The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation Part 110

[119] Gordon _v._ United States, 117 U.S. 697 (1886); McElrath _v._ United States, 102 U.S. 426 (1880); Williams _v._ United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933).

[120] United States _v._ Coe, 155 U.S. 76 (1894).

[121] Wallace _v._ Adams, 204 U.S. 415 (1907).

[122] Old Colony Trust Co. _v._ Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 279 U.S. 716 (1929); Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U.S. 438 (1929).

[123] The general tendency in the evolution of legislative courts is to provide for tenure during good behavior. This is true of the judges of the Court of Claims, the Customs Court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. The terms of the judges of the Tax Court are limited to twelve years and the judges are subject to removal by the President after notice and hearing. For the provisions of the statutes governing these matters _see_ 28 U.S.C. ---- 241, 296, 301-301a; 26 U.S.C. ---- 1102b, d, f.

The territorial judges in Alaska (48 U.S.C. -- 112) have four-year terms subject to removal by the President; in Hawaii six years unless removed by the President (48 U.S.C. -- 643), eight years in Puerto Rico (28 U.S.C. -- 803); eight years in the Ca.n.a.l Zone subject to removal by the President (48 U.S.C. -- 1353); and four years in the Virgin Islands unless sooner removed by the President (48 U.S.C. -- 1405y).

[124] 141 U.S. 174 (1891).

[125] Ibid. 188

[126] 289 U.S. 553 (1933).

[127] 268 U.S. 501 (1925).

[128] 117 U.S. 697 (1886).

[129] 13 How. 40, 48 (1852). _See also_ Keller _v._ Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923); Federal Radio Commission _v._ General Electric Co., 231 U.S. 464 (1930).

[130] 5 Wall. 419 (1867).

[131] Postum Cereal Co. _v._ California Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693 (1927); Federal Radio Commission _v._ General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930); Pope _v._ United States, 323 U.S. 1 (1944).

[132] 112 U.S. 50 (1884).

[133] Keller _v._ Potomac Electric Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923).

[134] Federal Radio Commission _v._ General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930).

[135] 279 U.S. 438 (1929). All of these rulings with respect to the vesting of revisory powers in the courts of the District carried the qualification that revisory actions and interlocutory opinions, as nonjudicial functions, were not reviewable on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States. Frasch _v._ Moore, 211 U.S. 1 (1908); E.C.

Atkins & Co. _v._ Moore, 212 U.S. 285 (1909); Keller _v._ Potomac Electric Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923); Federal Radio Commission _v._ General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930).

[136] O'Donoghue _v._ United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933).

[137] Ibid. 545-546.

[138] Ibid. 545. Chief Justice Hughes in a dissent joined by Justice Van Devanter and Cardozo took the position that the plenary power of Congress over the District is complete in itself and its power to create courts in the District is not derived from article III. Consequently, they argued that the limitations of article III do not apply to the organization of such courts. The O'Donoghue Case is discussed in the opinions of Justices Jackson and Rutledge and in the dissent of Chief Justice Vinson in National Mutual Insurance Co. _v._ Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 601-602, 608-611, 638-640 (1949).

[139] 6 Wheat. 264 (1821).

[140] Ibid. 378.

[141] Miller, Const.i.tution, 314, quoted in Muskrat _v._ United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911).

[142] 9 Wheat. 738, 819 (1824).

[143] 2 Dall. 419, 431, 432 (1793).

[144] In re Pacific Railway Commission, 32 F. 241, 255 (1887). Justice Field repeated the substance of this definition in Smith _v._ Adams, 130 U.S. 167, 173-174 (1889).

[145] 219 U.S. 346, 357 (1911).

[146] Ibid. 361-362. Judicial power is here defined by Justice Day as "the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants, duly inst.i.tuted in courts of proper jurisdiction." Ibid. 361.

[147] Muskrat _v._ United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911); Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. _v._ Wellman, 143 U.S. 339 (1892); Lampasas _v._ Bell, 180 U.S. 276 (1901); Braxton County Court _v._ West Virginia, 208 U.S. 192 (1908); Smith _v._ Indiana, 191 U.S. 138 (1903); Tregea _v._ Modesto Irrigation District, 164 U.S. 179 (1896).

[148] 143 U.S. 339 (1892).

[149] Ibid. 345.

[150] Muskrat _v._ United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).

[151] Lampasas _v._ Bell, 180 U.S. 276, 284 (1901).

[152] Braxton County Court _v._ West Virginia, 208 U.S. 192 (1908).

[153] Ibid. 198.

[154] Smith _v._ Indiana, 191 U.S. 138, 149 (1903).

[155] Tregea _v._ Modesto Irrigation District, 164 U.S. 179 (1896).

[156] Coffman _v._ Breeze Corporations, Inc., 323 U.S. 316, 324-325 (1945), citing Tyler _v._ The Judges, 179 U.S. 405 (1900); Hendrick _v._ Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915).

[157] Fleming _v._ Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 104 (1947). _See also_ Blackmer _v._ United States, 284 U.S. 421, 442 (1932); Virginian R. Co. _v._ System Federation, 300 U.S. 515 (1937); Carmichael _v._ Southern Coal & c.o.ke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 513 (1937).

[158] 157 U.S. 429 (1895). The first injunction suit by a stockholder to restrain a corporation from paying the tax appears to be Dodge _v._ Woolsey, 18 How. 331 (1856) which involved the validity of an Ohio tax.

The suit was entertained on the basis of English precedents. A case similar to the Pollock Case is Brushaber _v._ Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916). Hawes _v._ Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881) is cited in the Pollock Case, although it in fact threw out a stockholder's suit.

[159] _Cf._ Cheatham et al. _v._ United States, 92 U.S. 85 (1875); and Snyder _v._ Marks, 109 U.S. 189 (1883).

[160] Smith _v._ Kansas City t.i.tle Co., 255 U.S. 180, 201, 202 (1921).

[161] Ashwander _v._ Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).

Although the holdings of the plaintiffs amounted to only one-three hundred and fortieth of the preferred stock, the Court ruled that the right to maintain the suit was not affected by the smallness of the holdings.

[162] 298 U.S. 238 (1936).

[163] Robert L. Stern, in The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 645, 667-668 (1948), gives the following account of the litigation in the first bituminous coal case: On the same day that the Bituminous Coal Act became law, the directors of the Carter Coal Company met in New York. James Carter presented a letter saying the Coal Act was unconst.i.tutional and that the company should not join the Code. His father agreed that the act was invalid, but thought the company should not take the risk of paying the tax required of nonmembers in the event the act should be sustained. The third director agreed with the elder Carter, and the board pa.s.sed a resolution rejecting James Carter's proposals. This action was subsequently approved by a majority of the voting stock held by James Carter's father and mother who outvoted him and his wife.

[164] Ma.s.sachusetts _v._ Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923). _See also_ Williams _v._ Riley, 280 U.S. 78 (1929).

[165] Fairchild _v._ Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922).

[166] Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937). _See_, however, Ma.s.sachusetts State Grange _v._ Benton, 272 U.S. 525 (1926), where the Supreme Court, though affirming the dismissal of a suit to enjoin a day-light-saving statute, nonetheless, sustained the jurisdiction of the district court to entertain the suit.