The Life of Nelson Volume II Part 17

If the two Fleets are both willing to fight, but little manoeuvring is necessary; the less the better;--a day is soon lost in that business: therefore I will only suppose that the Enemy's Fleet being to leeward, standing close upon a wind on the starboard tack, and that I am nearly ahead of them, standing on the larboard tack, of course I should weather them. The weather must be supposed to be moderate; for if it be a gale of wind, the manoeuvring of both Fleets is but of little avail, and probably no decisive Action would take place with the whole Fleet. Two modes present themselves: one to stand on, just out of gunshot, until the Van-s.h.i.+p of my Line would be about the centre s.h.i.+p of the Enemy, then make the signal to wear together, then bear up, engage with all our force the six or five Van-s.h.i.+ps of the Enemy, pa.s.sing, certainly, if opportunity offered, through their Line. This would prevent their bearing up, and the Action, from the known bravery and conduct of the Admirals and Captains, would certainly be decisive: the second or third Rear-s.h.i.+ps of the Enemy would act as they please, and our s.h.i.+ps would give a good account of them, should they persist in mixing with our s.h.i.+ps. The other mode would be, to stand under an easy but commanding sail, directly for their headmost s.h.i.+p, so as to prevent the Enemy from knowing whether I should pa.s.s to leeward or windward of him. In that situation, I would make the signal to engage the Enemy to leeward, and to cut through their Fleet about the sixth s.h.i.+p from the Van, pa.s.sing very close; they being on a wind, and you going large, could cut their Line when you please. The Van-s.h.i.+ps of the Enemy would, by the time our Rear came abreast of the Van-s.h.i.+p, be severely cut up, and our Van could not expect to escape damage. I would then have our _Rear_ s.h.i.+p, and every s.h.i.+p in succession, wear, continue the Action with either the Van-s.h.i.+p, or second s.h.i.+p, as it might appear most eligible from her crippled state; and this mode pursued, I see nothing to prevent the capture of the five or six s.h.i.+ps of the Enemy's Van. The two or three s.h.i.+ps of the Enemy's Rear[122] must either bear up, or wear; and, in either case, although they would be in a better plight probably than our two Van-s.h.i.+ps (now in the Rear) yet they would be separated, and at a distance to leeward, so as to give our s.h.i.+ps time to refit; and by that time, I believe, the Battle would, from the judgment of the Admiral and Captains, be over with the rest of them. Signals from these moments are useless, when every man is disposed to do his duty. The great object is for us to support each other, and to keep close to the Enemy, and to leeward of him.

If the Enemy are running away, then the only signals necessary will be, to engage the Enemy as arriving up with them; and the other s.h.i.+ps to pa.s.s on for the second, third, &c., giving, if possible, a close fire into the Enemy in pa.s.sing, taking care to give our s.h.i.+ps engaged notice of your intention.

MEMORANDUM.

(Secret)

Victory, off CADIZ, 9th October, 1805.

[Sidenote: General Considerations.] Thinking it almost impossible to bring a Fleet of forty Sail of the Line into a Line of Battle in variable winds, thick weather, and other circ.u.mstances which must occur, without such a loss of time that the opportunity would probably be lost of bringing the Enemy to Battle in such a manner as to make the business decisive, I have therefore made up my mind to keep the Fleet in that position of sailing (with the exception of the First and Second in Command) that the Order of Sailing is to be the Order of Battle, placing the Fleet in two Lines of sixteen s.h.i.+ps each, with an Advanced Squadron of eight of the fastest sailing Two-decked s.h.i.+ps, which will always make, if wanted, a Line of twenty-four Sail, on whichever Line the Commander-in-Chief may direct.

[Sidenote: Powers of Second in Command.] The Second in Command will, after my intentions are made known to him, have the entire direction of his Line to make the attack upon the Enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured or destroyed.

[Sidenote: The Attack from to Leeward.] If the Enemy's Fleet should be seen to windward in Line of Battle, and that the two Lines and the Advanced Squadron can fetch them, they will probably be so extended that their Van could not succour their Rear.

