The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution Volume VIII Part 34

It is to be observed, that the Dantzickers, the Prussians and the Russians are improving the present opportunity, which the Dutch war affords them of increasing their own navigation, with the utmost industry; and the great rise of freights enables them to do it with much advantage. What effect this may have upon the sovereigns of the two last countries, to slacken their pace towards the acknowledgement of the independence of ours, which would lead to a speedy peace, I cannot say. The subjects of the Emperor are reaping the same advantages from the war.

An opportunity by water from hence to Amsterdam now presents itself, and this being the safest way, I shall send my despatches under cover to the care of Mr Adams, and shall desire him to break them up, and read them before he forwards them for America, as the best means of making him fully acquainted with all that has yet taken place here, especially with the sentiments of the French Minister, which appear to me to deserve our particular attention. Though I am no better satisfied with the reasons given in support of his opinion, in his second letter, than I was with those in his first, yet I thought it not prudent to press him any further, with my opposition to them, and that it was quite sufficient to give him to understand that I still intended to adopt the measure mentioned in my second letter. He possibly may have other reasons for his opinions, which he chooses to keep to himself, but surely such cannot serve as rules by which to regulate my conduct while I remain ignorant of them, nor can I imagine it to be my duty, or the expectation of Congress, that I should blindly fall into the sentiments of any man, especially when I think this backwardness to give proper support to our cause at the Courts of Europe, may be accounted for on other principles. That it does actually exist, I can now no longer doubt. However, Congress will make up their own judgment upon this point from the letters of the Minister himself, and from other facts, with which they are much better acquainted than I can be.

I confess, that had the proposition of the mediators been laid before me to form my opinion upon, unaccompanied with the strictures of the French Minister, I should have laid my finger upon three words only in it, viz. _en meme tems_, and considered the others, to which he meant to draw my particular attention, by underscoring them, as merely colorable terms, and a specimen of that finesse, from which the politics of Europe can never be free. I should therefore have drawn from it a conclusion very different from that of the French Minister, viz.--"_It is therefore clear, that their design is to avoid compromiting themselves by recognising the independence of the United States, till England herself shall have done it_;" for if, as he would have me to understand, the mediators do in fact still consider the United States as British Colonies, and that neither the belligerent powers, or themselves, ought to interfere in settling the war between them and Great Britain, without being invited by both parties, how comes it to pa.s.s, that as mediators between the belligerent powers, meaning not to comprehend America under that predicament, they should go on to annex, in the nature of condition of their mediation, that "there shall be _at the same time_ a treaty between Great Britain and the American Colonies, respecting the re-establishment of peace in America;" thereby prescribing to a sovereign State _the time_ when it shall enter upon the settlement of a dispute, existing between the Sovereign of that State and a part of his subjects, in which they mean not to intermeddle; and, according to the French Ministers, even the manner of doing it. For, says he, "the mediating Courts intend thereby, that your deputies shall treat simply with the English Ministers, in the same manner as they have already treated in America with the Commissioners from Great Britain in the year 1778." I could have set him right in matter of fact here, but it would have answered no good purpose.

This measure, I am told, has been proposed "to conciliate opposing pretensions," and "that the result of their negotiations will make known to the other powers on what footing they ought to be regarded, and that their public character will be acknowledged without difficulty _from the moment that the English interpose no opposition_." If such were the designs of the mediators, why not leave Great Britain to compose her internal troubles in her own time, and in her own way, and proceed to the great business of composing those of the nations of Europe? How are we to account for the Court of London rejecting the mediation if they conceived the proposition in that very inoffensive light, which he supposes it to be meant, and if it was so clear from it, that the mediators would not interfere in our particular negotiation unless invited to do it, and were determined never to acknowledge the independence of the United States until Great Britain herself had done it, or at least till the moment in which she shall cease to oppose it? Could a more favorable occasion be presented to Great Britain for negotiation? My present opinion upon this matter is, that the mediators do in fact consider the United States, as an independent sovereign power; that upon that principle they wish to extinguish the flames of war in both countries at the same time; that they do not flatter themselves they can restore peace to Europe during the continuance of the war in America, or that the United States will treat with Britain upon any other ground than that of an independent power; that to bring about a general pacification, in a manner the least offensive to any of the belligerent powers of Europe, particularly Britain, they have framed their propositions in the terms in which it is conceived; and although they declare in it, that the other belligerent powers, or even themselves ought not to interfere in our particular negotiations, yet it seems to be their intention, that the negotiation between the European powers, should proceed but with equal pace with our particular one.

