The Fight For The Republic in China Part 20

It is high time that the United States raises the whole question of the open door in China again, and refuses to tolerate any longer the old disruptive and dog-in-the-manger policy of the Powers. America is now happily in a position to inaugurate a new era in the Far East as in the Far West and to stop exploitation.

CHAPTER XVI

CHINA AND THE WAR

The question of Chinese sentiments on the subject of the war, as well as the precise relations between the Chinese Government and the two groups of belligerents, are matters which have been totally misunderstood. To those who have grasped the significance of the exhaustive preceding account of the Republic in travail, this statement should not cause surprise; for China has been in no condition to play anything but an insignificant and unsatisfactory role in world-politics.

When the world-war broke out China was still in the throes of her domestic troubles and without any money at all in her Central Treasury; and although Yuan s.h.i.+h-kai, on being suddenly confronted with an unparalleled international situation, did initiate certain negotiations with the German Legation with a view to securing a cancellation of the Kiaochow lease, the ultimatum which j.a.pan dispatched to Germany on the 15th August, 1914, completely nullified his tentative proposals. Yuan s.h.i.+h-kai had, indeed, not been in the slightest degree prepared for such a sensational development as war between j.a.pan and Germany over the question of a cruiser-base established on territory leased from China; and although he considered the possibility of sending a Chinese force to co-operate in the attack on the German stronghold, that project was never matured, whilst his subsequent contrivances, notably the establishment of a so-called war-zone in Shantung, were without international value, and attracted no attention save in j.a.pan.

Chinese, however, did not remain blind to the trend of events. After the fall of Tsingtao and the subsequent complications with j.a.pan, which so greatly served to increase the complexities of a nebulous situation, certain lines of thought insensibly developed. That the influential cla.s.ses in China should have desired that Germany should by some means rehabilitate herself in Europe and so be placed in a position to chastise a nation that for twenty years had brought nothing but sorrow to them was perhaps only natural; and it is primarily to this one cause that so-called sympathy with Germany during the first part of the war has been due. But it must also be noticed that the immense German propaganda in China during the first two years of the war, coupled with the successes won in Russia and elsewhere, powerfully impressed the population--not so much because they were attracted by the feats of a Power that had enthroned militarism, but because they wrongly supposed that sooner or later the effects of this military display would be not only to secure the relaxation of the j.a.panese grip on the country but would compel the Powers to re-cast their pre-war policies in China and abandon their attempts at placing the country under financial supervision. Thus, by the irony of Fate, Germany in Eastern Asia for the best part of 1914, 1915 and 1916, stood for the aspirations of the oppressed--a moral which we may very reasonably hope will not escape the attention of the Foreign Offices of the world. Nor must it be forgotten that the modern Chinese army, being like the j.a.panese, largely Germany-trained and Germany-armed, had a natural predilection for Teutonism; and since the army, as we have shown, plays a powerful role in the politics of the Republic, public opinion was greatly swayed by what it proclaimed through its accredited organs.

Be this as it may, it was humanly impossible for such a vast country with such vast resources in men and raw materials to remain permanently quiescent during an universal conflagration when there was so much to be salvaged. Slowly the idea became general in China that something had to be done; that is that a state of technical neutrality would lead nowhere save possibly to Avernus.

As early as November, 1915, Yuan s.h.i.+h-kai and his immediate henchmen had indeed realized the internal advantages to be derived from a formal war-partners.h.i.+p with the signatories of the Pact of London, the impulse to the movement being given by certain important s.h.i.+pments of arms and ammunition from China which were then made. A half-surrept.i.tious attempt to discuss terms in Peking caused no little excitement, the matter being, however, only debated in very general terms. The princ.i.p.al item proposed by the Peking government was characteristically the stipulation that an immediate loan of two million pounds should be made to China, in return for her technical belligerency. But when the proposal was taken to Tokio, j.a.pan rightly saw that its main purpose was simply to secure an indirect foreign endors.e.m.e.nt of Yuan s.h.i.+h-kai's candidature as Emperor; and for that reason she threw cold-water on the whole project. To subscribe to a formula, which besides enthroning Yuan s.h.i.+h-kai would have been a grievous blow to her Continental ambitions, was an unthinkable thing; and therefore the manoeuvre was foredoomed to failure.