I should therefore probably make the Second in Command's signal to lead through, about their twelfth s.h.i.+p from their Rear, (or wherever he could fetch, if not able to get so far advanced); my Line would lead through about their Centre, and the Advanced Squadron to cut two or three or four s.h.i.+ps a-head of their Centre, so as to ensure getting at their Commander-in-Chief, on whom every effort must be made to capture.

[Sidenote: The General Controlling Idea, under all Conditions.]

The whole impression of the British Fleet must be to overpower from two or three s.h.i.+ps a-head of their Commander-in-Chief supposed to be in the Centre, to the Rear of their Fleet. I will suppose twenty Sail of the Enemy's Line to be untouched, it must be some time before they could perform a manoeuvre to bring their force compact to attack any part of the British Fleet engaged, or to succour their own s.h.i.+ps, which indeed would be impossible without mixing with the s.h.i.+ps engaged.

Something must be left to chance; nothing is sure in a Sea Fight beyond all others. Shot will carry away the masts and yards of friends as well as foes; but I look with confidence to a Victory before the Van of the Enemy could succour their Rear, and then that the British Fleet would most of them be ready to receive their twenty Sail of the Line, or to pursue them, should they endeavour to make off.

If the Van of the Enemy tacks, the Captured s.h.i.+ps must run to leeward of the British Fleet; if the Enemy wears, the British must place themselves between the Enemy and the Captured, and disabled British s.h.i.+ps; and should the Enemy close, I have no fears as to the result.

[Sidenote: Duties of Subordinate.] The Second in Command will in all possible things direct the movements of his Line, by keeping them as compact as the nature of the circ.u.mstances will admit.

Captains are to look to their particular Line as their rallying point. But, in case Signals can neither be seen or perfectly understood, no Captain can do very wrong if he places his s.h.i.+p alongside that of an Enemy.

Of the intended attack from to windward, the Enemy in Line of Battle ready to receive an attack,

[Ill.u.s.tration][123]

[Sidenote: The Attack from to Windward.] The divisions of the British Fleet will be brought nearly within gun shot of the Enemy's Centre. The signal will most probably then be made for the Lee Line to bear up together, to set all their sails, even steering sails, in order to get as quickly as possible to the Enemy's Line, and to cut through, beginning from the 12 s.h.i.+p from the Enemy's Rear. Some s.h.i.+ps may not get through their exact place, but they will always be at hand to a.s.sist their friends; and if any are thrown round the Rear of the Enemy, they will effectually complete the business of twelve Sail of the Enemy.

Should the Enemy wear together, or bear up and sail large, still the twelve s.h.i.+ps composing, in the first position, the Enemy's Rear, are to be the object of attack of the Lee Line, unless otherwise directed from the Commander-in-Chief, which is scarcely to be expected, as the entire management of the Lee Line, after the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief, is signified, is intended to be left to the judgment of the Admiral commanding that Line.

[Sidenote: Special Charge of the Commander-in-Chief.] The remainder of the Enemy's Fleet, 34 Sail, are to be left to the management of the Commander-in-Chief, who will endeavour to take care that the movements of the Second in Command are as little interrupted as is possible.

NELSON AND BRONTE.

It will be borne in mind that the first of these instructions was issued for the handling of a small body of s.h.i.+ps--ten--expecting to meet fifteen to eighteen enemies; whereas the second contemplated the wielding of a great ma.s.s of vessels, as many as forty British, directed against a possible combination of forty-six French and Spanish. In the former case, however, although the aggregate numbers were smaller, the disproportion of force was much greater, even after allowance made for the British three-deckers; and we know, from other contemporary remarks of Nelson, that his object here was not so much a crus.h.i.+ng defeat of the enemy--"only numbers can annihilate"--as the disorganization and neutralization of a particular detachment, as the result of which the greater combination of the enemy would fall to pieces. "After they have beaten our fleet soundly, they will do us no more harm this summer."[124] Consequently, he relies much upon the confusion introduced into the enemy's movements by an attack, which, though of much inferior force, should be sudden in character, developing only at the last moment, into which the enemy should be precipitated unawares, while the British should encounter it, or rather should enter it, with minds fully prepared,--not only for the immediate manoeuvre, but for all probable consequences.

