Washington - A Life Part 16

CHAPTER FIFTY-FOUR.

Running into Extremes EARLY IN HIS ADMINISTRATION, George Was.h.i.+ngton had figured out that for foreign policy advice he would have to rely on his cabinet rather than the Senate, but the cabinet members were no less split in the foreign policy realm than they were on pressing domestic issues. The most divisive topic was whether the United States should lean toward France or Great Britain. Even after waging war against Britain for more than eight years, Was.h.i.+ngton took a coldly realistic view of the strategic need for cordial relations with London. The federal government depended upon customs duties as its princ.i.p.al revenue source and could scarcely afford to antagonize its major trading partner. After the war, as American trade with England swiftly rebounded, Was.h.i.+ngton had observed, "Our trade in all points of view is as essential to G[reat] B[ritain] as hers is to us."1 In the postwar period, American merchants had bristled at the exclusion of their s.h.i.+ps from the British West Indies. Scarcely a raging Anglophile, Was.h.i.+ngton had a long list of other grievances against the English-their refusal to make rest.i.tution for runaway slaves, their unwillingness to evacuate western posts, their reluctance to send a minister to the United States-but he never allowed those complaints to stymie his earnest efforts to improve relations with the Crown. In the postwar period, American merchants had bristled at the exclusion of their s.h.i.+ps from the British West Indies. Scarcely a raging Anglophile, Was.h.i.+ngton had a long list of other grievances against the English-their refusal to make rest.i.tution for runaway slaves, their unwillingness to evacuate western posts, their reluctance to send a minister to the United States-but he never allowed those complaints to stymie his earnest efforts to improve relations with the Crown.

In the autumn of 1789 Was.h.i.+ngton decided to post the witty Gouverneur Morris to England as an unofficial envoy to iron out problems between the two governments. Jefferson feared that America would import Britain's monarchical ways along with its products and strongly favored warmer relations with France, whose revolution he monitored with enthusiasm. Where Hamilton and Jay supported Morris's appointment, Jefferson staunchly opposed it, viewing Morris as a "high-flying monarchy man" and overly friendly to England.2 He later faulted the fun-loving Morris for prejudicing Was.h.i.+ngton's mind against the French Revolution. He later faulted the fun-loving Morris for prejudicing Was.h.i.+ngton's mind against the French Revolution.

Because Jefferson did not take office until March 1790, Hamilton was able to poach on territory usually reserved for the secretary of state and attempted to strengthen ties with Great Britain, with whom the United States still lacked formal diplomatic relations. In October 1789 he conducted a secret meeting with a British diplomat, Major George Beckwith, a.s.suring him, "I have always preferred a connection with you to that of any other country. We think in English We think in English and have a similarity of prejudices and predilections." and have a similarity of prejudices and predilections."3 Was.h.i.+ngton likewise believed that the common laws, language, and customs of America and England made them natural allies, and he fully concurred with Hamilton's desire to negotiate a commercial treaty between the two countries. By the summer of 1790 Morris's talks in London began to bear fruit. After a meeting with Beckwith, Hamilton relayed to Was.h.i.+ngton the startling news that Sir Guy Carleton, now the governor general of Canada, "had reason to believe that the Cabinet of Great Britain entertained a disposition not only towards a friendly intercourse but towards an alliance with the United States." Was.h.i.+ngton likewise believed that the common laws, language, and customs of America and England made them natural allies, and he fully concurred with Hamilton's desire to negotiate a commercial treaty between the two countries. By the summer of 1790 Morris's talks in London began to bear fruit. After a meeting with Beckwith, Hamilton relayed to Was.h.i.+ngton the startling news that Sir Guy Carleton, now the governor general of Canada, "had reason to believe that the Cabinet of Great Britain entertained a disposition not only towards a friendly intercourse but towards an alliance with the United States."4 Jefferson scoffed at such views emanating from an unofficial emissary. Jefferson scoffed at such views emanating from an unofficial emissary.

Accepting the need for creative diplomacy, Was.h.i.+ngton sought to profit from the back channel established by Hamilton with Beckwith. That summer the specter of war between England and Spain arose after their military confrontation at Nootka Sound on Vancouver Island in western Canada. Not ready to choose sides, Was.h.i.+ngton noted in his diary the instructions he had given Hamilton, saying that "the Secretary of the Treasury was to extract as much as he could from Major Beckwith and report it to me without committing . . . the Government of the U[nited] States."5 In subsequent meetings with Beckwith, Hamilton warned the British diplomat that while Was.h.i.+ngton was "perfectly dispa.s.sionate" toward a commercial treaty with England, Secretary of State Jefferson "may possibly frustrate the whole." In subsequent meetings with Beckwith, Hamilton warned the British diplomat that while Was.h.i.+ngton was "perfectly dispa.s.sionate" toward a commercial treaty with England, Secretary of State Jefferson "may possibly frustrate the whole."6 In September 1791 the overtures made by Hamilton, with Was.h.i.+ngton's approval, resulted in a major breakthrough in Anglo-American relations, as George III named George Hammond as the first British minister to America. When Hammond and his secretary, Edward Thornton, arrived that autumn, they immediately sensed the amicable disposition of the treasury secretary and the implacable hostility of the secretary of state. Writing home, Thornton evoked Jefferson's "strong hatred" of the British and his "decided and rancorous malevolence to the British name."7 Not surprisingly, Hammond and Thornton gravitated to the pro-British circle cl.u.s.tered around Hamilton. Not surprisingly, Hammond and Thornton gravitated to the pro-British circle cl.u.s.tered around Hamilton.

America's fervent attachment to France arose from grat.i.tude for its indispensable help during the Revolutionary War, and no country saluted its revolution with more fraternal warmth. In a variety of ways, the French Revolution had been sp.a.w.ned by its American predecessor, which had bred dreams of liberty among French aristocrats who fought in the war, then tried to enshrine its principles at home. The most visible standard-bearer of these hopes was the Marquis de Lafayette, who told Was.h.i.+ngton from Paris that the "ideas of liberty have been, since the American Revolution, spreading very fast."8 As Jefferson stated proudly, the French had been "awakened by our revolution . . . Our proceedings have been viewed as a model for them on every occasion." As Jefferson stated proudly, the French had been "awakened by our revolution . . . Our proceedings have been viewed as a model for them on every occasion."9 As early as 1780 Was.h.i.+ngton had predicted that France, to pay for its American adventure, would face a huge deficit and resort to ruinous taxes that "the people of France are not in a condition to endure for any duration." As early as 1780 Was.h.i.+ngton had predicted that France, to pay for its American adventure, would face a huge deficit and resort to ruinous taxes that "the people of France are not in a condition to endure for any duration."10 Those taxes and other hards.h.i.+ps had provoked immense discontent, leading King Louis XVI to convene a special advisory a.s.sembly called the Estates-General in May 1789, which mingled commoners with the clergy and n.o.bility. Those taxes and other hards.h.i.+ps had provoked immense discontent, leading King Louis XVI to convene a special advisory a.s.sembly called the Estates-General in May 1789, which mingled commoners with the clergy and n.o.bility.