I cannot but think the mediators expected the Court of London would reject this first plan of mediation, on account of the proposition respecting America (as I am told by a public Minister here, who ought to be well informed upon the point, they certainly have done) although it is worded in a manner as little offensive to their feelings as the nature of things would admit of; and that having tried this measure, the mediators will next proceed to another, in which their sentiments in favor of the United States will be less ambiguous.

After all, the French Minister may be perfectly right, touching the dispositions and resolutions of the mediating powers towards the United States, but I think his conviction must arise from other facts and principles, than those he has chosen to expose to me. I feel myself however on that supposition, at no great loss to determine what ought to be my own line of conduct. I think it ought to be exactly the same in both cases, so far as respects the proposed communication of my public character to this Court. If her Imperial Majesty has really resolved upon such a strange system of politics, the sooner Congress obtain the best evidence of it the better, on many accounts, and this is to be had only by making this experiment. They will among other things then consider, whether it is worth while for the United States to be at the expense of supporting a Minister at a Court, which is resolved to defer the acknowledgment of their independence, till Great Britain shall have done it herself, or at least to the moment she shall cease to oppose it. At this period, if it should ever arrive, the United States, I suppose, would feel themselves as much indebted to the sovereign, who should offer to acknowledge their independence, as I should to the French Minister here, who has told me, "that when you shall have succeeded in surmounting the difficulties, which you may meet in causing your public character to be recognised at this Court, you will find me entirely disposed to second you in everything, which shall regard the common interest of our countries," for any a.s.sistance he may then give me.

It is evident from hence, that I am not likely to receive from him the least a.s.sistance in the business of my mission. I must proceed in it therefore by myself, or be totally inactive. I thought it advisable to a.s.sure the French Minister, that I would wait some time for the answers of the Courts of Versailles and Madrid, lest he might think I treated his opinions with disrespect. In doing this I think no injury will happen to our interests, for besides the possibility that some important information may be obtained from them, and the effect they may have at this Court, I am told Count Panin will shortly return to Court, and that he has the most favorable sentiments of the United States, of any of her Imperial Majesty's Ministers. Should this information be just, an advantage is to be expected by the delay.

Congress will doubtless consider the difficulty of my situation, standing alone upon new ground, and will make every allowance for it I ought in reason to expect.[21]

I am, with the highest respect, and most perfect esteem, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

FOOTNOTES:

[21] The French government seem to have considered the proposition of the mediating powers, by which England and the United States were to treat separately, as impracticable and inadmissible. In their answer they say,

"His Majesty thinks it his duty to say, that he has allies, with whom he has inviolable engagements; that he should betray them in abandoning the American cause; and that it would be abandoning this cause for him to negotiate a separate peace. The high mediators have seen the impossibility of such an attempt, since they have themselves perceived the impossibility of proceeding at an equal pace with the negotiation of the King and that of the United States. But even admitting, that the King could separate his affairs from those of America, that he could consent to pursue only his personal interests, and leave to the Americans the task of coming to an accommodation with their ancient metropolis; what would be the result of this conduct? It would evidently be an illusory peace, a mere creation of the brain.

Indeed, if (as there is the strongest evidence) the Americans persist in refusing to return to obedience to the British Crown, the war will continue between England and her ancient Colonies, and the King will then be obliged, as he is now, to a.s.sist them." _Fla.s.san_, Vol. VII.

p. 319.