In accordance with the same general object--confusion--he directs his a.s.sault upon the van, instead of, as at Trafalgar, upon the rear; according to his saying in the Baltic, recorded by Stewart,[125]

"Close with a Frenchman, but out-manoeuvre a Russian," for which purpose he would throw his own force, preferably, upon the van of the latter. The reason is obvious, upon reflection; for in attacking and cutting off the head--van and centre--of a column of s.h.i.+ps, the rear, coming up under full way, has _immediate_ action forced upon it. There is no time for deliberation. The van is already engaged, and access to it more or less impeded, by the hostile dispositions. The decision must be instant--to the right hand, or to the left, to windward, or to leeward--and there is at least an even chance that the wrong thing will be done, as well as a probability, falling little short of certainty, that all the s.h.i.+ps of the rear will _not_ do the same thing; that is, they will be thrown into confusion with all its dire train of evils, doubt, hesitancy, faltering, and inconsequent action.

It is hard work to knit again a shattered line under the unremittent a.s.sault of hardened veterans, such as Nelson's Mediterranean s.h.i.+ps.

The method employed in the second of these instructions, the celebrated Memorandum, differs essentially from that of the Plan of Attack, though both are simply developments of the one idea of concentration. It is unfortunate for us that Nelson, like most men of action, reveals his reasoning processes, not in ordered discussion, but by stray gleams of expression, too often unrecorded, from which we can infer only the general tenor of his thought. It is in the chance phrase, transmitted by Stewart, coupled with the change of object, so definitely announced in the second instance,--the crus.h.i.+ng, namely, of the enemy's great fleet, and not the mere crippling of a detachment such as went to the West Indies,--that the author thinks to find the clew to the difference of dispositions, in the first case, from those prescribed and followed for Trafalgar--the "Nelson touch" that thrilled the captains. There is again, indeed, in the latter, the distinct reliance upon confusion, for the line of the foe is to be broken in two places; but now the confusion introduced is in the part of the enemy that is a.s.sailed, not, as before, in that which is left out of action. Confusion, in short, is now imposed by external force, rather than induced by internal perplexity,--a condition surer, and therefore more liable to result in a crus.h.i.+ng victory, for it depends upon the vigor of the offensive, and not on the weakness of the defensive, which may prove a deceitful reliance. Moreover, effectual crus.h.i.+ng requires time, even when, as in the final memorandum, a great concentration of superiority is intended on part of an enemy's order.

Now, when the van and centre are attacked, the rear is pointed fair, and, if it does not lose its head, comes quickly up to the rescue; but when, in the contrary case, the centre and rear receive the a.s.sault, the van, being left out of action, not only has to turn round, but naturally stands away, for an interval dependent upon the initiative of its immediate commander, as occurred to an extreme degree at Trafalgar. Thus time, the invaluable five minutes or half hour, is gained for the offensive to bring its first concentration to a successful issue, as well as to prepare to repel the van of the defensive, if it countermarches, as it should. "I look with confidence to a victory before the van of the enemy could succour their rear, and then that the British fleet would most of them be ready to receive their twenty sail of the line, or to pursue them, should they endeavour to make off."

The organization of a distinct body of eight fast-sailing s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line, to be carried to such part of the field as might appear necessary to the commander-in-chief in a particular emergency, resulted inevitably, perhaps, from the considerations presented by Nelson in the opening sentences of the Memorandum, and from the great number of s.h.i.+ps he then hoped to have. There were precedents for such a formation, in the practice of the day; but, as far as recalled by the author, they were the advanced guards, the skirmish line, of the fleet, not, as in this case, essentially a reserve. In Nelson's present thought, the employment of this force would be, not antecedent to, but consequent upon, the particular indications of the day.

Probably they would not be held back as long--for as distinct indications--as in the case of an army's reserve; but nevertheless, the chief object of their separate organization was to redress, at the moment, the unforeseen developments of a battle, whether at the instant of engagement or during its subsequent progress. The unfortunate Villeneuve, who commanded the allies, an accomplished though irresolute seaman, had adopted a similar arrangement, placing twelve detached s.h.i.+ps under his colleague Gravina; but, with sailing vessels, the effective use of such a force depended largely upon the windward position, which the allies did not have. If placed to leeward of a lee line, it was in the power of the a.s.sailant to throw them out of action altogether; if to windward, to attack them separately; therefore at Trafalgar Villeneuve ordered them back into the line.