The death of Yuan s.h.i.+h-kai in the summer of 1916 radically altered the situation. Powerful influences were again set to work to stamp out the German cult and to incline the minority of educated men who control the destinies of the country to see that their real interests could only lie with the Allies, who were beginning to export Chinese man-power as an auxiliary war-aid and who were very anxious to place the whole matter on a sounder footing. Little real progress was, however, made in the face of the renewed German efforts to swamp the country with their propaganda. By means of war-maps, printed in English and Chinese, and also by means of an exhaustive daily telegraphic service which hammered home every possible fact ill.u.s.trative of German invincibility, the German position in China, so far from being weakened, was actually strengthened during the period when Rumania was being overrun. By a singular destiny, any one advocating an alliance with the Allies was bitterly attacked not only by the Germans but by the j.a.panese as well--this somewhat nave identification of j.a.pan's political interest with those of an enemy country being an unique feature of the situation worthy of permanent record.

It was not until President Wilson sent out his Peace offering of the 19th December, 1916, that a distinct change came. On this doc.u.ment being formally communicated to the Chinese Government great interest was aroused, and the old hopes were revived that it would be somehow possible for China to gain entry at the definitive Peace Congress which would settle beyond repeal the question of the disposal of Kiaochow and the whole of German interests in Shantung Province,--a subject of burning interest to the country not only because of the harsh treatment which had been experienced at the hands of j.a.pan, but because the precedent established in 1905 at the Portsmouth Treaty was one which it was felt must be utterly shattered if China was not to abandon her claim of being considered a sovereign international State. On that occasion j.a.pan had simply negotiated direct with Russia concerning all matters affecting Manchuria, dispatching a Plenipotentiary to Peking, after the Treaty of Peace had been signed, to secure China's adhesion to all clauses _en bloc_ without discussion. True enough, by filing the Twenty-one Demands on China in 1915--when the war was hardly half-a-year old--and by forcing China's a.s.sent to all Shantung questions under the threat of an Ultimatum, j.a.pan had reversed the Portsmouth Treaty procedure and apparently settled the issues at stake for all time; nevertheless the Chinese hoped when the facts were properly known to the world that this species of diplomacy would not be endorsed, and that indeed the Shantung question could be reopened.

Consequently great pains were taken at the Chinese Foreign Office to draft a reply to the Wilson Note which would tell its own story. The authorized translation of the doc.u.ment handed to the American Legation on the 8th January has therefore a peculiar political interest. It runs as follows:--

"I have examined with the care which the gravity of the question demands the note concerning peace which President Wilson has addressed to the Governments of the Allies and the Central Powers now at war and the text of which Your Excellency has been good enough to transmit to me under instructions of your Government.

"China, a nation traditionally pacific, has recently again manifested her sentiments in concluding treaties concerning the pacific settlement of international disputes, responding thus to the voeux of the Peace Conference held at the Hague.

"On the other hand, the present war, by its prolongation, has seriously affected the interests of China, more so perhaps than those of other Powers which have remained neutral. She is at present at a time of reorganization which demands economically and industrially the co-operation of foreign countries, a co-operation which a large number of them are unable to accord on account of the war in which they are engaged.

"In manifesting her sympathy for the spirit of the President's Note, having in view the ending as soon as possible of the hostilities, China is but acting in conformity not only with her interests but also with her profound sentiments.

"On account of the extent which modern wars are apt to a.s.sume and the repercussions which they bring about, their effects are no longer limited to belligerent States. All countries are interested in seeing wars becoming as rare as possible. Consequently China cannot but show satisfaction with the views of the Government and people of the United States of America who declare themselves ready, and even eager, to co-operate when the war is over, by all proper means to a.s.sure the respect of the principle of the equality of nations, whatever their power may be, and to relieve them of the peril of wrong and violence. China is ready to join her efforts with theirs for the attainment of such results which can only be obtained through the help of all."