Always a perceptive student of politics, George Was.h.i.+ngton, from the first stir-rings of the French Revolution, was astonis.h.i.+ngly prophetic about its course. He regarded Louis XVI as a good-hearted but fallible king who would make a clumsy, self-destructive effort to foil revolutionary impulses. "Liberty, when it begins to take root, is a plant of rapid growth," Was.h.i.+ngton remarked to Madison in 1788. "The checks [the king] endeavors to give it . . . will, more than probably, kindle a flame which may not easily be extinguished, tho[ugh] for a while it may be smothered by the armies at his command."11 With his sure instincts, Was.h.i.+ngton intuited that the French Revolution might veer off into fanaticism and warned Lafayette "against running into extremes and prejudicing your cause." With his sure instincts, Was.h.i.+ngton intuited that the French Revolution might veer off into fanaticism and warned Lafayette "against running into extremes and prejudicing your cause."12 On the other hand, he also thought that if the king managed change properly, a const.i.tutional monarchy might ensue. Paradoxically, Jefferson, an eyewitness to the revolution's outbreak, seemed blind to its violent potential. In August 1788 he blithely reported to James Monroe from France, "I think it probable this country will, within two or three years, be in the enjoyment of a tolerably free const.i.tution and that without its having cost them a drop of blood." On the other hand, he also thought that if the king managed change properly, a const.i.tutional monarchy might ensue. Paradoxically, Jefferson, an eyewitness to the revolution's outbreak, seemed blind to its violent potential. In August 1788 he blithely reported to James Monroe from France, "I think it probable this country will, within two or three years, be in the enjoyment of a tolerably free const.i.tution and that without its having cost them a drop of blood."13 Perhaps because of his a.s.sociation with enlightened Parisian intellectuals, Jefferson missed the bloodthirsty spirit of the French Revolution, its l.u.s.t for gore and its gratuitous butchering of innocent victims. Perhaps because of his a.s.sociation with enlightened Parisian intellectuals, Jefferson missed the bloodthirsty spirit of the French Revolution, its l.u.s.t for gore and its gratuitous butchering of innocent victims.

The early days of the French Revolution, so giddily triumphant, produced general rejoicing among Americans. In the spring and summer of 1789 they applauded the creation of the National a.s.sembly and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, written by Lafayette with a.s.sistance from Jefferson. The Bastille's downfall, however, displayed the b.l.o.o.d.y predilections of the Parisian mobs, who decapitated the prison governor and sported his head on a pike. Such grisly details seemed lost upon many Americans cheering the event. The day after the Bastille was stormed, Lafayette, who hoped for a "fusion between the royalty and the people," was named head of the National Guard of Paris, further encouraging Americans to believe that their revolution had engendered a fitting sequel in France.14 In a masterful stroke, Lafayette sent Was.h.i.+ngton the ponderous old key to the Bastille gate plus a sketch of the infamous fortress. "Give me leave, my dear general, to present you with a picture of the Bastille just as it looked a few days after I had ordered its demolition, with the main key of that fortress of despotism," he wrote. "It is a tribute which I owe as a son to my adoptive father, as an aide-de-camp to my general, as a missionary of liberty to its patriarch." In a masterful stroke, Lafayette sent Was.h.i.+ngton the ponderous old key to the Bastille gate plus a sketch of the infamous fortress. "Give me leave, my dear general, to present you with a picture of the Bastille just as it looked a few days after I had ordered its demolition, with the main key of that fortress of despotism," he wrote. "It is a tribute which I owe as a son to my adoptive father, as an aide-de-camp to my general, as a missionary of liberty to its patriarch."15 Later on, the president hung the key inside a wall lantern at Mount Vernon, with the picture below it, spurring Chateaubriand's mordant comment, "If Was.h.i.+ngton had seen the 'victors of the Bastille' disporting themselves in the gutters of Paris, he would have felt less respect for his relic." Later on, the president hung the key inside a wall lantern at Mount Vernon, with the picture below it, spurring Chateaubriand's mordant comment, "If Was.h.i.+ngton had seen the 'victors of the Bastille' disporting themselves in the gutters of Paris, he would have felt less respect for his relic."16 While careful to support France in public, Was.h.i.+ngton succ.u.mbed to deep foreboding in private and predicted a cascading series of violent events. Like other Americans, he wanted to embrace the French Revolution, but he recoiled from its excessive zeal. In October 1789 he told Gouverneur Morris that while France "has gone triumphantly through the first paroxysm, it is not the last it has to encounter before matters are finally settled. In a word, the revolution is of too great magnitude to be effected in so short a s.p.a.ce and with the loss of so little blood."17 He feared both the frenzied mobs and the benighted aristocrats plotting to restore their privileges. Morris's letters from Paris had a profound impact on Was.h.i.+ngton, as Jefferson suspected, because they captured with a cool eye the demagogic logic of the revolution and the fanaticism fast taking hold. He feared both the frenzied mobs and the benighted aristocrats plotting to restore their privileges. Morris's letters from Paris had a profound impact on Was.h.i.+ngton, as Jefferson suspected, because they captured with a cool eye the demagogic logic of the revolution and the fanaticism fast taking hold.

Lafayette's tragedy in the French Revolution was that he tried to model himself after Was.h.i.+ngton and re-create his success in a situation that mocked his ambitions. In January 1790, calling himself Was.h.i.+ngton's "filial friend," Lafayette wrote to say how often he had wished for his mentor's "wise advices and friendly support!"18 He was not oblivious to the revolution's defects, but he thought they would be mended in time and hoped for the French equivalent of a Const.i.tutional Convention in ten years. There was a note of quiet apprehension in Lafayette's letters, a lonely whistling in the dark, as he recorded the wholesale destruction of the aristocracy, while hoping that liberty would somehow thrive in the resulting vacuum. Still wedded to replicating the American Revolution, he wrote in the slightly defensive tone of a man trying too hard to convince himself that all was well. He was not oblivious to the revolution's defects, but he thought they would be mended in time and hoped for the French equivalent of a Const.i.tutional Convention in ten years. There was a note of quiet apprehension in Lafayette's letters, a lonely whistling in the dark, as he recorded the wholesale destruction of the aristocracy, while hoping that liberty would somehow thrive in the resulting vacuum. Still wedded to replicating the American Revolution, he wrote in the slightly defensive tone of a man trying too hard to convince himself that all was well.

