The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution Volume VIII Part 39

By arguments of this kind, pursued into their details, and such as are contained in those reflections, I have endeavored, I hope with some good effect, to dissipate any apprehensions of the abovementioned rivalry. This had become an object of consequence to us, as this rivalry was maintained by both friends and foes, though with very different views. I will explain myself hereafter upon this point.

Our latest intelligence from America, comes by the way of Iceland, and in substance is, that the s.h.i.+p of war the Princess Caroline, had arrived there last from Charleston; that she was at Savannah on the 30th of June; that the garrison had received orders to evacuate that post; that on the 1st of July transports had arrived there from Charleston to take them off; that she carried Governor Wright to Charleston, where she arrived the 3d of July; that all was then quiet there, but that General Carleton had determined to evacuate that place also, and to keep possession of St Augustine. Thus it is generally supposed here, that those two posts have been evacuated by the British to reinforce New York and their Islands, and that New York is besieged, as we learn further by the way of London, that Vaudreuille had sailed with twenty s.h.i.+ps of the line for our continent, supposed with the design of covering the siege of that place. As to military operations in Europe, Gibraltar now commands universal attention, and it is believed that celebrated rock must soon change its masters, and if so, that this will smooth the way to peace.

I have the honor to be, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

_P. S._ I do not write to you in your cyphers, because, since your last copy is missing, I think the reasons against doing it are stronger than when I wrote my last.

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

St Petersburg, October 14th, 1782.

Sir,

I should have done myself the honor of writing to you before this day, but I have been so much indisposed ever since the date of my last, that I have been unable to do it. Notwithstanding the difficulties I have had upon my mind, and have expressed in my letters of September 29th, and October 1st, I have hazarded writing to you in your cypher, to communicate the matter contained in my last. It may be proper to acquaint you, that the reasons urged in support of that project, were in writing and annexed to it, that I read the whole carefully, and immediately upon my return home reduced it to writing from my memory, more at large than I have given it to you, having in my communication expressed myself in as few words as possible, preserving the substance only, to save unnecessary trouble in cyphering and decyphering. This is what is alluded to where it is said "this rivalry was maintained by both friends and foes, though with very different views."

As you have the matter now before you, if I did not feel myself under any restraint, it would be needless for me to trouble you with any particular observations of my own upon it, because you will at once discern its effects upon our present interests here, as well as upon our commerce and navigation in future, should the scheme be carried into execution, of which I believe there is now no probability, the plan mentioned in my letter of March 30th, particularly that part of it contained in the clause beginning "perhaps solidly" and ending with "protection" seems to be opening upon us. I have never entertained an idea, that her Imperial Majesty, or any other of the neutral powers, would take a part in the present war. The probability of her doing so is, if possible, much weaker than before.

Her attention will be turned to another quarter, and we may see a war break out against the Turks, in which the Emperor may be concerned likewise. Many movements tend to this end. An army of a hundred and sixty thousand Russians are ordered to a.s.semble at Kersant, a new fortified village in New Russia, situated on the western side of the Dnieper or Borysthenes, at about fourteen leagues from Oczakow, a well fortified town of the Turks, famous in the war of 1736, situated at the mouth of the same river, and opposite to Kinburn, a port which Russia obtained at the last peace, but which is exposed to the sudden attacks of the Turks from Oczakow. Eighteen regiments, amounting to about twentyfive thousand men, have already arrived at Kersant, and the residue, or as great a part as can be collected, will be at that rendezvous in March next. The restoration of the deposed Khan of the Crimea is the declared object of this great force; but I am told that revolution has been effected by the intrigues of the Court of St Petersburg, to raise a pretext for this movement, and to cover the real object in view, and that the campaign next year will open with the siege of Oczakow. I pretend not to be certain about this particular information, but I give it to you as what appears to me not to be improbable.

The Russian Ministers are in general Ante-Gallicans, and have, since the exit of Count Panin, sought to divide or lessen the enemies of Great Britain. Hence the most extraordinary proceedings to bring or rather to drive the United Provinces into a separate peace with Great Britain, (which have not yet ceased,) and hence all the patient acquiescence in her attempt to make a particular peace with the United States, though repugnant to the propositions of the mediating Courts.