Already, then, before there had been any question of Germany's ruthless submarine war necessitating a decisive move, China had commenced to show that she could not remain pa.s.sive during a world-conflict which was indirectly endangering her interests. America, by placing herself in direct communication with the Peking Government on the subject of a possible peace, had given a direct hint that she was solicitous of China's future and determined to help her as far as possible. All this was in strict accordance with the traditional policy of the United States in China, a policy which although too idealistic to have had much practical value--being too little supported by battles.h.i.+ps and bayonets to be respected--has nevertheless for sixty years tempered the wind to the shorn lamb. The ground had consequently been well prepared for the remarkable denouement which came on the 9th February, 1917, and which surprised all the world.

On the fourth of that month the United States formally communicated with China on the subject of the threatened German submarine war against neutral s.h.i.+pping and invited her to a.s.sociate herself with America in breaking-off diplomatic relations with Germany. China had meanwhile received a telegraphic communication from the Chinese Minister in Berlin transmitting a Note from the German Government making known the measures endangering all merchant vessels navigating the prescribed zones. The effect of these two communications on the mind of the Chinese Government was at first admittedly stunning and very varied expressions of opinion were heard in Peking. For the first time in the history of the country the government had been invited to take a step which meant the inauguration of a definite Foreign policy from which there could be no retreat. For four days a discussion raged which created the greatest uneasiness; but by the 8th February, President Li Yuan-hung had made up his mind--the final problem being simply the "conversion" of the Military Party to the idea that a decisive step, which would for ever separate them from Germany, must at last be taken. It is known that the brilliant Scholar Liang Ch'i-chao, who was hastily summoned to Peking, proved a decisive influence and performed the seemingly impossible in a few hours' discussion. Realizing at once the advantages which would accrue from a single masculine decision he advised instant action in such a convincing way that the military leaders surrendered. Accordingly on the 9th February the presence of the German Minister was requested at the Chinese Foreign Office when the following Note was read to him and subsequently transmitted telegraphically to Berlin.

Your Excellency:

A telegraphic communication has been received from the Chinese Minister at Berlin transmitting a note from the German Government dated February 1st, 1917, which makes known that the measures of blockade newly adopted by the Government of Germany will, from that day, endanger neutral merchant vessels navigating in certain prescribed zones.

The new measures of submarine warfare, inaugurated by Germany, imperilling the lives and property of Chinese citizens to even a greater extent than the measures previously taken which have already cost so many human lives to China, const.i.tute a violation of the principles of public international law at present in force; the tolerance of their application would have as a result the introduction into international law of arbitrary principles incompatible with even legitimate commercial intercourse between neutral states and between neutral states and belligerent powers.

The Chinese Government, therefore, protests energetically to the Imperial German Government against the measures proclaimed on February 1st, and sincerely hopes that with a view to respecting the rights of neutral states and to maintaining the friendly relations between these two countries, the said measures will not be carried out.

In case, contrary to its expectations, its protest be ineffectual the Government of the Chinese Republic will be constrained, to its profound regret, to sever the diplomatic relations at present existing between the two countries. It is unnecessary to add that the att.i.tude of the Chinese Government has been dictated purely by the desire to further the cause of the world's peace and by the maintenance of the sanct.i.ty of international law.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the a.s.surance of my highest consideration.

At the same time the following reply was handed to the American Minister in Peking thus definitely clinching the matter:

Your Excellency:

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note of the 4th February, 1917, informing me that the Government of the United States of America, in view of the adoption by the German Government of its new policy of submarine warfare on the 1st of February, has decided to take certain action which it judges necessary as regards Germany.

The Chinese Government, like the President of the United States of America, is reluctant to believe that the German Government will actually carry into execution those measures which imperil the lives and property of citizens of neutral states and jeopardize the commerce, even legitimate, between neutrals as well as between neutrals and belligerents and which tend, if allowed to be enforced without opposition, to introduce a new principle into public international law.

The Chinese Government being in accord with the principles set forth in Your Excellency's note and firmly a.s.sociating itself with the Government of the United States, has taken similar action by protesting energetically to the German Government against the new measures of blockade. The Chinese Government also proposes to take such action in the future as will be deemed necessary for the maintenance of the principles of international law.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the a.s.surance of my highest consideration.

His Excellency Paul S. Reinsch, Envoy Extraordinary & Minister Plenipotentiary of The United States of America.

