The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution Volume IV Part 39

[44] These letters relate to Silas Deane and Arthur Lee, and may be found in Arthur Lee's Correspondence, Vol. II, pp. 224, 227.

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Pa.s.sy, February 21st, 1779.

My dear Marquis,

The conversation with which you honored me last evening, has induced me to give you the trouble of this letter upon the same subject.

It is certain that a loan of money is very much needed to redeem the redundancy of our paper bills, and without it, it is impossible to foresee what will be the consequence to their credit, and therefore every service, that may be rendered in order to obtain it from this kingdom, from Spain, or Holland, will be a most acceptable service.

But without some other exertions, even a loan perhaps would be but a temporary relief; with them a smaller loan might suffice. You know perfectly well, that the enemy in America are at present very weak, and in great distress in every part. They are weak in Canada, weak in Halifax, weak in Rhode Island, weak in New York, weak in the Floridas, and weak in every one of the West India Islands. A strong armament of s.h.i.+ps of the line, with five thousand troops, directed against Halifax, Rhode Island, or New York, must infallibly succeed. So it must against the Floridas, so it must against Canada, or any one of the West India Islands.

You are very sensible, that in this state of weakness, the British possessions in America depend upon each other for reciprocal support.

The troops and s.h.i.+ps derive such supplies of provisions from Canada and Nova Scotia, that if these places or either of them were lost, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the other to subsist. The West India Islands derive such supplies from the Floridas, that if they were lost the others could hardly subsist. Their fleets and armies in Canada, Halifax, Rhode Island, New York, and the Floridas, receive supplies of rum, sugar, mola.s.ses, &c. from the West India Islands, without which they could scarcely subsist. Every part of their possessions in America, both on the continent and in the islands, receives constant supplies from Europe, from England, Scotland, and Ireland, without which they must fall. You perceive, therefore, that their dominions in America at present form such a chain, that the links mutually support each other in such a manner, that if one or two were taken away, the whole, or at least the greater part, must fall. In this state of things then, the obvious policy is to send a strong squadron of s.h.i.+ps of the line to co-operate with the Count d'Estaing and the American army, in some expedition directed against New York, Rhode Island, Halifax or perhaps all of them in course. Five or six thousand troops would be quite enough. Above all, it is indispensably necessary to keep a clear naval superiority, both on the coast of the continent, and in the West Islands. This together with French and American privateers would make such havoc among the enemy's transports, pa.s.sing from one of their possessions to another, as must ruin their affairs. The French have a great advantage in carrying on this kind of war in America, at present. The British s.h.i.+ps are badly manned and in bad repair. They cannot send them into the American seas, without the utmost terror for their own coasts. And when they are in America, they have not such advantages for supplies of provisions, naval stores, &c. as the French.

The devastation, which was made among their s.h.i.+ps of the line, frigates, transports, and traders, in the American seas the last summer, shows how much might be done, if a stronger force were sent there. As long as the enemy have possession of New York and Rhode Island, so long it will be necessary for us to keep up large armies, to watch their motions, and defend the country against them, which will oblige us to emit more paper, and still further to increase the depreciation. Now as long as they maintain the dominion of those seas, their troops will be protected by the cannon of their s.h.i.+ps, and we could not dislodge them with an army, however large, at least we could not keep possession of those places. But if their force was captivated in those seas, as it might easily be by a sea force, co-operating with the land forces, we might reduce our army and innumerable other articles of expense. We need not emit any more paper, and that already out would depreciate no further. I should be happy to have further conversation with you, Sir, upon these subjects, or to explain anything by letter, which may be in my power.

With the highest sentiments of esteem and respect, I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

COUNT DE VERGENNES TO JOHN ADAMS.

Translation.

Versailles, February 21st, 1779.

Sir,

I have received the letter, which you have done me the honor to write me on the 16th of this month. Although you are to be henceforth without a public character in France, be persuaded that the esteem and consideration, which you have justly acquired, are by no means diminished, and I flatter myself, Sir, that you will not deprive me of the pleasure of a.s.suring you of it by word of mouth, and being at the same time the interpreter of the favorable sentiments with which the King honors you. They are the consequence of the particular satisfaction, which his Majesty has received from the wise conduct you have held during the whole time of your commission, as well as the zeal you have constantly displayed, both for the cause of your country, and for the support of the alliance which attaches it to his Majesty.

I have the honor to be, with the greatest respect, &c.

DE VERGENNES.

TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.

Pa.s.sy, February 27th, 1779.

Sir,

I have received the letter, which your Excellency did me the honor to write me on the 21st of this month. This testimony from your Excellency of those indulgent sentiments, with which his Majesty is pleased to honor my sincere intentions, cannot fail to be preserved by me and my posterity as a most precious monument; and what is of infinitely more importance, it cannot fail to give great satisfaction to my country, to find that a servant of theirs, who has been honored with no small share of their confidence in the most dangerous of times, and most critical circ.u.mstances, has been so happy as not to forfeit the confidence of their ill.u.s.trious ally.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO JOHN JAY, PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Pa.s.sy, February 27th, 1779.