As news of Parisian atrocities reached American sh.o.r.es, Was.h.i.+ngton remained guardedly supportive of the French Revolution in public, confining his misgivings to a small circle of intimates. Writing to Rochambeau on August 10, 1790, he dismissed the horror stories printed in the London papers as reminiscent of British propaganda during the war: "Happily for you, we remembered how our own armies, after having been all slain to a man in the English newspapers, came to life again and even performed prodigies of valor against that very nation whose newspapers had so unmercifully destroyed them."19 In truth, Was.h.i.+ngton lent considerable credence to British reports, as he confided to Lafayette: "I will avow the accounts we received through the English papers . . . caused our fears of a failure almost to exceed our expectations of success." In truth, Was.h.i.+ngton lent considerable credence to British reports, as he confided to Lafayette: "I will avow the accounts we received through the English papers . . . caused our fears of a failure almost to exceed our expectations of success."20 When deputies in the National a.s.sembly abolished aristocratic t.i.tles in June 1790, Lafayette surprised his fellow n.o.blemen by supporting the measure, claiming it had "something of the American character."21 Henceforth, the Marquis de Lafayette was known simply as Lafayette. Even as he curried favor with the ma.s.ses, however, Lafayette worried that mob violence would supplant the rule of law, telling Was.h.i.+ngton in August 1790, "I have lately lost some of my favor with the mob and displeased the frantic lovers of licentiousness, as I am bent on establis.h.i.+ng a legal subordination." Henceforth, the Marquis de Lafayette was known simply as Lafayette. Even as he curried favor with the ma.s.ses, however, Lafayette worried that mob violence would supplant the rule of law, telling Was.h.i.+ngton in August 1790, "I have lately lost some of my favor with the mob and displeased the frantic lovers of licentiousness, as I am bent on establis.h.i.+ng a legal subordination."22 It was Lafayette's misfortune that the lower cla.s.ses regarded him as too conservative while patricians jeered at him as too radical. Nothing better ill.u.s.trates the distance between the American and French revolutions than the fact that Lafayette, who was so at home in the Continental Army, seemed tragically out of place in France, naively pursuing the chimera of a const.i.tutional monarchy among political cutthroats on the Paris streets. It was Lafayette's misfortune that the lower cla.s.ses regarded him as too conservative while patricians jeered at him as too radical. Nothing better ill.u.s.trates the distance between the American and French revolutions than the fact that Lafayette, who was so at home in the Continental Army, seemed tragically out of place in France, naively pursuing the chimera of a const.i.tutional monarchy among political cutthroats on the Paris streets.

Among those trying to place the French Revolution squarely in the American grain, perhaps none was more influential than Thomas Paine. In 1791 he published The Rights of Man The Rights of Man as a response to Edmund Burke's influential denunciation, as a response to Edmund Burke's influential denunciation, Reflections on the Revolution in France Reflections on the Revolution in France. Burke had condemned the royal family's mistreatment and prophesied bloodshed to come. Paine, in contrast, portrayed events in France as reprising the spirit of 1776 and called for a written const.i.tution, with an elected a.s.sembly and chief executive. Paine, who could be both arrogant and presumptuous, dedicated his polemic to Was.h.i.+ngton without first seeking his permission and published his screed in London on February 22, 1791-Was.h.i.+ngton's birthday. Drawing further parallels to the American Revolution, Paine informed Was.h.i.+ngton that he wanted to "make a cheap edition, just sufficient to bring in the price of the printing and paper, as I did by Common Sense Common Sense."23 Thomas Jefferson helped to arrange for publication of The Rights of Man The Rights of Man in Philadelphia, telling the printer that he was "extremely pleased to find it will be reprinted here and that something is at length to be publicly said against the political heresies which have sprung up among us." in Philadelphia, telling the printer that he was "extremely pleased to find it will be reprinted here and that something is at length to be publicly said against the political heresies which have sprung up among us."24 Jefferson professed amazement when the printer used this letter as a preface to Paine's work. Since Jefferson's reference to "political heresies" was widely construed as a swipe at the supposed crypto-monarchism of John Adams's treatise Jefferson professed amazement when the printer used this letter as a preface to Paine's work. Since Jefferson's reference to "political heresies" was widely construed as a swipe at the supposed crypto-monarchism of John Adams's treatise Discourses on Davila, Discourses on Davila, it created a brouhaha. The mortified Jefferson wrote a long, repentant letter to Was.h.i.+ngton, claiming that his letter had been used without permission and denying any intention to vilify the vice president. Was.h.i.+ngton's failure to acknowledge Jefferson's apology suggests his silent fury. Jefferson's own letters to Paine reflect his fear of highly placed monarchists in Was.h.i.+ngton's administration who were "preaching up and panting after an English const.i.tution of king, lords, and commons and whose heads are itching for crowns, coronets, and mitres." it created a brouhaha. The mortified Jefferson wrote a long, repentant letter to Was.h.i.+ngton, claiming that his letter had been used without permission and denying any intention to vilify the vice president. Was.h.i.+ngton's failure to acknowledge Jefferson's apology suggests his silent fury. Jefferson's own letters to Paine reflect his fear of highly placed monarchists in Was.h.i.+ngton's administration who were "preaching up and panting after an English const.i.tution of king, lords, and commons and whose heads are itching for crowns, coronets, and mitres."25 Because of the controversy over Paine's work, Was.h.i.+ngton responded to his letter with a blandly evasive reply. He pleaded the pressing duties of office and his imminent return to Mount Vernon as reasons why he couldn't react in detail: "Let it suffice, therefore, at this time to say that I rejoice in the information of your personal prosperity and . . . that it is the first wish of my heart that the enlightened policy of the present age may diffuse to all men those blessings to which they are ent.i.tled and lay the foundation of happiness for future generations."26 Was.h.i.+ngton had a matchless talent for skirting unwanted controversies. Was.h.i.+ngton had a matchless talent for skirting unwanted controversies.

In June 1791 King Louis XVI and the royal family fled Paris in disguise-the king dressed as a valet, the queen as the children's governess-only to be stopped and arrested by Lafayette's National Guard at Varennes, northeast of Paris. Although Lafayette duly informed the king and queen that the National a.s.sembly had placed them under a full-time guard, he was nonetheless denounced as a traitor on the Paris streets, and Danton accused him of engineering the royal family's escape. The underground press in France went so far as to caricature Lafayette in p.o.r.nographic poses with Marie-Antoinette. These events dimmed any hope for a const.i.tutional monarchy. Jefferson delivered to Was.h.i.+ngton the stunning news from Paris. "I never saw him so much dejected by any event in my life," Jefferson reported of his reaction.27 A crestfallen Lafayette was dismayed by the behavior of the royal couple, lamenting that Marie-Antoinette was "more concerned about looking beautiful in the face of danger than about staving it off." A crestfallen Lafayette was dismayed by the behavior of the royal couple, lamenting that Marie-Antoinette was "more concerned about looking beautiful in the face of danger than about staving it off."28 In September 1792 the monarchy would be abolished. Beset by terrible premonitions, Was.h.i.+ngton was extremely concerned about Lafayette's endangered position and, in a letter to him, identified a cardinal characteristic of the French Revolution that especially upset him: the urban mob. "The tumultuous populace of large cities are ever to be dreaded," he wrote. "Their indiscriminate violence prostrates for the time all public authority, and its consequences are sometimes extensive and terrible." 29 29 In October 1791 Lafayette resigned from the National Guard and retreated to the rural serenity of his home, the Chateau Chavaniac. He sent Was.h.i.+ngton a letter that breathed contentment, as if his troubles had suddenly evaporated. "After fifteen years of revolution, I am profiting from a new and agreeable life of calm in the mountains where I was born." In October 1791 Lafayette resigned from the National Guard and retreated to the rural serenity of his home, the Chateau Chavaniac. He sent Was.h.i.+ngton a letter that breathed contentment, as if his troubles had suddenly evaporated. "After fifteen years of revolution, I am profiting from a new and agreeable life of calm in the mountains where I was born."30 Given the turbulent events unfolding in Paris, this peaceful interlude was fated to be of short duration. Given the turbulent events unfolding in Paris, this peaceful interlude was fated to be of short duration.