When these facts became generally known an extraordinary ferment was noticeable. What efforts had to be made to overcome the not inconsiderable opposition of the Military Party who were opposed to any departure from a policy of pa.s.sive neutrality need not now be set down; but it is sufficient to state that the decision arrived at was in every sense a victory of the younger intellectual forces over the older mandarinate, whose traditions of _laissez faire_ and spineless diplomacy had hitherto cost the country so dear. A definite and far-reaching Foreign Policy had at last been inaugurated. By responding rapidly and firmly to the invitation of the United States to a.s.sociate herself with the stand taken against Germany's piratical submarine warfare, China has undoubtedly won for herself a new place in the world's esteem. Both in Europe and America the news of this development awakened well-understandable enthusiasm, and convinced men that the Republic at last stood for something vital and real. Until the 9th February, 1917, what China had been doing was not really to maintain her neutrality, since she had been unable to defend her territory from being made a common battleground in 1914: she had been engaged in guarding and perpetuating her traditional impotency. For whilst it may be accurate to declare--a fact which few Westerners have realized--that to the ma.s.s of the Chinese nation the various members of the European Family are undistinguishable from one another, there being little to choose in China between a Russian or a German, an Englishman or an Austrian, a Frenchman or a Greek, the trade-contact of a century had certainly taught to a great many that there was profit in certain directions and none in certain others. It was perfectly well-known, for instance, that England stood for a sea-empire; that the sea was an universal road; that British s.h.i.+ps, both mercantile and military, were the most numerous; and that other things being equal it must primarily be Britain more than any other European country which would influence Chinese destinies. But the British Alliance with j.a.pan had greatly weakened the trust which originally existed; and this added to the fact that Germany, although completely isolated and imprisoned by the sea, still maintained herself intact by reason of her marvellous war-machine, which had ploughed forward with such horrible results in a number of directions, had made inaction seem the best policy. And yet, although the Chinese may be pardoned for not forming clear concepts regarding the rights and wrongs of the present conflict, they had undoubtedly realized that it was absolutely essential for them not to remain outside the circle of international friends.h.i.+ps when a direct opportunity was offered them to step within.

It was a sudden inkling of these things which now dawned on the public mind and slowly awakened enthusiasm. For the first time since Treaty relations with the Powers had been established Chinese diplomatic action had swept beyond the walls of Peking and embraced world-politics within its scope. The Confucianist conception of the State, as being simply a regional creation, a thing complete in itself and all sufficient because it was locked to the past and indifferent to the future, had hitherto been supreme, foreign affairs being the result of unwilling contact at sea-ports or in the wastes of High Asia where rival empires meet. To find Chinese--five years after the inauguration of their Republic--ready to accept literally and loyally in the western way all the duties and obligations which their rights of eminent domain confer was a great and fine discovery. It has been supposed by some that a powerful role was played in this business by the temptation to benefit materially by an astute move: that is that China was greatly influenced in her decision by the knowledge that the denouncing of the German treaties would instantly suspend the German Boxer indemnity and pour into the depleted Central Treasury a monthly surplus of nearly two million Mexican dollars. Paradoxical as it may sound in a country notoriously hard-pressed for cash, monetary considerations played no part whatever in convincing the Peking Government that the hour for action had arrived; nor again was there any question of real hostility to a nation which is so far removed from the East as to be meaningless to the ma.s.ses. The deep, underlying, decisive influence was simply expediency--the most subtle of all political reasons and the hardest to define. But just as Britain declared war because the invasion of Belgium brought to a head all the vague grounds for opposition to German policy; and just as America broke off relations because the sc.r.a.pping of undertaking after undertaking regarding the sea-war made it imperative for her to act, so did China choose the right moment to enunciate the doctrine of her independence by voicing her determination to hold to the whole corpus of international sanctions on which her independence finally rests. In the last a.n.a.lysis, then, the Chinese note of the 9th February to the German Government was a categorical and unmistakable reply to all the insidious attempts which had been made since the beginning of the war to place her outside and beyond the operation of the Public Law of Europe; and it is solely and entirely in that light that her future actions must be judged. The leaders who direct the destinies of China became fully prepared for a state of belligerency from the moment they decided to speak; but they could not but be supremely anxious concerning the expression of that belligerency, since their international position had for years been such that a single false move might cripple them.

