Twenty Years of Congress Volume I Part 23

Samuel C. Fessenden and Thomas A. D. Fessenden, brothers of the distinguished senator, were members of this House,--the only instance in which three brothers were ever in Congress at the same time from the same State. Three Washburns had served in the preceding Congress, but they represented three States.

--The far North-West was well represented by young men. William Windom came from Minnesota, and from Iowa James F. Wilson, a man of positive strength, destined to take very prominent part in legislative proceedings. Fernando C. Beaman came from Michigan, and John F. Potter and A. Scott Sloan from Wisconsin. Martin F.

Conway came from the youngest State of the Union, fresh from the contests which had made Kansas almost a field of war.

The organization of the House was so promptly effected that the President's message was received on the same day. Throughout the country there was an eagerness to hear Mr. Lincoln's views on the painful situation. The people had read with deep sympathy the tender plea to the South contained in his Inaugural address. The next occasion on which they had heard from him officially was his proclamation for troops after the fall of Sumter. Public opinion in the North would undoubtedly be much influenced by what the President should now say. Mr. Lincoln was keenly alive to the importance of his message, and he weighed every word he wrote. He maintained, as he always did, calmness of tone, moderation in expression. He appealed to reason, not to prejudice. He spoke as one who knew that he would be judged by the public opinion of the world. It was his fortune to put his name to many state papers of extraordinary weight, but never to one of graver import than his first message to Congress.

PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S FIRST MESSAGE.

The President informed Congress that he would not call their attention "to any ordinary subject of legislation." In fact there were but two things for Congress to do in the national exigency-- provide for the enlistment of an army, and for the raising of money necessary to the conduct of a great war. The President vividly narrated the progressive steps in the South which had brought about the existing status of affairs. He depicted in strong colors the condition in which he found the government when he a.s.sumed office; how "the forts, a.r.s.enals, dock-yards, and custom-houses" of the National Government had been seized; how "the acc.u.mulations of national revenue" had been appropriated; how "a disproportionate share of Federal muskets and rifles" had found their way into the Southern States, and had been seized to be used against the government; how the navy had been "scattered in distant seas, leaving but a small part of it within immediate reach of the government;" how seven States had seceded from the Union, and formed "a separate government, which is already invoking recognition, aid, and intervention from foreign powers." With this critical situation he was compelled to deal at once, and the policy which he had chosen when he entered upon his office looked to the exhaustion of all peaceful measures before a resort to stronger ones.

In pursuing the policy of peace, the President had "sought only to hold the public places and property not already wrested from the government, and to collect the revenue--relying for the rest on time, discussion, and the ballot-box." He had even gone so far as "to promise a continuance of the mails at government expense to the very people who were resisting the government;" and he had given "repeated pledges" that every thing should be "forborne without which it was believed possible to keep the government on foot;" that there should be no "disturbances to any of the people, or to any of their rights." He had gone in the direction of conciliation as far as it was possible to go, without consenting to a disruption of the government.

The President gave in detail the events which led to the a.s.sault on Sumter. He declared that the reduction of the fort "was in no sense a matter of self-defense on the part of the a.s.sailants."

They well knew "that the garrison in the fort could by no possibility commit an aggression upon them;" they were expressly notified that "the giving of bread to the few brave and hungry men of the garrison was all which would be attempted, unless themselves, by resisting so much, should provoke more." They knew that the National Government desired to keep the garrison in the fort, "not to a.s.sail them, but merely to maintain visible possession, and thus to preserve the Union from actual and immediate dissolution." The Confederate Government had "a.s.sailed and reduced the fort for precisely the reverse object--to drive out the visible authority of the Federal Union, and thus force it to immediate dissolution."

"In this act," said Mr. Lincoln, "discarding all else, they have forced upon the country the distinct issue--immediate dissolution or blood; and this issue embraces more than the fate of these United States. It presents to the whole family of man the question, whether a Const.i.tutional Republic, a government of the people by the same people, can or cannot maintain its territorial integrity against its own domestic foes." The President presented this point with elaboration. The question really involved, was "whether discontented individuals, too few in number to control the administration according to the organic law, can always, upon the pretenses made in this case, or any other pretenses, or arbitrarily without pretenses, break up the government, and thus practically put an end to free government upon the earth. It forces us to ask, _Is there in all Republics this inherent and fatal weakness?_ Must a government of necessity be too strong for the liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?"

