Formation of the Union, 1750-1829 Part 22

THE UNION IN DANGER (1809-1815).

106. REFERENCES.

BIBLIOGRAPHIES.--W. E. Foster, _References to Presidential Administrations_, 12-15; J. Winsor, _Narrative and Critical History_, VII.

320-323, 341-343, 420-437, 457-460, 522-524; Channing and Hart, _Guide_, ---- 170-173.

HISTORICAL MAPS.--Nos. 1 and 4, this volume (_Epoch Maps_, Nos. 7 and 9); T. MacCoun, _Historical Geography_; Henry Adams, _United States_, VI, VII., VIII., _pa.s.sim_; Anderson, _Canada_ (1814); Arrowsmith, _Map of the United States_ (1813); Scribner, _Statistical Atlas_, Plate 14; school histories of Channing, Johnston, Scudder, and Thomas.

GENERAL ACCOUNTS--R. Hildreth, _United States_, VI. 149-674; H. Von Hoist, _Const.i.tutional History_, I 226-272; J. Schouler, _United States_, II. 194-444; J. B. McMaster, _United States_, III. 339-560 (to 1812), IV.; Bryant and Gay, _Popular History_, IV. 185-244; Geo. Tucker, _United States_, II. 349-515, III. 21-145; Bradford, _Const.i.tutional History_, I.

330-410.

SPECIAL HISTORIES.--Henry Adams, _History of the United States_, V.- IX.; C. Schurz, _Henry Clay_, I. 38-137; S. H. Gay, _James Madison_, 283- 337; C. J. Ingersoll, _Historical Sketch of the Second War_; T. Roosevelt, _Naval War of 1812_; J. Armstrong, _Notices of the War of 1812_; B. J.

Lossing, _Pictorial Field-book of the War of 1812_; H. M Brackenridge, _History of the Late War_; William Jones, _Military Occurrences_ and _Naval Occurrences_; E. S. Maclay, _United States Navy_.

CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTS--J. Q. Adams, _Memoirs_, II, III. (ch. ix); S.

G Goodrich, _Recollections_, I. 435-514, II. 9-60; Dolly Madison, _Memoirs and Letters_; John Randolph, _Letters to a Young Relative_; S.

Leech, _Thirty Years from Home_ (by a seaman of the Macedonian); W.

Cobbett, _Pride of Britannia Humbled_(1815); Coggeshall, _History of the American Privateers_; William Sullivan, _Familiar Letters on Public Characters_, 290-355; Timothy Dwight, _History of the Hartford Convention_. Works of Jefferson, Madison, Gallatin, Dallas, Clay.-- Reprints in M. Carey, _Olive Branch_; A. Johnston, _American Orations_, I, _American History told by Contemporaries_, III.

107. NON-INTERCOURSE LAWS (1809, 1810).

[Sidenote: Madison's administration.]

James Madison, who became President March 4, 1809, felt that his administration was to be a continuation of that of Jefferson; and he took over three members of Jefferson's cabinet, including Gallatin. The Secretary of State, Robert Smith, was incapable, and Madison was practically his own foreign minister.

[Sidenote: The situation abroad.]

The condition of European affairs was, on the whole, favorable to America.

In 1807 Russia had formed an alliance with France and had accepted the Continental System, thus cutting off American trade; but in 1808 the French lost ground in Spain, and the Spanish and Portuguese ports were thus opened to American commerce. Nevertheless a hundred and eight merchantmen were captured by England in 1808.

[Sidenote: Non-intercourse Act.]

[Sidenote: Favorable trade.]

To defend American commerce and the national honor, the administration possessed but three weapons,--war, retaliatory legislation, and diplomacy.

War meant both danger and sacrifice; there was already a deficit in the Treasury. Congress, therefore, continued to legislate, while at the same time attempts were made to negotiate with both France and England. The Non-intercourse Act continued in force throughout 1809, and hardly impeded American commerce; trade with England and France went on through a few intermediary ports such as Lisbon and Riga, and there was a brisk direct trade under special license of one or the other of the powers. The s.h.i.+pping engaged in foreign trade now reached a higher point than ever before. The profits of American vessels were so great that forged American papers were openly sold in England. The defection of New England was stayed, and the President was supported by a fair majority in both Houses.

It remained to be seen whether non-intercourse would have any effect in securing a withdrawal of the offensive orders and decrees.

108. FRUITLESS NEGOTIATIONS (1809-1811).

[Sidenote: The Erskine treaty.]

On April 19, 1809, Madison obtained what seemed a diplomatic triumph; Erskine, the new British envoy, signed a formal agreement that the British government should withdraw the Orders in Council. A proclamation was then issued, announcing that trade might be renewed with Great Britain. As France had from the first protested that her Decrees were simply retaliatory, it was expected that they would in due time also be annulled.

The satisfaction of the country was short-lived: Erskine had gone beyond his instructions. Once more the opportunity to conciliate the United States was thrown away by England; his agreement was formally disavowed; and on August 9 the President had the mortification of issuing a second proclamation, announcing that the Orders had not been withdrawn, and that trade with England was still forbidden.

[Sidenote: Jackson's negotiation.]

Another British minister, James Jackson, was received October 1, and began his negotiation by a.s.serting that Madison had tricked Erskine into signing an agreement which the American government knew he was not authorized to make. The charge was denied, and his relations were finally closed on November 8 by a note in which he was informed that inasmuch as he "had used a language which cannot be understood but as reiterating and even aggravating the same gross insinuation, no further communications will be received." Having thus practically been dismissed for brutally insulting the government to which he was accredited, Jackson made a tour of the Eastern States, and was received with hospitality and enthusiasm by the leading New England Federalists.