Let us make this clear. Whilst China has been from the first fully prepared to co-operate with friendly Powers in the taking of war-measures which would ultimately improve her world-position, she has not been prepared to surrender the initiative in these matters into foreign hands. The argument that the mobilization of her resources could only be effectively dealt with by specially designated foreigners, for instance, has always been repellent to her because she knows from bitter experience that although j.a.pan has played little or no part in the war, and indeed cla.s.sifies herself as a semi-belligerent, the Tokio Government would not hesitate to use any opportunity which presented itself in China for selfish ends; and by insisting that as she is on the spot she is the most competent to insure the effectiveness of Chinese co-operation, attempt to tighten her hold on the country. It is a fact which is self-evident to observers on the spot that ever since the coup of the Twenty-one Demands, many j.a.panese believe that their country has succeeded in almost completely infeodating China and has become the sovereign arbitrator of all quarrels, as well as the pacificator of the Eastern World. Statements which were incautiously allowed to appear in the j.a.panese Press a few days prior to the Chinese Note of the 9th February disclose what j.a.pan really thought on the subject of China identifying herself with the Allies. For instance, the following, which bears the hall-mark of official inspiration, reads very curiously in the light of after-events:

... "Dispatches from Peking say that England and France have already started a flanking movement to induce China to join the anti-German coalition. The intention of the Chinese Government has not yet been learned. But it is possible that China will agree, if conditions are favourable, thus gaining the right to voice her views at the coming peace conference. Should the Entente Powers give China a firm guarantee, it is feared here that China would not hesitate to act.

"The policy of the j.a.panese Government toward this question cannot yet be learned. It appears, however, that the j.a.panese Government is not opposed to applying the resolutions of the Paris Economic Conference, in so far as they concern purely economic questions, since j.a.pan desires that German influence in the commerce and finance of the Orient should be altogether uprooted. But should the Entente Powers of Europe try to induce China to join them, j.a.pan may object on the ground that it will create more disturbances in China and lead to a general disturbance of peace in the Orient."

Now there is not the slightest doubt in the writer's mind--and he can claim to speak as a student of twenty years' standing--that this definition of j.a.panese aims and objects is a very true one; and that the subsequent invitation to China to join the Allies which came from Tokio after a meeting between the j.a.panese Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Allied Amba.s.sadors was simply made when a new orientation of policy had been forced by stress of circ.u.mstances. j.a.pan has certainly always wished German influence in the Far East to be uprooted if she can take the place of Germany; but if she cannot take that place absolutely and entirely she would vastly prefer the influence to remain, since it is in the nature of counterweight to that of other European Powers and of America--foreign influence in China, as Mr. Hioki blandly told the late President Yuan s.h.i.+h-kai in his famous interview of the 18th January, 1915, being a source of constant irritation to the j.a.panese people, and the greatest stumbling-block to a permanent understanding in the Far East.

Chinese suspicion of any invitation coming by way of Tokio has been, therefore, in every way justified, if it is a reasonable and legitimate thing for a nation of four hundred millions of people to be acutely concerned about their independence; for events have already proved up to the hilt that so far from the expulsion of Germany from Shantung having resulted in the handing-back of interests which were forcibly acquired from China in 1898, that expulsion has merely resulted in j.a.pan succeeding to such interests and thereby obliterating all trace of her original promise to the world in 1914 that she would restore to China what was originally taken from her. Here it is necessary to remark that not only did j.a.pan in her negotiations over the Twenty-one Demands force China to hand over the twelve million pounds of German improvements in Shantung province, but that Baron Hayas.h.i.+, the present j.a.panese Minister to China, has recently declared that j.a.pan would demand from China a vast settlement or concession at Tsingtao, thus making even the alleged handing-back of the leased territory--which j.a.pan is pledged to force from Germany at the Peace Conference--wholly illusory, the formula of a Settlement being adopted because twelve years' experience of Port Arthur has shown that territorial "leases," with their military garrisons and administrative offices, are expensive and antiquated things, and that it is easier to push infiltration by means of a mult.i.tude of Settlements in which police-boxes and policemen form an important element, than to cut off slices of territory under a nomenclature which is a clamant advertis.e.m.e.nt of disruptive aims.

