The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution Volume VII Part 12

The Count said, that his advice to Congress would be to write a circular letter to every power in Europe, as soon as the definitive treaty should be signed, and transmit with it a printed copy of the treaty. In the letter, Congress should announce, that on the 4th of July, 1776, the United States had declared themselves a sovereign State, under the style and t.i.tle of the United States of America; that France, on the 6th of February, 1778, had acknowledged them; that the States-General had done the same on the 19th of April, 1782; that Great Britain, on the 30th of November, 1782, had signed with them a treaty of peace, in which she had fully acknowledged their sovereignty; that Sweden had entered into a treaty with them, on the 5th of February, 1783; and that Great Britain had concluded the definitive treaty under the mediation of the two Empires, if that should be the fact, &c. Such a notification to all the other powers would be a regular procedure, a piece of politeness, which would be very well received, and the letter would be respectfully answered by every power in the world, and these written answers would be explicit, and undeniable acknowledgments of our sovereignty.

It might have been proper to make this communication in form, immediately after the declaration of independence; it might have been more proper to do it after the signature of the provisional treaty; but that it was expected it would be done after the definitive treaty.

That these circular letters might be transmitted to your Ministers for peace, or such of them as may remain, or to any of your Ministers in Europe, to be by them delivered to the Ministers at the Court where they are, or transmitted any other way. That Congress must be very exact in the etiquette of t.i.tles, as this was indispensable, and the letters could not be answered nor received without it. That we might have these t.i.tles at the Count de Vergennes' office with precision, &c.

The Count then proceeded to commerce, and said, that all the cabinets of Europe had lately turned their views to commerce, so that we should be attended to and respected by all of them. He thought we should find our account in a large trade in Italy, every part of which had a constant demand for our tobacco, and salt-fish, at least. The dominions of the King, his master, could furnish us in exchange, oranges, citrons, olives, oil, raisins, figs, anchovies, coral, lead, sulphur, alum, salt, marble of the finest quality and gayest colors, manufactures of silk, especially silk stockings twenty per cent cheaper than France, hemp, and cordage. He said, we might have great advantages in Italy in another respect. We had it in our power to become the princ.i.p.al carriers for the people of Italy, who have little skill or inclination for navigation or commerce. The (_cabotage_) carrying-trade of Italy had been carried on by the English, French, and Dutch; the English had now lost it, the French had some of it, but the Dutch the most, who made an immense profit of it; for to his knowledge they sold in the Baltic, and even in Holland, many Italian productions, at a profit of five or six for one. That we should have the advantage of them all. By bringing our tobacco and fish to Italy, we might unload at some of their ports, take in cargoes upon freight for other ports of Italy, and thus make coasting voyages, until we had made up our cargoes for return, or we might take in cargoes on freight for Germany, or the Baltic. The Dutch, he said, would be the greatest losers by this rivalry, but as long as the Italians and Americans would be honestly gainers, neither need be anxious for that. That there was a very good port in his master's dominions, which was perfectly free, where we might go in and out at pleasure, without being subject to duties, searches, or visits.

We then made a transition to Turkey; the Count could not, for his part, blame the Emperor for wis.h.i.+ng to open the navigation of the Danube; his kingdom of Hungary was one of the finest countries in the world; it was one of the most fertile, producing in great abundance wines of various sorts, all excellent, though Tokay was the best; grains of every sort in great quant.i.ties, metals of all sorts, gold, silver, copper, iron, quicksilver; yet all these blessings of nature were rendered in a manner useless by the slavery of the Danube. The Emperor was very unfortunate, in having the Danube enslaved on one side, and the Scheldt on the other; and in this age, when the liberty of navigation and commerce was the universal cry, he did not wonder at his impatience under it. He did not think, that England would meddle in the dispute, as her trade to the Levant had declined. The Dutch had some still, but France had now the greatest part of it to Smyrna, Alexandria, Aleppo, in short, to all the trading towns of Turkey in Asia, for this is what is understood by the Levant trade. France, he thought, could not venture to engage in the war in earnest, in the present state of her finances.

I have learnt, since I came here, that France is desirous that this Republic should declare herself concerning this Turkish war. But she will avoid it. Unhappily, France has lost much of her influence here.