Again, the French government say in their answer;

"The two Imperial Courts cannot flatter themselves with the hopes of bringing their mediation to a happy issue, if they do not prevent the subterfuges and false interpretations, which either of the belligerent powers may avail themselves of to explain according to their views the preliminary propositions, which will certainly happen if they do not previously ascertain the sense of the expressions, which relate to America.

"The Court of London will elude as much, and as long as she possibly can, the direct or indirect acknowledgment of the independence of the United States, and will avail herself of the terms that are used in speaking of them, to maintain that she is not obliged to treat with her ancient Colonies as with a free and independent nation. From whence it will follow, that when the mediation is in force, and they shall be about to enter upon the negotiation, they will dispute the character in which the American Plenipotentiary shall be received. The King of England will consider him as his subject, while Congress will demand that he should be received as the representative of a free people, by means whereof the mediation will be stopped at the first outset.

"To prevent this inconvenience it should seem, that previous to any other measure, the character of the American agent ought to be determined in the most precise and positive manner, and Congress should be invited to confide its interests to the mediation. This invitation is so much the more interesting as the negotiation relative to America should go hand in hand with that of the Courts of Madrid and Versailles, and by consequence the negotiations, although separate, should commence at the same time. But who will invite the Congress to treat with England? The King (of France) cannot, since the first article excludes him from the negotiation. This task then can only be executed by the mediators themselves. All that the King can do, and that he will do with zeal and fidelity, is to invite the Americans to the peace, and to facilitate it by every means, which they believe compatible with their essential interests. But that the King may take this step with safety and the hopes of success, and with the certainty of not rendering himself suspected by the Americans, it is necessary that he should first know the determination of the mediators upon the observations now made to them, and that this determination should be such as to secure to the United States their political existence."

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

St Petersburg, October 1st, 1781.

Sir,

In the project of a treaty, which France proposes to Russia, there is an article to this effect;

"When the subjects of France shall carry in their own vessels French goods into Russia, and shall exchange them for Russian goods, in such cases there shall be a drawback of the duties, both of importation and exportation, paid by the subjects of France."

France, to induce Russia to grant this, says, "France will want great quant.i.ties of Russian goods, which, after the war, France will not be obliged to take of Russia, for France can have the like from America, and though perhaps not so cheap, yet it will be the interest of France, if Russia should not grant this, to pay America fifteen or twenty per cent more for the same articles; for this would enable America to take off more French goods, and to pay France for them."

Hemp is particularly mentioned.

I pray you to keep this to yourself, and I have the honor to be, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

St Petersburg, October 15th, 1781.

Sir,

Since my letter to your Excellency of September 15th, enclosing a duplicate of mine from Berlin, and copies of all the enclosed papers, the French Minister has sent me a copy of all the propositions of the mediators, and of the answer of the Court of Versailles. I have the satisfaction to think the inferences I then drew from the first propositions only, are well supported by the tenor of the second, in which they expressly say, that our particular peace shall not be signed, but conjointly, and at the same time with that of the powers, whose interests shall have been treated of by the mediating powers; that the pacifications, notwithstanding they may be treated separately, shall not be concluded the one without the other; that care shall be taken constantly to inform the mediators of the progress, and of the state of our particular treaty, to the end the mediation may be able to govern itself in the progress of that, which is intrusted to them, according to the state of our particular negotiation, and that both of the pacifications, although they shall have been separately concluded, shall be solemnly guarantied by the mediators, and all other neutral powers, whose guarantee the belligerent powers shall judge proper to ask.

What force are we now to allow to the terms in the first proposition "the American Colonies," and "without the intervention of any of the other belligerent powers, or even that of the two Imperial Courts, unless their mediation has been formally demanded, and granted upon this object?" Is it clear from hence, that the design of the mediators is to avoid exposing themselves by acknowledging the independence of the United States before Great Britain has done this herself? Do not the propositions speak this language to Britain? You may make such a peace with America, not only as she chooses to make with you, but as the other belligerent powers, and we shall choose you should make with her; and remember you are to have no peace in Europe, unless you give peace to America, and when this peace is once made, we will take care you shall not break it. We shall soon see by the replies, which the mediators will give to the belligerent powers, particularly to the Court of Versailles, whether they will recede in favor of Britain from their first plan of pacification, or go on in their next a step further in the spirit of their former system. It seems, that consistent with their own dignity, they can neither retreat or remain on the same ground. The independence of the United States was certainly the basis of the first plan of pacification, and I have no great fears, that it will be departed from.