I believe they would have been well pleased, not only that their partial mediation between Holland and Great Britain had succeeded, but that the United States as an independent nation had made their own peace with Great Britain, and left her to contend with the house of Bourbon alone. From this general sketch of their system, you may be enabled to account for many appearances.

I have the honor to be, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

St Petersburg, November 1st, 1782.

Sir,

Conceiving that the most, if not the only profitable connexion, we can form with this Empire, is of a commercial nature, I have, during my residence here, turned much of my attention to learn in what manner we can carry on a commerce with it, to our greatest benefit. In a former letter I acquainted you, that rice and indigo were the princ.i.p.al of our commodities adapted to this market; that it would be necessary, therefore, for us, in order to maintain any considerable commerce with this Empire, to do it by means of a circuitous navigation, and I pointed out a course which I thought practicable. That, however, would be absolutely annihilated, if the scheme, communicated in my letter of October 1st, should be carried into execution.

It was not on that account alone that I was led to consider that scheme in so serious a light. I found it a great obstacle in my way, counteracting our immediate views, and aiming a blow at our interests, in the only part where they were liable to, or might most easily be injured and wounded. I was of course an obstacle in the way of that, though at first without the least apprehension of its existence, and it must necessarily have been supposed, that I should be so. How far this may have influenced in certain matters, which I need not point out for your information, I will not take upon me to say. I hope it will not be thought I have already said too much upon it, or that I have been unreasonably alarmed about it. There is not, I believe, the least apprehension that I have come to the knowledge of it, or that I have been in the way of obtaining the least information of it. While things remain in this state, there will be no disagreeable consequences from it. In my last, I have added some circ.u.mstances for the explanation of this subject, as I thought it not advisable to say anything upon it in my letter of October 1st, lest it might tend to disclose it, if that letter should be intercepted at the office here.

One channel of my correspondence has been lately discovered, and a letter written to me upon political subjects, was opened at the office, and sent to me slightly sealed, that I might know it had been opened there. Fortunately, it placed our affairs in a very favorable light, and can do us no injury, but will serve to confirm the representation I have constantly made of them.

There is another channel of commerce, which we may perhaps enter into with equal or greater benefit to ourselves, and in which we shall have great advantages, if I am not deceived, over all the nations of Europe in this market; I mean through the West Indies, all the productions of which (rum excepted) are brought here, after being carried into the respective mother countries, where they are unloaded, deposited for a considerable time, and loaded again before they are brought in here; all which occasions a great increase of expense, and much enhances their price. Now almost all our commodities find a ready market in the islands. Would it not be practicable, therefore, for us to exchange them there for the proper commodities of the islands, at proper seasons of the year, and to proceed directly for this market? By such means might we not be able to furnish them here at a much cheaper rate than any of the Europeans can do it, and nearly as cheap as if they were our own native productions--and might we not always be at this market with them before they could be, or by the time they arrive in their respective ports? Our want of proper commodities to carry on a commerce with this country to any considerable extent, whose productions we stand in great need of, should, and doubtless will, make us look abroad for them. The Dutch have found it for their advantage to take the commodities of the West Indies through France, and to bring them on here, as well as the wines, brandies, &c. of that country. I am sensible this is a matter of calculation, and that no one but a thorough merchant, should pretend to decide upon it. I throw out the matter therefore for consideration.

I have suggested this plan here, as one by means of which this Empire might be furnished with all the productions of the West Indies, at a much cheaper rate than the European nations can possibly supply them through their respective European countries; and, besides this certain advantage, they may obtain another as a consequence of that, of infinite importance to this country, viz. that the Europeans seeing their West India commodities undersold here by the Americans, may find it necessary to set the commerce of these islands and countries free; and to permit the productions of them to be exported directly to any foreign ports in Europe, and that it is not improbable that such a revolution in commerce will take place.

I have the honor to be, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO FRANCIS DANA.

