Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs Volume II Part 13

Speculation in gold was not all on one side. There were speculators who were anxious to break down the price of gold, and between the lines I could read the condition of the respective parties from whom I received letters. Under date of September 23, I received a letter from a prominent house in New York in which the writer said: "I am actuated to again portray to you the state of financial affairs as they now exist in this city. The speculative advance in gold has brought legitimate business almost to a standstill, owing to the apprehension of a corner, which from appearances may appear at any moment."

It did not follow that the writer of the letter was "short on gold," as the phrase is. I had, however, in my possession at the time a list of persons in New York who were supposed to be contestants, some for an advance in gold and others for a fall. The writer of the letter was among those whose names had been given to me as speculators for a fall in gold. In this connection I may say that it was no part of my policy to regulate affairs in Wall Street or State Street or Lombard Street.

Until it became apparent that the operations in New York affected largely and seriously the business interests of the country, and until it became apparent that the Treasury receipts were diminished by the panic that had taken possession of the public, I refrained from any interference with those who were engaged either in forcing up or forcing down the price of gold.

Under date of the 24th day of September, I received a letter from my special and trusted correspondent in the city of New York in which I find this statement: "This has been the most dreadful day I have ever seen in this city. While gold was jumping from forty-three to sixty- one the excitement was painful. Old, conservative merchants looked aghast, n.o.body was in their offices, and the agony depicted on the faces of men who crowded the streets made one feel as if Gettysburg had been lost and that the rebels were marching down Broadway. Friends of the Administration openly stated that the President or yourself must have given these men to feel that you would not interfere with them or they would never dare to rush gold up so rapidly. In truth, many parties of real responsibility and friends of the Government openly declared that somebody in Was.h.i.+ngton must be in this combination."

The last sentence in this quotation unfolds the policy which had guided Gould and Fisk and their a.s.sociates from April to the culmination of their undertaking, the 24th day of September. As far as I know, the effort had been directed chiefly to the support of a false theory that the President was opposed to the sale of gold, especially during the autumn months, when a large amount of currency is required, or in those days was supposed to be required, for "the moving," as it was called, of the produce of the West to the sea coast for s.h.i.+pment to Europe.

They even went so far as to allege that the President had ordered the Secretary of the Treasury to suspend the sale of gold during the month of September, for which there was no foundation whatever.

Indeed, up to the 22d of September, when I introduced the subject of the price of gold to the President, he had neither said nor done anything, except to write a letter from New York City under date of September 12, 1869, in the following words:

NEW YORK CITY, _September_ 12, 1869.

DEAR SIR: I leave here for western Pennsylvania to-morrow morning and will not reach Was.h.i.+ngton before the middle or last of next week. Had I known before making my arrangements for starting that you would be in this city early this week, I would have remained to meet you. I am satisfied that on your arrival you will be met by the bulls and bears of Wall Street, and probably by merchants, too, to induce you to sell gold, or pay the November interest in advance, on the one side, and to hold fast on the other. The fact is, a desperate struggle is now taking place, and each party wants the Government to help him out. I write this letter to advise you of what I think you may expect, to put you on your guard.

I think, from the lights before me, I would move on without change until the present struggle is over. If you want to write me this week, my address will be Was.h.i.+ngton, Pennsylvania. I would like to hear your experience with the factions, at all events, if they give you time to write. No doubt you will have a better chance to judge than I, for I have avoided general discussion on the subject.

Yours truly, U. S. GRANT.

Hon. GEORGE S. BOUTWELL, _Secretary of Treasury_.

At a meeting, which was accidental, as far as the President was concerned, on board one of Fisk and Gould's Fall River steamers, when he was on his way to Boston, in June of that year, to attend the Peace Jubilee, an attempt was made to commit General Grant to the policy of holding gold. I was present on the trip with the President. What happened on the boat may be best given in the language of Mr. Fisk and Mr. Gould. Mr. Fisk, in his testimony before the committee, said:

"On our pa.s.sage over to Boston with General Grant, we endeavored to ascertain what his position in regard to the finances was. We went down to supper about nine o'clock, intending while we were there to have this thing pretty thoroughly talked up, and, if possible, to relieve him from any idea of putting the price of gold down."

