The Army of the Cumberland Part 6

Crittenden's corps had during the time moved down the Sequatchie Valley, in readiness for an active campaign. He then crossed the river at Bridgeport, Sh.e.l.l Mound, and Battle Creek, and on September 4th his entire corps was across the river. He was ordered to move up the valley of Running Water Creek and Whiteside, leaving one division on the line of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, and to push forward as near as possible to Chattanooga, threatening the enemy in that direction. At 6 A.M. on the 9th Crittenden was informed by a despatch from Rosecrans that Chattanooga had been abandoned by the enemy, and that he was to push forward at once with five day's rations and make a vigorous pursuit. During the morning Crittenden with Wood's division occupied the town, and Wood was placed in command. Palmer's and Van Cleve's were turned off south after they pa.s.sed the spur of Lookout Mountain, and encamped at Rossville, five miles south of Chattanooga. In the afternoon of the same day Crittenden was ordered to leave a brigade at Chattanooga, and with the balance of his command to pursue the enemy with the utmost vigor, the line of march to be through Ringgold and on to Dalton. The next day Crittenden left Wagner-who had crossed the river from the front of the town during the night-in command, and ordered forward Palmer's, Van Cleve's, and the two brigades of Wood's division in pursuit, marching on the Rossville and Riggold road. During the afternoon Palmer reported the enemy's cavalry strong on his front, that he had only been able to march six miles, had encamped at Chickamauga Creek, and that his advance had been checked by a charge of the rebel cavalry. That night Crittenden received several reports from his front that the enemy was in force near La Fayette, and threatening to retake Chattanooga.

During the 11th, Wood, with his two brigades, was on a reconnoissance at Gordon's Mills, and Crittenden was ordered to occupy Ringgold and report. These movements determined to Rosecrans's satisfaction the position of the enemy in force in the vicinity of La Fayette. He immediately ordered Crittenden to close his entire command upon Wood, crossing as quickly as possible to the Rossville and La Fayette road, to some point near Lee and Gordon's Mills. Early on the morning of the 12th, Wilder was ordered back to Ringgold and directed to follow on the line of march of the infantry, covering the left flank. Crittenden succeeded during the day in effecting a concentration of his command at Lee and Gordon's Mills, which point Wilder's brigade reached after a severe skirmish during the day near Leet's tanyard, where he lost thirty men killed and wounded. With the knowledge that Bragg was concentrating his forces awaiting reinforcements behind Pigeon Mountain, in the vicinity of La Fayette, and that his own army was scattered a distance of thirty miles from flank to flank-from Lee and Gordon's Mills to Alpine-Rosecrans felt that it was a matter of life and death to effect the concentration of his army in the shortest possible s.p.a.ce of time.

During these movements of the army under Rosecrans, what was Bragg doing? On August 20th, the movement of our army over the c.u.mberland Mountains was reported to Bragg, and he then knew that he might look for an immediate advance. The movement of our army across the Tennessee was also reported to Bragg by his scouts, but was regarded by him as incredible. These reports were soon after confirmed by the news that our cavalry had occupied Trenton and had advanced up the Will's Valley Railroad as far as Wauhatchie, within seven miles of Chattanooga, as a covering force under which Rosecrans's columns of infantry were advancing. Our army was now as near the line of communication of the rebel army, as the latter was to the line to Nashville, and with less risk in its advance movements should Bragg commence operations to the north. Bringing his cavalry forward at once, Bragg soon ascertained that the general movement of our army was toward his left and rear in the direction of Dalton and Rome, keeping Lookout Mountain between the armies. He then determined to meet our army as its columns debouched from the defiles of the mountains. To hold Chattanooga would require at least two strong divisions, and he felt that his force would not permit this and make a successful attack also. Bragg put his army in motion on September 7th and 8th, and took up position from Lee and Gordon's Mills to La Fayette, on the road running south from Chattanooga, with the front to the east side of Lookout Mountain, and on the east bank of Chickamauga Creek, establis.h.i.+ng his headquarters at the former place.

The positions of our detached corps was fully known to Bragg on the 8th. Learning of Negley's movement of the 9th into McLemore's cove, Bragg rightly interpreted it to mean that a hurried pursuit was being made after his force, under the idea that he was in full retreat. With his own force concentrated in front of the centre, Bragg at once saw how Rosecrans had exposed the corps of his army to be attacked and defeated in detail, and that evening he gave order to Hindman to prepare his division to move against Negley, and ordered Hill to send or take Cleburne's division, join Hindman, and immediately move upon Negley. On receipt of these orders, Hill replied that his part of the movement was impracticable, as Cleburne was sick, and that both gaps-Dug and Catlett's-had been closed by felling timber which would require twenty-four hours to remove. Hindman having marched during the night of the 9th some ten miles, was now in position, some three miles from Negley in the cove. Bragg not wis.h.i.+ng to lose so favorable an opportunity of striking his opponent's force, ordered Buckner with his command to move from Anderson and join Hindman in the cove, which he did during the afternoon of the 10th. After these commands had united, the commanders held a consultation and determined that a change in the plan of operations should be made. Bragg having removed his headquarters to La Fayette, "so as to secure more prompt and decided action in the movements ordered against the enemy's centre," now directed Polk to send his remaining division to support Hindman during the operations in the cove. Despatching an officer to Bragg with a report as to this change of plans, Hindman and Cleburne waited his return. Bragg refused to make any change, and sent a verbal order to Hindman to proceed at once to carry out his previous instruction. Bragg at the same time sent written orders by courier to Hindman, notifying him of the movements of our forces, that Polk had been directed to cover his rear, and ordered him to attack and force his way through Negley to La Fayette at the earliest hour in the morning, and adds "Cleburne will attack in front the moment your guns are heard." Walker's reserve corps was also ordered to move promptly, join Cleburne's division at Dug Gap and unite in the attack. All obstructions were removed from Dug and Catlett's Gaps, and Breckenridge's division of Hill's corps was kept in position south of La Fayette to check any movement of our troops from that direction, thus putting 30,000 troops in position to crush Negley and Baird. Bragg shortly after daylight joined Cleburne, where they waited nearly all day for Hindman's guns to open-when Cleburne was to attack-on the flank and rear of Negley and Baird's divisions. After waiting long past noon in great anxiety for Hindman's attack, about the middle of the afternoon his first gun was heard. Cleburne at once pressed forward and discovered that Negley had fallen back to Steven's Gap.