Philadelphia, November 7th, 1782.

Dear Sir,

Since my last, a duplicate of which goes with this, I have been favored with yours of March 5th and June 28th, by which I find some of the inquiries made in my last answered. The reasons you have given for not having taken any steps to display your public character are judicious, and I hope will continue to influence your conduct till you see the moment in which, with the advice of your correspondent, you may do it to advantage.

You will continue to give us the politics of the Court you are at, and of every other from which you can collect any authentic information, which the enclosed resolution of the 17th of October makes more peculiarly your duty.[25] I hope you have received the cypher I sent to Mr Adams for you. Lest you should not, I enclose one. If you have received either of the others, use the large printed one, which you will find much safer than the other, as well as more easy in the practice. The large one is also designed as a common cypher between Mr Adams and you. So that you may communicate freely with each other, from which you may find mutual advantages.

I also enclose several resolutions of Congress declaratory of their determination in no event to conclude a peace without the concurrence of their allies. As it is for the honor of the United States, that their sentiments on this subject should be known, you will make such communication of them as your prudence will direct. In my last, you have a copy of Carleton and Digby's letter to General Was.h.i.+ngton, in which they say, that they are authorised to declare that his Britannic Majesty has proposed the unconditional independence of America as preliminary to a peace. This change in the British system places them in a truly contemptible light, since it is a direct disavowal of their a.s.sertion. Carleton seems to feel this, if we may judge by some expressions in the extracts I enclose you.

The campaign here is brought to a close, the army have gone into winter quarters; the summer has pa.s.sed in perfecting their discipline and establis.h.i.+ng a variety of arrangements, which rendered them, in the opinion of well-informed foreign officers, equal in every point to the best troops in Europe. The enemy are so perfectly conscious of this, that they have never ventured beyond their lines, which they have contracted considerably. We cannot yet hear that Charleston is evacuated, though many arrangements had long since been made for that purpose; it is improbable that the late change in the British system has occasioned a change of sentiment upon this point, even after their annunciation of such a design had driven out their partisans to take protection from us and enlist under our banner, which was insisted upon as a condition precedent to their being received into favor.

The enclosed resolution will inform you of the appointment of Mr Boudinot to the rank of President in the room of Mr Hanson, whose year had expired. The public prints which accompany this, will furnish you with some articles of intelligence, which you may find interesting. I informed you sometime ago, that the salaries of our Ministers would in future be paid here, and I requested you to appoint an agent to receive yours. The expense to which this would put you, would be amply compensated by the profit on the purchase of bills and the regularity of payment. I have taken upon me to act as your agent till I hear from you; and my Secretary, Mr Morris, has. .h.i.therto transmitted bills to you on Dr Franklin, on your account, bought at the rate of six s.h.i.+llings and three pence this money for five livres, which makes a saving to you of about twelve per cent. A letter from him containing a state of your account and bills for the last quarter due, will be sent with this.

I wish you to appoint an agent here, or direct me to appoint one for you, as this is a troublesome business to me; particularly while I act without knowing your sentiments on this subject. I have been induced to undertake it, at the pressing instance of the Superintendent of the Finances, and to render your payments more regular than I fear they have hitherto been. No provision is made for your contingent expenses, nor can there be, till you send me an account of them.

I have the honor to be, Sir, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

FOOTNOTES:

[25] "Resolved, That the Secretary of Foreign Affairs inform the several Ministers of the United States in Europe, that it is the desire and the express direction of Congress, that they transmit full and frequent communications as well of the proceedings of the Courts at which they respectively reside, as those which relate to the negotiations for peace, and also of all such other transactions and events as may in any manner concern the United States."

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

St Petersburg, November 18th, 1782.

Sir,

When I was informed by Mr Adams, that Mr Jay had written to him from Paris, that "the British Commissioner there had received full powers to treat of a peace with the Commissioners of the United States," I waited upon the French Minister to consult him on this special occasion upon the expediency of communicating my powers to this Court. It would be imprudent, through this channel, to go into the reasons he a.s.signed against it. It may be sufficient to say, I found him strong in the opinion, that all attempts made prior to a peace would be fruitless.