Mr. Gould's account before the committee was as follows:

"At this supper the question came up about the state of the country, the crops, prospects ahead, etc. The President was a listener; the other gentlemen were discussing. Some were in favor of Boutwell's selling gold, and some were opposed to it. After they had all interchanged their views, some one asked the President what his view was. He remarked that he thought there was a certain amount of fict.i.tiousness about the prosperity of the country, and that the bubble might as well be tapped in one way as another. . . . We supposed from that conversation that the President was a contractionist. His remark struck across us like a wet blanket."

The error of Fisk and Gould and their a.s.sociates, from the beginning to the end of the contest, was in the supposition that the President was taking any part in the operations of the Treasury concerning the price of gold. If he expressed any opinions outside in conversation, there were no acts on his part in harmony with or in antagonism to the views he entertained. As a matter of fact, with the exception of the letter from the city of New York, he had no conference or correspondence with me up to the 22d day of September, when I called upon him, and gave him a statement of the price of gold in the city of New York, and of the nature and character of the combination that existed there, as far as it was understood by me. Their policy was directed to two points: first, to influence the President, if possible, to interfere in a way to advance the price of gold; and, second, to satisfy their adherents and opponents that the President either had so interfered or would so interfere.

Even Fisk and Gould may at a period of time have rested in the belief that the President either had interfered or that he would interfere.

Their confidence was in Mr. A. R. Corbin, a brother-in-law of the President, who, under the influence of various considerations, which appear to have been personal and pecuniary to a very large extent, lent himself to the task of influencing the President. As a matter of fact, his attempts were very feeble and misdirected and of no consequence whatever. Indeed, such is my opinion of the President, and such my belief as to his opinion concerning Mr. Corbin, that nothing which Mr.

Corbin did say, or could have said, did have or could have had the least influence upon the President's opinion or conduct. It is, however, also true that Fisk and Gould employed Corbin and gave him consideration in their undertakings out of which he realized some money. I received information, also, which may not have been true, that they suggested to him that he might become president of the Tenth National Bank, which had a very conspicuous part in the events which culminated in Black Friday.

An attempt to strengthen the impression that it was the purpose of the President to prevent the sale of gold was made through an article prepared by Mr. Corbin, probably under the direction of Mr. Gould and others, which appeared finally, with some alterations and omissions, in the New York _Times_ of the 25th of August. It appears to have been the purpose of the parties interested to mislead the _Times_ as to the authors.h.i.+p of the article, and they secured the agency of Mr. James McHenry, a prominent English capitalist, who called at the _Times_ office, and presented the article to Mr. Bigelow, the editor, as the opinion of a person in the intimate confidence of the President. The article was put in type and double leaded. When so prepared, suspicions were aroused, and the financial editor, Mr. Norvell, made very important corrections, taking care to omit sentences and paragraphs that contained explicit statements as to the purposes of the President. Some of the phrases omitted were in these words: "It may be that further purchases of bonds will be made directly with gold."

"As gold acc.u.mulates, the less would be the premium upon it. High prices for gold before the sale of our products would cause lower prices of gold after the sale of products."

Among the statements made which were preserved in the article as printed finally were these: "The President evidently intends to pay off the 5-20s as rapidly as he may in gold"; "So far as current movements of the Treasury are concerned, until crops are moved it is not likely Treasury gold will be sold for currency to be locked up."

Following the appearance of this article, I received a letter from Mr.