Bragg, finding his attempt against Thomas's corps a failure, then determined to hurl his columns upon Crittenden's divided corps, approaching from Chattanooga, by withdrawing the troops engaged in the movement on Thomas's command to La Fayette, and directing Polk's and Walker's corps to move immediately in the direction of Lee and Gordon's Mills. Bragg knew Crittenden's corps was divided, but supposed only one division had been sent to Ringgold. At six o'clock on the evening of the 12th, Bragg wrote again to Polk, notifying him of Crittenden's position of the 11th, and stated: "This presents you a fine opportunity of striking Crittenden in detail, and I hope you will avail yourself of it at daylight to-morrow. This division crushed, and the others are yours. We can then turn on the force in the cove. Wheeler's cavalry will move on Wilder so as to cover your right. I shall be delighted to hear of your success." Later in the evening two additional orders were issued to Polk, urging him to attack promptly at "day-dawn," on the 13th; that our army was concentrating, and that it should be quick and decided." At eleven o'clock that night Polk sent a dispatch stating that he had taken a strong position for defense and asked that he be heavily re-enforced. Bragg sent him an immediate order not to defer his attack, as his command was numerically superior to the opposing force, and told him that to secure success, prompt and rapid movements on his part were necessary. Early on the morning of the 13th, Bragg, at the head of Buckner's command, went to the front, and found no advance had been made by Polk as ordered, and that Crittenden had united his forces and recrossed the Chickamauga.

Again the attempt to strike our army in detail had failed, and now Bragg gave orders to his commanders to concentrate along the east bank of Chickamauga in position for battle, and as soon as his reinforcements under Longstreet from Virginia were up to attack with the entire command. Wheeler, with two divisions of cavalry on the extreme left, was ordered to engage the attention of Thomas in McLemore's Cove, covering the main movement of the rebel army; Forrest with his own and Pegram's divisions of cavalry covered the right and front. Bragg ordered B. R. Johnson's brigade from Ringgold, where he had been stationed protecting the railroad, to take position near Reed's bridge on the extreme right of his line. Walker's corps was then formed on Johnson's left, opposite Alexander's Bridge. Buckner's corps was formed on the left of Walker, near Ledford's Ford. Polk's corps was placed in line opposite Lee and Gordon's Mills on Buckner's left, with Hill on the extreme left. Two brigades that had just arrived from Mississippi were placed under Johnson on the right, making his command a division of three brigades strong. To this division in the earlier movements three brigades of Longstreet's corps from Virginia were temporarily attached. On the 18th, Hood reporting, was placed in command of this column on the right.

The rebel army on the 17th were in position, and that evening Bragg issued his orders for his forces to cross the Chickamauga, commencing the movement at six o'clock on the morning of the 18th. Bragg's plan of battle for the 18th was for the column under Johnson-later under Hood-to cross in force at Reed's Bridge, rapidly turn to the left by the most practicable route, and sweep up the Chickamauga toward Lee and Gordon's Mills. Walker's corps next on the left, crossing at Alexandria Bridge, was to unite in the movement, pressing our army vigorously on flank and rear, in the same direction. Buckner, crossing at Ledford's Ford, was to join in the movement to the left, pressing our army back up the stream from Polk's front. The latter to push forward to the front at Lee and Gordon's Mills, and if not able to cross there, to bear to the right and cross at Dalton's Ford or Alexander's Bridge, and unite in the attack wherever he could find an opposing force. Hill, to cover the left flank of the rebel army from an advance by our forces in the cove, to ascertain by pressing his cavalry to the front if we were reinforcing our corps at Lee and Gordon's Mills, and if so to attack on the flank. This plan contemplated the destruction of the left of our army, the seizing of the La Fayette road, and, if possible, occupying and holding the roads in Chattanooga Valley, cutting off all access from Chattanooga. These movements were not executed as rapidly as was contemplated by Bragg, owing to the resistance made by our cavalry and Wilder's mounted infantry, and the difficulties arising from bad and narrow roads. Johnson was repeatedly urged to commence the movement on the right, but he delayed his advance until late in the afternoon, when Hood arrived and effected the crossing. Walker moved up to Alexander's Bridge, at which point Wilder hotly contested his crossing, and finally broke up the bridge. Walker moved down the creek to Byron's Ford, where he crossed and joined Hood on the right during the night. On Walker's crossing, Wilder was compelled to fall back.

The concentration of our army continued on the 13th, Thomas held his position of the 12th, with Negley's, Baird's, and Brannan's divisions remaining in camp, waiting the arrival of McCook, who had been ordered to close up to the left. Reynolds's division was concentrated on the road from Cooper's or Frick's Gap to Catlett's Gap, and the next day moved forward and took position at Pond Spring, with his two infantry brigades, and was joined here by Wilder. Reynolds sent Turchin to make a reconnoissance with the Ninety-second Illinois mounted infantry, to the mouth of Catlett's Gap, driving the rebel cavalry pickets from Chickamauga Creek to the gap, where he found the enemy posted with strong reserves. Brannan on the same day reconnoitered the position of the enemy toward Dug Gap, sending a brigade to Chickamauga Creek, east of Lee's Mills, one mile to the right and south of Reynolds, at Pond Spring. Turchin made another reconnoissance on the 16th toward Catlett's Gap, and found the enemy strongly posted there with infantry and artillery. The next day Thomas moved his entire corps and closed upon Crittenden's right along Chickamauga Creek, and was joined at night by McCook on his right. The four divisions of Thomas's command on the afternoon of the 18h moved to the left to Crawfish Springs. Here Rosecrans, antic.i.p.ating the movement of Bragg to secure the road to Chattanooga, and recognizing the importance of holding it, ordered Thomas with his corps to march on the cross-road leading by the Widow Glenn's to the Chattanooga and La Fayette road, and take position on that road near Kelly's farm, connecting with Crittenden's corps on his right at Gordon's Mills. During the entire night of the 18th the troops of Thomas's corps were moving to the left, and at daylight on the 19th the head of the column reached Kelly's farm; Baird's division in the advance, taking position at the forks of the road, facing toward Reed's and Alexander's Bridges over the Chickamauga. Wilder had been driven across the State road to the heights east of Widow Glenn's house the evening before, by the advance in force of the enemy over these bridges, and Baird's right rested close to Wilder's brigade. Baird's division was closely followed by Brannan, who was placed in position on the left of Baird, on the two roads leading to the bridges.

Orders were received by McCook at midnight on the 13th, directing two divisions of his corps to move to Thomas's support, and that he send his train back under guard of his remaining division. McCook moved his command, by way of Valley Head, up the mountain at Alpine on the night of the 13th, and down on the 14th into Lookout Valley, except one brigade from each division forming his train guard under command of Lytle, encamped at Little River in the mountains. Sheridan's marched down Lookout Valley to Johnson's Crook, while Johnson's and Davis's divisions were sent from Valley head on the direct road to Stevens's Gap. General Lytle was ordered to make a reconnoissance with two brigades toward Dougherty's Gap at the head of McLemore's Cove, and on the night of the 18th General Lytle joining the corps with two of his brigades, McCook's command was closed up on the Fourteenth Corps, except Post's brigade of Davis's division, ordered by General Rosecrans to hold Stevens's Gap at all hazards.