EVEN AS WAs.h.i.+NGTON worriedly tracked events in France, he had to deal with a brilliant, charming, but difficult Frenchman at home. Though historians often pin the label of military engineer or architect on Major Pierre-Charles L'Enfant, he had trained as a painter at the Royal Academy of Painting and Sculpture in Paris. At twenty-two, he joined the Continental Army with other French volunteers, forming part of the engineering corps, and sketched soldiers at Valley Forge. After the war he had turned New York's City Hall into Federal Hall, establis.h.i.+ng his credentials as a talented architect. As early as September 1789 he proposed himself to Was.h.i.+ngton as designer of the new federal capital. A peerless judge of talent, Was.h.i.+ngton soon grasped L'Enfant's visionary powers, but their relations.h.i.+p was never smooth.

A portrait of L'Enfant shows a man with a coolly superior air. With an imagination shaped by the courts, palaces, and public works of Europe, L'Enfant would be hotheaded and autocratic in negotiating the intricacies of the new capital. Hypersensitive, with a touch of grandiosity, he was the perfect man to hatch a dream but not to implement it. It was characteristic of Was.h.i.+ngton that L'Enfant's hauteur did not deter him; the president had faith in his ability to control even the most intractable personalities and extract the best from them. His checkered relations.h.i.+p with L'Enfant was a cla.s.sic encounter between a consummate pragmatist and an uncompromising dreamer.

In early 1791 Was.h.i.+ngton asked L'Enfant to review the grounds selected for the new capital and identify the most promising sites for the chief government buildings. Local proprietors had already granted the president sweeping powers to shape the city. "The President shall have the sole power of directing the Federal City to be laid off in what manner he pleases," they agreed. "He may retain any number of squares he may think proper for public improvements or other public uses."31 On March 28, at the outset of his southern tour, Was.h.i.+ngton met with L'Enfant, who laid before him a rough pencil sketch of the new capital. He envisioned the seat of Congress on the brow of the highest wood, a steep spot called Jenkins Hill, which he praised as "a pedestal waiting for a superstructure." On March 28, at the outset of his southern tour, Was.h.i.+ngton met with L'Enfant, who laid before him a rough pencil sketch of the new capital. He envisioned the seat of Congress on the brow of the highest wood, a steep spot called Jenkins Hill, which he praised as "a pedestal waiting for a superstructure."32 This building would be the visual centerpiece of the city, with broad, diagonal thoroughfares radiating outward. Its centrality bore an unmistakable message about the primacy of the people's branch of government. Rejecting a simple grid for the capital as "tiresome and insipid," he argued that such a pattern made sense only for flat cities. This building would be the visual centerpiece of the city, with broad, diagonal thoroughfares radiating outward. Its centrality bore an unmistakable message about the primacy of the people's branch of government. Rejecting a simple grid for the capital as "tiresome and insipid," he argued that such a pattern made sense only for flat cities.33 Not only would diagonal streets provide "contrast and variety," but they would serve as express lanes, shortening the distance between places. Not only would diagonal streets provide "contrast and variety," but they would serve as express lanes, shortening the distance between places.34 Town squares would be situated where diagonal avenues crossed. The kernel of the future Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C., lay in that conception. Striking a note of buoyant optimism that appealed to the president, L'Enfant wanted the city to be able to grow in size and beauty as "the wealth of the nation will permit it to pursue, at any period, however remote." Town squares would be situated where diagonal avenues crossed. The kernel of the future Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C., lay in that conception. Striking a note of buoyant optimism that appealed to the president, L'Enfant wanted the city to be able to grow in size and beauty as "the wealth of the nation will permit it to pursue, at any period, however remote."35 Aside from tr.i.m.m.i.n.g the number of diagonal streets, Was.h.i.+ngton gave L'Enfant an unrestricted hand to pursue his plan. At the close of his southern tour, he rode across the federal district with L'Enfant and Andrew Ellicott to experience the elevations chosen for Congress and other public buildings. While he endorsed Jenkins Hill for Congress, he balked at a site chosen for the executive mansion and opted for higher ground farther west, thereby a.s.serting executive power and giving it visual parity with the Capitol. In endorsing the spot for the future White House, L'Enfant cunningly played to Was.h.i.+ngton's interests by observing that it would possess an "extensive view down the Potomac, with a prospect of the whole harbor and town of Alexandria"-that is, it would face Mount Vernon.36 The entire project gratified Was.h.i.+ngton's vanity on another level: people a.s.sumed that the new city would be named either Was.h.i.+ngton or Was.h.i.+ngtonople. In September Was.h.i.+ngton learned that the commissioners had indeed decided, without fanfare, to call the city Was.h.i.+ngton and the surrounding district Columbia, giving birth to Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C. Was.h.i.+ngton would never have signed the original Residence Act had the capital then been called Was.h.i.+ngton-it would have seemed supremely vain-but now he was merely acceding to the will of the three bureaucrats he had appointed. The entire project gratified Was.h.i.+ngton's vanity on another level: people a.s.sumed that the new city would be named either Was.h.i.+ngton or Was.h.i.+ngtonople. In September Was.h.i.+ngton learned that the commissioners had indeed decided, without fanfare, to call the city Was.h.i.+ngton and the surrounding district Columbia, giving birth to Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C. Was.h.i.+ngton would never have signed the original Residence Act had the capital then been called Was.h.i.+ngton-it would have seemed supremely vain-but now he was merely acceding to the will of the three bureaucrats he had appointed.

That October Was.h.i.+ngton sneaked in a monthlong stay at Mount Vernon before Congress reconvened. The health of his tubercular nephew and estate manager, George Augustine Was.h.i.+ngton, had deteriorated so sharply that he had gone to Berkeley Springs for rest. He was a likable young man who pleased many visitors; one praised his "gentle manner and interesting face" and another described him as a "handsome, genteel, attentive man."37 By this point, however, he could scarcely ride a horse, much less manage an estate, and Was.h.i.+ngton named his secretary, Robert Lewis, as temporary manager of Mount Vernon. Lewis would eventually be succeeded by Anthony Whitting. By this point, however, he could scarcely ride a horse, much less manage an estate, and Was.h.i.+ngton named his secretary, Robert Lewis, as temporary manager of Mount Vernon. Lewis would eventually be succeeded by Anthony Whitting.

