The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution Volume V Part 15

Here Congress will see the extreme ignorance or deception of the writer, in affirming, that the "far greater part of the people wish and hope for a union with Great Britain, and are ready to unite in reducing," &c. But notwithstanding the bad faith of the writer, we see that such is the force of truth, that he cannot adduce an argument to persuade the English to continue the war, without producing at the same time a much stronger argument to persuade the Americans to adhere to the last to their sovereignty and their alliances. Of this nature are all his other arguments.

"With the Independence of America," says he, "we must give up our fisheries on the Bank of Newfoundland, and in the American seas."

Supposing this to be true, which it is in part, but not in the whole, if Great Britain loses her fisheries, does not America gain them? Are they not an object then to America, as important and desirable as to Great Britain? Has not America then at least as strong and pressing a motive to fight for them as Great Britain? The question then is reduced to another, which has the best prospect of contending for them successfully? America, favored by all the world, or Great Britain thwarted and opposed by all the world. And to whom did G.o.d and nature give them? The English lay great stress upon the gifts of G.o.d and nature, as they call the advantage of their insular situation, to justify their injustice and hostilities against all the maritime powers of the world. Why should the Americans hold the blessings of Providence in a lower estimation, which they can enjoy, without doing injury to any nation or individual whatsoever?

"With American independence, we must give up thirtyfive thousand American seamen, and twentyeight thousand more bred and maintained in those excellent nurseries the fisheries. Our valuable trade, carried on from thence with the Roman Catholic States, will be in the hands of America. These nurseries and this trade will ever remain the natural right of the people who inhabit that country. A trade so profitable, and a nursery of seamen so excellent and so necessary for the support of her naval force, will never be given up, or even divided by America with any power whatsoever."

If Great Britain loses sixtythree thousand seamen by our independence, and I believe she will not lose much less, I mean in the course of a few years, will not America gain them? Are sixtythree thousand seamen a feebler bulwark for America than Great Britain? Are they weaker instruments of wealth and strength, of power and glory, in the hands of Americans, than in those of the English; at the command of Congress than at the command of the King of England? Are they not then as strong a temptation to us to continue the war, as to them? The question then recurs again, which has the fairest prospect of success?

America, which grows stronger every year, or England, which grows weaker?

"The British islands," he adds, "in the West Indies must fall of course. The same power that can compel Great Britain to yield up America, will compel her to give up the West Indies. They are evidently the immediate objects of France."

The true political consequence from this is to stop short, make peace, and save the British islands while you can; once taken, it will be more difficult to get them back. The whole returns again to the question, are you able to keep peace at home and in Ireland, and the East Indies, to settle matters with the maritime powers, and go on with the war long enough to beat France and Spain, make them renounce the war, and after that reduce the United States of America to submission? Will your soldiers, your seamen, and your revenues hold out till this is done, and after it shall be done, be sufficient to keep up a force sufficient to keep down France, Spain, and America?

"France," he subjoins, "expects from the independence of America, and the acquisition of the West India Islands, the sovereignty of the British seas, if not of Great Britain itself."

Is not this the strongest of all arguments for putting an end to the war? Now you may make peace, and keep the West India Islands, and secure the neutrality at least of America for the future; and in this case you may at least maintain your own sovereignty, and the freedom of the British seas. France at present claims no more than freedom on any seas. If you make peace at present, you may have more of American trade in future than France, and derive more support to your navy than she will to her marine from that country, and consequently may preserve your liberty upon all seas; but by pus.h.i.+ng the war you will weaken yourselves and strengthen France and Spain to such a degree, that they will have in the end such a superiority as may endanger your liberty. But if Great Britain is to lose the West India Islands, and the sovereignty of the seas, by the independence of America, surely France, Spain, or America, or all three together are to gain them. And are not these advantages as tempting to these powers as to England, and as urgent motives to pursue the war?

So that we come again to the old question, which is likely to hold it out longest? The immense inexhaustible resources of France, Spain, and America together, or the ruined, exhausted, or distracted kingdom of Great Britain. The writer goes on. "France has long struggled to rival us in our manufactures in vain; this will enable her to do it with effect." If England were to make peace now, it is very doubtful whether France would be able to rival her in manufactures, those I mean which are most wanted in America, of wool and iron. But if she continues the war, France will be very likely to rival her, to effect, as it is certain she is taking measures for the purpose and the longer the war continues, the more opportunity she will have of pursuing those measures to effect.