Crittenden on the 13th, under orders from headquarters, posted Wood's division in a strong position at Lee and Gordon's Mills, under orders to resist any advance of the enemy to last, and in case of extremity, if Granger was not in position to support, then to fall back to some point where he could guard the road to Chattanooga and the one around the point of Lookout Mountain, and hold both roads, as long as he had a man under him. The next day Crittenden moved the two remaining divisions of his corps to a position on the southern spur of Missionary Ridge, his right communicating with Thomas, where he was to remain, covering the road in Chattanooga Valley. Finding no movement of the enemy on his front, on the 15th Crittenden was ordered to return with his command and take position near Crawfish Spring, with Van Cleve on the left and Palmer on the right. During the day Minty with the cavalry made an extended reconnoissance on the front, finding the enemy in force at all points. Wood, holding position on Chickamauga Creek, at Lee and Gordon's Mills, on the morning of the 18th reported the enemy advancing with strong line of skirmishers on his left and asked for supports. Van Cleve was placed on Wood's left and Palmer then took Van Cleve's position on Wood's right. Wilder in the afternoon reported Minty's cavalry driven back after being re-enforced with two of his regiments; that the enemy was flanking him and that he would fall back on Wood. Palmer later in the day was placed on the left of Van Cleve's new position on the line of Chickamauga Creek, his last brigade reaching its position at four o'clock on the morning of the 19th; Wood holding his position on the creek at Lee and Gordon's Mills, which at this point runs between steep rocky bluffs in an eastwardly course, with the road to Chattanooga via Rossville crossing it at right angles; Van Cleve on his left and Palmer on the left of Van Cleve; the general course of the line being northeasterly along the Chickamauga and Rossville road.

Chapter XII.

The Battle of Chickamauga.

Colonel Dan. McCook, of Granger's reserve corps, who had been posted on the road leading to Reed's Bridge, on the evening of the 18th, made a reconnoissance to Chickamauga Creek as far as Reed's Bridge, which he burned. On the 19th, meeting Thomas, he reported that an isolated brigade of the enemy was on the west side of the creek, and as the bridge was destroyed a prompt movement in that direction might succeed in capturing the entire force. Thomas ordered Brannan to post a brigade on the road to Alexander's Bridge as support to Baird, and with his other brigades to reconnoitre the road to Reed's Bridge in search of this brigade of the enemy. Brannan moved at nine o'clock A.M., and Baird, under orders from Thomas, threw forward his right wing so as to get into line with Brannan. Baird was also ordered to keep a sharp outlook on his right flank and watch the movements of the enemy in that quarter. Shortly after these movements a part of Palmer's division reported to Thomas and was placed in position on the right of Baird. Rosecrans, when he sent Thomas to the left-the critical point-told him that he was to hold the road to Rossville, and if hard pressed, that he should be re-enforced with the entire army.

Under Bragg's orders, Walker's corps on the 18th crossed the west side of Chickamauga a little below Alexander's Bridge and then moved up the stream opposite this point. Bushrod Johnson's command the same day crossed at Reed's bridge, and then marched up the stream some three miles and took position on the morning of the 19th. Walker resumed his movement to his left up the stream, under the impression that our centre was still at Lee and Gordon's Mills, Bragg's plan being to ma.s.s Walker's and Johnson's commands and attack our left flank. The advance movement of Brannan's division, Croxton's brigade in front, about ten o'clock encountered the enemy, being the cavalry under Forrest with Wilson's and Ector's brigades of infantry, and drove them nearly half a mile, when it met with obstinate resistance. This reconnoissance of Brannan in pursuit of the brigade reported by Dan. McCook developed the relative position of the opposing contending forces, which up to this time was unknown to the respective commanders of each. It gave to Bragg the knowledge that his right was greatly overlapped by Thomas on our left, and that his flank was in danger of being turned. It compelled him at once to halt Walker's command on its march, and to direct it to retrace its steps and reinforce Forrest, now engaged with Croxton, whose movement brought on the battle of Chickamauga before Bragg had his troops in the position ordered.

Thomas then ordered Baird's division forward to Croxton's support. Moving at once with two brigades on the front, with Starkweather's in reserve, Baird and Croxton drove the enemy steadily for some distance with great loss, capturing many prisoners. Croxton's brigade having exhausted its ammunition in the severe fighting of over an hour, was then moved to the rear, and Brannan's and Baird's divisions with united forces drove the enemy from their immediate front. Here the line was halted and readjusted. Baird learning from his prisoners that the rebel army was in heavy force on his immediate front, gathering for an attack in ma.s.s, drew back his right wing and waited the a.s.sault of Bragg's right on his line, which was made in heavy force by Walker, who had reached his new position. Before Baird had completed the reforming of his line, Walker's corps, in overwhelming numbers was upon him, a.s.saulting Scribner's and King's brigades, and driving them back in disorder.

McCook, early on the morning of the 19th, had taken position with his corps at Crawfish Spring, and was now beyond the extreme left of the rebel army, ma.s.sing his troops at this point and waiting for orders. At a little after ten o'clock in the morning he was directed to take command of the right and the cavalry on that flank. This included Negley's division of the Fourteenth Corps, which was watching the fords of Chickamauga near Crawfish Spring, one brigade of his command being then engaged with the enemy. The same order directed McCook to send Johnson's divisions to the left to report to Thomas, and following this came another one from Rosecrans directing McCook to send Davis's division also to Thomas. On Baird being driven back, General Thomas ordered Johnson's and Reynolds's division of his own corps-both of whom had opportunely arrived by this time-immediately to advance and drive the enemy back. Johnson arriving first was ordered at once to advance his left, connecting with Baird's right, Palmer was immediately placed on Johnson's right and Reynolds still to the right of Palmer, with one brigade of his division in reserve. As soon as the line was thus formed the troops advanced, attacking Walker's corps on the flank with great vigor, driving it in confusion back to its first position, while Brannan's division, fighting them on the front, drove back the head of the column and retook the artillery which had been captured from Baird when he was driven back. Bragg then ordered up Cheatham's division, which had been in reserve, reinforcing Walker. With these two commands united, the rebels pressed forward with loud yells, determined on the destruction of our left. As these two commands advanced, a gap was made in their lines, into which Bragg threw Stewart's division. As they encountered our line, these troops moved forward. Striking Johnson first, they drove him from his position in disorder, then Palmer was compelled to retire, when Van Cleve coming to his support was also beaten back. Reynolds then in turn was overpowered and the rebels seemed to be sweeping every thing before them as at Stone's River. By this time Davis had reported with his division, and moving at once to the front checked the rebel advance, when Wood coming up to his a.s.sistance, our lines were reformed, and Cheatham's, Stewart's, and Walker's troops were driven in rapid retreat back to their original line. Sheridan, under orders, had left Lytle's brigade to hold Lee and Gordon's Mills on our extreme right, and moved to our left in support of the new line near Wood's and Davis's divisions. He reached the position opportunely and aided in driving back the rebels, Bradley's brigade recapturing the Eighth Indiana battery previously taken by the enemy. A large number of prisoners were captured belonging to Longstreet's corps.

