The Fight For The Republic in China Part 5

These things, however, need not detain us. Not that Manchuria or the adjoining Mongolian plain is not important; not that the threads of destiny are not woven thickly there. For it is certain that the vast region immediately beyond the Great Wall of China is the Flanders of the Far East--and that the next inevitable war which will destroy China or make her something of a nation must be fought on that soil just as two other wars have been fought there during the past twenty years. But this does not belong to contemporary politics; it is possibly an affair of the Chinese army of 1925 or 1935. Some day China will fight for Manchuria if it is impossible to recover it in any other way,--n.o.body need doubt that. For Manchuria is absolutely Chinese--people must remember. No matter how far the town-dwelling j.a.panese may invade the country during the next two or three decades, no matter what large alien garrisons may be planted there, the Chinese must and will remain the dominant racial element, since their population which already numbers twenty-five millions is growing at the rate of half a million a year, and in a few decades will equal the population of a first-cla.s.s European Power.

When we reach Group III we touch matters that are not only immediately vital but quite new in their type of audacity and which every one can to-day understand since they are politico-industrial. Group III, as it stands in the original text, is _simply the plan for the conquest of the mineral wealth of the Yangtsze Valley_ which mainly centres round Hankow because the vast alluvial plains of the lower reaches of this greatest of rivers were once the floor of the Yellow Sea, the upper provinces of Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi being the region of prehistoric forests clothing the coasts, which once looked down upon the slowly-receding waste of waters, and which to-day contain all the coal and iron. Hitherto every one has always believed that the Yangtsze Valley was _par excellence_ the British sphere in China; and every one has always thought that that belief was enough. It is true that political students, going carefully over all published doc.u.ments, have ended their search by declaring that the matter certainly required further elucidation. To be precise, this so-called British sphere is not an _enclave_ at all in the proper sense; indeed it can only seem one to those who still believe that it is still possible to pre-empt provinces by ministerial declarations. The j.a.panese have been the first to dare to say that the preconceived general belief was stupid. They know, of course, that it was a British force which invaded the Yangtsze Valley seventy-five years ago, and forced the signature of the Treaty of Nanking which first opened China to the world's trade; but they are by no means impressed with the rights which that action has been held to confer, since the mineral resources of this region are priceless in their eyes and must somehow be won.

The study of twenty years of history proves this a.s.sumption to be correct. Ever since 1895, j.a.pan has been driving wedges into the Yangtsze Valley of a peculiar kind to form the foundations for her sweeping claims of 1915. Thus after the war with China in 1894-95, she opened by her Treaty of Peace four ports in the Yangtsze Valley region, Soochow, Hangchow, Chungking and Shasi; that is, at the two extreme ends of the valley she established politico-commercial _points d'appui_ from which to direct her campaign. Whilst the proximity of Soochow and Hangchow to the British stronghold of Shanghai made it difficult to carry out any "penetration" work at the lower end of the river save in the form of subsidized steam-s.h.i.+pping, the case was different in Hunan and Hupeh provinces. There she was unendingly busy, and in 1903 by a fresh treaty she formally opened to trade Changsha, the capital of the turbulent Hunan province. Changsha for years remained a secret centre possessing the greatest political importance for her, and serving as a focus for most varied activities involving Hunan, Hupeh, and Kiangsi, as well as a vast hinterland. The great Tayeh iron-mines, although entirely Chinese-owned, were already being tapped to supply iron-ore for the j.a.panese Government Foundry at Wakamatsu on the island of Kius.h.i.+u. The rich coal mines of Pinghsiang, being conveniently near, supplied the great Chinese Government a.r.s.enal of Hanyang with fuel; and since j.a.pan had very little coal or iron of her own, she decided that it would be best to embrace as soon as possible the whole area of interests in one categorical demand--that is, to claim a dominant share in the Hanyang a.r.s.enal, the Tayeh iron-mines and the Pinghsiang collieries.[14] By lending money to these enterprises, which were grouped together under the name of Hanyehping, she had early established a claim on them which she turned at the psychological moment into an international question.

We can pa.s.s quickly by Group IV which is of little importance, except to say that in taking upon herself, without consultation with the senior ally, the duty of asking from China a declaration concerning the future non-leasing of harbours and islands, j.a.pan has attempted to a.s.sume a protectors.h.i.+p of Chinese territory which does not belong to her historically. It is well also to note that although j.a.pan wished it to appear to the world that this action was dictated by her desire to prevent Germany from acquiring a fresh foothold in China after the war, in reality Group IV was drafted as a general warning to the nations, one point being that she believed that the United States was contemplating the reorganization of the Foochow a.r.s.enal in Fuhkien province, and that as a corollary to that reorganization would be given the lease of an adjoining harbour such as Santuao.