"We receive," says he, "from the West India Islands, certain commodities absolutely necessary to carry on our manufactures to any advantage and extent, and which we can procure from no other country.

We must take the remains from France or America, after they have supplied themselves and fulfilled their contracts with their allies, at their own prices, and loaded with the expense of foreign transportation, if we are permitted to trade for them at all." Is it possible to demonstrate the necessity of making peace, now while we may, more clearly? We may now preserve the West India Islands, but continuing the war we lose them infallibly.

"But this is not all we shall lose with the West Indies," says the writer. "We must add to our loss of seamen sustained by the independence of America, at least twenty thousand more, who have been bred and maintained in the trade from Great Britain to the West Indies, and in the West India trade among themselves, and with other parts, amounting in the whole to upwards of eighty thousand; a loss, which cannot fail to affect the sensibility of every man who loves this country, and knows that its safety can only be secured by its navy."

Is not this full proof of the necessity of making peace? These seamen may now be saved, with the islands whose commerce supports them. But if we continue the war, will France and Spain be less zealous to conquer your islands? Because, by this means they will certainly take away from you, and divide among themselves, twenty thousand seamen.

Taking these islands from you, and annexing them to France and Spain, will in fact increase the trade of France, Spain, the United Provinces of the Low Countries, the United States of America, and Denmark; and the twenty thousand seamen will be divided in some proportion among all these powers. The Dutch and the Americans will have the carriage of a good deal of this trade, in consequence of their dismemberment from you, and annexion to France and Spain; do you expect to save these things by continuing the war? Or that these powers will be less zealous to continue it, by your holding out to them such temptations?

"Will not Great Britain lose much of her independence in the present state of Europe," continues the writer, "while she is obliged to other countries for her naval stores? In the time of Queen Anne, we paid at Stockholm three pounds per barrel for pitch and tar, to the extortionate Swede; and such was the small demand of those countries for the manufactures of this, that the balance of trade was greatly in their favor. The gold which we obtained in our other commerce, was continually pouring into their laps. But we have reduced that balance, by our importation of large quant.i.ties of those supplies from America."

But what is there to hinder Great Britain from importing pitch, tar, and turpentine from America, after her independence? She may be obliged to give a somewhat higher price, because France, Spain, Holland, and all other nations will import them too. But will this higher price induce America to give up her independence? Will the prospect which is opened to the other maritime powers of drawing these supplies from America, in exchange for their productions, make them less zealous to support American independence? Will the increase of the demand upon the northern powers for these articles, in consequence of the destruction of the British monopoly in America, make these powers less inclined to American independency? The British monopoly and British bounties, it was in fact, which reduced the price of these articles in the northern markets. The ceasing of that monopoly and those bounties, will rather raise the price in the Baltic, because those States in America in which pitch and tar chiefly grow, have so many articles of more profitable cultivation, that without bounties it is not probable that trade will flourish to a degree, to reduce the prices in the north of Europe. Should a war take place between us and the northern powers, where are we to procure our naval stores?

inquires the pamphleteer.

I answer, make peace with America, and procure them from her. But if you go to war with America and the Northern Powers at once, you will get them nowhere. This writer appears to have had no suspicion of the real intentions of the Northern Powers, when he wrote his book. What he will say now after the confederation of all of them against Great Britain, for I can call it no otherwise, I am at a loss to conjecture.

"Timber of every kind, iron, saltpetre, tar, pitch, turpentine, and hemp, are raised and manufactured in America. Fields, of a hundred thousand acres, of hemp, are to be seen spontaneously growing between the Ohio and the Mississippi, and of a quality little inferior to the European."

Are not these articles as precious to France, Spain, and Holland as to England? Will not these powers be proportionably active to procure a share of them, or a liberty to trade in them, as England will be to defend her monopoly of them? And will not America be as alert to obtain the freedom of selling them to the best advantage in a variety of markets as other nations will for that of purchasing them?