The President was severe upon Virginia and Virginians. He had made earnest effort to save the State from joining the Rebellion. He had held conferences with her leading men, and had gone so far on the 13th of April as to address a communication, for public use in Virginia, to the State convention then in session at Richmond, in answer to a resolution of the convention asking him to define the policy he intended to pursue in regard to the Confederate States.

In this he re-a.s.serted the position a.s.sumed in his Inaugural, and added that "if, as now appears to be true, an unprovoked a.s.sault has been made on Fort Sumter, I shall hold myself at liberty to repossess it if I can, and the like places which had been seized before the government was devolved upon me. I shall, to the best of my ability, repel force by force." This letter was used to inflame public sentiment in Virginia, and to hurl the State into Secession through the agency of a Convention elected to maintain the Union. Mr. Lincoln afterwards believed that the letter had been obtained from him under disingenuous pretenses and for the express purpose of using it, as it was used, against the Union and in favor of the Confederacy.

PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S FIRST MESSAGE.

The President's resentment towards those who had thus, as he thought, broken faith with him is visible in his message. Referring to the Virginia convention, he observed that, "the people had chosen a large majority of professed Union men" as delegates. "After the fall of Sumter, many members of that majority went over to the original Disunion minority, and with them adopted an ordinance withdrawing the State from the Union." In his own peculiar style, Mr. Lincoln made the stinging comment, "Whether this change was wrought by their great approval of the a.s.sault upon Sumter, or by their great resentment at the government's resistance to that a.s.sault, is not definitely known." Though the Virginia convention had submitted the ordinance of Secession to a vote of the people, to be taken on a day nearly a month in the future, the President informed Congress that "they immediately commenced acting as if the State was already out of the Union." They seized the a.r.s.enal at Harper's Ferry, and the navy-yard at Norfolk, and "received, perhaps invited, large bodies of troops from the so-called seceding States." They "sent members to their Congress at Montgomery, and finally permitted the insurrectionary government to be transferred to their Capitol at Richmond." Mr. Lincoln concluded with an ominous sentence which might well have inspired Virginians with a sense of impending peril; "The people of Virginia have thus allowed his giant insurrection to make its nest within her borders, and this government has no choice left but to deal with it where it finds it." In that moment of pa.s.sion these words, with all their terrible significance, were heard by Southern men only to be jeered at.

When the President came to specific recommendations he was brief and pointed. He asked that Congress would place "at the control of the government at least four hundred thousand men, and four hundred millions of money." He said this number was about one- tenth of those of proper age within the regions where all were apparently willing to engage, and the sum was "less than a twenty- third part of the money value owned by men who seem ready to devote the whole." He argued that "a debt of six hundred millions of dollars is now a less sum per head than the debt of the Revolution when we came out of that struggle, and the money value in the country bears even a greater proportion to what it was then than does the population." "Surely," he added, "each man has as strong a motive now to _preserve_ our liberties as each had then to _establish_ them."

After arguing at length as to the utter fallacy of the right of Secession, and showing how the public "mind of the South had been drugged and insidiously debauched with the doctrine for thirty years," the President closed his message "with the deepest regret that he found the duty of employing the war power of the government forced upon him;" but he "must perform his duty, or surrender the existence of the government." Compromise had been urged upon the President from every quarter. He answered all such requests frankly: "No compromise by public servants could in this case be a cure; not that compromises are not often proper, but that no popular government can long survive a marked precedent that those who carry an election can only save the government from immediate destruction by giving up the main point upon which the people gave the election.

The people themselves, and not their servants, can safely reverse their own deliberate decision."