Bragg, finding that his plan of battle was discovered by his opponent, and that the latter intended to dispute to the end for the possession of the Rossville and Chattanooga road, ordered Polk to cross the creek with his remaining division at the nearest ford and to a.s.sume command in person on their right. Hill with his corps was also ordered to move across the Chickamauga below Lee and Gordon's Mills and to join the line on the right.

The rebels made another desperate a.s.sault at about half past two o'clock on our right. Hood's corps, with Bushrod Johnson's division from the enemy's centre, moved forward in heavy ma.s.ses, a.s.saulting furiously Reynolds's and Van Cleve's divisions. Here they met with fearful loss from the heavy infantry and artillery fire, portions of six batteries opening with canister on their advancing columns, but still on they came. Soon the roar of battle was heard approaching near to the Widow Glenn's house, where Rosecrans's headquarters were. Our right centre now was pierced and the enemy was on the La Fayette road. Negley, from the right under McCook, was immediately ordered up with his division, Brannan from Thomas's left joining him. These two divisions were at once sent in to the fight. Moving rapidly forward to the attack, with cheer on cheer, they hurled back Hood and Johnson, steadily driving them until darkness ended the combat, our troops re-occupying their old positions.

Thomas, wis.h.i.+ng to reform his lines-which had become greatly extended in driving the rebels-and concentrate them on more commanding ground in the rear preparatory to the engagement to be renewed on the morrow, selected a new position for Baird's and Johnson's divisions, the former on the extreme left. These positions were designated to them and were occupied at once. Palmer and Reynolds were ordered into position in line on the right of Johnson, with Brannan to the rear and right of Reynolds as reserve. While these movements were being made, Cleburne with his fresh division of Hill's corps, who had been ordered to the extreme right by Bragg, under orders to attack immediately, advancing in full force, supported by Cheatham, a.s.saulted Johnson first and then Baird with tremendous force. The onset was so determined that some confusion in the line resulted, but in a few minutes our troops rallied and the enemy was repulsed in fine style. This conflict lasted for some time after dark with heavy losses on both sides, the heavy firing lighting up the struggle. At this point our artillery was again used with good effect. Wilder's brigade had occupied a position during the day on the La Fayette road about a mile north of Lee and Gordon's Mills, with Minty close by. The latter was now ordered to report to Granger at Rossville, to hold in check the enemy's cavalry operating on their right. Granger, with his reserves protected the roads to the rear toward Rossville and covered our left flank.

With night the fighting ceased, and the troops, worn out after the marching of the night before-moving from the right to the extreme left-and the heavy fighting of the day, slept on their arms, awaiting the heavier conflict of the morrow. Though weary, the troops were in most excellent spirits, and confident of final victory. It was known throughout the army that we had been fighting during the day largely superior forces. That Bragg had been heavily re-enforced from Mississippi and East Tennessee, and by Longstreet's command from Virginia, and that the enemy was fighting most desperately. Bragg's great aim had been to conceal his main attack on our left by the feint on the centre, and supposed that our centre on the morning of the 19th was still at Lee and Gordon's Mills. Presuming this to be the case, Bragg had ma.s.sed heavily on our left, intending to repeat his movement made on our right at Murfreesboro. His plan contemplated the breaking of our left, sweeping it before him in broken ma.s.ses, crus.h.i.+ng our centre, and destroying our right, and then occupying the road to Chattanooga in force he would have the Federal army completely in his power. The movement made by Croxton compelled Bragg to open the battle in heavy force on the left, before his troops had secured the positions a.s.signed them, and then, to his surprise, he found that during the night our left had been greatly prolonged, and that Rosecrans was in force, occupying a position far to the north of what he had been led to expect. During the night Bragg ordered up by forced marches all reinforcements arriving by railroad. Three brigades of fresh troops reached the enemy during the night, and were placed in line early in the morning of the 20th. These, with the troops ordered late the day before from the east bank of the Chickamauga, gave Bragg a large number of fresh troops, which he placed in line of battle on the 20th. During the night Bragg summoned his generals to meet him at his camp fire, and there gave them orders for the following day. He divided his entire force into two commands, to which he a.s.signed his senior Lieutenant-Generals Longstreet and Polk. The former-who had reported during the night-to the left, composed of six divisions where his own troops were stationed, and the latter continuing in his command of five divisions on the right. Bragg's plan of battle for the 20th was for Polk to a.s.sault in force, with Breckinridge's division on his extreme right at day-dawn, when the attack was to be taken up rapidly in succession by the divisions to his left. The left wing was to await the movement on the right, and when the attack was made there to take it up promptly. When the entire line became engaged it was to move forward vigorously and persistently throughout its entire length, the whole army wheeling on Longstreet's left as a pivot, but constantly pressing our left to get possession of the road to Chattanooga.

The battle of the 19th was a series of brilliant charges and counter-charges, in favor of first one side and then the other. During the day our troops, at times broken and driven by the enemy, always promptly rallied and drove the rebels in disorder to their lines by brilliant and effective dashes, moving to the attack with vigor and determination. In the main the results of the day were in our favor. Bragg had been forced to fight before he was in position, and had been foiled in his attempt to secure the roads, which on the evening of the 19th remained even more securely in our possession than before, fully protected on both flanks by our cavalry. As this was the object of the severe conflict of the 19th, that day's fighting was a success for our arms, both the Rossville and the Dry Valley roads being firmly held by our troops that night.

But the battle was not yet over. During the night Rosecrans a.s.sembled his corps commanders at his headquarters at the Widow Glenn's house, and after a consultation with them on the state and condition of their commands, gave orders for the disposition and movements of the troops for the next day. The divisions of Thomas's corps, with those which had re-enforced him, to hold the road to Rossville, in the same position as then occupied by them in line of battle, with Brannan in reserve. McCook, with Sheridan's and Davis's divisions was to maintain his picket line until it was attacked and driven back. His left division-Davis's-was to close on Thomas, and to have his right refused covering the position at Widow Glenn's house. Crittenden was to hold two divisions, Wood's and Van Cleve's, in reserve near where the line of McCook and Thomas joined to reinforce the front line as needed.