Will the coasting trade, and that of the Baltic and Mediterranean, with the small intercourse we have in our bottoms with other nations, furnish seamen sufficient for a navy necessary for the protection of Great Britain and its trade? Will our mariners continue as they are, when our manufactures are laboring under the disadvantage of receiving their materials at higher and exorbitant prices, and selling at foreign markets at a certain loss. Will these nurseries of seamen, thus weakened, supply the loss of eighty thousand, sustained by the independence of America, and the conquest of the West Indies?

But what is the tendency of this? If it serves to convince Britain that she should continue the war, does it not serve to convince the allies that they ought to continue it too? For they are to get all that Britain is to lose, and America is to be the greatest gainer of all; whereas she is not only to lose these objects, but her liberties too, if she is subdued. France, Spain, and all the other maritime powers, are to gain a share of these objects, if Britain loses them; whereas they not only lose all share in them, but even the safety and existence of their flags upon the ocean may be lost, if America is reduced, and the British monopoly of American trade, fisheries, and seamen is revived.

"It does not require the spirit of divination to perceive that Great Britain, robbed of her foreign dominions and commerce, her nurseries of seamen lost, her navy weakened, and the power of her ambitious neighbors thus strengthened and increased, will not be able to maintain her independence among the nations."

If she would now make peace, she might preserve not only her independence, but a great share of her present importance. If she continues this war but a year or two longer, she will be reduced to the government of her own island, in two independent kingdoms, Scotland and England probably. As to conquest and subordination to some neighboring power, none that has common sense would accept the government of that island, because it would cost infinitely more to maintain it than it would be worth.

Thus I have given some account of these "cool thoughts on the consequences of American independence," which I consider as the result of all the consultations and deliberations of the refugees upon the subject.

I think it might as well have been ent.i.tled, an Essay towards demonstrating that it is the clear interest and the indispensable duty of America, to maintain her sovereignty and her alliances at all events, and of France, Spain, Holland, and all the maritime powers to support her in the possession of them.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.

Paris, June 16th, 1780.

Sir,

I have just received a letter from Nantes, brought in a s.h.i.+p from New London. I enclose your Excellency a newspaper enclosed in it, and an extract of the letter, which is from a gentleman who is a member of the a.s.sembly, and one of the judges of Boston. This is all the news I have. I hope your Excellency has more by the same vessel.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

_P. S._ I have mislaid the letter from Boston. The extract informed, that a bill had pa.s.sed the two Houses of a.s.sembly, adopting the resolution of Congress of the 18th of March, and establis.h.i.+ng an annual tax for seven years, for the redemption of their part of the bills payable in silver and gold, or in produce at the market price, in hard money.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paris, June 17th, 1780.

Sir,

The refugees in England are so great an obstacle to peace, that it seems not improper for me to take notice of them to Congress. Governor Hutchinson is dead. Whether the late popular insurrections, or whether the resolutions of Congress of the 18th of March, respecting their finances, by suddenly extinguis.h.i.+ng the last rays of his hopes, put a sudden end to his life, or whether it was owing to any other cause, I know not. He was born to be the cause and the victim of popular fury, outrage, and conflagrations. Descended from an ancient and honorable family, born and educated in America, professing all the zeal of the congregational religion, affecting to honor the characters of the first planters of the new world, and to vindicate the character of America, and especially of New England, early initiated into public business, industrious and indefatigable in it, beloved and esteemed by the people, elected and trusted by them and their representatives, his views opened and extended by repeated travels in Europe, engaged in extensive correspondence in Europe as well as in America, favored by the Crown of Great Britain, and possessed of its honors and emoluments; possessed of all these advantages and surrounded by all these circ.u.mstances, he was perhaps the only man in the world who could have brought on the controversy between Great Britain and America, in the manner and at the time it was done, and involved the two countries in an enmity, which must end in their everlasting separation. Yet this was the character of the man, and these his memorable actions. An inextinguishable ambition and avarice, that were ever seen among his other qualities, and which grew with his growth and strengthened with his age and experience, and at last predominated over every other principle of his heart, rendered him credulous to a childish degree, of everything that favored his ruling pa.s.sion, and blind and deaf to everything that thwarted it, to such a degree, that his representations, with those of his fellow-laborer, Bernard, drew on the King, Ministry, Parliament, and nation, to concert measures, which will end in their reduction and the exaltation of America.

I think I see visible traces of his councils in a number of pamphlets, not long since published in London, and ascribed to Mr Galloway. It is most probable, that they were concerted between the Ministry and the refugees in general, and that Mr Galloway was to be given out as the ostensible, as he probably was the princ.i.p.al author.