Nelson likewise then embodied his reserve in the two columns of attack, because he had fewer vessels than he expected, and because the light wind forbade the wasting of time in evolutionary refinements.

The incident of the simultaneous adoption of the same provision by the two opposing admirals, however, is interesting as indicative of the progress of naval thought, though still hampered by the uncertainties of the motive power.

The second of these Orders, that of October 9, is memorable, not only for the sagacity and comprehensiveness of its general dispositions, but even more for the magnanimous confidence with which the details of execution were freely intrusted to those upon whom they had to fall.

It was evidently drawn up in the first instance for Collingwood only; the word "your" in the original draught having been struck out, and "second in command" subst.i.tuted. The comparison already made between it and its predecessor of May, may not uninstructively be followed by a study of the difference in details between itself and the execution it actually received at the Battle of Trafalgar. To aid this purpose the author has traced, in marginal notes, the succession of the leading ideas.

After a statement of General Considerations, and a frank attribution of full powers to the second in command for carrying out his part, Nelson lays down the manner of Attack from to Leeward. This condition not obtaining at Trafalgar, the plan cannot be contrasted with the performance of that day. Upon this follows a luminous enunciation of the general idea, namely, Collingwood's engaging the twelve rear s.h.i.+ps, which underlies the method prescribed for each attack--from to leeward and to windward. Of the latter Nelson fortunately gives an outline diagram, which ill.u.s.trates the picture before his own mind, facilitating our comprehension of his probable expectations, and allowing a comparison between them and the event as it actually occurred. It is not to the discredit, but greatly to the credit, of his conception, that it was susceptible of large modification in practice while retaining its characteristic idea.

Looking at his diagram,[126] and following his words, it will be seen that the British lines are not formed perpendicularly to that of the enemy (as they were at Trafalgar), but parallel to it. Starting from this disposition, near the enemy and abreast his centre, the lee line of sixteen s.h.i.+ps was to bear up _together_, and advance in line, not in column (as happened at Trafalgar); their object being the twelve rear s.h.i.+ps of the enemy. This first move stands by itself; the action of the weather line, and of the reserve squadron still farther to windward, are held in suspense under the eye of the commander-in-chief, to take the direction which the latter shall prescribe as the struggle develops. The mere menace of such a force, just out of gunshot to windward, would be sufficient to prevent any extensive manoeuvre of the unengaged enemies. Nelson doubtless had in mind the dispositions, more than a century old, of Tourville and De Ruyter, by which a few s.h.i.+ps, s.p.a.ced to windward of an enemy's van, could check its tacking, because of the raking fire to which they would subject it. Unquestionably, he would not have kept long in idle expectancy twenty-four s.h.i.+ps, the number he had in mind; but clearly also he proposed to hold them until he saw how things went with Collingwood. Thus much time would allow, granting the position he a.s.sumed and a reasonable breeze. His twenty-four to windward held an absolute check over the supposed thirty-four unengaged, of the enemy.

The attack as planned, therefore, differed from that executed (1) in that the lee line was not to advance in column, but in line, thereby dispersing the enemy's fire, and avoiding the terrific concentration which crushed the leaders at Trafalgar; and (2) in that the weather squadrons were not to attack simultaneously with the lee, but after it had engaged, in order to permit the remedying of any mishap that might arise in delivering the crucial blow. In both these matters of detail the plan was better than the modification; but the latter was forced upon Nelson by conditions beyond his control.

It will be observed that, when considering attacking from to leeward, he orders a simultaneous movement of the three British divisions,--lee, weather, and reserve; for the obvious reason that if he held his own divisions in reserve to leeward he could not at all count upon bringing them into action at will; and, moreover, such an attack would probably have to be in columns, and, if simultaneous, would be less liable to disaster than in succession, mutual support diverting the enemies' fire. In fact, the highest order of offensive combination was only possible when having the advantage of the wind--fair, and enough of it.