Her friends fear, that the odium of losing Negapatnam will fall upon them among the people. The English and the Stadtholderians are endeavoring to detach the Republic entirely from France, and to revive the ancient connexions, particularly the ancient alliance, offensive and defensive in the treaty of 1674. A Mr s.h.i.+rley, at Paris, has lately proposed to M. Boers, and M. Van der Pere, two agents of the Dutch East India Company, who have been a year or two at Paris, and are reputed to be in the Stadtholder's interest, that England had the best dispositions towards the Republic, and would give them ample satisfaction if they would treat distinctly from France, and renew the ancient cordial friends.h.i.+p, and proposed an interview with the Dutch Amba.s.sadors upon this subject. The agents proposed it, but Brantzen refused, to the great satisfaction of the princ.i.p.al republicans. Yet M. Berenger tells me, that some of the republican members begin to be afraid, and to think they shall be obliged to fall in with the English.

Upon conversing with many people in the government and out of it, in Amsterdam as well as the Hague, they all complain to me of the conduct of France. They all confess, that the Republic has not done so much in the war as she ought, but this is the fault of the friends of England, they say, not those of France, and the worst evils of all, that befall the latter, are the reproaches of the former, who now say insultingly, "this comes of confiding in France, we always told you, that you would be cheated," &c. France ought, they say, to have considered this, and not have imputed to the Republic the faults of her enemies, because the punishment falls wholly on her friends.

I mention these things to you, because, although we are not immediately interested in them, they may have consequences which may affect us; and, therefore, you ought to know them. I think, however, upon the whole, the Republic will stand firm, and refuse to receive the alliance, though they sacrifice Negapatnam. France wishes to win the Republic into an alliance, but feels an awkwardness about proposing it, and, indeed, I doubt whether she would now succeed; she might have succeeded heretofore. But, in plain English, Sir, the Count de Vergennes has no conception of the right way of negotiating with any free people, or with any a.s.sembly, aristocratical or democratical. He cannot enter into the motives which govern them; he never penetrates their real system, and never appears to comprehend their const.i.tution. With empires, and monarchs, and their Ministers of State, he negotiates aptly enough.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

The Hague, August 1st, 1783.

Sir,

I had last evening some conversation with D. Joas Theolonico de Almeida, the Envoy Extraordinary of Portugal, who desired to meet me today at any hour at his house or mine. I promised to visit him at twelve, which I did.

He said, he had heard that the French Minister had proposed to the Duke of Manchester, at Versailles, to reduce the duties upon French wines in England to the level of those upon Portugal wines, and begged of me to inform him if it were true, because, if it were, Portugal must endeavor to indemnify herself by opening a trade with America, or some other way, for such a project will be ruinous to the sale of their wines in England, which was their only market. I answered, that I had heard of such a project among mult.i.tudes of others in private conversation, but knew no authority for it. We have a treaty, says he, made in 1703, by which we have stipulated with the English, to permit the importation of their cloths, upon condition that they allow the importation of Portugal wines upon paying one third of the duty upon French wines; if they violate the treaty, says he, we shall be rid of it.

I asked him, if his Court permitted the English, or any other nation, to go to the Brazils? In the last century, said he, between 1660 and 1670, we did agree with Charles the Second, who married a daughter of Portugal, that the English should go to the Brazils, and after that, the Dutch sued for permission to go there too, and we granted it. But we found it inconvenient, and in 1714 or 1715, at the treaty of Utrecht, we agreed upon an article with Spain, to exclude all nations from the Brazils, and as the English Amba.s.sadors were there, we have since held that nation bound, and have confiscated their vessels as well as the Dutch which venture there. The English have sometimes made strong remonstrances, but we have always told them, if we admit you, we must admit the Dutch too, and such has been their jealousy of the Dutch, and dread of their rivalry, that this has always quieted them, choosing rather to be excluded themselves, than that the Dutch should be admitted. So that this commerce has been a long time carried on in Portuguese s.h.i.+ps only, and directly between the Brazils and Lisbon.

I asked him, whether we might not have free communication with all their Western Islands, and whether one or all of them might not be made a depot for the produce of the Brazils, so that Portuguese s.h.i.+ps might stop and deposit cargoes there, and American vessels take them?

He said, he would write about it to his Court by the next post. At present, Brazil communicated only with Lisbon, and, perhaps, it might be difficult for government to secure the duties at the Western Islands. I asked, if there were any refineries of sugar at Lisbon? He said, none. Their sugars had all been brought here by the Dutch for refining; that all their carrying-trade with other parts of Europe had been carried on by the English and Dutch; that their mercantile navigation (_marine marchand_) before this war, had been upon a very poor footing, but it was now much changed, and they began to carry on their trade in their own vessels. I observed, if their trade should continue to be carried on by others, it must be indifferent to them whether it were done in English, Dutch, or American vessels, provided it was done to their equal advantage. But if they should persist in the desire to conduct it in their own vessels, they might purchase s.h.i.+ps ready built in America cheaper than they could build them or buy them elsewhere. All this, he said, was true. That they could supply us with sugars, coffee, cocoa, Brazil wood, and even with tea, for they had an island, called Macao, near China, which was a flouris.h.i.+ng establishment, and sent them annually a good deal of tea, which the Dutch usually bought very cheap at Lisbon to sell again.