Now although these matters appear to be taking us far from the particular theme we are discussing, it is not really so. Like a dark thunder-cloud on the horizon the menace of j.a.panese action has rendered frank Chinese co-operation, even in such a simple matter as war-measures against Germany, a thing of supreme difficulty. The mere rumour that China might dispatch an Expeditionary Force to Mesopotamia was sufficient to send the host of unofficial j.a.panese agents in Peking scurrying in every direction and insisting that if the Chinese did anything at all they should limit themselves to sending troops to Russia, where they would be "lost"--a suggestion made because that was what j.a.pan herself offered to do when she declined in 1915 the Allies'

proposal to dispatch troops to Europe. Nor must the fact be lost sight of that as in other countries so in China, foreign affairs provide an excellent opportunity for influencing the march of internal events.

Thus, as we have clearly shown, the Military Party, although originally averse to any action at all, saw that a strong foreign policy would greatly enhance its reputation and allow it to influence the important elections for the Parliament of 1918 which, sitting as a National Convention, will elect the next President. Thus, in the extraordinary way which happens throughout the world, the whole of February was consumed in the rival political parties manoeuvring for position, the Vice-President, General Feng Kuo-chang, himself coming hastily to Peking from Nanking to take part in this elaborate game in which many were now partic.i.p.ating merely for what they could get out of it.

On the 4th March matters were brought to a climax by an open breach between President Li Yuan-hung and the Premier, General Tuan Chi-jui, at a Cabinet meeting regarding the procedure to be observed in breaking off diplomatic relations with Germany. Although nearly a month had elapsed, no reply had been received from Berlin; and of the many plans of action proposed nothing had been formally decided. Owing to the pressure j.a.pan was exerting from Tokio to get China to come to a definite arrangement, popular anxiety was growing. Over the question of certain telegrams to be communicated to the j.a.panese Government, of which he had been kept in ignorance, President Li Yuan-hung took a firm stand; with the result that the Premier, deeply offended, abruptly left the Council Chamber, handed in his resignation and left the capital--a course of action which threatened to provoke a national crisis.

Fortunately in President Li Yuan-hung China had a cool and dispa.s.sionate statesman. At the first grave crisis in his administration he wished at all costs to secure that the a.s.sent of Parliament should be given to all steps taken, and that nothing so speculative as a policy which had not been publicly debated should be put into force. He held to this point doggedly; and after some negotiations, the Premier was induced to return to the capital and resume office, on the understanding that nothing final was to be done until a popular endors.e.m.e.nt had been secured.

On the 10th March the question was sent to Parliament for decision.

After a stormy debate of several hours in the Lower House the policy of the Government was upheld by 330 votes to 87: on the following day the Senate endorsed this decision by 158 votes to 37. By a coincidence which was too extraordinary not to have been artificially contrived, the long-awaited German reply arrived on the morning of this 10th March, copies of the doc.u.ment being circulated wholesale by German agents among the Members of Parliament in a last effort to influence their decision.

The actual text of the German reply was as follows, and it will be seen how transparently worded it is:

_To the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China_:

YOUR EXCELLENCY: By the instructions of my home Government--which reached me on the 10th inst.--I beg to forward you the following reply to China's protest to the latest blockade policy of Germany:--

"The Imperial German Government expresses its great surprise at the action threatened by the Government of the Republic of China in its Note of protest. Many other countries have also protested, but China, which has been in friendly relations with Germany, is the only State which has added a threat to its protest. The surprise is doubly great, because of the fact that, as China has no s.h.i.+pping interests in the seas of the barred zones, she will not suffer thereby.

"The Government of the Republic of China mentions that loss of life of Chinese citizens has occurred as the results of the present method of war. The Imperial German Government wishes to point out that the Government of the Republic of China has never communicated with the Imperial Government regarding a single case of this kind nor has it protested in this connexion before. According to reports received by the Imperial Government, such losses as have been actually sustained by Chinese subjects have occurred in the firing line while they were engaged in digging trenches and in other war services. While thus engaged, they were exposed to the dangers inevitable to all forces engaged in war. The fact that Germany has on several occasions protested against the employment of Chinese citizens for warlike purpose is evidence that the Imperial Government has given excellent proof of its friendly feelings toward China. In consideration of these friendly relations the Imperial Government is willing to treat the matter as if the threat had never been uttered. It is reasonable for the Imperial Government to expect that the Government of the Republic of China will revise its views respecting the question.