Gould, dated the 30th of August, in which this sentence appears: "If the New York _Times_ correctly reflects your financial policy during the next three or four months; namely, to unloose the currency balance at the Treasury or keep it at the lowest possible figure, and also to refrain during the same period from selling or putting gold on the market, thus preventing a depression of the premium at a season of the year when the bulk of our agricultural products have to be marketed, then I think the country peculiarly fortunate in having a financial head who can take a broad view of the situation, and who realizes the importance of settling the large balance of debt against us by the export of our agricultural and mining products instead of bonds and gold."

Of my reply to that letter, the committee say: "The brief and formal reply of the Secretary gave Gould no clew to the purpose of the Government."

Under date of September 20, I received a letter from Gould to which I made no reply. Aside from the topics to which he directed my attention in the letter, it is the unavoidable inference from the context as a whole that Gould had then no faith in the statements given to the public that the President was in any manner pledged to interfere and prevent the sale of gold. The following extracts from the letter of September 20 are a full exposition of his policy and of the means on which he relied to advance the price of gold during the month of September:

"On the subject of the price of gold and its effect upon the producing interests of the West, permit me to say that during the months of September of the past two years the price has averaged about forty- five. Gold must range this year at about that premium to enable the export of the surplus crops of wheat and corn. We have to compete with the grain-producing countries bordering on the Black and Mediterranean seas, and it requires a premium of over forty per cent on gold to equalize our high-priced labor and long rail transportation to the seaboard.

"My theory is to let gold go to a price that we can export our surplus products to pay our foreign debts, and the moment we turn the balance of trade in our favor gold will decline from natural causes. In my judgment, the Government cannot afford to sell gold during the next three months while the crops are being marketed, and if such a policy were announced, it would immediately cause a high export of bread- stuffs and an active fall trade.

"P. S. In addition to the above, if gold were put upon the market, government bonds would decline to at least fifteen, leaving the purchases made by the Government in the past few months open to criticism as showing a loss."

As early as the 20th of September, I had evidence satisfactory to me that the Tenth National Bank in the city of New York was a party to the speculation in gold, and that its a.s.sistance was rendered largely through the certification of checks drawn by the brokers, and largely in excess of the balances due them upon the books of the bank when the certifications were made. It appeared from the evidence submitted that these certifications of checks in excess of the balances due to brokers amounted to about $18,000,000 on the 22d and 23d of September, when the speculation was at its height.

For the purpose of arresting that process and checking the speculation in gold, I detained the comptroller of the currency and three competent clerks after the close of business on the 22d of September. The clerks received commissions as bank examiners, and were instructed to go to New York that night and to take possession of the Tenth National Bank, at the opening of business in the morning, and to give directions that the habit of certifying checks in excess of the balances due must be suspended. It was my expectation that the enforcement of that rule would, or might, end the speculation, inasmuch as the purchasers of gold would be unable to meet their obligations, and therefore it would be out of their power to create them. This expectation was not realized. Whether the certification went on at the Tenth National Bak in defiance of the order, or whether other banks were so connected with the speculation that checks were certified elsewhere, was not known to me.

I called upon the President after business on the 23d of September, and made a statement of the condition of the gold market in the city of New York, as far as it had been communicated to me during the day.

I then said that a sale of gold should be made for the purpose of breaking the market and ending the excitement. He asked me what sum I proposed to sell. I said: "Three million dollars will be sufficient to break the combination."

He said in reply: "I think you had better make it $5,000,000."

Without a.s.senting to his proposition or dissenting from it, I returned to the department, and sent an order for the sale of $4,000,000 of gold the next day. The order was to the a.s.sistant treasurer in these words: "Sell $4,000,000 gold to-morrow, and buy $4,000,000 bonds."

The message was not in cipher, and there was no attempt to keep it secret. It was duplicated and sent by each of the rival telegraph lines to New York. Within the s.p.a.ce of fifteen minutes after the receipt of the despatch, the price of gold fell from 160 to 133, and in the language of one of the witnesses, "half of Wall Street was involved in ruin."