I have lately been told by a person, who certainly knew the truth of the matter, in so confident a manner that I have no room to doubt it, that it was a secret part of the original plan of the armed neutrality, as soon as it should be completed, that the neutral confederated powers should propose a general pacification between the belligerent powers, which it was supposed could not be brought about otherwise than by leaving America free and independent, and to enforce this proposition by their joint armaments; and that so long ago as in May, 1780, if Holland had done her part, affairs were then in all other quarters in a proper train to have carried the whole plan into execution; but unfortunately for her British influence was too great there, and instead of doing the business at once, they entered upon the parade of sending a brace of Amba.s.sadors to this Court, not with a view to finish, but at least to delay it. Holland, in fact, did not accede to the Marine Convention, which was first entered into by Russia and Denmark on the 9th of July, 1780, and next by Sweden on the 21st of the same month, until the 20th of November following, and it was not signed on their part till the 5th of last January. All this time her navy was neglected, and the mischiefs she has suffered are not the only ones consequent upon her tardiness and inactivity. For Britain has been thereby enabled for a while to detach Denmark from the confederation, or at least to make that Court indifferent in the business of it. It was but a short time after it had adopted the plan before it made a breach upon it by including in a treaty with Britain, hemp, &c. among contraband articles. From that time the spirit of the confederation seems to have languished. The Danish Minister most interested in it has been superseded. Count Panin, who in this Court, it is said, was its princ.i.p.al support, retired. It is true, he has lately returned to Court, but has not a.s.sumed his former office of Chief Minister in the Department of Foreign Affairs, though he is still of the Privy Council. My information about the share he has in those affairs is very different; by some I am told, he has little or no influence in them, by others, that he possesses a considerable portion of his former influence, and my informants on both parts ought to, and perhaps do, know the truth of the matter. On one side everything is veiled in profound mystery, and nothing is let out but what presents a discouraging prospect.

It has not such an effect upon my mind at present, and I am strongly encouraged to hope, that the confederation will become properly invigorated by the accession of the King of Prussia. The first open part he took in it, was the issuing his ordinance of the 30th of last April. Soon after this, (the 8th of May) he entered into a similar convention with the Empress. About this time, (the 23d of May,) the propositions for a general pacification were made, and on the 20th of August, both the Prussian and Russian Ministers at the Hague notified to the States-General the accession of his Prussian Majesty to the confederation. Laying these things together, and presuming as I do, that the confederated powers can have no well-grounded hope of reaping any lasting benefit from their confederation, for the maintenance of the liberty of their commerce, and of their navigation, but in the establishment of the independence of the United States, one might conclude with confidence, that all would soon go well between us, if it was confidently to be concluded, that all Courts are governed by the real interests of their countries, even where that is clearly understood, or act upon a permanent system. All now depends upon the stability of the Empress. If she should persevere in the n.o.ble line she has marked out, of Sweden and of Russia there is no danger, and it is probable Denmark will not stand out. The Emperor has ceased his opposition to the confederation. The step is now short for him to favor and support it. I believe it may be depended upon, that he has already agreed to accede to it.

If I were to hazard an opinion touching the manner in which our particular business will issue here, it is that the success of it will depend upon the neutral powers consolidating themselves in their confederation; that even after this should take place, our independence will not be acknowledged by this Court before all the neutral confederated powers shall have agreed upon this measure, and are fully prepared to adopt it, and that even Holland waits for this event, although her ease is now different from theirs, by being actually at war with our enemy.