In the federal district L'Enfant, schooled in a European tradition where master builders ruled entire projects, refused to take direction from anyone. The first lots were auctioned off in Georgetown on October 17, with Jefferson and Madison in attendance; L'Enfant declined to show anyone his map, afraid that buyers would shun parcels in sections distant from the main government buildings. The most he deigned to share with bidders was a verbal description of the town layout. Was.h.i.+ngton had expected to be on hand for the three-day sale but was caught in an embarra.s.sing error. In planning his return trip to Philadelphia, he knew that Congress would meet the fourth Friday of October, which he calculated as October 31. He was mortified to discover that he had miscalculated and that Congress would meet October 24. "I had no more idea of this than I had of its being doomsday," he told Tobias Lear.38 Thrown for a loop, he departed hastily for Philadelphia to give his annual address to Congress and arrived in time to deliver an upbeat a.s.sessment of the state of the Union, noting "the happy effects of that revival of confidence, public as well as private, to which the Const.i.tution and laws of the United States have so eminently contributed." Thrown for a loop, he departed hastily for Philadelphia to give his annual address to Congress and arrived in time to deliver an upbeat a.s.sessment of the state of the Union, noting "the happy effects of that revival of confidence, public as well as private, to which the Const.i.tution and laws of the United States have so eminently contributed."39 L'Enfant had been instructed to bring to Philadelphia a plan of the federal city, which Was.h.i.+ngton would submit to Congress with his annual message, but the mercurial Frenchman never delivered it. L'Enfant had been instructed to bring to Philadelphia a plan of the federal city, which Was.h.i.+ngton would submit to Congress with his annual message, but the mercurial Frenchman never delivered it.

In late October the three commissioners informed Was.h.i.+ngton that L'Enfant's high-handed refusal to turn over his plans had impeded the auction; scarcely more than thirty lots had been sold. Was.h.i.+ngton replied angrily that while he had suspected that L'Enfant might be obstinate in defending his plan, he had not thought he would go so far as to sabotage the sale. Clearly L'Enfant would make no concessions to attract real estate speculators and considered himself answerable only to the president. His feud with the commissioners festered. At one point, when L'Enfant demolished a building erected by a commissioner because it intruded on one of his grand avenues, the clash erupted into open warfare. Was.h.i.+ngton confidentially told Jefferson that he could tolerate the French prima donna up to a point, but "he must know there is a line beyond which he will not be suffered to go." there is a line beyond which he will not be suffered to go."40 Much as he hated losing L'Enfant, Was.h.i.+ngton knew that, unless he reined him in tightly, he might lose his three commissioners. He had Jefferson draft a stern reprimand to the Frenchman, to be sent out under his own signature. "Having the beauty and harmony of your plan only in view," Was.h.i.+ngton wrote, "you pursue it as if every person and thing was Much as he hated losing L'Enfant, Was.h.i.+ngton knew that, unless he reined him in tightly, he might lose his three commissioners. He had Jefferson draft a stern reprimand to the Frenchman, to be sent out under his own signature. "Having the beauty and harmony of your plan only in view," Was.h.i.+ngton wrote, "you pursue it as if every person and thing was obliged obliged to yield to it, whereas the commissioners have many circ.u.mstances to attend to, some of which, perhaps, may be unknown to you." to yield to it, whereas the commissioners have many circ.u.mstances to attend to, some of which, perhaps, may be unknown to you."41 L'Enfant seriously misread Was.h.i.+ngton, who wanted harmony and cooperation among those involved in planning the new capital. In January 1792 the self-important L'Enfant submitted a lengthy memorandum to Was.h.i.+ngton, which was a barefaced attempt to push aside the commissioners and take sole control of the project. After proposing a one-million-dollar expenditure and a workforce of a thousand men, L'Enfant ended by saying, "It is necessary to place under the authority of one single director all those employed in the execution."42 Was.h.i.+ngton grew apoplectic. "The conduct of Maj[o]r L'Enfant and those employed under him astonishes me beyond measure!" he told Jefferson, who drew up an ultimatum in which he asked L'Enfant point-blank whether he intended to subordinate himself to the commissioners. Was.h.i.+ngton grew apoplectic. "The conduct of Maj[o]r L'Enfant and those employed under him astonishes me beyond measure!" he told Jefferson, who drew up an ultimatum in which he asked L'Enfant point-blank whether he intended to subordinate himself to the commissioners.43 Always eager to compromise, Was.h.i.+ngton sent Tobias Lear to patch things up with L'Enfant, but the latter bl.u.s.tered that he needed complete freedom from the commissioners. On February 27, 1792, bowing to the inevitable, Jefferson terminated L'Enfant's services. Was.h.i.+ngton ended up feeling bitter toward L'Enfant for his imperious treatment of the commissioners. Nevertheless, the broad strokes of L'Enfant's design for Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C., left their imprint on the city. As John Adams concluded years later, "Was.h.i.+ngton, Jefferson, and L'Enfant were the triumvirate who planned the city, the capitol, and the prince's palace." Always eager to compromise, Was.h.i.+ngton sent Tobias Lear to patch things up with L'Enfant, but the latter bl.u.s.tered that he needed complete freedom from the commissioners. On February 27, 1792, bowing to the inevitable, Jefferson terminated L'Enfant's services. Was.h.i.+ngton ended up feeling bitter toward L'Enfant for his imperious treatment of the commissioners. Nevertheless, the broad strokes of L'Enfant's design for Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C., left their imprint on the city. As John Adams concluded years later, "Was.h.i.+ngton, Jefferson, and L'Enfant were the triumvirate who planned the city, the capitol, and the prince's palace."44 Philadelphia's citizens were by no means resigned to their city being only a temporary capital and continued to throw up new government buildings, hoping to sway legislators to stay. When they tried constructing a new presidential residence, Was.h.i.+ngton saw their secret intent and insisted that his current house was perfectly satisfactory. Sensing an even split in public opinion about moving the capital to the Potomac, he divulged his fears to Jefferson: "The current in this this city sets so strongly against the Federal City that I believe nothing that city sets so strongly against the Federal City that I believe nothing that can can be avoided will ever be accomplished in it." be avoided will ever be accomplished in it."45 Was.h.i.+ngton grew paranoid about the wily Philadelphians, even imagining that local printers stalled in producing engraved designs of the Potomac capital. Any delays, he feared, might doom the enterprise. He pressed for buildings in the District of Columbia that would foreshadow America's future might and rival the great cities of Europe. "The buildings, especially the Capitol, ought to be upon a scale far superior to anything in Was.h.i.+ngton grew paranoid about the wily Philadelphians, even imagining that local printers stalled in producing engraved designs of the Potomac capital. Any delays, he feared, might doom the enterprise. He pressed for buildings in the District of Columbia that would foreshadow America's future might and rival the great cities of Europe. "The buildings, especially the Capitol, ought to be upon a scale far superior to anything in this this country," he insisted to Jefferson. The house for the president should be both "chaste" and "capacious." country," he insisted to Jefferson. The house for the president should be both "chaste" and "capacious."46 In time the city of Was.h.i.+ngton would come to justify the grandiose dimensions envisioned by both Was.h.i.+ngton and L'Enfant. In time the city of Was.h.i.+ngton would come to justify the grandiose dimensions envisioned by both Was.h.i.+ngton and L'Enfant.