For the moment, the condition of Wall Street and the Gold Exchange seemed to justify the statement of the person whose language has just been quoted. As a matter of fact, however, many of the people involved recovered from the panic, and were able to meet their obligations.

Some were gainers, probably, by the proceedings of the month of September, and some were losers. As I have already said, I had no purpose to help anybody or to hurt anybody, and I interfered in Wall Street only when the operations that were going on there involved innocent parties who were engaged in legitimate business, and also imposed upon the Government a sacrifice in the loss of revenue.

Following the downfall of the combination, there appeared in the newspapers statements and imputations which reflected upon the President and his family as to their relations to the gold operations.

All these statements were without foundation. Mr. Corbin's connection was established beyond controversy, but the evidence which established his relations to the parties engaged in the gold speculation was also conclusive as to the fact that the President had no connection with it, and that he was not in any way interested in any policy calculated to advance the interests of the combination.

The apprehensions that were entertained on the evening of the 24th and on the 25th of September as to the extent of the disaster to business and to individuals engaged in gold speculation were not realized in full. My special correspondent in New York said in a letter dated September 25: "Many of the houses hurt and reported failed yesterday are likely to recover." Again he said: "The demoralization in the street was never equaled, and it must take several days at least before matters get fairly straightened. There is a wholesome dread against making any obligations. Smith, Gould and Martin are just reported as paying in full."

In a letter dated September 27 at 6:30 P. M., the a.s.sistant treasurer at New York wrote me: "From the best evidence to be gathered in the excitement here, it is safe to infer that the Gold Exchange Bank will suffer losses to the extent of its capital and surplus at least, and perhaps more." To the contrary of that prediction, it is to be said that the Gold Exchange Bank was able to meet all its obligations.

In a letter written by Mr. Grinnell, then collector of the port of New York, under date of September 24, after the announcement of the sale of gold had been made, I find this statement: "Had you not taken the course which you did, I believe a large proportion of our most reliable merchants and bankers would have been obliged to suspend before three o'clock to-day, as confidence was entirely gone and the panic was becoming universal."

Following the break in the price of gold, there were persons who became apprehensive that the rate would fall to a point which would affect their interests unfavorably, and I received a letter, dated after business hours on the 24th, in which the writer said: "It is not impossible that, in view of the largeness of the amount of gold to be sold to-morrow, there may be a combination to procure it at a low price, and you will therefore excuse a suggestion that, as the effect of your intervention has already been realized, it might be well to protect the Government by making it known that you will reject all unacceptable bids."

These extracts from letters received previous to and during the crisis may lead to the conclusion that it is not safe to trust to persons engaged in large business and commercial transactions as guides for the administration of the Government in financial matters. Indeed, one may go still further, and say that it is not safe to trust the guidance of the Government in financial affairs to men whose life business it has been to convert information into gold.

The most unpleasant incident of the gold speculation of 1869 was the fact that General b.u.t.terfield, the a.s.sistant treasurer in the city of New York, was so far involved as to lead the President to ask for his resignation. That request did not arise from any evidence that General b.u.t.terfield was in any way concerned in the movement or combination, which led to the advance in gold. Indeed, the evidence was conclusive to the contrary. This fact, however, did appear--that during the period of the excitement he had made some purchases and sales of gold and bonds. The suspicions that existed in the city of New York as to his connection with the gold movement were largely exaggerations of the actual facts. There was no evidence which impeached his official or personal integrity in business. His resignation was requested upon the ground that it was essential to the proper administration of the office that the person holding the important place of a.s.sistant treasurer in the city of New York, should not be engaged in business transactions which might give rise to the conjecture that he had advantages over others in consequence of his connection with the Government.