He asked, whether Portugal wines had been much used in America. I answered, that Port wines, common Lisbon, and Caracavalles, had been before the war frequently used, and that Madeira was esteemed above all other wine. That it was found equally wholesome and agreeable, in the heats of summer and the colds of winter, so that it would probably continue to be preferred, though there was no doubt that a variety of French wines would now be more commonly used than heretofore. He said, they should have occasion for a great deal of our fish, grain, and perhaps s.h.i.+ps or s.h.i.+p-timber, and naval stores, and other things, and he thought there was a prospect of a very beneficial trade with us, and he would write largely to his Court upon it. I replied, that I wondered his Court had not sent a Minister to Philadelphia, where the members and Ministers of Congress, and even the merchants of the city, might throw much light upon the subject, and a.s.sist in framing a treaty to the greatest possible advantage for both countries. He said, he would write for a commission and instructions to negotiate a treaty with me. I told him, that I believed his Court had already instructed their Amba.s.sador at Versailles to treat with Dr Franklin; but that I thought that Philadelphia or Lisbon were the proper places to treat, and that I feared mutual advantages might be lost by this method of striking up a bargain in haste in a distant country, between Ministers who could not be supposed to have made of commerce a study.

In a letter from Paris yesterday, I am informed that a project of a treaty with Portugal, and another with Denmark, are to go home by Captain Barney.[9] These projects have never been communicated to me, nor to Mr Jay. I hope that Congress will not be in haste to conclude them, but take time to inform themselves of everything which may be added to the mutual advantage of the nations and countries concerned.

I am much mistaken, if we have not lost advantages by a similar piece of cunning in the case of Sweden.

With great respect and esteem, I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

FOOTNOTE:

[9] For these treaties, and some account of them, see _Franklin's Correspondence_, Vol. IV. pp. 114, 115, 130, 141, 150.

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

The Hague, August 2d, 1783.

Sir,

M. Berenger, the Secretary of the French Legation, has this moment left me. He came in to inform me of the news. The Empress of Russia has communicated to the King of Prussia, a treaty of alliance between the Emperor of Germany and her, defensive against the Christian powers and offensive against the Turks. The King of Prussia has answered her, "that he is very sensible, upon this communication, as one is upon the communication of things of great importance." Thus wrapped up in an impenetrable reserve is this great warrior and statesman. We may discern by this answer, what all the world would know without it, viz.

that his Majesty has no joy in this new alliance. Still he expresses no sorrow; and maintains a perfect liberty to take which side he will, or neither, at his pleasure, and the same reserve he will probably hold to the end of the war.

M. Berenger says, if Prussia is neutral France must be so too, for she cannot cope by land with the two Empires; that this Republic is desired to declare, but does not choose it; that they are dissatisfied, and the republicans murmur a good deal, and are wavering, and that the other party will do nothing; that England hitherto has favored an accommodation between Russia and the Turks; that the British Amba.s.sador, at Constantinople, has co-operated with the French to bring about an accommodation; that the Turks have offered Russia the free navigation of the Black Sea and pa.s.sage of the Dardanelles, and the same with a free navigation of the Danube to the Emperor, but they will not accept it, but are determined to drive the Turks from Europe; that France has determined to put her army upon a war footing, because it has been much neglected during the late war; that he believes France and Spain will shut the Mediterranean against a Turkish fleet, as Russia, Sweden, and Denmark excluded warlike vessels from the Baltic in the last war; that this state of things gives him great pain, and must embarra.s.s the Count de Vergennes. It is a great and difficult question, whether France should take a side. If she does not, and the Empires should prevail, it will be an immense aggrandizement of the House of Austria, which, with Russia, will become two great maritime powers; that England will act an insidious part; pretend to favor peace, secretly foment war, and join in, at the end, if she sees a favorable opportunity to crush France. These are sensible observations of M. Berenger, who added, that a new difficulty in the way of the definitive treaty had arisen between England and Spain, respecting the Musquito sh.o.r.e, so that more couriers must go and return.

I confess myself as much in pain at this state of things as M.