It is not, however, until we reach Group V that the real purpose of the j.a.panese demands becomes unalterably clear, for in this Group we have seven sketches of things designed to serve as the _coup de grace_. Not only is a new sphere--Fuhkien province--indicated; not only is the mid-Yangtsze, from the vicinity of Kiukiang, to serve as the terminus for a system of j.a.panese railways, radiating from the great river to the coasts of South China; but the gleaming knife of the j.a.panese surgeon is to aid the j.a.panese teacher in the great work of propaganda; the j.a.panese monk and the j.a.panese policeman are to be dispersed like skirmishers throughout the land; j.a.panese a.r.s.enals are to supply all the necessary arms, or failing that a special j.a.panese a.r.s.enal is to be established; j.a.panese advisers are to give the necessary advice in finance, in politics, in every department--foreshadowing a complete and all embracing political control. Never was a more sweeping programme of supervision presented, and small wonder if Chinese when they learnt of this climax exclaimed that the fate of Korea was to be their own.

For a number of weeks after the presentation of these demands everything remained clothed in impenetrable mystery, and despite every effort on the part of diplomatists reliable details of what was occurring could not be obtained. Gradually, however, the admission was forced that the secrecy being preserved was due to the j.a.panese threat that publicity would be met with the harshest reprisals; and presently the veil was entirely lifted by newspaper publication and foreign Amba.s.sadors began making inquiries in Tokio. The nature and scope of the Twenty-one Demands could now be no longer hidden; and in response to the growing indignation which began to be voiced by the press and the pressure which British diplomacy brought to bear, j.a.pan found it necessary to modify some of the most important items. She had held twenty-four meetings at the Chinese Foreign Office, and although the Chinese negotiators had been forced to give way in such matters as extending the "leasing"

periods of railways and territories in Manchuria and in admitting the j.a.panese right to succeed to all German interests and rights in Shantung (Group I and II), in the essential matters of the Hanyehping concessions (Group III) and the noxious demands of Group V China had stood absolutely firm, declining even to discuss some of the items.

Accordingly j.a.panese diplomacy was forced to restate and re-group the whole corpus of the demands. On the 26th April, acting under direct instructions from Tokio, the j.a.panese Minister to Peking presented a revised list for renewed consideration, the demands being expanded to twenty-four articles (in place of the original twenty-one largely because discussion had shown the necessity of breaking up into smaller units some of the original articles). Most significant, however, is the fact that Group V (which in its original form was a more vicious a.s.sault on Chinese sovereignty than the Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia of June, 1914), was so remodelled as to convey a very different meaning, the group heading disappearing entirely and an innocent-looking exchange of notes being asked for. It is necessary to recall that, when taxed with making Demands which were entirely in conflict with the spirit of the Anglo-j.a.panese Alliance, the j.a.panese Government through its amba.s.sadors abroad had categorically denied that they had ever laid any such Demands on the Chinese Government. It was claimed that there had never been twenty-one Demands, as the Chinese alleged, but only fourteen, _the seven items of Group V being desiderata which it was in the interests of China to endorse but which j.a.pan had no intention of forcing upon her_.

The writer, being acquainted from first to last with everything that took place in Peking from the 18th January to the filing of the j.a.panese ultimatum of the 7th May, has no hesitation in stigmatizing this statement as false. The whole aim and object of these negotiations was to force through Group V. j.a.pan would have gladly postponed _sine die_ the discussion of all the other Groups had China a.s.sented to provisions which would have made her independence a thing of the past. Every Chinese knew that, in the main, Group V was simply a repet.i.tion of the measures undertaken in Korea after the Russo-j.a.panese war of 1905 as a forerunner to annexation; and although obviously in the case of China no such rapid surgery could be practised, the endors.e.m.e.nt of these measures would have meant a virtual j.a.panese Protectorate. Even a cursory study of the text that follows will confirm in every particular these capital contentions:

j.a.pAN'S REVISED DEMANDS

j.a.pan's Revised Demands on China, twenty-four in all, presented April 26, 1915.

_Note on original text_:

[The revised list of articles is a Chinese translation of the j.a.panese text. It is hereby declared that when a final decision is reached, there shall be a revision of the wording of the text.]

GROUP I

The j.a.panese Government and the Chinese Government, being desirous of maintaining the general peace in Eastern Asia and further strengthening the friendly relations and good neighbourhood existing between the two nations, agree to the following articles:--

Article 1. The Chinese Government engages to give full a.s.sent to all matters upon which the j.a.panese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government, relating to the disposition of all rights, interests and concessions, which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung.

Article 2. (Changed into an exchange of notes.)

The Chinese Government declares that within the Province of Shantung and along its coast no territory or island will be ceded or leased to any Power under any pretext.

Article 3. The Chinese Government consents that as regards the railway to be built by China herself from Chefoo or Lungkow to connect with the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway, if Germany is willing to abandon the privilege of financing the Chefoo-Weihsien line, China will approach j.a.panese capitalists to negotiate for a loan.

