Rudolph Eucken Part 5

This has arisen from several reasons. To begin with, it tends to narrow religion, which is concerned with life, to the realm of ideas, and to tie down religion by connecting it with a thought-system of a particular age. Further, the necessary mechanical routine, and the appointment of special persons to carry out this routine, tends to elevate the routine and these special persons to a far higher place than they should occupy.

Again, spiritual things have been dragged into the service of personal ambition, and bound up with human interests. The most serious danger, however, is that religion, from being an inward matter, tends to become externalised.

Despite this, an organised Church cannot be dispensed with, and Eucken points out what changes are necessary to make the Church effective. One important point he makes clear, namely, that as the Church must speak to all, and every day, and not only to spiritually distinguished souls, and in moments of elevated feeling, then the teaching of the Church will always lag behind religion itself, and must be considered as an inadequate expression of it.

It is necessary that there should be no coercion with regard to men's att.i.tude towards the Church, and men should be free to join this or that Church, or no Church at all.

Then there must be more freedom, movement, and individuality within the Church. What the Church holds as a final result of the experience of life cannot be expected as the confession of all, especially of the young. "How can every man and every child feel what such a mightily contrasted nature as Luther's with all its convulsive experiences felt?"

Then the Church must not so much teach this or that doctrine as point to the Spiritual Life, set forth the conditions of its development, and be the representative of the higher world. Thus, and thus only, Eucken thinks that the Church can fulfil its proper function, and avoid being a danger to religion.

Eucken's _appreciation of Christianity_ is sincere. Viewing it from the standpoint of the Spiritual Life, he finds that it fulfils the conditions that religion should fulfil. It is based on freedom, and on the presence of the Divine in humanity, even to the extent of a complete union between them. The ideal of the Christian life is a personal life of pure inwardness, and of an ethical character. He speaks of the "flow of inner life by means of which Christianity far surpa.s.ses all other religions," and of the "unfathomable depth and immeasurable hope which are contained in the Christian faith."

In Christianity the life of Christ has a value transcending all time, and is a standard by which to judge all other lives. There is, too, in Christianity a complete transformation or break, which must take place before any progress or development can take place.

"There is no need of a breach with Christianity; it can be to us what a historical religion pre-eminently is meant to be--a sure pathway to truth, an awakener of immediate and intimate life, a vivid representation and realisation of an Eternal Order which all the changes of time cannot possess or destroy."

At the same time, there are changes necessary in the form of Christianity, if it is to answer to the demands of the age, and be the Absolute Religion. It must be shorn of temporary accretions, and must cast aside the ideas of any one particular age which have now been superseded. No longer can it retain the primitive view of nature and the world which formerly obtained, no longer must it take up a somewhat negative and pa.s.sive att.i.tude, but, realising that religion is a matter of the whole life, must energetically work itself out through all departments of life. It must remedy wrong, not merely endure it. It must proceed from a narrow and subjective point of view to a cosmic one, without at the same time losing sight of the fact that religion is an inward and personal matter. It must take account to the full of the value of man as man, and of the possibilities latent in him, and take account of his own activity in his salvation.

The Christian ideal of life must be a more joyous one, of greater spiritual power, and the idea of redemption must not stop short at redemption from evil, but must progress to a restoration to free and self-determining activity. Since an absolute religion is based on the spiritual life, the form in which it is clothed must not be too rigid--life cannot be bound within a rigid creed. With its form modified in this way, Eucken considers that Christianity may well be the Absolute Religion, and that not only we can be, but we _must_ be Christians if life is to have for us the highest meaning and value.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION: CRITICISM AND APPRECIATION

We have attempted to enunciate the special problem with which Eucken deals, and to follow him in his masterly criticisms of the solutions that have been offered, in his further search for the reality in life, in his arguments and statement of the philosophy of the spiritual life, and finally in his profound and able investigation into the eternal truth that is to be found in religion. In doing so, we have only been able in a few cases to suggest points of criticism, and sometimes to emphasise the special merits of the work. It was necessary to choose between making a critical examination of a few points, and setting forth in outline his philosophy as a whole. It was felt that it would be more profitable for the average reader if the latter course were adopted.