The plan upon which Trafalgar was to be fought, as above described and a.n.a.lyzed, was formed some time before leaving England, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that it was in fact a modification of the earlier idea, laid down during the chase to the West Indies. On the 10th of September, three days only before quitting Merton, Nelson called upon his old friend, Lord Sidmouth,[127] who until recently had been Prime Minister. In the course of the interview he explained his intentions as regards the attack. "Rodney," he said, "broke the enemy's line in one place,[128] I will break it in two;" and with his finger he indicated upon a table the general character of the a.s.sault, to be made in two lines, led by himself and Collingwood. He felt confident, according to Sidmouth's narration, that he should capture either their van and centre or their centre and rear. It was of course out of his power to prevent the enemy inverting their order, by the simultaneous turning round of every s.h.i.+p, at the time of engagement, so that the attack intended for the rear should fall upon it become the van. Against this contingency he provided by the words, "should the enemy wear together, still the twelve s.h.i.+ps composing, _in the first position_, the enemy's rear, are to be the object of attack of the lee line." Sidmouth did not commit his recollection of this incident to writing until many years later, and, not being a seaman, very likely failed to comprehend some of the details--there seems to the author to be in the story a confusion of what Nelson planned with what Nelson did; but a great conception is largely independent of details, and the essential features of Trafalgar are in Sidmouth's account. The idea was doubtless imparted also to the family circle at Merton, where probably the expression, "Nelson touch," originated. It occurs chiefly, if not wholly, in his letters to Lady Hamilton, to whom, some days before reaching the fleet, he wrote, "I am anxious to join, for it would add to my grief if any other man was to give them the Nelson touch, which WE say is warranted never to fail;" but there may be a quaint allusion to it in the motto he told Rose he had adopted: "Touch and Take."

When Nelson left England, he was intrusted by the First Lord with the delicate and unpleasant mission of communicating to Sir Robert Calder the dissatisfaction of the Government with his conduct, in the encounter with the allied fleets the previous July; especially for failing to keep touch with them and bring them again to action. The national outcry was too strong to be disregarded, nor is it probable that the Admiralty took a more lenient view of the matter. At all events, an inquiry was inevitable, and the authorities seem to have felt that it was a favor to Calder to permit him to ask for the Court which in any case must be ordered. "I did not fail," wrote Nelson to Barham, "immediately on my arrival, to deliver your message to Sir Robert Calder; and it will give your Lords.h.i.+p pleasure to find, as it has me, that an inquiry is what the Vice-Admiral wishes, and that he had written to you by the Nautilus, which I detained, to say so. Sir Robert thinks that he can clearly prove, that it was not in his power to bring the combined squadrons again to battle."

Nelson felt a profound sympathy for the unfortunate officer, pursued by the undiscriminating and ignorant fury of popular clamor, the extent and intensity of which he had had opportunity to realize when in England. While he probably did not look for so tragic an issue, the execution of Byng under a similar odium and a similar charge, although expressly cleared of cowardice and disaffection, was still fresh in the naval mind. "Sir Robert has an ordeal to pa.s.s through," he wrote Collingwood, "which he little expects." His own opinion upon the case seems to have undergone some modification, since the generous outburst with which he at first deprecated the prejudgment of a disappointed and frightened people; nor could it well fail, as details became known to him, that he should pa.s.s a silent censure upon proceedings, which contravened alike his inward professional convictions, and his expressed purposes of action for a similar contingency. "I have had, as you will believe, a very distressing scene with poor Sir Robert Calder," he told Lady Hamilton. "He has wrote home to beg an inquiry, feeling confident that he can fully justify himself. I sincerely hope he may, but--I have given him the advice as to my dearest friend. He is in adversity, and if he ever has been my enemy, he now feels the pang of it, and finds me one of his best friends." "Sir Robert Calder," he wrote to another correspondent, "has just left us to stand his trial, which I think of a very serious nature." Nelson was obliged to detain him until reinforcements arrived from England, because Calder was unwilling to undergo the apparent humiliation of leaving his flags.h.i.+p under charges, and she could not yet be spared. It was not the least of this unlucky man's misfortunes that he left the fleet just a week before the battle, where his conduct would undoubtedly have redeemed whatever of errors he may have committed. One of the last remarks Nelson made before the action began, was, "Hardy, what would poor Sir Robert Calder give to be with us now!"