As his opinion is the rule by which I am to be governed in this case, nothing can be attempted till the period arrives when we shall not feel ourselves under strong obligations to any Sovereign in the world, who should even make advances to form political connexions with us, or acquire much eclat from any such connexions. I thought the opportunity favorable when the only power, which had any pretence of right, to contest our independence, had consented by so formal an act, to treat with us upon the footing of a sovereign and independent State. The consideration we should acquire by a political connexion with the ill.u.s.trious Sovereign of this empire during the war, and the advantages we might reasonably expect to derive from it in our negotiation for a peace, (for I have never considered independence as our only object) have ever made me desirous, if possible, to effect it during the war. Scarce any political measure of great importance can be undertaken with "an absolute certainty of success." If, therefore, upon mature deliberation, the state of things is found to be such, that success is not improbable, and the benefits of it great and permanent, while the disadvantages of a failure, comparatively speaking, are small, and of a transient nature, in such a case it should seem that the measure should be hazarded. Though I do not believe this to be the very moment, in which her Imperial Majesty would wish to form any political connexion with the United States, but on the contrary, she would wish to postpone it till the conclusion of the war, and be well pleased that no advances should be made on our part till then; because this would afford her opportunity to claim much merit of the Court of London, in having withheld any encouragement to us, when at the same time not only any offence to the United States would be avoided, but she might allege, without a possibility of contradiction, that if an earlier application had been made by them, she would have been happy to have had an occasion to manifest her respect for them, and the early interests she took in their concerns.

Nevertheless there is room to suppose, that if our propositions were communicated while the British King is in fact treating with the United States, as with an independent Sovereign power, that they would not be rejected. And if they were received, this circ.u.mstance might be productive of great benefit to our permanent interests. It would, in all probability, bring on a declaration of our independence by some other very considerable powers of Europe, particularly Sweden and Russia. The neutral maritime powers would extend the protection of their commerce and navigation to America, and no longer suffer their flags to be insulted on our coasts. The Court of London would treat of peace with more zeal and good faith. They would the more readily give up certain claims and pretensions, which they will doubtless make upon the United States, and would be exceedingly cautious how they broke off any negotiations, which they had opened. In a word, we should stand on a more advantageous and independent ground of treaty.

For the attainment of objects like these, had any discretionary power been left me, I should have thought it clearly my duty to have made the attempt here in this moment, as I now consider it to be my duty to wait for the conclusion of the war, the period which is pointed out to me as the only proper one, and when most certainly nothing will remain to be hazarded.

If the present negotiations for a peace should happily succeed, I shall have occasion for the money mentioned in my letter of September 5th, before I can expect an answer from Congress on that subject, and I shall apply to Dr Franklin and Mr Adams to advance it between them.

It may not be amiss again to inform you, that by the express allowance and order of her Majesty, there is to be paid by every power entering into _any_ treaty with her, six thousand roubles to _each_ of her Ministers signing the same; and it is now understood, that there shall be four signatures on the part of her Majesty, viz. that of Count Ostermann, the Vice Chancellor; Count Woronzow, the President of the College of Commerce; M. Bakournin, Vice President of the College of Finances, and M. Besborodko, Secretary of the Private Affairs, or Particular Cabinet of her Majesty. Matters of this sort were formerly secret and gratuitous. They have now changed, their nature become public, and are demanded as of right, at least no treaty can be otherwise obtained. And care is taken to make it the interest of most powers, to form a commercial treaty with this Empire by declaring in the new tariff, which is just published, that all nations not having such a treaty shall pay the duties, one half in rix dollars, and the other in the money of the country. This has heretofore, under the old tariff, been the rule for all nations except the British, who by their treaty obtained the right of paying _all_ the duties in the money of the country. This privilege is extended to Denmark by their late treaty, and will doubtless be made common to all nations, which shall choose to enter into a commercial treaty with her Majesty, and thus the British will lose the princ.i.p.al benefit of their treaty before it expires, viz. 1786.