Thousands who have heard the name of Eucken and have read frequent references to him are asking, "What has Eucken really to say?" and we have attempted to give a systematic, if brief, answer to the question.

Having done this it will be well to mention some of the main points of criticism that have been made, and to call attention again to some of the remarkable aspects of the contributions he has made to philosophy and religion.

Several critics complain of the obscurity of his writings, of his loose use of terms, and of his tendency to use freely such indefinite and abstruse terms as "The Whole," "The All," &c., and of his tendency to repeat himself. Of course, if he is guilty of these faults, and he certainly is to some extent, they are merely faults of style, and do not necessarily affect the truth or otherwise of his opinions. In the matter of clarity he is very variable; occasional sentences are brilliantly clear, others present considerable difficulty to the practised student.

His more popular works, however, are much clearer and easier to understand than the two standard treatises on _The Truth of Religion_ and _Life's Basis and Life's Ideal_. His tendency to repet.i.tion is by no means an unmixed evil, for even when he appears to be repeating himself, he is very often in reality expressing new shades of meaning, which help towards the better understanding of the first statements.

The slight looseness in the use of terms, and a certain inexactness of expression that is sometimes apparent, must of course not be exaggerated; it is by no means serious enough to invalidate his main argument. It gives an opportunity for a great deal of superficial criticism on the part of unsympathetic writers, which, however, can do little harm to Eucken's position. One has to remember that it is difficult to combine the fervour of a prophet with pedantic exactness, and that an inspired and profound philosopher cannot be expected to spend much time over verbal niceties.

Of course one would prefer absolute clarity and exactness, but we must guard against allowing the absence of these things to prejudice us against the profound truths of a philosophical position, which are not vitally affected by that absence.

Frequent criticism is directed towards the incompleteness of Eucken's philosophy. He does not introduce his philosophy with a systematic discussion of the great epistemological and ontological problems.

Philosophers have often introduced their work in this way, and it has been customary to expect an introduction of the kind. To do so, however, would be quite out of keeping with Eucken's activistic position, as it would necessarily involve much intellectual speculation, and he does not believe that the problem of life can be solved by such speculation. It is unfortunate that he has so little to say concerning the world of matter. Beyond insisting upon the superiority of the spiritual life, which he calls the "substantial," over matter, which he calls the merely "existential," he tells us very little about the material world. Rightly or wrongly, thinkers are deeply interested in the merely existential, in the periphery of life, in the material world, but for the solution of this problem Eucken contributes little or nothing. His sole concern is the spiritual world, and although we should like an elaboration of his views on the mere periphery of life, we must not let the fact that he does not give it, lead us to undervalue his real contributions. Another serious incompleteness lies in the fact that he pays little attention to the psychological implications of his theories. Until he does this, his philosophy cannot be regarded as complete. Eucken, however, would be the last to claim that his solution is a finished or final one; he is content if his work is a substantial contribution to the final solution.

Objection has been taken to the fact that he starts upon his task with a definite bias in a certain direction. He candidly admits from the outset that his aim is to find a meaning for life, and in doing this he of course tacitly a.s.sumes that life has a deep and profound meaning. Strict scientists aver that the investigator must set out without prejudice, to examine the phenomena he observes; and Eucken's initial bias may form a fatal stumbling-block to the acceptance of his philosophy by these, or indeed, by any who are not disposed to accept this fundamental position.

If we deny that life has a meaning, then Eucken has little for us; but if we are merely doubtful on the matter, the reading of Eucken will probably bring conviction.

Many critics point to the far-reaching a.s.sumptions he makes. He a.s.sumes as axiomatic certainties and insoluble mysteries the existence of the spiritual life in man, the union of the human and divine, and the freedom of the spiritual personalities, though in a sense dependent upon the Universal Spiritual Life. This of course does not mean that he is in the habit of making unjustifiable a.s.sumptions. This is far from being the case; on the contrary, he takes the greatest care in the matter of his speculative bases. There are some fundamental facts of life, however, which according to Eucken are proved to us by life itself; we feel they must be true, but they are not truths that can be reasoned about, nor proved by the intellect alone. These are the three great facts mentioned above, which, while not admitting of proof, must be regarded as certainties.