It ought to be said the Mr. Gould, in his testimony before the committee, which was given at great length and with singular clearness of statement, denied expressly the existence of any combination. In fine, he claimed, what may have been the truth, and upon the whole probably was the truth, that it was not part of his purpose to carry the price of gold above forty or forty-five per cent premium. He attributed the excessive and rapid advance of the price of gold to the persons who had sold short and who, becoming alarmed, attempted to cover their sales by making purchases, and by bidding against each other carried the price from about 140 to 160.

The same statement was made by Mr. Fisk as to the cause of the excessive rise in the price of gold. He said: "It went up to sixty, for the reason that there were in that market a hundred men short of gold. There were banking houses which had stood for fifty years, and who did not know but what they were ruined. They rushed into the market to cover their shorts. I think it went from forty-five to sixty without the purchase of more than $600,000 or $700,000 of gold.

It went there in consequence of the frightened bear interests. There was a feeling that there was no gold in the market and that the Government would not let any gold go out."

At the time of the gold panic, Gould and Fisk were interested in the business of railway transportation from the West to the seaboard, and Mr. Fisk made a statement which sets forth the theory on which he and Gould professed to act. Fisk said: "The whole movement was based upon a desire on our part to employ our men and work our power getting surplus crops moved East and receiving for ourselves that portion of the transportation properly belonging to our road. That was the beginning of the movement, and the further operations were based upon the promise of what Corbin said the Government would do."

From the testimony of Jay Gould and James Fisk, Jr., as it appeared in the printed report, we are able to comprehend the characteristics of the two men. Gould was cool and collected from beginning to end, with no indication in his statements that the events of the 24th of September had in any particular disturbed him in temper or nerve or confidence in his ability to meet the exigencies of the situation.

On the other hand, the testimony of Fisk indicated the absence of the qualities ascribed to Gould, and during his examination he failed to maintain even ordinary equanimity of temper. He interfered with the proceedings, and delivered this address to the committee: "I must state that I must ask you gentlemen to summon witnesses whose names I shall give you. My men are starving. When the newspapers told you we were keeping away from this committee, I say to you that there is no man in this country who wants to come before you as bad as Jim Fisk, Jr. I have thirty or forty thousand wives and children to feed with the money disbursed from our office. We have no money to pay them, and I know what has brought them to this condition."

Another extract from Fisk's testimony gives a graphic view of his condition when the crash came: "I went down to the neighborhood of Wall Street Friday morning. When I got back to our office you can imagine I was in no enviable state of mind, and the moment I got up street that afternoon I started right round to old Corbin's to rake him out. I went into the room, and sent word that Mr. Fisk wanted to see him in the dining-room. I was too mad to say anything civil, and when he came into the room, said I, 'Do you know what you have done here, you and your people?' He began to wring his hands, and 'Oh,' he says, 'this is a horrible position. Are you ruined?' I said I didn't know whether I was or not; and I asked him again if he knew what had happened. He had been crying, and said he had just heard; that he had been sure everything was all right; but that something had occurred entirely different from what he had antic.i.p.ated. Said I, 'That don't amount to anything. We know that gold ought not to be at thirty-one, and that it would not be but for such performances as you have had this last week; you know ---- well it would not if you had not failed.' I knew that somebody had run a saw right into us, and said I, 'This whole ---- thing has turned out just as I told you it would.' I considered the whole party a pack of cowards; and I expected that, when we came to clear our hands, they would sock it right into us. I said to him, 'I don't know whether you have lied or not, and I don't know what ought to be done with you.'

"He was on the other side of the table, weeping and wailing, and I was gnas.h.i.+ng my teeth. 'Now,' he says, 'you must quiet yourself.' I told him I didn't want to be quiet; I had no desire to ever be quiet again.

He says, 'But, my dear sir, you will lose your reason.' Says I, 'Speyers has already lost his reason; reason has gone out of everybody but me.'"

My part and my interest in the events of Black Friday came to an end with an effort to ascertain the authors.h.i.+p of an anonymous communication, written in red ink, that I received the 6th day of October. It was postmarked at New York, the 5th of October, 1869.