AS EARLY AS THE FALL OF 1789, Was.h.i.+ngton emphasized to General Arthur St. Clair, first governor of the Northwest Territory, that he preferred a peace treaty with the hostile Indians of the Ohio Country to war. On the other hand, as long as those tribes, instigated by the British, pursued depredations on frontier communities, the government would be "constrained to punish them with severity."47 During the summer of 1790 the Miami and Wabash tribes flouted peace overtures from the government and conducted fierce raids against American traffic on the Ohio and Wabash rivers. In response, Was.h.i.+ngton and Knox instructed St. Clair to summon the militia and destroy crops and villages of the offending Indians, hoping a show of strength would prod them into a negotiated peace. Selected to command the fifteen-hundred-man force, made up mostly of militia, was Brigadier General Josiah Harmar, a Revolutionary War veteran whose drinking habits caused concern in Philadelphia. Henry Knox scolded Harmar for being "too fond of the convivial gla.s.s" and pointed out that Was.h.i.+ngton was aware of this problem. During the summer of 1790 the Miami and Wabash tribes flouted peace overtures from the government and conducted fierce raids against American traffic on the Ohio and Wabash rivers. In response, Was.h.i.+ngton and Knox instructed St. Clair to summon the militia and destroy crops and villages of the offending Indians, hoping a show of strength would prod them into a negotiated peace. Selected to command the fifteen-hundred-man force, made up mostly of militia, was Brigadier General Josiah Harmar, a Revolutionary War veteran whose drinking habits caused concern in Philadelphia. Henry Knox scolded Harmar for being "too fond of the convivial gla.s.s" and pointed out that Was.h.i.+ngton was aware of this problem.48 At the end of that September, Harmar led his men on an expedition against the Wabash Indians northwest of the Ohio River. By mid-November, with the fate of the operation wrapped in mysterious silence, Was.h.i.+ngton girded for bad news and confessed to Knox his forebodings of a "disgraceful termination" to the expedition. Always moralistic about alcohol problems, he reserved harsh words for General Harmar. "I expected little little from the moment I heard he was a from the moment I heard he was a drunkard, drunkard," he told Knox.49 Was.h.i.+ngton's worries about the expedition were prescient: Harmar's men suffered a stunning defeat at a Miami Indian village near the present-day city of Fort Wayne, Indiana. The dreadful performance of American troops-they killed two hundred Indians but suffered an equal number of casualties-only reinforced Was.h.i.+ngton and Knox's long-standing prejudice against militia. Nonetheless, a military court of inquiry vindicated Harmar, labeling his conduct "irreproachable." Was.h.i.+ngton's worries about the expedition were prescient: Harmar's men suffered a stunning defeat at a Miami Indian village near the present-day city of Fort Wayne, Indiana. The dreadful performance of American troops-they killed two hundred Indians but suffered an equal number of casualties-only reinforced Was.h.i.+ngton and Knox's long-standing prejudice against militia. Nonetheless, a military court of inquiry vindicated Harmar, labeling his conduct "irreproachable."50 Was.h.i.+ngton always tried to be evenhanded in dealing with the Indians. He hoped that they would abandon their itinerant hunting life and adapt to fixed agricultural communities in the manner of Anglo-Saxon settlers. He never advocated outright confiscation of their land or the forcible removal of tribes, and he berated American settlers who abused Indians, admitting that he held out no hope for pacific relations with the Indians as long as "frontier settlers entertain the opinion that there is not the same crime (or indeed no crime at all) in killing an Indian as in killing a white man."51 When addressing Seneca chiefs that December, he conceded provocations by American settlers: "The murders that have been committed upon some of your people by the bad white men, I sincerely lament and reprobate, and I earnestly hope that the real murderers will be secured and punished as they deserve." When addressing Seneca chiefs that December, he conceded provocations by American settlers: "The murders that have been committed upon some of your people by the bad white men, I sincerely lament and reprobate, and I earnestly hope that the real murderers will be secured and punished as they deserve."52 Nevertheless Indians saw only a pattern of steady encroachment and unrelenting westward advancement by white settlers that threatened their traditional way of life. In the end, Was.h.i.+ngton's hope of "civilizing" the Indians by converting them to agriculture and Christianity was destined to fail. Nevertheless Indians saw only a pattern of steady encroachment and unrelenting westward advancement by white settlers that threatened their traditional way of life. In the end, Was.h.i.+ngton's hope of "civilizing" the Indians by converting them to agriculture and Christianity was destined to fail.

It was only a matter of time before Was.h.i.+ngton and Knox got authority to raise a new regiment and mount a major reprisal against the Indians. Arthur St. Clair, elevated to a major general, was to lead fourteen hundred troops to the Miami village with an unsparing mandate: "Seek the enemy and endeavor by all possible means to strike them with great severity."53 Born in Scotland, trained as a physician, St. Clair was a seasoned officer who had fought in the French and Indian War. Patriotic if a bit pompous, he had turned in a mixed record during the Revolutionary War but performed well enough that Was.h.i.+ngton valued him as a soldier in "high repute." Born in Scotland, trained as a physician, St. Clair was a seasoned officer who had fought in the French and Indian War. Patriotic if a bit pompous, he had turned in a mixed record during the Revolutionary War but performed well enough that Was.h.i.+ngton valued him as a soldier in "high repute."54 For his 1791 expedition, St. Clair led a threadbare, inexperienced army described by one officer as "badly clothed, badly paid, and badly fed." For his 1791 expedition, St. Clair led a threadbare, inexperienced army described by one officer as "badly clothed, badly paid, and badly fed."55 As this force dragged bra.s.s field pieces through the wilderness, it was depleted by illness and desertion. St. Clair, suffering from agonizing gout, had to be borne aloft on a stretcher. The general grew peevish over lax discipline among his men and paused during the march to construct a gallows to punish insubordination. As this force dragged bra.s.s field pieces through the wilderness, it was depleted by illness and desertion. St. Clair, suffering from agonizing gout, had to be borne aloft on a stretcher. The general grew peevish over lax discipline among his men and paused during the march to construct a gallows to punish insubordination.

On November 4, 1791, right before sunrise, St. Clair and his men were camped near the Miami village when up to fifteen hundred Indians pounced in a surprise attack. Hurling aside artillery and baggage, the Americans fled in a panic-stricken rout. All discipline broke down amid the general slaughter, and gruesome stories of butchery filtered back from the wilderness. As one soldier related, "I saw a Capt. Smith just after he was scalped, setting on his backside, his head smoking like a chimney."56 The heart of General Richard Butler was supposedly sliced into pieces and distributed to the victorious tribes. In a ghoulish warning to stay off their land, the Indians stuffed the mouths of some victims with soil. St. Clair's troops suffered shocking casualties-900 out of 1,400 men-versus only 150 Indians. The heart of General Richard Butler was supposedly sliced into pieces and distributed to the victorious tribes. In a ghoulish warning to stay off their land, the Indians stuffed the mouths of some victims with soil. St. Clair's troops suffered shocking casualties-900 out of 1,400 men-versus only 150 Indians.