[Sidenote: Macon Bill No. 2.]

[Sidenote: Anger of France.]

[Sidenote: Pretended revocation by France.]

From France no satisfaction could be obtained during 1809. To remove all restrictions on commerce was to give up everything; but Congress was tired of resistance, and on May i, 1810, pa.s.sed the "Macon Bill No. 2," which was practically a surrender of all the principles at stake. It provided that commerce should be free, but that if either England or France should withdraw her Orders or Decrees, intercourse should be prohibited with the nation which retained them. The probable effect on France was speedily seen by the publication of a Decree which had been issued March 23, 1810: it declared that all American vessels which had entered French ports after the date of the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809 were to be seized. This was practically an act of war. The Macon bill now suggested to the Emperor that the Americans might be entrapped into another ambush: on August 5 his foreign minister wrote to Armstrong, the American minister, that "the Emperor loves the Americans," and that he would revoke the Milan and Berlin Decrees from November 1, provided England would withdraw her Orders in Council. Five days earlier the secret Decree of the Trianon had ordered the seizure of all American vessels that might reach French ports. The object of these measures was to entice American vessels within the reach of the French, and the ruse was successful. November 1 the President issued a proclamation declaring trade with England suspended because France had withdrawn her Decrees. Then ensued a long diplomatic discussion: since captures of American vessels by French cruisers continued, the British government refused to admit that the Decrees had been withdrawn, and complained of the prohibition of English trade. On December 25 Napoleon drew in his net by a general order for the seizure of all American vessels in French ports; and property to the value of about ten million dollars was thus confiscated.

[Sidenote: Fruitless negotiation with England.]

The British ministry kept its promise to Jackson, not to recall him till the end of a year. In February, 1811, Pinkney, our minister in London, demanded his pa.s.sports, and left England with a tacit threat of war. The British government instantly sent a fourth minister, Mr. Foster, to the United States, and on June 13, 1811, reparation was made for the "Leopard- Chesapeake" outrage. This tardy act was received with coldness: four weeks earlier the English corvette "Little Belt" had fired upon the American frigate "President;" the fire was returned, and the "Little Belt"

captured.

109. THE WAR PARTY (1811).

[Sidenote: Madison's first Congress.]

The responsibility for peace or war was now thrown upon the Congress which a.s.sembled Nov. 4, 1811. It had been elected at a time when it was believed that France had at last withdrawn the Decrees, and it had a strong Republican majority in both branches; there were but six Federalists in the Senate, and thirty-seven in the House. Even Ma.s.sachusetts had chosen a Republican senator.

[Sidenote: The young Republicans.]

The new Congress had little of the timid spirit of its predecessor. It contained an unusual number of vigorous young men. Among the members who appeared for the first time in the House were John C. Calhoun, Langdon Cheves, and William Lowndes; two years later Daniel Webster took his seat.

The first act of the new House Was to elect as its Speaker Henry Clay of Kentucky,--a young man for the first time a member of the House, and known to be in favor of war. His selection meant a change of counsels; the committees were reorganized, and Calhoun was made a leading member of the committee on Foreign Relations.

[Sidenote: Influence of the West.]

For the first time since 1807 war seemed likely. The controlling element in Congress had no longer the traditions of the Revolutionary War and the influence of Revolutionary statesmen. Many of these members represented interior States, having no sea-coast, and subject to no danger from invasion. These States were too new to command the affectionate support of their people; to their members the United States government represented the power and dignity of America; they chafed under the humiliations which had so long been suffered. The growth of the South and West enabled Congress to override the Federalists of New England and the peace Republicans of the Middle States.

[Sidenote: Madison's att.i.tude.]

The President was a peaceful man, but he was unable to manage Congress, and was weary of the long series of offensive measures against his country. The annual message bore a distinctly warlike tone, especially toward England; and Gallatin suggested increased import duties and new war taxes.

[Sidenote: Who was the enemy?]

The grievances of the United States were heavy, but to go to war was difficult. The government was hampered by the fact that the New England s.h.i.+p-owners, in whose behalf the government was negotiating and threatening, preferred an irregular and hazardous trade to war. A more serious difficulty was that France had notoriously been a worse enemy than England; she had done all the open injury in her power, and had then treacherously entrapped our vessels. Madison had taken the untenable ground that our trade was respected by France, and that the British government was therefore bound to withdraw its Orders. The New England Federalists had a corresponding partisan friends.h.i.+p for England, and could see no offence in the blockade of our coasts, or even in impressment.

[Sidenote: Designs on Canada.]

Yet the war spirit against England was steadily rising. The reason is to be found in a speech delivered by Henry Clay some months later: "An honorable peace is obtainable only by an efficient war. My plan would be to call out the ample resources of the country, give them a judicious direction, prosecute the war with the utmost vigor, strike wherever we can reach the enemy at sea or on land, and negotiate the terms of peace at Quebec or Halifax." The immediate object of the war was, therefore, not to secure the rights of vessel-owners: war would instantly make all American commerce subject to capture; the evident purpose was to take Canada, and by the occupation of British territory to force England to make a favorable peace.

[Sidenote: Preliminaries of war.]

On Jan. 6, 1812, a bill for raising twenty-five thousand troops was pa.s.sed, and fifty thousand volunteers were authorized. The enthusiasm of Congress was chilled by new action of the French government, which proved its friendliness by capturing American merchantmen wherever found upon the sea. Nevertheless, on April 1 the President recommended an embargo, which was understood to be preliminary to war with England. As the time for Presidential nominations came on, the New York Republicans bolted, and nominated De Witt Clinton.