Mr. Lincoln thus saw his duty clearly and met it boldly. In his own person was centred, as he profoundly realized, the fate of Republican government. He had been elected President of the United States in strict accordance with all the requirements of the Const.i.tution. He had been chosen without bribe, without violence, without undue pressure, by a majority of the electoral votes. If there had been outrage upon the freedom of the ballot it was not among his supporters; if there had been a terror of public opinion, overawing the right of private judgment, it was not in the States which had voted for him, but in those Southern communities where, by threats of violence, the opportunity to cast a ballot was denied to electors favorable to his cause. If he should now yield, he evil results would be immeasurable and irremediable. "As a private citizen," he said, "the Executive could not have consented that Republican inst.i.tutions shall perish; much less could he in betrayal of so vast and so sacred a trust as these free people have confided to him." He avowed that, in full view of his great responsibility, he had so far done what he had deemed his duty. His words were almost to foreshadow the great tragedy of after years when declaring that _he felt he had no moral right to s.h.i.+rk, or even to count the chances of his own life in what might follow_. In conclusion he said to Congress, "having thus chosen our own course without guile, and with pure purpose, let us renew our trust in G.o.d, and go forward without fear, and with manly hearts."

The effect of this message upon the public opinion of the North was very great. If there had been hesitation by any party or any cla.s.s upon the subsidence of the first glow of patriotism which had animated the country after the a.s.sault on Sumter, Mr. Lincoln's words arrested it, and restored enthusiasm and ardor to all hearts.

Indeed, men of thought and discretion everywhere saw that the course of the President was fixed, and even if they differed from his conclusions, they were persuaded that safety could be secured only by following his counsels, and upholding his measures. Mr. Lincoln had been throughout his life much given to reading, to argument, to induction, to speculation, to reflection. He was now before the world as a man of whom decision and action were required, with the lives and fortunes of unborn millions depending upon his wisdom, with the fate of Republican liberty and Const.i.tutional government at stake upon his success. The history of the world shows no example of a man upon whom extraordinary public duties and perilous responsibilities were so suddenly thrust. No antecedent training had apparently fitted him for his work; no experience in affairs had given a.s.surance that he could master a situation which demanded an unprecedented expenditure of treasure, which involved the control of armies larger than the fabled host of Xerxes, which developed questions of state-craft more delicate and more difficult than those which had baffled the best minds in Europe.

Under the inspiration of the message, and in strict accordance with its recommendations, Congress proceeded to its work. No legislation was attempted, none was even seriously suggested, except measures relating to the war. In no other session of Congress was so much accomplished in so brief a time. Convening on the fourth day of July, both Houses adjourned finally on the 6th of August. There were in all but twenty-nine working-days, and every moment was faithfully and energetically employed. Seventy-six public Acts were pa.s.sed. With the exception of four inconsiderable bills, the entire number related to the war,--to the various modes of strengthening the military and naval forces of the Union, to the wisest methods of securing money for the public service, to the effectual building up of the National credit. Many of these bills were long and complex. The military establishment was re-organized, the navy enlarged, the tariff revised, direct taxes were levied, and loan-bills perfected. Two hundred and seven millions of dollars were appropriated for the army, and fifty-six millions for the navy. Some details of these measures are elsewhere presented under appropriate heads. They are referred to here only to ill.u.s.trate the patriotic spirit which pervaded Congress, and the magnitude of the work accomplished under the pressure of necessity.

DEFEAT OF THE UNION ARMY AT BULL RUN.

Seventeen days after the extra session began, and fifteen days before it closed, the country was startled and profoundly moved by a decisive defeat of the Union army at Bull Run in Virginia. The National troops were commanded by General Irvin McDowell, and the Confederates by General Beauregard. The battle is remarkable for the large number of division and brigade commanders who afterwards became widely known. Serving under General McDowell were General William T. Sherman, General Hunter, General Burnside, General Miles, General Heintzelman, General Fitz-John Porter, and General Howard.

Serving under General Beauregard were Stonewall Jackson, General Longstreet, General Ewell, General J. E. B. Stuart. General Joseph E. Johnston re-enforced Beauregard with another army during the fight, and became the ranking-officer on the field. The defeat of the Union army was complete; it was a _rout_, and on the retreat became a panic. When the troops reached the protection of the fortifications around Was.h.i.+ngton, a thorough demoralization pervaded their ranks. The holiday illusion had been rudely dispelled, and the young men who had enlisted for a summer excursion, suddenly found that they were engaged in a b.l.o.o.d.y war in which comrades and friends had been slain by their side, and in which they saw nothing before them but privation, peril, loss of health, and possibly loss of life. The North had been taught a lesson. The doubting were at last convinced that the Confederates were equipped for a desperate fight, and intended to make it. If the Union were to be saved, it must be saved by the united loyalty and the unflinching resolution of the people.