Calder's reluctance to quit his flags.h.i.+p, and the keen sensitiveness with which he expressed his feelings, drew from Nelson a concession he knew to be wrong, but which is too characteristic, both in the act itself and in his own account of it, to be omitted. "Sir Robert felt so much," he wrote to the First Lord, "even at the idea of being removed from his own s.h.i.+p which he commanded, in the face of the fleet, that I much fear I shall incur the censure of the Board of Admiralty, without your Lords.h.i.+p's influence with the members of it. I may be thought wrong, as an officer, to disobey the orders of the Admiralty, by not insisting on Sir Robert Calder's quitting the Prince of Wales for the Dreadnought, and for parting with a 90-gun s.h.i.+p, before the force arrives which their Lords.h.i.+ps have judged necessary; but I trust that I shall be considered to have done right as a man, and to a brother officer in affliction--my heart could not stand it, and so the thing must rest. I shall submit to the wisdom of the Board to censure me or not, as to them may seem best for the Service; I shall bow with all due respect to their decision."

From the military point of view this step was indefensible, but it is in singular keeping with Nelson's kindness of heart, his generosity of temper, and with a certain recklessness of consequences,--when supported by inward conviction of right, or swayed by natural impulses,--which formed no small part of his greatness as a warrior.

"Numbers only can annihilate;" yet to spare the feelings of an unhappy man, whom he believed to have been his enemy, he parted with one of the best units from his numbers, although, even with her present, he was inferior to the allies. He felt keenly, however, the responsibility he a.s.sumed, not only towards the Admiralty, but towards his own success and reputation. At one time he seems, with unusual vacillation, even to have returned upon his decision, and to have notified Calder that the s.h.i.+p could not be spared; for on the 12th of October the latter wrote him: "The contents of your Lords.h.i.+p's letter have cut me to the soul. If I am to be turned out of my s.h.i.+p, after all that has pa.s.sed, I have only to request I may be allowed to take my Captain, and such officers as I find necessary for the justification of my conduct as an officer, and that I may be permitted to go without a moment's further loss of time. My heart is broken."

This appeal broke down all Nelson's power of resistance. He deprived himself on the eve of battle of a first-rate s.h.i.+p, taking only the precaution of sending his entire correspondence with Calder, public and private, to explain his course, though scarcely to justify it. The significance of this act is enhanced by the known importance which he himself attached to the presence or absence of even a third-rate s.h.i.+p-of-the-line. When the expedition to the Baltic was on the eve of starting, a seventy-four went aground, in leaving the Downs.

Lieutenant Layman having been conspicuously instrumental in getting her off, Nelson told him that he had in consequence written in his favor to the Admiralty; and upon Layman's remarking that what he had done scarcely deserved so much, the admiral replied, "I think differently, the loss of one line-of-battle s.h.i.+p might be the loss of a victory."

When Nelson joined the fleet, he found it stationed some fifteen to twenty miles from Cadiz. He soon moved the main body to fifty miles west of the port. "It is desirable," he admitted, "to be well up in easterly winds, but I must guard against being caught with a westerly wind near Cadiz, as a fleet of s.h.i.+ps with so many three-deckers would inevitably be forced into the Straits, and then Cadiz would be perfectly free for the enemy to come out with a westerly wind, as they served Lord Keith in the late war." The memory of his weary beat out of the Mediterranean the previous April, against wind and current, remained vividly in his mind; and he feared also that the willingness of the enemy to come out, which was his great object, would be much cooled by the certainty that his fleet could not be avoided, and by seeing such additions as it might receive. "I think we are near enough," he wrote Colling wood, "for the weather if it is fine, the wind serves, and we are in sight, they will never move." "I rely on you," he tells Blackwood, "that we can't miss getting hold of them, and I will give them such a shaking as they never yet experienced; at least I will lay down my life in the attempt." An advanced squadron of fast-sailing seventy-fours was thrown out ten or twelve miles east of the fleet, through which daily signals could be exchanged with Blackwood's squadron of frigates, that cruised day and night close to the harbor's mouth. This disposition received a farther development after the 10th of October, when the combined fleets s.h.i.+fted from the inner harbor to the Bay of Cadiz, and gave other tokens of a speedy start. On the 14th of the month he made the following entry in his diary: "Enemy at the harbour's mouth. Placed Defence and Agamemnon from seven to ten leagues west of Cadiz, and Mars and Colossus five leagues east of fleet [that is, under way between the fleet and the former group], whose station is from fifteen to twenty leagues west of Cadiz; and by this chain I hope to have constant communication with the frigates off Cadiz." To the captain of the "Defence" he wrote that it was possible the enemy might try to drive off the frigate squadron, in order to facilitate their own evasion; in which case the inner s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line would be at hand to resist the attempt.