During the night Thomas received word from Baird on the extreme left, that the left of his division did not reach the road to Reed's Ridge, as had been antic.i.p.ated. Thomas immediately requested that Negley's division be ordered to report to him to take position on Baird's left and rear, securing this flank from a.s.sault. At daylight Rosecrans, riding the line, ordered Negley to join Thomas at once, and directed McCook to relieve Negley, who was on the front line. He also ordered McCook to adjust his right, as it was too far out on the crest, and to move Davis's division to the left, and close it up compactly. Crittenden was also directed to move his two divisions to the left and Palmer, on Thomas's line, was instructed to close up his front. On reaching the left Rosecrans was convinced that the first attack would be made on that flank, and returned at once to the right to hurry Negley over to Thomas. Arriving there he found that this division had not moved, and that McCook's troops were not ready to relieve him. Negley was then ordered to send his reserve brigade under John Beatty, and to follow with the other two when relieved from the front. Impatient at McCook's delay in relieving Negley, and antic.i.p.ating momentarily the attack of the enemy on our left, Rosecrans ordered Crittenden to move Wood's division to the front, to fill the position occupied by Negley of which McCook was notified by Rosecrans in person. Rosecrans, when first at McCook's line, was greatly dissatisfied with McCook's position. He now called McCook's attention to the defects in his line, that it was too light, and that it was weakened by being too much strung out, and charged him to keep well closed up on the left at all hazards. Leaving McCook, Rosecrans then returned to Negley, and found to his surprise that the brigades in front had not yet been relieved and started to Thomas after his repeated orders, as Wood's division had only reached the position of Negley's reserve. Greatly irritated at this, Rosecrans gave preemptory orders and Wood's division was at once placed in front, closed up on the right of Brannan.

A heavy fog hung over the battlefield during the early morning. Bragg, before daylight with his staff, took position immediately in the rear of the centre of his line, and waited for Polk to begin the attack, waiting until after sunrise with increasing anxiety and disappointment. Bragg then sent a staff officer to Polk to ascertain and report as to the cause of the delay, with orders urging him to a prompt and speedy attack. Polk was not found with his troops, and the staff officer learning that he had spent the night on the east side of Chickamauga Creek, rode over there and delivered his message. Bragg, impatient at the delay, proceeded in person to his right wing and there found the troops wholly unprepared for the movement. Messengers were sent for Polk in hot haste, and on his reporting he was urged to a prompt execution of his orders and to make a vigorous attack at once.

During the night our troops threw up temporary breastworks of logs and rails. Behind these Thomas's command awaited the attack. After Bragg had sent for Polk, he ordered a reconnoissance in his front on the extreme left of our line, and crossing the main road to Chattanooga developed the fact that this position so greatly desired by him was thus feebly held. At half past eight o'clock the rebel attack opened on our left with skirmish firing. Pus.h.i.+ng forward with a heavy line of skirmishers to develop Baird's position, with Breckenridge's division on the right and Cleburne to his left, the rebels made, about an hour late, a tremendous a.s.sault. Beatty's brigade of Negley's division being now in line on Baird's left, received the full force of the blow from the brigades of Adams and Stovall on the right of Breckinridge's division, and was driven back in disorder. Helm's brigade and Cleburne's division, advancing on the front of Baird, encountered the troops behind their breastworks but were here met with a terrific fire of canister and musketry, and their advance checked so thoroughly that it was not regarded as safe to send the two brigades now overlapping Baird to attack his rear. These brigades, however, had reached and crossed the La Fayette road. Beatty in falling back was relieved by several regiments of Johnson's division, which were placed in position by Baird. These regiments were joined by Van Derveer's brigade of Brannan's division and a portion of Stanley's brigade of Negley's division, which had been hurried to the left and thrown into action. These forces advancing checked the a.s.sault of the enemy and then drove him entirely from Baird's left and rear. Immediately following the attack on Baird, the enemy's a.s.sault, being taken up by the divisions on Breckinridge's left, pressed on and struck Johnson, then Palmer and Reynolds successively with equal fierceness, maintaining the attack for two hours, the enemy in repeated a.s.saults bringing fresh troops constantly to the front was each time met and hurled back by the splendid fighting of our troops. Here Bragg exhausted his utmost energies to drive in the centre and to dislodge Thomas's right, and failing in this after repeated attacks fell back and occupied his old position.

McCook, early in the morning, on going to the front found that Wood's division, not having the battle-front of Negley's, did not occupy the entire of the rude barricade thrown up by Negley's troops, and that portion of it on Wood's right was not occupied by any of our forces. Wood, on meeting McCook, explained to him that his left was well protected, resting on Brannan's right, and that his orders were to keep well closed up on Brannan. On the right of this gap to the right of Wood, McCook had posted Wilder with his brigade, who had been ordered to report to McCook and receive orders from him. McCook then directed Sheridan to bring forward one of his brigades and occupy with it the s.p.a.ce between Wood's right and Wilder. As McCook started to leave this portion of the line, he met Davis's division marching toward this vacant s.p.a.ce. Davis was directed at once to post one of his brigades in this part of the line, holding the other in reserve. When the brigade Sheridan sent arrived, McCook placed it in column as support to Davis on his right and rear. At this time Thomas again reporting that he needed reinforcements and the right as yet not being actively engaged, Rosecrans concluded that Bragg's efforts were still looking to the possession of the roads on our left, and that he was ma.s.sing his troops on his right, thus prolonging his line on that flank. He then, at 10.10 A.M., ordered McCook to withdraw as far as possible the force on the right and reinforce Thomas, stating that "the left must be held at all hazards, even if the right is withdrawn wholly back to the present left." Five minutes after the receipt of this order McCook received one dated 10.30 A.M., directing him to send two brigades of Sheridan's division at once with all possible dispatch to support Thomas and to send the third brigade as soon as it could safely be withdrawn. McCook immediately sent Lytle's and Walworth's brigades of Sheridan's division on the double quick to the support of Thomas.

The battle increasing in fury and volume was gradually approaching the centre from the left, but Thomas still sustaining the brunt of the fight was compelled to send again and again for reinforcements. Beatty's and Stanley's brigades of Negley's division had been sent from the right. Van Derveer with his brigade of Brannan's division also reported. Barnes's brigade of Van Cleve's division had also been ordered to Thomas, and now the two of Sheridan's divisions were under orders to proceed to the left. About this time Lieutenant-Colonel Von Schrader of Thomas's staff, who had been riding the lines, reported to Thomas that there were no troops on Reynolds's right, and a long gap existed between Reynolds and Wood; not aware that Brannan's division although not in front line was still in position, retired in the woods a short distance back, but not out of line. This information was at once sent by Thomas to Rosecrans, who immediately directed Wood to close up the line on Reynolds and support him, and sent word to Thomas that he would be supported if it required all of McCook's and Crittenden's corps to do so.