The special and immediate danger was an outbreak in the Border slave States. Their people were seriously divided; but the Union men, aided by the entire moral influence and in no small degree by the military force of the Nation, had thus far triumphed. The repulse of the National arms, with the consequent loss of prestige, necessarily emboldened the enemies of the Union, who, by playing upon the prejudices and fears of the slave-holders, might succeed in seducing them from their allegiance. To prevent the success of such appeal Mr. Crittenden, whose wise counsels were devoted with sleepless patriotism to the preservation of loyalty in the Border States, offered in the House a resolution defining the objects of the National struggle. The resolution set forth that "the deplorable civil war has been forced upon the country by the Disunionists of the Southern States now in arms against the Const.i.tutional Government;"

that "in this National emergency, Congress, banis.h.i.+ng all feelings of mere pa.s.sion or resentment, will recollect only its duty to the whole country;" that "the war is not waged in any spirit of oppression, or for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, or the overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established inst.i.tutions of those States, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Const.i.tution, and to preserve the Union with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired;" and that, "as soon as these objects are accomplished, the war ought to cease."

The resolution was adopted by the House without debate, and with only two negative votes.

THE CRITTENDEN RESOLUTION.

The same resolution was offered in the Senate by Andrew Johnson of Tennessee two days after its adoption in the House. It led to a somewhat acrimonious debate. Mr. Polk of Missouri desired an amendment declaring that the war had been "forced upon the country by the Disunionists of the Southern and Northern States." He was asked by Mr. Collamer of Vermont, whether he had ever "heard of any Northern Disunionists being in revolt against the government."

He replied by a.s.serting his belief that there were Disunionists North as well as South. He had "read Fourth of July speeches, in which the country was congratulated that there was now to be a dissolution of the Union." The amendment was rejected, receiving only four votes.

--Mr. Collamer spoke ably for the resolution. He was not however afraid of the word "subjugation." Its literal, cla.s.sical meaning was, to pa.s.s under the yoke, but in the popular acceptation it meant that "all the people of the United States should submit to the Const.i.tution and laws."

--Mr. Harris of New York expressed his approval of the resolution "precisely as it was offered. Every expression in it was apt and appropriate." If slavery should be abolished as a result of the war, he would not "shed a tear over that result; but yet it is not the purpose of the government in prosecuting the war to overthrow slavery."

--Mr. Fessenden of Maine agreed with Mr. Collamer as to the word "subjugation." It expressed the idea clearly, and he was "satisfied with it. The talk about subjugation is mere clap-trap."

--Mr. Doolittle of Wisconsin said the use of the word "subjugation"

in the resolution did not imply that it was not "the purpose of the Government to compel the Disunionists to submit to the Const.i.tution and the laws."

--Mr. Willey of Virginia said that there was a great sensitiveness in his section; that there was a fear among many that the object of the war was subjugation; that "its design was to reduce the Old Dominion to a province, and to make the people (in the language of the senator from Vermont) pa.s.s under the yoke."

--Mr. Hale of New Hamps.h.i.+re favored the resolution. He said the most radical abolitionists had "always disclaimed the idea or the power of interfering with slavery in the States."

--Mr. Clark, the colleague of Mr. Hale, would support the resolution, and would oppose any amendment offered to it, not because he liked its phraseology, but because "it was drawn by the senator from Tennessee, and suited him and the region from which he came."

--Mr. Breckinridge of Kentucky could not vote for the resolution, because he did not "agree with the statement of facts contained in it." He would not go into the antecedents of the unhappy difficulties.

He did not consider that "the rupture in the harbor of Charleston, the firing on the _Star of the West_, and the collision at Fort Sumter, justified those proceedings on the part of the President which have made one blaze of war from the Atlantic to the western borders of the Republic." He did not believe that "the President had a right to take that step which produced the war, and to call (under Presidential authority alone) the largest army into the field ever a.s.sembled on the American continent, and the largest fleet ever collected in American harbors." He believed that "the responsibility for the war is to be charged, first, to the majority in the two Houses last winter in rejecting amendments to the Const.i.tution; and, secondly, to the President, for calling out an armed force."