"The cool thoughts on the consequences of American independence,"

although calculated to inflame a hasty warlike nation to pursue the conquest of America, are sober reasons for defending our independence and our alliances, and therefore proper for me to lay before my countrymen. The pamphlet says, "it has been often a.s.serted, that Great Britain has expended in settling and defending America, more than she will ever be able to repay, and that it will be more to the profit of this kingdom to give her independence, and to lose what we have expended, than to retain her as a part of her dominions." To this he answers, "that the bounties on articles of commerce, and the expense of the last war, ought not to be charged to America, and that the sums expended in support of Colonial governments, have been confined to New York, the Carolinas, Georgia, Nova Scotia, and East and West Florida.

That New England, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, and Virginia, have not cost Great Britain a farthing, and that the whole expense of the former is no more than 1,700,000, and when we deduct the 700,000, extravagantly expended in building a key at Halifax, we can only call it one million." He concludes, "that posterity will feel that America was not only worth all that was spent upon her, but that a just, firm, and const.i.tutional subordination of the Colonies, was absolutely necessary to the independence and existence of Great Britain." Here I think I see the traces of Mr Hutchinson.

Another argument, he says, much relied on by the advocates for American independence is, "that a similarity of laws, religion, and manners, has formed an attachment between the people of Great Britain and America, which will ensure to Great Britain a preference in the commerce of America." He agrees, "that a uniformity of laws and religion, united with a subordination to the same supreme authority, in a great measure forms and fixes the national attachment. But when the laws and the supreme authority are abolished, the manners, habits, and customs derived from them will soon be effaced. When different systems of laws and governments shall be established, other habits and manners must take place. The fact is, that the Americans have already inst.i.tuted governments, as opposite to the principles upon which the British government is established as human invention could possibly devise. New laws are made, and will be made in conformity to, and in support of their new political systems, and of course destructive to this national attachment. Their new States being altogether popular, their essential laws do already, and will continue to bear a greater resemblance to those of the democratical Cantons of Switzerland, than to the laws and policy of Great Britain. Thus we find, in their first acts, the strongest of all proofs of an aversion in their rulers to our national policy, and a sure foundation laid to obliterate all affection and attachment to this country among the people. How long then can we expect that their attachment, arising from a similarity of laws, habits, and manners, if any such should remain, will continue?

No longer than between the United Provinces and Spain, or the Corsicans and the Genoese, which was changed, from the moment of their separation, into an enmity, which is not worn out to this day."

How it is possible for these rulers, who are the creatures of the people, and constantly dependent upon them for their political existence, to have the strongest aversion to the national policy of Great Britain, and at the same time the far greater part of the people wish and hope for a union with that country, and are ready to unite in reducing the powers of those rulers, as this author a.s.serts, I know not. I leave him to reconcile it. If he had been candid, and confessed that the attachment in American minds in general is not very strong to the laws and government of England, and that they rather prefer a different form of government, I should have agreed with him, as I certainly shall agree, that no attachment between nations arising merely from a similarity of laws and government, is ever very strong, or sufficient to bind nations together, who have opposite or even different interests.

"As to attachments," says he, "arising from a similarity of religion, they will appear still more groundless and ridiculous. America has no predominant religion. There is not a religious society in Europe, which is not to be found in America. If we wish to visit the churches of England, or the meetings of the Lutherans, Methodists, Calvinists, Presbyterians, Moravians, Menonists, Swinfielders, Dumplers, or Roman Catholics, we shall find them all in America.

"What a motley, or rather how many different and opposite attachments, will this jumble of religions make.

"Should there be any remains of this kind of national attachment, we may conclude, that the Lutherans, Calvinists, Menonists, Swinfielders, Dumplers, and Moravians, will be attached to Germany, the country from whence they emigrated, and where their religions are best tolerated; the Presbyterians and Puritans to Ireland, and the Roman Catholics to France, Spain, and the Pope, and the small number of the Church of England to Great Britain.

"Do we not daily see, Monarchies at war with Monarchies, Infidels with Infidels, Christians with Christians, Catholics with Catholics, and Dissenters with Dissenters? What stress then can be justly laid on an attachment arising from a similarity of laws, government, or religion?