Berenger, and, therefore, I wish most ardently, that we may omit no proper means of settling our question with every Court in Europe, and especially our plan of commerce with Great Britain. If this is too long left in uncertainty, the face of things may soon change, so as to involve us in the complicated, extensive, and long war, which seems to be now opening.

The prospect of returning to Paris, and living there without my family, in absolute idleness, at a time when so many and so great things want to be done for our country elsewhere, is very disagreeable. If we must live there, waiting for the moving of many waters, and treaties are to be there negotiated with the powers of Europe, or only with Denmark and Portugal, I pray that we may all be joined in the business, as we are in the commission for peace, that, at least, we may have the satisfaction of knowing what is done, and of giving a hint for the public good, if any one occurs to us, and that we may not be made the sport and ridicule of all Europe, as well as of those who contrive such humiliations for us.

With the greatest respect, I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

The Hague, August 3d, 1783.

Sir,

The fiscal systems of the powers of Europe have such an ill influence on commerce, that they deserve the serious attention of Congress and their Ministers, whenever they have under consideration a treaty with any foreign power. In conversation yesterday with M. d'Asp, the _Charge d'Affaires_ of Sweden, I inquired of him what imposts were payable in their ports upon the importation and exportation of merchandises, and observed to him, that I had lately seen in the gazettes, that the King had taken off certain duties upon the importation of merchandises from America, in Swedish s.h.i.+ps. He agreed that such a thing had been done. This ought to alarm us. All the powers of Europe, who are called neutral, have felt a sudden increase of their navigation in the course of the late war, and the profits they have made have excited a desire to augment it still further. If they should generally exact duties of our s.h.i.+ps, and none of their own upon the importation of our produce, this will be as great a discouragement to our navigation as it will be an encouragement to theirs. Whether this has been attended to in the treaty with Sweden I know not, for I have not seen it. But it ought to be carefully considered by those who negotiate the treaties with Denmark and Portugal, the Emperor and Empress, and all other powers. We have a good right to insist, that no distinction shall be made in their ports between their s.h.i.+ps and ours; that we should pay in their ports no higher duties than they pay in ours.

I should think it therefore advisable for Congress to instruct their negotiators, to endeavor to obtain equity in this respect. This is the time for it, if ever. If we cannot obtain it by negotiation, we must think and talk of doing ourselves justice by making similar distinctions in our own ports between our vessels and theirs. But here again comes in the difficulty of uniting our States in such measures; a difficulty which must be surmounted, or our commerce, navigation, and marine will still be ruined, notwithstanding the conservation of the fisheries. It deserves to be considered by whom this new method of huddling up treaties at Paris is contrived, and for what purposes. It may well be conjectured, that it is done with the secret intention of preventing these things from being attended to; for there are persons who had rather that any other people should have navigation than the Americans. I have good reason to believe that it was known at Versailles, that Mr Dana had well digested his thoughts upon this subject, which was reason enough for some people to endeavor to take Sweden out of his hands, in whose department it was. Their success is much to be lamented.[10]

I had yesterday and the day before long conversations with the Baron Van der Capellen de Pal, and M. Gyselaer. They both complain to me, in the most pathetic terms, of the cruel situation of the friends of America and France in this Republic. They both say, that they are looking round every way like drowning men for support. The Province of Friesland, their great dependence, wavers, and many of their fellow-laborers are discouraged. They both inquired of me very earnestly, if closer connexions could not be formed with us; if we could not agree to warrant to each other the liberty of navigation, or enter into an alliance, offensive and defensive. They see they shall be obliged to make a shameful peace, and that the blame of it will fall upon them, which will give a triumph to the Court, and put their persons even in danger. They say, the King of France, by his Amba.s.sador, in July, 1782, gave them a positive a.s.surance that he would never separate his cause from theirs. In consequence of this, they had instructed their Amba.s.sadors never to separate their cause from his. On their part the agreement had been sacredly observed, but not on the other. With Great Britain enraged against them, with a formidable party in the Republic furious against them, with the King of Prussia threatening them, and abandoned by France, their prospects are, they say, as disagreeable as can be conceived.

There are many appearances of designs to excite the people to seditions, and I think it probable that the Court of London studies delays of the Definitive Treaty in this hope. I still believe, however, that the people will be wise and the Republic firm, and submit to the immense losses of the war, and that of Negapatnam, rather than renew their old submission to the Court and to England.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

FOOTNOTE:

[10] The plan of the treaty with Sweden was sent out to Dr Franklin by Congress, and adopted with hardly a verbal alteration. See the plan, and the treaty as adopted, in the Secret Journals of Congress, Vol.

III. pp. 227, 369.