after the collision. Ten minutes later it was found that there was water to the height of 8 feet above the double bottom in No. 6 boiler room.

No. 5 boiler room was damaged at the s.h.i.+p's side in the starboard forward bunker at a distance of 2 feet above the stokehold plates, at 2 feet from the water-tight bulkhead between Nos. 5 and 6 boiler rooms.

Water poured in at that place as it would from an ordinary fire hose. At the time of the collision this bunker had no coal in it. The bunker door was closed when water was seen to be entering the s.h.i.+p.

In No. 4 boiler room there was no indication of any damage at the early stages of the sinking.

GRADUAL EFFECT OF THE DAMAGE.

It will thus be seen that all the six compartments forward of No. 4 boiler room were open to the sea by damage which existed at about 10 feet above the keel. At 10 minutes after the collision the water seems to have risen to about 14 feet above the keel in all these compartments except No. 5 boiler room. After the first ten minutes the water rose steadily in all these six compartments. The forepeak above the peak tank was not filled until an hour after the collision, when the vessel's bow was submerged to above C deck. The water then flowed in from the top through the deck scuttle forward of the collision bulkhead. It was by this scuttle that access was obtained to all the decks below C down to the peak tank top on the orlop deck.

At 12 o'clock water was coming up in No. 1 hatch. It was getting into the firemen's quarters and driving the firemen out. It was rus.h.i.+ng round No. 1 hatch on G deck and coming mostly from the starboard side, so that in 20 minutes the water had risen above G deck in No. 1 hold.

In No. 2 hold about 40 minutes after the collision the water was coming in to the seamen's quarters on E deck through a burst fore and aft wooden bulkhead of a third-cla.s.s cabin opposite the seamen's wash place.

Thus, the water had risen in No. 2 hold to about 3 feet above E deck in 40 minutes.

In No. 3 hold the mail room was afloat about 20 minutes after the collision. The bottom of the mail room which is on the orlop deck, is 24 feet above the keel.

The water-tight doors on F deck at the fore and after ends of No. 3 compartment were not closed then.

The mail room was filling and water was within 2 feet of G deck, rising fast when the order was given to clear the boats.

There was then no water on F deck.

There is a stairway on the port side on G deck which leads down to the first-cla.s.s baggage room on the orlop deck immediately below. There was water in this baggage room 25 minutes after the collision. Half an hour after the collision water was up to G deck in the mail room.

Thus the water had risen in this compartment to within 2 feet of G deck in 20 minutes, and above G deck in 25 to 30 minutes.

No. 6 boiler room was abandoned by the men almost immediately after the collision. Ten minutes later the water had risen to 8 feet above the top of the double bottom, and probably reached the top of the bulkhead at the after end of the compartment, at the level of E deck, in about one hour after the collision.

In No. 5 boiler room there was no water above the stokehold plates, until a rush of water came through the pa.s.s between the boilers from the forward end, and drove the leading stoker out.

It has already been shown in the description of what happened in the first 10 minutes, that water was coming into No. 5 boiler room in the forward starboard bunker at 2 feet above the plates in a stream about the size of a deck hose. The door in this bunker had been dropped probably when water was first discovered, which was a few minutes after the collision. This would cause the water to be retained in the bunker until it rose high enough to burst the door which was weaker than the bunker bulkhead. This happened about an hour after the collision.

_No. 4 boiler room._--One hour and 40 minutes after the collision water was coming in forward, in No. 4 boiler room, from underneath the floor in the forward part, in small quant.i.ties. The men remained in that stokehold till ordered on deck.

_Nos. 3, 2, and 1 boiler rooms._--When the men left No. 4 some of them went through Nos. 3, 2, and 1 boiler rooms into the reciprocating engine room, and from there on deck. There was no water in the boiler rooms abaft No. 4 one hour 40 minutes after the collision (1.20 a. m.), and there was then none in the reciprocating and turbine engine rooms.

_Electrical engine room and tunnels._--There was no damage to these compartments.

From the foregoing it follows that there was no damage abaft No. 4 boiler room.

All the water-tight doors aft of the main engine room were opened after the collision.

Half an hour after the collision the water-tight doors from the engine room to the stokehold were opened as far forward as they could be to No.

4 boiler room.

FINAL EFFECT OF THE DAMAGE.

The later stages of the sinking can not be stated with any precision, owing to a confusion of the times which was natural under the circ.u.mstances.

The forecastle deck was not under water at 1.35 a. m. Distress signals were fired until two hours after the collision (1.45 a. m.). At this time the fore deck was under water. The forecastle head was not then submerged though it was getting close down to the water, about half an hour before she disappeared (1.50 a. m.).

When the last boat, lowered from davits (D), left the s.h.i.+p, A deck was under water, and water came up the stairway under the boat deck almost immediately afterwards. After this the other port collapsible (B), which had been stowed on the officers' house, was uncovered, the las.h.i.+ngs cut adrift, and she was swung round over the edge of the coamings of the deckhouse on to the boat deck.

Very shortly afterwards the vessel, according to Mr. Lightoller's account, seemed to take a dive, and he just walked into the water. When he came to the surface all the funnels were above the water.

Her stern was gradually rising out of the water, and the propellers were clear of the water. The s.h.i.+p did not break in two, and she did, eventually, attain the perpendicular, when the second funnel from aft about reached the water. There were no lights burning then, though they kept alight practically until the last.

Before reaching the perpendicular, when at an angle of 50 or 60, there was a rumbling sound which may be attributed to the boilers leaving their beds and cras.h.i.+ng down on to or through the bulkheads. She became more perpendicular and finally absolutely perpendicular, when she went slowly down.