According to an account based on an 1816 talk with Tobias Lear, the dreadful tidings arrived in Philadelphia on December 9, in the middle of one of Martha Was.h.i.+ngton's demure Friday-evening receptions. After knocking at the president's door, the courier informed Lear that he had dispatches to deliver directly to Was.h.i.+ngton. After being pulled from the reception, the president was closeted for a time with this unusual messenger and read St. Clair's description of "as warm and unfortunate an action as almost any that has been fought."57 When he returned to the reception, he apologized to his guests but revealed nothing of the extraordinary news. Instead, he went dutifully through his social paces, conversing with each lady in attendance. With extraordinary self-control, Was.h.i.+ngton allowed nothing in his demeanor to hint at the pent-up rage churning inside him. When the guests were gone, Was.h.i.+ngton and Lear sat alone by the parlor fire, and Was.h.i.+ngton blew up in tremendous wrath, throwing up his hands in agitation, scarcely able to contain his emotions. The editors of the George Was.h.i.+ngton papers note that the story "contains some credible details" but also point out that by the date in question "unofficial reports of the defeat already were circulating in Philadelphia." When he returned to the reception, he apologized to his guests but revealed nothing of the extraordinary news. Instead, he went dutifully through his social paces, conversing with each lady in attendance. With extraordinary self-control, Was.h.i.+ngton allowed nothing in his demeanor to hint at the pent-up rage churning inside him. When the guests were gone, Was.h.i.+ngton and Lear sat alone by the parlor fire, and Was.h.i.+ngton blew up in tremendous wrath, throwing up his hands in agitation, scarcely able to contain his emotions. The editors of the George Was.h.i.+ngton papers note that the story "contains some credible details" but also point out that by the date in question "unofficial reports of the defeat already were circulating in Philadelphia." 58 58 At a later cabinet meeting, Was.h.i.+ngton, reaching back to his early frontier experience, faulted St. Clair for failing to keep "his army in such a position always as to be able to display them in a line behind trees in the Ind[ia]n manner at any moment." At a later cabinet meeting, Was.h.i.+ngton, reaching back to his early frontier experience, faulted St. Clair for failing to keep "his army in such a position always as to be able to display them in a line behind trees in the Ind[ia]n manner at any moment."59 In early January the first news reports of the disaster cast St. Clair in a heroic light. In February the tenor abruptly changed when Colonel William Darke published an anonymous diatribe against Was.h.i.+ngton for having dispatched a woefully infirm general, bedridden and propped up with pillows, into battle: "That the executive should commit the reputation of the government . . . to a man who, from the situation of his health, was under the necessity of traveling on a bier, seems to have been an oversight as unexpected as it has been severely censured. A general, enwrapped ten-fold in flannel robes, unable to walk alone, placed on his car, bolstered on all sides with pillows and medicines, and thus moving on to attack the most active enemy in the world was . . . a very tragicomical appearance indeed."60 Congressman William B. Grove labeled the St. Clair defeat "the most complete victory ever known in this country obtained by Indians." Congressman William B. Grove labeled the St. Clair defeat "the most complete victory ever known in this country obtained by Indians."61 When Knox submitted a request to Congress for an expanded army and a new a.s.sault on the refractory Indians, several congressmen took advantage of it to condemn administration policy. One critic rebuked the administration for "preparing to squander away money by millions" and contended that n.o.body, "except those who are in the secrets of the Cabinet, knows for what reason the war has been thus carried on for three years."62 In general, Was.h.i.+ngton did not dignify such criticisms with responses, but he asked Knox to draw up a doc.u.ment that could also be published as a broadside-a distinct departure showing a new sensitivity to public opinion. Knox's statement recounted the deaths of white frontier settlers and numerous peace overtures toward the Indians. But these measures having failed, he now argued for a new and larger army. In early February the House voted its approval of five new regiments, with almost a thousand men apiece. To allay fears of a standing army, the new units were to be disbanded once the Indian threat in the Northwest Territory subsided. In general, Was.h.i.+ngton did not dignify such criticisms with responses, but he asked Knox to draw up a doc.u.ment that could also be published as a broadside-a distinct departure showing a new sensitivity to public opinion. Knox's statement recounted the deaths of white frontier settlers and numerous peace overtures toward the Indians. But these measures having failed, he now argued for a new and larger army. In early February the House voted its approval of five new regiments, with almost a thousand men apiece. To allay fears of a standing army, the new units were to be disbanded once the Indian threat in the Northwest Territory subsided.

The wrangling between Congress and the administration over Indian warfare reached a crisis when legislators launched an investigation and asked Knox in late March for his correspondence relating to the ill-fated St. Clair campaign. Aware that revealing these papers might redefine the separation of powers, Was.h.i.+ngton a.s.sembled his cabinet and told them, according to Jefferson, that he wished their decision "should be rightly conducted" because it might "become a precedent."63 The cabinet ruled that "the executive ought to communicate such papers as the public good would permit and ought to refuse those the disclosure of which would injure the public." The cabinet ruled that "the executive ought to communicate such papers as the public good would permit and ought to refuse those the disclosure of which would injure the public."64 This equivocal decision left the question of executive privilege up in the air. In its final report, Congress vindicated St. Clair's management of the debacle, placing the onus squarely on Was.h.i.+ngton's administration by lambasting the logistical support the army had received. This equivocal decision left the question of executive privilege up in the air. In its final report, Congress vindicated St. Clair's management of the debacle, placing the onus squarely on Was.h.i.+ngton's administration by lambasting the logistical support the army had received.

Thus far Was.h.i.+ngton's Indian policy added up to a well-meaning failure: he had been able neither to negotiate peace nor to prevail in war. To restore the army's battered reputation, he appointed Anthony Wayne, the quondam hero of Stony Point, to lead the new augmented army in the Northwest Territory. The redoubtable Wayne inst.i.tuted tough measures to instill discipline in the new army and shaved, branded, and whipped soldiers to sharpen their performance. While pleased with Wayne's rigor, Henry Knox introduced a caveat: "Uncommon punishment not sanctioned by law should be admitted with caution."65 The creation of this new, more professional army only heightened the qualms of those who feared a standing army and exacerbated the growing political divisions in Philadelphia. Nonetheless, under Wayne's leaders.h.i.+p, the army would reverse the disastrous direction that Indian warfare had taken during the unsuccessful Harmar and St. Clair campaigns. The creation of this new, more professional army only heightened the qualms of those who feared a standing army and exacerbated the growing political divisions in Philadelphia. Nonetheless, under Wayne's leaders.h.i.+p, the army would reverse the disastrous direction that Indian warfare had taken during the unsuccessful Harmar and St. Clair campaigns.

CHAPTER FIFTY-FIVE.