Despite these careful dispositions, his mind was still ill at ease lest the enemy might escape undetected. He never had frigates enough to make the result as sure as it ought to be, where such vast issues were at stake. While eight at least were needed to be always with the fleet before Cadiz, he had but five; and to maintain even so many it was necessary to cut short other services and essential stations. This deficiency he urged upon the Government still more than he did the inadequacy of the line-of-battle force; for his fear of the enemy eluding him was greater than that of a conflict with superior numbers.

As regards the latter contingency, he wrote to Lord Barham that, if the enemy came out, he would immediately bring them to battle; "but, although I should not doubt of spoiling any voyage they might attempt, yet I hope for the arrival of the s.h.i.+ps from England, that as an enemy's fleet they may be annihilated." On the other hand, "the last fleet was lost to me for want of frigates." Besides his own direct representations, he pressed Rose to obtain an intimation to the Admiralty from the Prime Minister, that the latter was personally solicitous that more small cruisers should be supplied. Both Collingwood and Nelson believed the allies bound to the Mediterranean; but in this they might be mistaken, and as the real object might be again the West Indies, lookouts should be placed off Cape Blanco on the coast of Africa, and off the Salvages,[129] both which he knew had been sighted by Villeneuve, in the outward voyage of the previous spring.

To his concern about the immediate situation before Cadiz were added the universal cares of the Mediterranean, with all parts of which he renewed his correspondence, occupying his active mind with provisions for forwarding the cause of Great Britain and her allies. Under his many anxieties, however, he preserved his buoyant, resolute temper, not worrying over possible happenings against which he was unable to provide. "The force is at present not so large as might be wished," he writes to Ball, "but I will do my best with it; they will give me more when they can, and I am not come forth to find difficulties, but to remove them." "Your Lords.h.i.+p may depend upon my exertions," he tells Barham. The possibility that he himself might fall was, as always, present to his thoughts, and never did life mean more to him than it now did; yet, as the twilight deepened, and the realization of danger pa.s.sed gradually into a presentiment of death, he faced the prospect without gloom--steadfast still in mind. "Let the battle be when it may, it will never have been surpa.s.sed. My shattered frame, if I survive that day, will require rest, and that is all I shall ask for.

If I fall on such a glorious occasion, it shall be my pride to take care that my friends shall not blush for me. These things are in the hands of a wise and just Providence, and His will be done! I have got some trifle, thank G.o.d, to leave those I hold most dear, and I have taken care not to neglect it. Do not think I am low-spirited on this account, or fancy anything is to happen to me; quite the contrary--my mind is calm, and I have only to think of destroying our inveterate foe."