Article 4. The Chinese Government engages, in the interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself as soon as possible certain suitable places in the Province of Shantung as Commercial Ports.

(Supplementary Exchange of Notes)

The places which ought to be opened are to be chosen and the regulations are to be drafted, by the Chinese Government, but the j.a.panese Minister must be consulted before making a decision.

GROUP II

The j.a.panese Government and the Chinese Government, with a view to developing their economic relations in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, agree to the following articles:--

Article 1. The two contracting Powers mutually agree that the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the terms of the South Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway shall be extended to 99 years.

(Supplementary Exchange of Notes)

The term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny shall expire in the 86th year of the Republic or 1997. The date for restoring the South Manchurian Railway to China shall fall due in the 91st year of the Republic or 2002. Article 12 in the original South Manchurian Railway Agreement stating that it may be redeemed by China after 36 years after the traffic is opened is hereby cancelled. The term of the Antung-Mukden Railway shall expire in the 96th year of the Republic or 2007.

Article 2. j.a.panese subjects in South Manchuria may lease or purchase the necessary land for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for prosecuting agricultural enterprises.

Article 3. j.a.panese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in South Manchuria and to engage in business and manufacture of any kind whatsoever.

Article 3a. The j.a.panese subjects referred to in the preceding two articles, besides being required to register with the local authorities pa.s.sports which they must procure under the existing regulations, shall also submit to police laws and ordinances and tax regulations, which are approved by the j.a.panese consul. Civil and criminal cases in which the defendants are j.a.panese shall be tried and adjudicated by the j.a.panese consul; those in which the defendants are Chinese shall be tried and adjudicated by Chinese Authorities. In either case an officer can be deputed to the court to attend the proceedings. But mixed civil cases between Chinese and j.a.panese relating to land shall be tried and adjudicated by delegates of both nations conjointly in accordance with Chinese law and local usage. When the judicial system in the said region is completely reformed, all civil and criminal cases concerning j.a.panese subjects shall be tried entirely by Chinese law courts.

Article 4. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)

The Chinese Government agrees that j.a.panese subjects shall be permitted forthwith to investigate, select, and then prospect for and open mines at the following places in South Manchuria, apart from those mining areas in which mines are being prospected for or worked; until the Mining Ordinance is definitely settled methods at present in force shall be followed.

PROVINCE OF FENG-TIEN

|Locality |District |Mineral | | | |Niu Hsin T'ai |Pen-hsi |Coal |Tien s.h.i.+h Fu Kou |Pen-hsi |Coal |Sha Sung Kang |Hai-lung |Coal |T'ieh Ch'ang |Tung-hua |Coal |Nuan Ti Tang |Chin |Coal |An Shan Chan region |From Liaoyang to Pen-hsi |Iron

PROVINCE OF KIRIN

(Southern portion)

|Sha Sung Kang |Ho-lung |Coal and Iron |Kang Yao |Chi-lin (Kirin) |Coal |Chia P'i Kou |Hua-tien |Gold

Article 5. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)

The Chinese Government declares that China will hereafter provide funds for building railways in South Manchuria; if foreign capital is required, the Chinese Government agrees to negotiate for the loan with j.a.panese capitalists first.

Article 5a. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)

The Chinese Government agrees that hereafter, when a foreign loan is to be made on the security of the taxes of South Manchuria (not including customs and salt revenue on the security of which loans have already been made by the Central Government), it will negotiate for the loan with j.a.panese capitalists first.

Article 6. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)

The Chinese Government declares that hereafter if foreign advisers or instructors on political, financial, military or police matters, are to be employed in South Manchuria, j.a.panese will be employed first.

Article 7. The Chinese Government agrees speedily to make a fundamental revision of the Kirin-Changchun Railway Loan Agreement, taking as a standard the provisions in railroad loan agreements made heretofore between China and foreign financiers. If, in future, more advantageous terms than those in existing railway loan agreements are granted to foreign financiers, in connection with railway loans, the above agreement shall again be revised in accordance with j.a.pan's wishes.

All existing treaties between China and j.a.pan relating to Manchuria shall, except where otherwise provided for by this Convention, remain in force.

1. The Chinese Government agrees that hereafter when a foreign loan is to be made on the security of the taxes of Eastern Inner Mongolia, China must negotiate with the j.a.panese Government first.

2. The Chinese Government agrees that China will herself provide funds for building the railways in Eastern Inner Mongolia; if foreign capital is required, she must negotiate with the j.a.panese Government first.

3. The Chinese Government agrees, in the interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself, as soon as possible, certain suitable places in Eastern Inner Mongolia as Commercial Ports. The places which ought to be opened are to be chosen, and the regulations are to be drafted, by the Chinese Government, but the j.a.panese Minister must be consulted before making a decision.

4. In the event of j.a.panese and Chinese desiring jointly to undertake agricultural enterprises and industries incidental thereto, the Chinese Government shall give its permission.

GROUP III