A Tissue of Machinations AS THE FIRST PRESIDENT, George Was.h.i.+ngton hoped to float above the political fray and avoid infighting, backbiting, and poisonous intrigue. He wanted to be an exemplary figure of national unity, surmounting partisan interests, and was therefore slow to spot the deep fissures yawning open in his administration. In June 1790 he told Lafayette, "By having Mr Jefferson at the head of the Department of State . . . Hamilton of the Treasury and Knox of that of War, I feel myself supported by able coadjutors, who harmonize together extremely well."1 Was.h.i.+ngton always worked hard to appear impartial and to impress the electorate that he was president of Was.h.i.+ngton always worked hard to appear impartial and to impress the electorate that he was president of all all the people. This pose of immaculate purity was congenial to him, as he sought a happy medium in his behavior. Despite holding firm opinions, he was never an ideologue, and his policy positions did not come wrapped in tidy ideological packages. Rather, they developed in a slow, evolutionary manner, annealed in the heat of conflict. the people. This pose of immaculate purity was congenial to him, as he sought a happy medium in his behavior. Despite holding firm opinions, he was never an ideologue, and his policy positions did not come wrapped in tidy ideological packages. Rather, they developed in a slow, evolutionary manner, annealed in the heat of conflict.

Was.h.i.+ngton and other founders entertained the fanciful hope that America would be spared the bane of political parties, which they called "factions" and a.s.sociated with parochial self-interest. The first president did not see that parties might someday clarify choices for the electorate, organize opinion, and enlist people in the political process; rather he feared that parties could blight a still fragile republic. He was hardly alone. "If I could not go to heaven but with a party," Jefferson opined, "I would not go there at all."2 Yet the first factions arose from Jefferson's extreme displeasure with Hamilton's mounting influence. They were not political parties in the modern sense so much as clas.h.i.+ng coteries of intellectual elites, who operated through letters and conversations instead of meetings, platforms, and conventions. Nonetheless these groups solidified into parties during the decade and, notwithstanding the founders' fears, formed an enduring cornerstone of American democratic politics. Yet the first factions arose from Jefferson's extreme displeasure with Hamilton's mounting influence. They were not political parties in the modern sense so much as clas.h.i.+ng coteries of intellectual elites, who operated through letters and conversations instead of meetings, platforms, and conventions. Nonetheless these groups solidified into parties during the decade and, notwithstanding the founders' fears, formed an enduring cornerstone of American democratic politics.

Disturbed by the expansion of federal power under Hamilton's programs, Jefferson and Madison suspected a secret counterrevolution was at work, an incipient plot to install a monarchical government on the British model. Their defeat over the bank bill in late February 1791 convinced them that Hamilton had hopelessly bewitched the president. Hamilton's a.s.sertion of federal power also awakened fears that meddlesome northerners might interfere with southern slavery. As one Virginian later said, "Tell me, if Congress can establish banks, make roads and ca.n.a.ls, whether they cannot free all the slaves in the United States."3 Unlike the Anglophile Hamilton, Jefferson and Madison often seemed to want to make the American government everything that the British government was not. To denigrate his foes, Jefferson applied to them hyperbolic labels, including "monocrats" and "Anglomen"-words with an evocative conspiratorial ring. As the French Revolution grew more sanguinary, Hamilton in turn demonized the Jeffersonians as involved in a worldwide Jacobin conspiracy emanating from Paris.

To organize opposition to the dangerous political backsliding that they perceived, Jefferson and Madison took a tour of New York and New England in May- June 1791. The cover story Jefferson supplied to Was.h.i.+ngton was that he needed a break "to get rid of a headache which is very troublesome, by giving more exercise to the body and less to the mind."4 Jefferson and Madison supposedly planned to collect botanical specimens, but they actually intended to recruit political partisans, especially on Hamilton's home turf of New York. A courtly, charismatic leader, Jefferson was adept at fostering camaraderie among like-minded politicians. If more circ.u.mspect, Madison was no less crafty or committed to the cause. The long-standing friends.h.i.+p of these two men now deepened into a powerful political partners.h.i.+p. Jefferson and Madison supposedly planned to collect botanical specimens, but they actually intended to recruit political partisans, especially on Hamilton's home turf of New York. A courtly, charismatic leader, Jefferson was adept at fostering camaraderie among like-minded politicians. If more circ.u.mspect, Madison was no less crafty or committed to the cause. The long-standing friends.h.i.+p of these two men now deepened into a powerful political partners.h.i.+p.

It seems strange that the revolt against Was.h.i.+ngton's administration originated with a member of his own cabinet and a close confidant. When the president delivered his annual message to Congress in October 1791, Madison chaired the House committee that drafted a response, and Was.h.i.+ngton asked him to draft his own reply to that doc.u.ment. At the time, no political protocol insisted that disgruntled cabinet members should resign from an administration with which they disagreed. Nor was there yet a tradition of a loyal opposition. Was.h.i.+ngton sometimes found it hard to differentiate between legitimate dissent and outright disloyalty. He tended to view criticism as something fomented by wily, demagogic people, manipulating an otherwise contented populace.

In an extreme act of duplicity, Madison and Jefferson installed a flaming critic of Was.h.i.+ngton right in the heart of his own government. They wanted to counter the views of John Fenno, editor of the pro-administration Gazette of the United States, Gazette of the United States, which Jefferson accused of peddling "doctrines of monarchy, aristocracy, and the exclusion of the influence of the people." which Jefferson accused of peddling "doctrines of monarchy, aristocracy, and the exclusion of the influence of the people."5 To woo him to Philadelphia, Jefferson offered a job as State Department translator to the poet Philip Freneau, who knew only one language and was scarcely qualified. The suggestion came from Madison, a friend and former Princeton cla.s.smate of his. During the war Freneau had written a rhapsodic paean to Was.h.i.+ngton ent.i.tled "Cincinnatus." After being incarcerated in a loathsome British prison s.h.i.+p, he came to detest everything British and turned against President Was.h.i.+ngton and the Hamiltonian program with a vengeance. In late October 1791, after taking the State Department job, Freneau launched the To woo him to Philadelphia, Jefferson offered a job as State Department translator to the poet Philip Freneau, who knew only one language and was scarcely qualified. The suggestion came from Madison, a friend and former Princeton cla.s.smate of his. During the war Freneau had written a rhapsodic paean to Was.h.i.+ngton ent.i.tled "Cincinnatus." After being incarcerated in a loathsome British prison s.h.i.+p, he came to detest everything British and turned against President Was.h.i.+ngton and the Hamiltonian program with a vengeance. In late October 1791, after taking the State Department job, Freneau launched the National Gazette, National Gazette, which became the virulent organ of the Jeffersonian opposition. In its premier issue, it accused Hamilton of being the kingpin of a monarchist conspiracy and touted Jefferson as the "colossus of liberty." which became the virulent organ of the Jeffersonian opposition. In its premier issue, it accused Hamilton of being the kingpin of a monarchist conspiracy and touted Jefferson as the "colossus of liberty."6 Before long the two factions took on revealing names. The Hamiltonian party called itself Federalists, implying that it alone supported the Const.i.tution and national unity. It took a robust view of federal power and a strong executive branch, and it favored banks and manufacturing as well as agriculture. Elitist in its politics, it tended to doubt the wisdom of the common people, but it also included a large numb