--Mr. Sherman of Ohio replied with great spirit to Mr. Breckinridge.

He said Ohio and Kentucky stood side by side, and had always been friends; but if the senator who had just spoken, spoke the voice of his State, then he feared that Kentucky and Ohio would soon be enemies. He felt confident however that "the views expressed do not represent the sentiments of Kentucky's patriotic citizens."

On the contrary, no person with the authority of President Lincoln "ever forbore so patiently." The people of the loyal States had "forborne with the Disunionists of the Southern States too much and too long." There was not a line, not a syllable, not a promise, in the Const.i.tution which the people of the loyal States did not religiously obey. "The South has no right to demand any other compromise. The Const.i.tution was the bond of union; and it was the South that sought to change it by amendments, or to subvert it by force. The Disunionists of the Southern States are traitors to their country, and must be, and will be, subdued."

--Mr. Breckinridge, replying to Mr. Sherman, believed that he truly represented the sentiment of Kentucky, and would submit the matter to the people of his State. "If they should decide that the prosperity and peace of the country would be best promoted by an unnatural and horrible fraternal war, and should throw their own energies into the struggle," he would "acquiesce in sadness and tears, but would no longer be the representative of Kentucky in the American Senate." He characterized personal allusion which had been made to himself as ungenerous and unjust, and declared that he had "never uttered a word or cherished a thought that was false to the Const.i.tution and Union."

--Mr. Browning of Illinois, the successor of Stephen A. Douglas in the Senate, closed the debate. He spoke of "the indulgence shown to Mr. Breckinridge," and of his having used it to "a.s.sail the President vehemently, almost vindictively, while he had not a single word of condemnation for the atrocious conduct of the rebellious States." Was the senator from Kentucky here to vindicate them, and the hurl unceasing denunciations at the President, "who was never surpa.s.sed by any ruler in patriotism, honor, integrity, and devotion to the great cause of human rights?"

The resolution was adopted with only five dissenting votes,-- Breckinridge and Powell of Kentucky, Johnson and Polk of Missouri, and Trumbull of Illinois. Mr. Trumbull voted in the negative, because he did not like the form of expression.

The Crittenden Resolution, as it has always been termed, was thus adopted respectively, not jointly, by the two Houses of Congress.

Its declarations, contained in the concluding clauses, though made somewhat under the pressure of national adversity, were nevertheless a fair reflection of the popular sentiment throughout the North.

The public mind had been absorbed with the one thought of restoring the Union promptly and completely, and had not even contemplated interference with slavery as an instrumentality to that end. Many wise and far-seeing men were convinced from the first that the Rebellion would result in the destruction of slavery, but for various reasons deemed it inexpedient to make a premature declaration of their belief. Indeed, the wisest of them saw that a premature declaration would probably prove a hinderance and not a help to the conclusion they most desired. In the Senate it was noted that Mr. Sumner withheld his vote, as did Thaddeus Stevens and Owen Lovejoy in the House. But almost the entire Republican vote, including such men as Fessenden, Hale, Chandler, and Grimes, sustained the resolution. It was the voice of the Republican party, with no one openly opposing it in either branch of Congress.

ANTI-SLAVERY SENTIMENT DEVELOPED.

It was soon discovered, however, that if the National Government did not interfere with slavery, slavery would seriously interfere with the National Government. In other words, it was made apparent that the slaves if undisturbed were to be a source of strength to the Rebellion. Mr. Crittenden's resolution had hardly pa.s.sed the House when it was learned from the partic.i.p.ants in the battle of Bull Run that slaves by the thousand had been employed on the Confederate side in the construction of earthworks, in driving teams, in cooking, in the general work of the Quartermaster and Commissary Departments, and in all forms of camp drudgery. To permit this was simply adding four millions to the population from which the Confederates could draw their quotas of men for military service. It was no answer to say that they never intended to put arms in the hands of negroes. Their use in the various forms of work to which they were allotted, and for which they were admirably qualified, released the same number of white men, who could at once be mustered into the ranks. The slaves were therefore an effective addition to the military strength of the Confederacy from the very beginning of the war, and had seriously increased the available force of fighting men at the first engagement between the two armies.