Sir,

By the new arrangement, which was brought by the Marquis de Lafayette, I find myself restored to the character of a private citizen.

The appointment of a single Minister at the Court of Versailles was not unexpected to me, because I had not been two months in Europe before I was convinced of the policy, and indeed of the necessity, of such a measure. But I ever entertained hopes, that when the news of such an alteration should arrive, the path of my own duty would have been made plain to me by the directions of Congress, either to return home or go elsewhere. But as no information that we have received from Congress has expressed their intentions concerning me, I am obliged to collect them by implication, according to the best of my understanding, and as the election of the new Minister Plenipotentiary was on the fourteenth of September, and the Alliance sailed from Boston the fourteenth of January, and in this s.p.a.ce of four months no notice appears to have been taken of me, I think the only inference that can be made is, that Congress have no further service for me on this side the water, and that all my duties are on the other. I have accordingly given notice to his Excellency, M. de Sartine, and to his Excellency the Minister Plenipotentiary here, of my intentions to return, which I shall do by the first frigate that sails for any part of the United States, unless I should receive counter orders in the meantime. In a matter of so much uncertainty, I hope I shall not incur the disapprobation of Congress, even if I should not judge aright of their intentions, which it is my desire as well as my duty to observe, as far as I can know them.

By the papers enclosed with this, Congress will perceive the discontented and tumultuous state of the three kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland, which is so great and so rapidly increasing, that the United States will have little to fear from reinforcements of their enemies the ensuing campaign. All their forces will be necessary to keep in order their own riotous populace, and to replace those which are daily consuming in the West Indies. There is, however, no prospect of their evacuating either New York or Rhode Island. The possession of those places is so indispensable for the preservation of their West India and other trade, as well as of their other dominions in America, that nothing but the last necessity will induce them to give them up.

The greatest source of danger and unhappiness to the States then probably will be a depreciating currency. The prospect of a loan in Europe, after every measure that has been or could be taken, I think it my duty to say frankly to Congress, is very unpromising. The causes of this are very obvious, and cannot be removed; the state of our country itself, and the course of exchange, would be sufficient to discourage such a loan, if there were no other obstruction, but there are many others. There are more borrowers in Europe than lenders, and the British loan itself will not be made this year at a less interest than seven and a half per cent.

I see no hope of relief, but from economy and taxation, and those I flatter myself will be found sufficient, if the people are once convinced of the necessity of them. When a people are contending not only for the greatest object, that any people ever had in view, but for security from the greatest evil that any nation ever had to dread, (for there is at this hour no medium between unlimited subjugation to Parliament and entire sovereignty) they must be dest.i.tute of sense as well as of virtue, if they are not willing to pay sufficient sums annually to defray the necessary expense of their defence in future, supported as they are by so powerful an ally, and by the prospect of others, against a kingdom already exhausted, without any ally at all, or a possibility of obtaining one. As this is the first time I have had the honor to address myself to Congress, since we received the news of your Excellency's appointment to the chair, you will please to accept of my congratulations on that event.

I have the honor to be, with the highest esteem, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO JOHN JAY, PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Pa.s.sy, March 1st, 1779.

Sir,

My last letter to Congress was on the twentyseventh of last month; since which an account of the new loan is received from London, and as this may, perhaps, afford to Congress the clearest proof of the weakness of their enemies, it is of importance, that it should be transmitted to them. Some accounts say, that the loan is to be seven millions, others eight. The conditions of the loan are, in general, the established interest of three per cent, an annuity for three and three quarters per cent for twentynine years, and seven lottery tickets for every thousand pounds.

In one account the advantages are thus stated.

100 3 per cent, 61 00 00 3 15s. annuity for twentynine years, at twelve years' purchase, 45 00 00 Two fifths of a year's interest and annuity, gained by both beginning from the 5th of January, although the money is paid monthly, and not ended until December, 2 14 00 3 premium of seven lottery tickets for each 1000, gives for each hundred, 2 2 00 --------- For each 100 paid, there is received 110 16 00

This statement for the first year is pretty accurate. Another account makes it ten and one quarter per cent for the first year. The subsequent years, however it will not be so much. Yet for all the subsequent years, during the term of the annuity, it will be six and three quarters per cent. Upon the whole, it is generally looked upon as good as seven and a half per cent. In a country where the highest interest, that is tolerated by the standing laws, is five per cent, this is a terrible symptom.

While this system has any credit among the money lenders in Holland, Switzerland, Geneva, &c. Congress will perceive, that there is little hope of procuring a private loan for the United States from any of those places. Whether any may be procured from any State, or Prince, time must discover.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.