His contention that they cannot be reasoned about has led to the further charge of irrationalism. The question that has to be decided is, whether Eucken in emphasising the fact that great truths must be solved by life and action, is underestimating the part that intellect must play in life. The decision must be largely one of individual opinion. Many critics are of the opinion that he does lay too little stress upon the intellectual factor in life. In actual fact, however, the fault is more apparent than real, for Eucken does in fact reason and argue closely concerning the facts of life. The charge, too, is to some extent due to the fact that he continually attacks the over-emphasis on the intellectual that the people of his own race--the Germans--are apt to place. With the glorification of the intellect he has no sympathy, for he feels there is something higher and more valuable in life than thought--and that is action.

These are the main points of criticism that have been raised--the reader must judge for himself how seriously they should be regarded. But before arriving at a final opinion he must think again of the contributions Eucken has indubitably made to philosophy and religion, of which we shall again in brief remind him.

He has given us a striking examination of the various theories of life, and has ably demonstrated their inadequacy. He has displayed great scholars.h.i.+p in his search for the ultimate reality. He has found this reality in the universal life, and has urged the need for a break with the natural world in order to enter upon a higher life. He has traced the progress of the spiritual life, and has given us ultimately a bold vindication of human personality and of the freedom of the spiritual being.

He has raised philosophy from being mere discussions concerning abstract theories to a discussion of life itself. In this way philosophy becomes not merely a theory concerning the universe, nor merely a theory of life, but a real factor in life itself--indeed it becomes itself a life.

Thus has he given to philosophy a higher ideal, a new urgency--by his continued emphasis upon the spiritual he has given to philosophy a n.o.bler and a higher mission. He has placed the emphasis in general upon life, and has pointed out the inability of the intellect to solve all life's problems. He has given to idealistic philosophies a possible rallying-point, where theories differing in detail can meet on common ground. As one eminent writer says: "The depth and inclusiveness of Eucken's philosophy, the comprehensiveness of its substructure and its stimulating personal quality, mark it out as the right rallying-point for the idealistic endeavour of to-day."

And what does he give to religion? Many will reply that he has given us nothing that is not already in the Christian religion. Therein lies the value and strength of Eucken's contributions. He has given a striking vindication of the spiritual content of Christianity as against the effects of time changes. He has attempted to bring out the contrast between what is really vital, and what are merely temporary colourings and accretions. He makes many of the main elements of Christianity acceptable without the need of a historical basis or proof. Not only does he present the Christian position as a reasonable view of the problem of life, but as the only solution that can really solve the final problem. He has cleared the decks of all superfluous baggage, and has laid bare a firm basis for a practical, constructive endeavour.

He has given us in himself a profound believer in the inward and higher nature of man, and in the existence of the spiritual life. As one critic says: "The earnestness, depth and grandeur, humility and conscious choice of high ideals, have raised his work far above mere intellectual acuteness and minuteness."

In Eucken we have one of the greatest thinkers of the age--some would say _the_ greatest--setting his life upon emphasising the spiritual at a time when the tendency is strongly in materialistic directions. He has gathered around him a number of able and whole-hearted disciples in various countries, and future ages may find in Eucken the greatest force in the revulsion of the twentieth century (that is already making itself felt) from the extreme materialistic position, to take religion up again, and particularly the Christian religion, as the only satisfying solution of humanity's most urgent problem.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The English reader should first read:

_The Meaning and Value of Life_ (A. & C. Black), which is a good introduction to Eucken's philosophy; and _The Life of the Spirit_ (Williams & Norgate).

He can then proceed to study Eucken's three comprehensive and important works:

_Life's Basis and Life's Ideal_, in which he gives a detailed presentation of his philosophy (A. & C. Black).

_The Truth of Religion_, in which he gives his ideas on religion (Williams & Norgate).

_The Problem of Human Life_, in which he makes a searching a.n.a.lysis of the philosophies of the past (Fisher Unwin).

The student will be much helped in his study by the following books:

_Eucken and Bergson_, by E. Hermann (James Clark & Co.).

_Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy of Life_, by Professor W.R. Boyce Gibson (A. & C. Black).

When he has studied these he will probably be anxious to read other works of Eucken's, of which translations have already appeared, or are soon to appear.