On receipt of this order-impossible for him to execute literally-Wood undertook to carry it out by withdrawing his entire command from the front, leaving a gap of two brigades in the line of battle, moving to the rear past Brannan's division, to where Reynolds was posted in line. Into the gap thus made by Wood, Davis attempted to throw sufficient force to hold that portion of the line thus vacated, by posting his reserve brigade.

Just at this time the order of battle on the enemy's lines had reached Longstreet's command, who, seeing this gap, ordered his troops, formed in heavy columns, to advance. Into this gap there poured Stewart's, Hood's, Kershaw's, Johnson's, and Hindman's divisions, das.h.i.+ng impetuously forward, with Preston's large division as supports. Our right, disabled as it was, was speedily turned, the line of battle on the enemy's front extending nearly from Brannan's centre to a point far to the right of the Widow Glenn's house, and from the front of that portion of the line Sheridan's brigades had just been taken. McCook, to resist this fierce a.s.sault, had only Carlin's and Heg's brigades of Davis's division and Laibold's brigade of Sheridan's division. On finding the rebel troops pressing through the s.p.a.ce vacated by Wood, McCook ordered Lytle and Walworth to change front and return to a.s.sist in repelling the enemy. Wilder and Harrison closed in on Sheridan with their commands as speedily as possible, and aided in resisting the enemy's attack. Davis, being overpowered by the immense numbers of the rebels, was compelled to retire to save his command. Laibold was in turn driven back in confusion, and the tide of battle then struck Lytle and Walworth, who contended n.o.bly against the overpowering columns, and for a time checked the advance of the enemy on their immediate front. The rebel troops swarming in, turned the left of these brigades, and they were compelled to withdraw to escape being surrounded. At this point the gallant Lytle was killed. Here our army lost several thousand prisoners, forty guns, and a large number of wagon-trains.

Once more the right of the army was broken all to pieces, and five brigades of that wing cut off entirely from the rest of the command. In the meantime Bragg, determined to turn Thomas's left, and cut him off from Chattanooga, was making his preparations for a second a.s.sault on his right in heavier force. Bragg directed this movement in person. Extending his right by moving Breckinridge's division beyond its former position, he ordered Walker's corps in line on Breckinridge's left, and connected to Cleburne's right on the left of Walker. Bragg's plan was for Breckenridge to advance, wheeling to the left, and thus envelop Thomas's exposed left flank, striking it in the rear. Breckinridge, advancing, was soon in position on the Chattanooga road, partly in rear of Thomas. But he was now detached from the main body of the rebel troops engaged in the movement, and, making a bold a.s.sault on the rear, he was here met by the three reserve brigades under Van Deveer, Willich, and Grose, and hurled in rout back on his original line. On reaching it he there found the other troops that had taken part in this charge, and that they had been repulsed at every point by Baird's, Johnson's, and Palmer's divisions.

Beatty, just prior to the repulse of the enemy on the left by Thomas, applied in person to the latter for at least a brigade to support him in the attack of the rebels he was then expecting. Thomas sent an aid to hurry Sheridan up. This officer returned soon afterward, and reported that he had encountered a heavy force of the enemy in the rear of Reynolds's position, which was advancing slowly, with a strong line of skirmishers thrown out; that he had met Harker, who, with his brigade posted on a ridge a short distance to Reynolds's rear, was watching this force approaching, and was of the opinion that these troops were Sheridan's coming to Thomas's a.s.sistance. Thomas then rode forward to determine the character of the advancing troops, which he soon did, and ordered Harker to open fire upon them, resisting their farther advance. Thomas then selected the crest of the commanding ridge, known as "Horseshoe Ridge," on which to place Brannan's division in line, which-on Longstreet's sweeping McCook's lines from the right-had been struck in the flank on the line of battle. On the spurs to the rear he posted his artillery. On Thomas leaving Harker, the latter opening fire with skirmishers, then posted his right to connect with Brannan's division and portions of Beatty's and Stanley's brigades of Negley's division, which had been ordered over to his point from the extreme left. Thomas then went to the crest of the hill on the front, where he met Wood with his division, who confirmed him in the opinion that the troops advancing were those of the enemy. Thomas was not aware at that time of the extent of the disaster to the right. He ordered Wood to place his division in line with Brannan's, and to resist as long as possible the advance of the enemy. On receipt of this order Wood immediately threw his troops on the left of Brannan, and had barely time to form his lines when the enemy was upon them in a heavy, fierce a.s.sault like those early in the day. This, however, was handsomely repulsed, the enemy charging again and again with fresh troops, but their efforts were successfully resisted. These were Bushrod Johnson's men, with Patton Anderson's brigade on his right, which had been formed on the brow of the secondary spur of the ridge, and at about two o'clock moved forward, making a most determined a.s.sault on our forces. Part of his line reached the crest held by Wood, but was hurled back to its original position under as determined a counter-charge.

Away off at Rossville Gordon Granger with three brigades of reserve corps was stationed. He had heard during the morning heavy firing from the front, in the direction of Thomas, and as the firing increased in volume and intensity on the right, he judged that the enemy were pressing him hard. He then determined, although contrary to his orders, to gather what troops he could and go to Thomas's a.s.sistance. Ordering Whittaker's and Mitch.e.l.l's brigades under the immediate command of Steedman to move to his front, he placed Dan McCook's brigade at the McAfee church, to cover the Ringgold road. Thomas was at this time heavily engaged on "Horseshoe Ridge," between the La Fayette and the Dry Valley roads, about three miles and a half from Granger's headquarters. Pus.h.i.+ng forward his troops rapidly, Granger moved past a detachment of the enemy some two miles out, and ordered Dan McCook forward to watch the movements of the rebels, to keep open the La Fayette road, and to cover the open fields on the right of the road intervening between this point and Thomas's position. McCook brought up his brigade as rapidly as possible, took and held his position until late that night. Granger moving to the front arrived with his command about three o'clock, and reported at once to Thomas, who was then with this part of his command on "Horseshoe Ridge," where the enemy was pressing him hard on front and endeavoring to turn both of his flanks. To the right of this position was a ridge running east and west nearly at right angles with it. On this Bushrod Johnson had reformed his command, so severely repulsed by Wood. Longstreet now strengthened it with Hindman's division and that of Kershaw, all under the command of Hindman, who formed it in heavy columns for an attack on the right flank and rear of Thomas's troops. Kershaw's division had possession of a gorge in this ridge through which his division was moving in heavy ma.s.ses, with the design of making an attack in the rear. This was the most critical hour of this eventful day. Granger promptly ordered Whittaker and Mitch.e.l.l to hurl themselves against this threatening force. Steedman gallantly seizing the colors of a regiment, led his command to the charge. Rus.h.i.+ng upon the enemy with loud cheers, after a terrific conflict, only of some twenty minutes' duration, with a hot infantry and artillery fire, Steedman drove them from their position and occupied both the ridge and gorge. Here the slaughter was frightful. The victory was won at a fearful cost, but the army was saved. After Hindman was driven back, Longstreet about four o'clock, determined to re-take the ridge. Asking Bragg for reinforcements from the right, he was informed by him "that they had been beaten back so badly that they could be of no service to me." Longstreet then ordered up his reserve division of fresh troops under Preston, four brigades strong, supported by Stewart's corps, and directed him to attack the troops on the ridge. Advancing with wild yells, confident of success, Preston dashed boldly up the hill, supported by Kershaw's troops with Johnson's-part of Hindman's-and later on by those of Stewart's. But once more the enemy was driven back with frightful slaughter, and thus was charge and counter-charge at this part of the field, lasting for nearly two hours, the day wore away until darkness settled down, night finding Thomas's command-the troops under Brannan, Wood, and Granger-still holding the ridge. Some unauthorized person had ordered Thomas's ammunition train back to Chattanooga, and the supply with the troops on the field was running very low. The ammunition that ranger brought up with him was divided with the troops on that part of the field where his command fought-Brannan's and Wood's divisions-but this supply was soon exhausted. The troops then gathered what could be found in the cartridge-boxes of the slain, friend and foe being alike examined. With the fresh charges of the enemy, the troops were ordered to use their bayonets and give the rebels cold steel, and in the final charges the enemy was met and repulsed in this way.