The ground on which the secret part of the original plan of the armed neutrality abovementioned was formed, was an apprehension of the powers engaged in it, that by the loss of America, and by the continuance of the war, the maritime force of Britain might be too much reduced to preserve the balance of power upon the ocean; but as she has not abated of her haughtiness, her injustice, and outrageous violations of the rights of the neutral maritime powers, and still opposes herself to the establishment of a system calculated to secure those rights, and to vindicate the general law of nations, thereby manifesting, that the measure of her power is to prescribe her rule of right, they have become tolerably well reconciled to the idea of seeing her more effectually weakened and humbled.

On the whole, I am not anxious about the manner of _thinking_ of the neutral powers, touching the great objects which concern our fundamental interests. We have nothing to apprehend, I believe, but the baneful influence of British gold, which can serve but to defer for awhile, however, the event they most dread, the open acknowledgment of our independence by this, and the other neutral powers. I expect to be informed of the answer of this Court to that of Versailles respecting the pacification, as soon as it shall be communicated to the French Minister. It has already been delayed longer than I was given to understand it would be, which is owing, probably, to the necessity of consultations with the Court of Vienna.

I shall wait but a few days for it, before I make the communication of my mission to this Court, unless some matter which I do not foresee, should render it expedient to delay doing it still longer.

I am, with the highest respect, and most perfect esteem, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO FRANCIS DANA.

Philadelphia, October 22d, 1781.

Sir,

Congress having lately thought it advisable that their correspondence with foreign Courts and their Ministers abroad should pa.s.s through the hands of their Secretary for Foreign Affairs, I enclose the act by which they did me the honor to appoint me to that office. In this character, Sir, I have the pleasure of communicating to you the important account of two signal victories, which have lately been obtained over the enemy in this quarter, the one by General Greene, which has been followed by the re-establishment of the governments of South Carolina and Georgia, in which States, though the enemy hold one or two posts, yet they have no command of the country. The other still more signal, by the allied arms of France and America over Lord Cornwallis, in Virginia. By the latter, near seven thousand men, including seamen, fell into our hands; and about one hundred vessels, above fifty of them square rigged.

You will not fail to make the best use of this intelligence, which must fix our independence, not only beyond all doubt, but even beyond all controversy. I should have mentioned to you, that besides the troops and seamen abovementioned, the enemy lost during the siege of Yorktown, including those that were taken, upwards of two thousand negroes. The naval force of France in these seas under the command of the Count de Gra.s.se, amounts to thirtyfour sail of the line, that of the British to twentyfour. Both fleets have lately sailed, the one from New York, the other from the Chesapeake. We daily expect to hear of their meeting, and promise ourselves a second victory, since every advantage is on the side of the French. Should they think it more advisable to go to the West Indies, the Islands must fall an easy prey to them, as the whole British fleet is at present on this coast, nor will it be in their power to follow immediately, as Sir Henry Clinton with the best part of the troops from New York are on board the fleet, which, on the very day that Cornwallis surrendered, left New York for his relief. These must be brought back and re-landed, which will be a work of some time.

It is of importance to you to know that the spirit of opposition to the independence of this country, which was languis.h.i.+ng when you left it, has been growing weaker ever since, and may now be said to be quite extinct. To this, the settled form that our governments have a.s.sumed, the success of our arms, and above all, the shocking barbarity of the British, have greatly contributed.

As this letter goes by an uncertain conveyance, and as, indeed, I have hardly yet entered upon my office, having only been qualified a few days since, I do not think it prudent to proceed to any minute discussions. I can only tell you, that the people here entertain the highest respect for the Court you are at. They consider the plan of the armed neutrality as the best proof of an enlarged and generous policy, and look upon its execution as a charter of enfranchis.e.m.e.nt from the ambition of Princes; granted by the wisdom of the Empress to the trade of the world. The sense of Congress on this subject, I enclose you in an abstract from their minutes of October 5th, 1780;[22]

What a pity it would be, if a more confined policy should lessen the glory, or defeat the purposes she has so liberally formed. You will do me the favor to direct in future your public letters to me. I wish them to be as numerous and as minute as possible, particularly on the subject of such negotiations as may be in agitation for a general peace, and for a partial one between Britain and the United Provinces.