As soon as this fact became well established, Congress proceeded to enact the first law since the organization of the Federal Government by which a slave could acquire his freedom. The "Act to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes" was on the calendar of the Senate when the disaster at Bull Run occurred, and had been under consideration the day preceding the battle. As originally framed, it only confiscated "any property used or employed in aiding, abetting, or promoting insurrection, or resistance to the laws." The word "property" would not include slaves, who, in the contemplation of the Federal law, were always "persons." A new section was now added, declaring that "whenever hereafter during the present insurrection against the Government of the United States, any person held to labor or service under the law of any State shall be required or permitted by the person to whom such labor or service is due to take up arms against the United States, or to work in or upon any fort, dock, navy-yard, armory, intrenchment, or in any military or naval service whatever against the Government of the United States, the person to whom such service or labor is due shall forfeit his claim thereto." The law further provided in effect that "whenever any person shall seek to enforce his claim to a slave, it shall be a sufficient answer to such claim, that the slave had been employed in the military or naval service against the United States contrary to the provisions of this Act."

ZEAL AND INDUSTRY OF CONGRESS.

The virtue of this law consisted mainly in the fact that it exhibited a willingness on the part of Congress to strike very hard blows and to trample the inst.i.tution of slavery under foot whenever or wherever it should be deemed advantageous to the cause of the Union to do so. From that time onward the disposition to a.s.sail slavery was rapidly developed, and the grounds on which the a.s.surance contained in the Crittenden Resolution was given, had so changed in consequence of the use of slaves by the Confederate Government that every Republican member of both Senate and House felt himself absolved from any implied pledge therein to the slave-holders of the Border States. Humiliating as was the Bull Run disaster to the National arms, it carried with it many compensating considerations, and taught many useful lessons. The nation had learned that war must be conducted according to strict principles of military science, and cannot be successfully carried on with banners and toasts and stump speeches, or by the mere ardor of patriotism, or by boundless confidence in a just cause. The Government learned that it is lawful to strike at whatever gives strength to the enemy, and that an insurgent against the National authority must, by the law of common sense, be treated as beyond the protection of the National Const.i.tution, both as to himself and his possessions.

Though the Act thus conditionally confiscating slave property was signed by Mr. Lincoln, it did not meet his entire approval. He had no objection to the principle involved, but thought it ill- timed and premature,--more likely to produce harm than good. He believed that it would prove _brutum fulmen_ in the rebellious States, and a source of injury to the Union cause in the Border slave States. From the outbreak of hostilities, Mr. Lincoln regarded the position of those States as the key to the situation, and every thing which tended to weaken their loyalty as a blow struck directly and with fearful power against the Union. He could not however veto the bill, because that would be equivalent to declaring that the Confederate army might have the full benefit of the slave population as a military force. What he desired was that Congress should wait on his recommendations in regard to the question of Slavery. He felt a.s.sured that he could see the whole field more clearly; that, above all, he knew the time and the method for that form of intervention which would smite the States in rebellion and not alienate the slave States which still adhered to the Union.

The rapidity with which business was dispatched at this session gave little opportunity for any form of debate except that which was absolutely necessary in the explanation of measures. Active interest in the House centred around the obstructive and disloyal course of Mr. Vallandigham of Ohio and Mr. Burnett of Kentucky.

Still greater interest attached to the course of Mr. Breckinridge in the Senate. He had returned to Was.h.i.+ngton under a cloud of suspicion. He was thoroughly distrusted by the Union men of Kentucky, who had in the popular election won a n.o.ble victory over the foes of the National Government, of whom Mr. Breckinridge had been reckoned chief. No overt act of treason could be charged against him, but the prevalent belief was that his sympathies were wholly with the government at Richmond. He opposed every act designed to strengthen the Union, and continually found fault with the att.i.tude and with the intentions of the National Government.

He was considered by many to be in Was.h.i.+ngton only that he might the more efficiently aid the cause of the Confederacy. During the consideration of "a bill to suppress insurrection and sedition,"

a debate arose between Mr. Breckinridge and Mr. Baker, the new senator from Oregon, which fixed the attention of the country upon the former, and subjected him to general condemnation in the Loyal States.