In the breaking up of our right, two brigades of Davis's division, one of Van Cleve's, and the entire of Sheridan's division was caught in the whirl and sent adrift from the main command, the enemy in heavy columns completely controlling all access to Thomas and the remaining divisions with him, except by way of the Dry Valley road across the ridge and on to Rossville, thence back on the La Fayette road to Thomas's left. The troops of Sheridan's and Davis's divisions were rallied a short distance in the rear of the line, and taking the Dry Valley road, endeavored to unite with Thomas's command. They were placed in position on the Rossville road leading to the battlefield. [Note from Bob: In fact, Sheridan continued to withdraw his division away from the battlefield.]

Rosecrans was watching on the rear of Davis's right for McCook to close up his line to the left when Longstreet's men poured through the gap left by Wood's withdrawal. Seeing that some disaster had occurred, Rosecrans hurried in person to the extreme right, to direct Sheridan's movements on the flank of the advancing rebels. But it was simply impossible to stem the tide and our men were driven back as the enemy advanced. Leaving orders for the troops to be rallied behind the ridges west of the Dry Valley road, Rosecrans endeavored with Garfield, his chief of staff, and a few others of his staff, to rejoin Thomas by pa.s.sing to the rear of the broken portions of the right. Riding down in this direction, some two or three hundred yards under a heavy fire, he found the troops that had been driven from the right far over toward the left, and from all indications it appeared doubtful if the left had been able to maintain its position. He then concluded to go to Rossville and there determine whether to join Thomas on the battlefield or whether his duty called him to Chattanooga, to prepare for his broken army if his worst fears should be realized. On reaching Rossville it was determined that Garfield should go to the front to Thomas and report, and that Rosecrans should go to Chattanooga and make the necessary dispositions for the troops as they came back in rout.

Rosecrans on arriving at Chattanooga at once sent out orders to Thomas to a.s.sume command of all the troops at the front, and with Crittenden and McCook to take a strong position and a.s.sume a threatening att.i.tude at Rossville, where ammunition and rations would be sent to meet him. Thomas determined to hold his position until nightfall, if possible, before withdrawing. He then distributed ammunition to the commands and ordered the division commanders to hold themselves in readiness to fall back as soon as ordered. Reynolds at half-past five was notified to commence the movement. Leaving the position he had held near Wood, Thomas started to meet Reynolds and show him the position he wanted him to occupy, forming the line covering the retirement of the troops on the La Fayette road on the left. Just before meeting Reynolds, Thomas was informed of a large rebel force in the woods ahead of him, drawn up in line and advancing toward him. This was Liddell's division on the extreme rebel right, under orders from Bragg, moving to a third attack on Thomas's left. Reynolds arriving at this time, Thomas ordered him to at once change the head of the column to the left, form lines perpendicular to the road and to charge the enemy then in his immediate front, while the artillery opened a converging fire from the right and left. Turchin charged with his brigade upon the rebel force and drove them in complete rout far beyond Baird's left. Robinson's command-King's brigade-closely supporting Turchin, was posted on the road leading through the ridge to hold the ground, while the troops on our right and left retired.

Shortly after this Willich with his brigade was placed in position on commanding ground to the right of the ridge road, and a.s.sisted in covering the withdrawal of our troops. Turchin's brigade, having cleared the front, returned and took position on this road with Robinson and Willich.

Thomas having made this disposition of the troops, ordered Wood, Brannan, and Granger, to fall back from their positions. These troops were not molested, but Baird and Johnson as they were retiring were attacked. By the exercise of care and foresight they retired without confusion and with but slight loss. This attack was led by L. E. Polk's brigade, but the rebel lines had become so changed that they formed an acute angle and their troops were firing into each other in the dark. So quietly was the army withdrawn that it was not until after sunrise on the 21st that Bragg discovered that Thomas had retired. Having effected the withdrawal of his troops, General Thomas, accompanied by Granger and Garfield, proceeded to Rossville and placed the command in position at that place, ordering one brigade of Negley's division to hold the gap on the Ringgold road with the other two brigades posted on the top of the ridge to the right, joining on the brigades in the road, with Dan McCook's brigade in reserve. On the right of Negley Reynold's division took position, reaching to the Dry Valley road, with Brannan's division as a reserve in rear of Reynolds's right. On the right of the Dry Valley road, extending to the west, McCook's corps was placed, his right extending to Chattanooga Creek. Upon the high ground to the left of the Ringgold road the entire of Crittenden's corps was placed. As a reserve Steedman's division of Granger's corps was posted on his left, while Baird's division was also in reserve and in support of the brigade of Negley's division holding the gap. Thrown out on the Ringgold road, a mile and a half in advance of the gap, Minty's brigade of cavalry held the road at that point during the night. Here the weary troops rested undisturbed the night after the heavy fighting and nothing was seen of the enemy until about nine o'clock of the 21st, when their advance appeared in heavy force of infantry and cavalry on Minty's front. Thomas, withdrawing Minty through the gap, posted his command on our left flank and directed him to throw out strong reconnoitering parties across the ridge, watching the enemy's movements on our left and front. There was no object in attempting to hold the position at Rossville Gap, beyond the gaining of a day to select the final position for the troops at Chattanooga on their retirement to that place, the location of the lines, and the preparation for throwing up earthworks. This was all accomplished on the 21st and preparations made to fall back. All wagons, ambulances, and surplus artillery-carriages were sent to the rear before night and the troops were held in readiness to move at a moment's notice. The orders to withdraw reached Thomas about six o'clock P.M., and the movement commenced about nine P.M.