Of these days of preoccupation, while in hourly expectation of the issue, overcharged with official anxieties, and facing, however fearlessly, a growing impression that he himself would not survive the conflict for which he longed, an anecdote has been transmitted that shows again how to the end, and whatever his personal cares, his quick sympathy went out to men of all cla.s.ses. Word had been pa.s.sed through the fleet that a mail was about to start for England, which would not improbably be the last opportunity of writing home before the enemy came forth. The letters had been collected as usual, the bags were all on board the departing vessel, and she herself, under full sail, had got already some distance away, when Nelson saw a mids.h.i.+pman come up and speak to Lieutenant Pasco, the signal officer, who, upon hearing what was said, stamped his foot in evident vexation, and uttered an exclamation. The admiral, of whose nearness Pasco was not aware, called him, and asked what was the matter. "Nothing that need trouble your Lords.h.i.+p," was the reply. "You are not the man to lose your temper for nothing," rejoined Nelson. "What was it?" "Well, if you must know, my Lord, I will tell you. You see that c.o.c.kswain," pointing to one of the most active of the petty officers; "we have not a better man on board the Victory and the message which put me out was this. I was told that he was so busy receiving and getting off the mail-bags, that he forgot to drop his own letter to his wife into one of them, and he has just discovered it in his pocket." "Hoist a signal to bring her back," was Nelson's instant command; "who knows that he may not fall in action to-morrow. His letter shall go with the rest,"--and the despatch vessel was brought back for that alone.[130] In telling the story, Pasco used to say it was no wonder that the common sailors idolized Nelson, since he was always thinking about them, and won their hearts by showing his own.

In addition to the combined fleets in Cadiz, which numbered thirty-six of the line, besides frigates, the enemy had a half-dozen of the line in Cartagena, which showed signs of moving, and whose junction must be prevented, if possible. Partly for this reason, partly because it was necessary to renew the water of the s.h.i.+ps, Nelson sent a detachment of six of the line to Gibraltar and Tetuan, immediately after he took charge. To the junior admiral who commanded it, and who lamented that they might lose their share in the expected battle, he replied: "I have no other means of keeping my fleet complete in provisions and water. The enemy _will_ come out, and we shall fight them; but there will be time for you to get back first." They did not, however, return as thus expected, a misadventure which was chiefly due to their having to guard a convoy past Cartagena,--a potent ill.u.s.tration of the influence exerted by a powerful squadron, judiciously placed on the flank of an important trade route, or line of communication; but even had they rejoined, six others were told off to leave at once in turn.

Nelson did not dare to take the fleet in ma.s.s to Tetuan, as he used to Madalena; for he could never be sure of getting out of the Straits when he wished, or when the enemy moved. Thus his fleet was reduced, by both administrative and strategic exigencies, to twenty-three s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line. Fortunately, four more joined before the battle, raising the numbers actually engaged to twenty-seven. It will be recognized that Calder's ninety-gun s.h.i.+p was no small loss.

Such were the general dispositions in which the sailing of the enemy was awaited. A main body of eighteen to twenty, fifty miles west of Cadiz, a frigate squadron close in to the harbor, and two groups of s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line extended between these extremes. With a westerly wind, approach to the port would be easy for all; with an easterly, Nelson wrote to Blackwood, he would habitually beat up for Cadiz, never going north of the port. His whereabouts in case of thick weather was thus always known. He notified Collingwood and his other subordinates, that if the enemy came out, he should stand for Cape Spartel, the African outpost of the Straits, to bar the entrance of the allies to the Mediterranean. Signals were arranged, precise, yet not so elaborate as to tend to confusion, by which the departure and general direction of the enemy could be continually transmitted, from the furthest lookouts to the main body, by night as by day.

On the 13th of October his old s.h.i.+p, the "Agamemnon," joined the fleet. She was commanded by Sir Edward Berry, who had been first lieutenant in her with Nelson, had accompanied him in boarding the "San Nicolas" and "San Josef" at St. Vincent, and was afterwards his flag-captain at the Nile. When her approach was reported to the admiral, he exclaimed gleefully, "Here comes Berry! Now we shall have a battle;" for Berry, having been in more fleet actions than any captain in the British Navy,[131] had a proverbial reputation for such luck. The event did not belie the prediction. Five days later, on the 18th of the month, Nelson noted in his diary: "Fine weather, wind easterly; the combined fleets cannot have finer weather to put to sea;" and the following morning, at half-past nine, the signal, repeated from masthead to masthead, from the insh.o.r.e frigates to their commander-in-chief fifty miles at sea, announced that the long-expected battle was at hand--for "The Enemy are coming out of port."

FOOTNOTES:

[121] May, 1805.