Brannan's division was posted at six P.M. on the road about half way from Rossville to Chattanooga, covering the movement. Orders were sent by Thomas for each division commander to throw out a strong skirmish line, to be withdrawn at daylight, concealing the movement to the rear. This line was to be supported by Baird's division and Minty's brigade of cavalry, which was to retire after the skirmishers were withdrawn. During the night the movement was completed without the loss of a single man, and at seven o'clock on the morning of the 22d, the Army of the c.u.mberland, again united, was in position, holding the coveted prize, still strong enough to prevent the enemy from attempting further to dispute our possession of the town. The temporary works were strengthened from day to day until all apprehension of an attack from the enemy on the front was at an end.

Taking all the surroundings into consideration, the campaign from the western slopes of the c.u.mberland Mountains, ending in the battle of Chickamauga, was the most brilliant one of the war, made as it was, in the face of the strong column of the enemy, whose business it was to watch every movement, and as far as possible to r.e.t.a.r.d and cripple the advance. Rosecrans, with his masterly manvering, in every instance deceived his opponent down to the withdrawal of Bragg from Chattanooga. While recognizing the genius of the military leader who could plan the campaign that was made from the time of the crossing of the c.u.mberland Mountains, Bragg regarded the obstacles to be overcome on such a campaign so stupendous that he was incredulous that any movement south of the Tennessee was contemplated by the Federal leader. Every preparation was made by Bragg to meet the crossing of our army over the Tennessee north of Chattanooga on the advance of Crittenden, he threw open the gateway for Rosecrans's advance. When the full scope of the movement dawned upon him, Bragg abandoned Chattanooga and gathered his troops wherever he could reach them from all quarters to concentrate for the destruction of our army. Bragg never intended his withdrawal from Chattanooga to be permanent; all the indications he left behind him pointed that way. None of the bridges were destroyed as he retired. All storehouses, hospitals, and other buildings used by his army were left standing, and Rosecrans's mistake was in construing Bragg's withdrawal to be a demoralized retreat and in ordering his army to pursue before this was definitely determined. However, all advices that Rosecrans had were to the effect that the rebels were in hasty flight and would not stop anywhere north of Dalton, and that their probable destination was Rome. This information was sent to him from Was.h.i.+ngton, and Bragg aided in confirming this belief by sending numbers of his soldiers as "deserters" into the Federal lines with the same report.

As late as the 11th, Halleck telegraphed Rosecrans that after he occupied "the mountain pa.s.ses to the west of Dalton" it would be determined what his future movements would be; and on the 13th, Halleck telegraphed Rosecrans that if Bragg should go to Alabama he must not be allowed to re-enter Middle Tennessee. On the 13th, Foster, at Fortress Monroe, telegraphed Halleck that trains of cars had been running day and night southward for the past thirty-six hours. On the following day Foster sent Halleck another despatch, that Longstreet's corps was reported going south, which Meade on the same day confirmed. Then Halleck sent urgent messages to Hurlbut and Burnside to move to Rosecrans's support. But it was too late. These commands were many days' marches away, and at that moment the Army of the c.u.mberland was engaged in the earlier movements of the life and death struggle it was peremptorily ordered by Halleck to encounter alone with its old enemy, under Bragg, heavily re-enforced, while large numbers of Federal troops which might have been within helping distance, had orders been given in due season, as asked for by Rosecrans, remained inactive.

It was not until McCook had received and partly executed his orders to occupy Alpine that the actual facts as to Bragg's movements were developed, and that he was concentrated at La Fayette, there waiting for reinforcements, but strong enough without them to crush the Army of the c.u.mberland in detail. Rosecrans, when aware of Bragg's movements, grasped the situation at once. Bending every energy to the concentration of his army before Bragg should strike, on the 12th he issued orders for McCook's immediate return, and despatched the same in all haste by courier. Hearing nothing definite from McCook, on the next day Rosecrans repeated his orders and duplicated them in the afternoon of that day. Still learning nothing positive as to McCook's movements, on the 14th repeated orders were sent to him urging him to consummate his rearward movement with all possible haste. After a sleepless night, Rosecrans on the 15th left Chattanooga for the front, to hasten, if possible, McCook's movements. After another sleepless night, information was had from McCook as to the position of his command, and on the 17th the concentration of the army was effected in McLemore's Cove, five days after McCook's first orders were dated.

The delay attending McCook's movements was almost fatal to the Army of the c.u.mberland. Had Bragg received his promised reinforcements at the date he expected them, our army would in all probability have been completely annihilated in detail. McCook claims that his delay was only incident to the route he was compelled to take to join Thomas. This took him back over Lookout Mountain, to Valley Head, then down that valley, crossing the mountain again at Cooper's Gap, and then up and down Missionary Ridge into McLemore's Cove, a long, difficult road, nearly all of it over rough mountains. This route, McCook from the information received, regarded as the better one to take, as between it and the one on which he was ordered to move, which was a road on the mountain into the head of McLemore's Cove, through Dougherty's Gap.

The battle for Chattanooga would never have been fought at Chickamauga had not the safety of McCook's corps demanded it. Could the Army of the c.u.mberland have been withdrawn in safety to Chattanooga and there concentrated behind earthworks, as it was later, while Bragg doubtless would have made his attack there, yet the surroundings would have been far more favorable for our army, especially as the troops afterward sent might have reached Rosecrans in time to have defeated Bragg, as he was later at the battle of Missionary Ridge. But the reinforcements that were hurried from all points AFTER the disaster, by the officials at Was.h.i.+ngton were not to benefit Rosecrans.

While the battle of the 19th was severe at times, and some slight advantages were gained by the enemy, still nothing had been accomplished to mark that day's fighting as a great, distinctive battle. The delay on the part of Negley in reporting as ordered, to Thomas on the left, placed that position in extreme peril, had Polk made his attack as ordered at day-dawn on the 20th. Fortunately, Polk slept outside of his lines that night-not as he was accustomed to-and was not awakened as early as he would have been had he remained in camp. For this reason the attack, was not made until after Beatty's brigade had reached Baird's left. While this was too weak to successfully resist the attack, still with this command rallied after it was driven back and aided by the troops sent to its support, Thomas was able to repulse Breckinridge's first charge of the morning. Th